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ABSTRACT
Canadian unmigration law has traditionally relied upon broad p t s of
discretionary authority as a tool for immigrant application processing. Such authority has
had two facets - a procedural aspect allowing for fiexiiility in methods and processes for
handling applications, and a substantive aspect relating to actual decision making. This
thesis examines such discretion in the particuiar context of the hdependent category of
migration that is provided for under the current Immigration A c t and ReguCations.
Chapter One begins with a discussion of the concept of discretion generally. An
ovemiew of the extremes of jurisprudential opinions which affect this topic is provided,
together with an examination of the rationale for existence of discretionary authority and
a review of the various f o m that it may take. Chapter Two highlights use of
discretionary power in overseas processing, where most Indepemdent selection occurs,
and traces recent developments in the immigration bureaucracy that appear to impact
upon its availability and usage. Chapter Three scrutini;i:es the current Iimits on usage of
discretion that have derived from the process of judicial review and the courts' treatment
of this topic. Additionaiiy, certain extra-judicial influences and the hctiona.1 limits they
impose upon discretionary power are identified.
This thesis argues that discretionary power has recently been significantly afXected
by two evo1Mng trends. Hampered by fiscal constraints, the bureaucracy has sought to
reduce usage of positive substantive discretion which, by its very nature, is a resource
intensive processing tool. ConverseIy, since negative substantive discretion retains some
functiond benefits, not much official disdain has been focused upon it. Meanwhile,
procedural discretion has been enhancd because of the resource savings it has delivered
up. The courts, on the other hami, have worked to restrict negative substantive discretion
while simdtaneously guarding the m e s s of its positive variant. These dual purposes
are rooted in a traditionai mistnist of discretionary authority and a modem trend to favour
ri@.
While the courts have been proactive in constraining negative discretion, their
protection of positive substantive discretion has followed a more passive and traditional
course, focusing only on whether it has been unduly fettered. They have not gone so far
as to tïnd any vested rights in applicants to draw upon policies allowing for inclusion
outside of normal requirements. Concurrently, procedural discretion has only been of
interest to the judiciary with respect to any adverse impact upon applicant rights.
The conclusion drawn in Chapter Four is that the developments descnbed al1 push
dtimately in the same direction. Though the bureaucracy and the judiciary each have
their own reasons and interests in the matter, yet they are united in desiring a more d e s
based selection system, that is less reliant upon substantive discretion. Recognizing that
such a move is in harmony with the spirit of the current post-Charter of Rights and
Freedoms era, a consideration of how refom may be undertaken and some specific
initiatives in that regard are recommended. In particular, 1note that the complete
elimination of ail dismtionary authon@may be neither possible nor desirable and offer
some suggestions for its containment and structuring that may serve to enhance its
beneficiai qualities and limit its offensive aspects.
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INTRODUCTION
7.

Purpose

This is a study of the use of discretionary powm in contemporary Canadian
immigration law and practice. It is, most centrally, a story of change and transformation.

Unremitting change, occunhg with almost lightening speed, appears to be one of the few
constants of life today in Canada. It is a pace of change that stems nom developments
and innovations that seem to feed one upon the other to fuel ever more evolution. The
phenornenon of globalization and advanca in information and other technologies have, in
many ways, made the world a smaller place. Closer to home, the social and legal
landscape has similarly been subjected to powerful forces that have reshaped many
aspects of our society. The advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedorns in the early
19807s,for example, has had profound and far-reaching consequences that have left few

areas of law and social policy unaffected. More recently, the restricted economic means

of governments in Canada, both provincial and federal, has harbingered s e ~ c e
reductions and bureaucratie restnicturing whose full effects remain to be seen.
As I attempt to demonstrate in this work, these same forces, as weli as others,

have worked in recent years to reshape our understanding and acceptance of discretionary
authority within the particular field of immigration law. unmigration law and policy, of
course, are simply one small part of a larger whole that is our legal system. And, since
the legai system exists to serve the needs of sociev, it cannot be immune to the

innuences and events that rework society as a whole. 1have endeavorrred in this thesis to
examine and explain some of the theories, jurisprudence, and praçticai considerations
about discretion that affects its place and usage in our law. However, in order to tell the
complete story of discretion, 1 have also found it important to do so with reference, not
just to the law andjurisprudence, but aiso to the wider political and social context.

The

use of discretionary power has as much to do with attitudes and opinions that can be

shaped by a wide variety of factors and influences beyond the law itself.
The current Immigration Act and Regdations have been in place for some twenty
years and reflet thinking of a .earlier, perhaps less complicated, or at lest more stable,

period. At that tirne, legislators saw fit to incorporate express grants of broad substantive
g defects in
discretion in the Independent selection rules as a sort of panacea for c u ~ any

the way the d e s actuaiiy operated. Wnting just after the current immigration regime
was put in place, J.H. Grey, in a study of discretionary power in Canadian law, noted that:

If administrative law is seen as the study of the use of power, one of its most
important interests is discretion, since the limits on discretion are at the same t h e
the limits on the power that anyone c a . have in our type of democracy. The
massive expansion of the powers of the state, and the growth of immensely
powerfid conmittees, commissions and other bodies, against which may be
juxtaposed a new and fervent interest in civil liberties and human rights, renders a
re-examination of discretion and discretionary powers both essentiai and
inevitable.'
Much has changed in society and in the law since Grey wrote these words and
there is now even more cogency and urgency to the need for a re-examination of
discretion. Indeed, as one of the more controversial parts of immigration law, it is
surprising that so little attention has been accordeci it in the academic fiterature. That may

' J.H. Grey, "Dismtionin Administrative Law"(1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.L

107 at 107.

be changing, however. A recent legislative review commissioned by the Minister of
Immigration, for example, thol-9 cursory in its treatment of the topic, has serveci to focus
some attention on discretionary authority. That report has suggested vast changes to the
availability and handling of discretionary power in immigration matters. These changes
involve not just restruchuing of discretion, but also its reduction. The proposals offered
by the Review Committee reflect the tealities of a 'hew-think" which has taken hold of
immigration law in Canada.
However, broad substantive discretion has increasingiy f d e n into disfavour, not
just with the courts and the bar, but also with the bureaucracy that administers

immigration law. Though the two sides have approached the issue fiam different
perspectives and for different reasons, their views have converged to place broad

substantive discretion in something of a tightening vise. Discretion is a labour intensive
selection tool, requiring a substantial commitment of time and energy nom decision-

makers to render individualized decisions. In an era of cutbacks and reductions,
administrators have found it increasingly difficuitto reconcile such a commitment with a
diminishing resource base. Meantirne, the courts and the bar have also worked against
broad substantive discretion, prefming instead that immigration decisions should
proceed h m the strict application of expiicit des. Because of their peculiar interests,
the two sides have chosen to focus on différent aspects of substantive discretion. The
bureaucracy's desire to resile h m discretionary decision making is concentrated on
positive discretion, used to gant exemptions nom the ordinary rules, while the judiciary

and bar have sought to limit its negative use, as a tool for denying qualification. A
combination of bureaucratic expediency and judicial fomialism has combineci to restnct

the ambit and scope of substantive discretion- Procedural discretion, used to d u c e
processing steps, however, has simultaneously enjoyed something of a renaissance.
Offering advantages for administrative corivenience, it has been only of passing interest

to the courts and the bar, who have acted prirnarily just to ensure that it is not used in a
way that negatively impacts upon applicant nghts.
Though this paper examines the handling of both procedural and substantive
discretion, it is obviously the uncertain situation of substantive discretion that is the story
of the hou. It is compelling reading precisely because it is a story of paradox, with two
sides working for Merent reasons to hem it in fiom opposite directions. It is curious,

perhaps, but not unusual. Discretion, by its very nature, seems to be dominated by
paradox and inconsistency. It is a subject involving strong opinions which, while largely
polarized, are yet also inconsistent. Those who decry use of negative discretion in one
breath, for example, are dso often heard to cal1 for more ample positive discretion in the
next? Discretion is about exceptions to the ordinary d e s for qualification as an
immigrant. In the past, the human condition worldwide seemed to be simply too diverse
to be readily and adequately captured by a set of d e s , no matter how ample and dl
encompassing they purported to be. Though the 'hew-think"involves an emerging
consensus favouring a more complete, comprehensive set of d e s as the basis for
immigrant selection, no one seems to have quite figured out how to dispense with

discretion altogether. The Legislative Review Cornmittee, for example, while
highlighting that discretion remaius an uneasy and troubling component of our
-

-

-

-

For a discussion of this apparent double standard, see for example, JM. Evans, H.N.Janisch & David J.
Muilan, Administrative Law.- Lares, TText and MatmkLs, 4th ed,(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, I995), at

immigration law and practice, still recommends retention of some residual discretion to
protect against the possibility of d e faiiure. And therein lies the irony of discretion widely conceded to be essential and ubiquitous yet not much loved.
The problem, of course, is that immigration involves tough choices. Though we
prefer d e s , we don't always seem to Like the effects that their application cm have upon
the lives of individuals. Rules seem fair because they suggest everyone will be treated
the same. The choices become tough, however, when the application of rules moves
£tom the abstract to the particuiar. Thae is no shortage of candidates seeking entry as

immigrants to Canada who are able to cite some personal circumstances involving
disadvantage, misery or hardship. It matters not whether the problem is seen to arise

fiom application of the niles themselves or h m the peculiar situation of the applicant.
Either way, compassionate people must inevitably be moved by any example of distress.
But what to do? The reality of hard choices is in fact the raison d 'etre for the existence
of substantive discretionary power in our immigration Law. Existing dongside, between
and around the black and white d e s , its ability to relieve against any hardship arising out
of application of the niles is that which renders it indispensable. It is important to note,
though, that because of the restrictions placed upon its negative use, the tough choices
today seem to be mostly of one variety - when to allow an exemption fiom the strict d e s
for qualification.
The grant of an exemption nom the rules involves larger issues which make the
choices even tougher. Relief is not simply a matter between the applicant and the
decision-maker. Rather, it also strikes at certain fûndamentals of our legal system, such
1021 (heremaIter referred to as "Evans").

as notions about the d e of law and the supremacy of Parliament. This is evident in the
decision of Muldoon J. in the Ormiter case', where the applicant argued that the Act's
prohibition on entry of persons unable to support themselves constituted irnpermissible
age discrimination, con-

to the Gzmter of Rights and Freedom. In dismissing the

application, the Court stated:

This nation is a parliamentary democracy, which means that the elected
tribunes of the people are those who must lawfbily enact the legislation. It means
that Parliament, by legislation under the rule of law, may choose which
foreigners, if any, may be legaiiy stlmitted for pmanent residence in Canada. It
means that if parliamentary democracy is to survive in Canada, Parliament must
make those choices and not become helpless in the face of assertions by aliens, no
matter how sympathetic their cases. ...
It takes a certain degree of inteliectual toughness to support the principles
of parliamentaxy democracy in face of various individuals who seek migration
into Canada against the wili of the democraticaiiy elected representatives of the
people (not to disparage the Senate of Canada). If the Charter be interpreted in
such a marner as to obviate the will of Parliament in a matter nich as this, it is the
sort of fiutration which would ultimately destroy national government by
amputating the lawful means of govername.'
Notwithstanding any cornmitment to the will of Parliament, however, the
evolution of discretion in recent years appears to have involved a downplaying of the
public interest in immigration matters. Again, it seems to be an issue where the three
major players in immigration have been in agreement, albeit for different reasons. The
bureaucracy, for example, has encouraged a paradigrn shift amongst its decision-makers
to be considered in immigration matters is the individual visa
where the only bbclient"
applicant.' The bar, on the other hand, has encouraged a devotion to rules, at least on the
negative side of the discretion equation, without regard for consequences that may flow

'Orantes v. Conada ( M i n k t e ~of Emp~oyment& Immigration) ((1990),34 F-TJL 184.
fiid. at 188.
'See in& note 740 and a c c o m p ~ text
g for a diswsion ofthis phenornenon.

h m the d t . It has been an effective strategy in the courts, since the oversight
mechanism available to Independent immigrants, judicid review, is ostensibly only
concemed with procedure. The devotion of ail sides, therefore, has himed predominantly
to procedure. Discretion, though, is more about substantivejustice than procedure. Thus,
it is not surprishg that it has been something of a victim to be s d c e d at the altar of
procedure.

T'us, in descnbing the current trend to move away fÎom discretionary power and
to have more particuiarization in the des, I have attempted to sound a note caution.
Though critics may be vocal in their disdain for discretionary power, the case, as 1
attempt to show is not all one way against discretion. Shouid we move too far towards a
niles based system, we need to recognize that it may well be gained at the expense of the

responsiveness and humanity that has been a hallmark of our immigration processes. We
may be able to devise d e s that exclude sutnciently welI, but it is also clear that we will
never devise inclusionary niles sufEiciently clever to capture al1 those who are seen to be
desewing. It is important, therefore to ask whether the potential downsides are consistent

with the public interest and whether we, as a people, are prepared to make any Me-offs

in our immigration program that may be necessary. C e r t d y , before we have the more
d e s based system that seems to be favoured, it is important to understand more fUly

what discretion is, how it is used in our system and what implications are likely from
current developments. My hope is that this study wiIl contribute in some measure to that
end.

2.

Scope
'7s it true that immigration policy is often in conflict with the nile of law? ... The

answer is only too often ' Y ~ S .So
'~
begins
~ an article by Toronto immigration lawyers
Cecil Rotenberg and Mary Lam, detailing their views of a conflict between the
immigration law promuigated by Parliament and the immigration policy devised by the

Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). Their assertion dernonstrates

vividly the philosophical gulfthat oflen separates the bar and the bureaucracy. It is also a
ciear indication of the hold that the "rule of law" principle maintah over the hearts,

rninds and imaginations of Canada's immigration lawyers.' Particularly in this postCharter era, that principle is the shibboleth for our time that marks the h n t h e of the
struggie between philistine discretion and the righteousness of niles. But what exactly is

C.L. Rotenberg & Mary Lam, "Busmess Immigration and Poiicy - A Revîew of Some Aspects of the
Entrepreneur Program", (1995) 26 immLX(2d) 100 at 100.
'The importance of the d e of law principle is one that stretches across a i i areas of law. One of the more
prominent curent Canadian issues in which it is implicated concems the matter of Quebec secession. In
particular, the d e of law is a central theme of various intervenors' arguments before the Supreme Court of
Canada m Refkence Concming Certain Questions Relating to the Secession of Quebecfiont Canada,
Supreme Court File No. 25506, initiated by ûrder-in-Council P.C. 1996-1497, dated September 30, 1996.
For a pair of recent articles, published under a joint titie of '"The Rde of Law'', discussing the role of the
nile of law m this reference, see H. W. MacLauchlan., "Accounting For Democracy and the Rule of Law in
the Quebec Secession Reference" (1997) 76 Cam Bar Rev. 155;and Robert Howse & Alissa Malfcin.
"Canadians Are a Sovereign People: How the Supreme Court Shouid Approach the Reference on Quebec
Secession" (1997) 76 Can. Bar Rev. 186.
The ubiquity and fundamental nature of the concept of the d e of law is such that it has even crept into
the lexicon of the inteniationd lawyer. For example, James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International
Law at the University of Cambridge,in demiing human rights law and practice at the international level
uses the term to typiSr a middle ground position between three potentiai theones. In his modei, the first,
and most traditionai, position is what he terms the "convemtionai" model. There, huma. rights are derived
h m the content of treaties and have no special simiificance beyond that. At the other extreme is the
"constitutional" position, where human rights become the centrai organking idea of the international
system, with states' rights subordiaated to it, In ktween, there is what he caik the "de of iaw" model.
Under this model when states enter into treaties or other promises concerning human rights, the situation is
changed, with the result that those rights become vesteci in individuals. T'us, a set of state-individual
rights is added ta the traditional conception of international law as simply a collection of states' rights. In
this way, hwnan rights can affect states' fieedom of action, as seen in the conventional model. J.
Crawford, 'Wuman Rights and the State" (Lecture of 8 Jmuary, 1997, Erom "The Bertha Wilson Corne in
Human Rights", Speciai Visiting Lecturer series held at Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., 6 - 17

this 'hile of lad' and what is its relationship to Canadian immigration law and policy? 1s
it tnily the hdamental comerstone that underpins our legal system? Moreuver, is the

paradox that is discretionary power, being both undesirable and indispensable,
fimdamentaily incompatible with it? What concessions have been necessary to allow the
two to coexist within one system? What adjustments might stiU be necessary to effect a

better balance between the d e of law and discretionary power? And what of the courts

who act as arbitas between the opposing views? Are they really in the middle between
the positions of the bar and the bureaucracy? Why does discretionary power have such a

bad reputation? What are the influences that t d y affect its exercise? These are just
some of the questions that are examined in this study.

As may be apparent, discretion is an enormous topic. Accordingly, 1have felt
compelled to impose limits, wherever possible, so as to contain the ambit of this work

w i t h what was realisticaily possible, given the various collsfraints and limitations 1
faced. The major Illniting device employed, of course, is that 1 have chosen to focus only
on so-called Independent immigrants. The Immigration Act and Regdations provide for

three broad classes of immigration - Refugees, Farnily Class and Independents. Though
discretionary power affects al1 three to some extent, neither of the other two classes is so
overtly subject to it as are Independents. Independent immigrants are selected largely as

a matter of unabashed national self-interest and it is this which provides much of the
rationale for leaving their selection process most directly subject to discretionary power.

CIC's Immigration Manuals define "Independents" as "...persans who intend to enter the
labour market and have the intention and ability to be self-supporthg upon their arriva1in

Canada'' The point of the exercise is to select in only those who wiU not be a drain on

the public purse and are capable of contributing to the economy. Likewise, since this
category is dealt with, for the most part, outside of Canada, it is overseas processes that
are particularly considered in this study,though 1have drawn upon examples developed

in the context of the other immigrant classes, wherever they seemed to have broader
application or illustratecl particular points weU.

Further, I have limitai this study to identifj/ing and descniing only those factors
and forces, presently affecting discretionary power, which 1believed to be particularly
significant In my estimation, those forces are not yet fully played out and the
complexities of their inter-relationships are such that their h a 1 outcome remains largely
to be detennined. Further, the influences that rnight potentially affect any given exercise

of discretion are simply too rnany to be practically dealt with in a study of this nature.
Accordingly, this work does not purport to be either di encompassing or the last word on
the subject.
Additionally, this study proceeds out of m y seven years experience as a visa
officer and daily exposure to the application of discretion in practice. This experience
obviously imposes certain biases about this topic which 1have attempted to recognize and
reconcile. Nonetheles, it is also an experience which, 1beiieve, has equipped me well to
venture some opinions as to the practical realities of discretion. Thus, while I have
attempted an academic treatment of the topic, yet 1have also striven to ground it in the
ways and methods of actuai usage by using real examples whenever possible.

* CIC immigration Manual (hereinaftcr IM),Chap. OP-5, para. 2 2 'Who is eiigible to apply?".

3.

Layout
This work begins in Chapter 1 with a review of some of the fiindamentai

characteristics and attributes of discretionary power and its treatrnent in Canadian
jurisprudence. In particular, the two schools of jurisprudence, positivism and
fiinctionalism, which have had the greatest impact upon its perception in our law are
considered. The discussion then moves on to examine why discretion is thought to be
necessary and what it is exactly. In Chapter 2,1 examine how the overseas selection
process for Independent immigrant works and the ways in which discretionary power is
imported into that process. Attention is then paid to the restmcturing exercise that CIC

has undergone in recent years and the particular initiatives that have corne out of it.
Particular emphasis is placed upon the mamer in which such initiatives may have
impacted upon discretionary decision-making. Chapter 2 concludes with consideration of
sociological theories and the insights they may offkr as to how discretion is af3ected by

the institutional setting in which it is employed. Chapter 3 opens with a consideration of
the role of the courts and judicial review in Independent immigrant matters. The courts'

handling of discretionary power within the selection process, and the impact that judicial
decisions have had on its availability and usage, are considered in the middle part of this
chapter. In particuiar, attention is aven to the limitations that have proceeded from
judicial intewentions. The remaining portion of the chapter nnishes with a discussion of
the role and influence of other actors, outside of the courts, in setting Limits upon the use
of discretionary power. Chapter 4 then offers my wncIuions a s to the current

availability and usage of discretionary power, both substantive and procedurai. 1 also

consider the proposais for reform that have recently been suggested by the Legislative

Review Committee. Finaiiy, 1conclude by providing some thoughts and
recornmendations as to possible directions for fùture reform.

CHAPTER 1

- FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRETION

"Discretion is the means by which law - the most consequential normative
system in society - is translated into action?

1.1

How is discretion understood?
In the British legal tradition, jurisprudence and philosophy have tended

historically to portray discretionary authority as a sort of ill-defined law, compriseci of
plenary power usually subject to few restrictions or controls. This image of discretion as

an unstructured and largely m t r a i n e d power has left an indelible image in legal circles
of the character of discretion that is bleak and unsenling. Certaùily, as a sort of semidespotic power, the necessity for abiding wariness and constant vigilance over
discretionary power has been a predominant theme of academic literature.
Though recent scholarly literature has begun to pierce the veil of doubt
srnoundhg discretionary power, the roots of mistrust run deep and are difficult to shuck
off. Grnerations of lawyers have been inculcated with a pejorative view of discretion that

remains widespreadI0and which has far reaching consequences. As Evans observes,
"[n]o aspect of the administrative state has attracted a worse press nom lawyers than the

discretionary powers regularly conferred on, and exercised by, agencies and officiais in
Keith Hawkins, ed., The Uses of DrSctetion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at I l (hereinafter refemed
to as cT3awkins'').
'O See for example, JM. Evans, "ControiiingAdministrative Discretion: A Role for Rules?" in The
Cambn'dge Lectures 1991, edited by F.E. McArdie (Cowwviiie, Que,: Yvon Blais, 1993) 209 at 209,
where the author observes ''Lawyers are by instinct deeply suspicious of broad dismtionary power
exercisable by public officiais and institutions.... if one were to ask lawyers what words they associate

the course of carrying out statutory ~chemes."~'In faimess. it must be conceded that it is

a suspicion that has beea pmven well-founded in too many instances, over too many
years. In the particdar field of immigration law, historical examples of broad misuse and
abuse of discretionary power are not hard to kd.12

However, it is possible also to discern a sort of "spill-over" effect fiom those
examples of misdeeds, that readily ascribes blame to discretion for any illicit activity by
govemmental authorities. It is a process of popular demonization, whereby every

injustice is credited to discretion, regardless of whether such wrongs trdy involved
application of a lawhilly granted statutory authority. An example of this is found in a
postscnpt by R Sampat-Mehta to his book, bteniationul Barriers.l3 In iî, he describes

an abrupt change in Canadian immigration policy in late 1972, whereby visitors to
Canada were no longer pennitted to apply for permanent residence fiom within Canadai4

with "discretion", most would be negative: "arbitrary", "capricious" and "abuse" would, 1expect, figure
prominently m their replies."
" Evans, supra note 2 at 1019.
l2 An obvious example would, of course, be those p o l i e s and procedures which were used in the part to
exclude persons on the basis of racial and ethnic ongins. For a brief description of such poiicies, see Carol
Turner-Tnisca, "A Short History of Immigration to Canada 1869-1995" (1995) 12:3 Bout de Papier 11.
See also R. Sampat-Mehta, International Barriers (Ottawa: Harpeil's Press, 1973), at 131-136, where a
number of instances of the use of discretionary power to discximinate against Asian peoples during the first
part of this century are cited For example, prospective immigrants were required to demonstrate that they
possessed a certain stipulated rninmiuxn amount of unencumbered b d s available to aid their settlement.
Likewise, a requirement of "continuous jouniey" was interpreted so that only those amving directiy h m their
country of origin could be landed. The lack of ciirect commercial transportation h m Asia to Cana& made it
impossible for Asians to sati* this m m ~ The
t reguIations containing these provisions were ostensibly
applicable to a l l immigrants. However, they containeci a grant of discretionary power to M g r a t i o n officiais
allowing th& waiver. Sampat-Mehta notes ample evidence h t such provisions were regularly waived for
European and Amencan immigrants, but never for Asians.
l3 Id.
l4 Id. at 319-325. A general prohibition against applying fkom within Canada for permanent residence has
been in place, as Sampat-Mehta d e s c n i , since November 3, 1972, It is enshrined in S. 9(1) of the current
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, which mds: "Except m such cases as are presmibed,. .,every
immigrant and visitor shaU make an appiication for and obtain a visa before that person appears at a port of
entry."

Apparently reacting to an unanticipateci tide of would-be arriving immigrants1: the
govemment suspended y~oa?&r?z+&& wt!e6

vEk= t2 ~hangetheir status to

immigrants, fkom within the couutry.l6 This had the effect of shifting significant

discretionary power to port of entry unmigration officers to detemiine the bona fides of
visitors. In particular, the officers were empowered to refuse entry, and summarily retum
to their point of origin, any arriving traveler detennined to be an intending immigrant.
In Sampat-Mehta's view, "[bly executive action, the govemment has again placed
unrestricted discretionary powers in the han& of Immigration Ofncers in deciding who
are and are not to be aâmitted to the ~ountry."~
He desmies the consequences of this as

'hiany faceted abuses"18,and goes on to relate an account of two port of entry

immigration officers convicted of extortion and dereliction of duty for importuning an
arriving visitor for sex, in retum for a gant of entry. While this certainly describes a
despicable event, it serves also to illustrate how opponents of discretionary power are
able to find abuse where they wish. An alternative view of this episode is to recognuie
that while it involves abuse, it is not one involving the exercise of a statutonly accorded
power. The convictions that were registered clearly demonstrate that the duo was not

acting within any sort of lawful authority. Rather, the malefactors obviously relied upon
the aura of authority attacheci to their positions to achieve their illegitimate aim.
Unfortunately, this is the type of abuse of authority which can and does occur
even in the presence of the clearest d e s . But why is it then that such incidents are so
'%anqat-Mehta, id., a s m i a racial motive to the policy change. h his visw, it was not just a case of
overwhelmiag numbers, but rather the predominantly Asian characteristic of the movement, which caused
most conceni.
l6 Id. at 320.

readily seized upon as illustrative of the dangers of discretionary power? The answer lies
in the jurispnidential thought that has shaped our administrative law. Certauily, it is in

jurisprudence that the mots of curent law and practice regarding exercise and control of
discretionary power are found, and it is there that its usefhhess and utility as an
administrative tool has been molded. Since "[n Jothing is more practical than theory"19, it
is appropriate therefore to begin a study ofthe use of discretion in Canadian immigration

law by considering briefly the jurisprudential footing upon which it rests.
Accordingly, this chapter commences with a consideration of the role and
innuence of legal positivism, the philosophical foundation h m which the concept of the
'hile of law" s p ~ g s In
. particular, 1explore development of the concept of the rule of
law, with its favouritism for codification and the seeming certitude of d e s , and the effect

that this has had upon acceptame of discretionary authority. 1 then go on to consider the
functionalist Line of jurisprudence which has encourageci a more pragmatic understanding

of the administrative world generaily, and of discretionary power in parti~ular.~
This
chapter then concludes with a discussion of the %hy" and the 'khat" of discretion - why
it is seen as necessary in our law and what it is exactly.

"ld. at 323.

id.
19Evans,supra note 2 at 33.
Though there are other schoois of thought that offer insights upon disaetionq power, I have
deliberately chosen to limit consideration ofjurispmâence to these two alone. Quite smiply, they have had
the greatest impact in shaping cumnt attitudes and t6rmmig about discretion and pmvide sufflcientiy
contrasting viewpohts to ïkstrate something of the range of opinions that obtain on this abject.
Moreover, my purpose for consideringjurisprudence is simply to provide essentiai context for the real
focus of this paper - considnation of the cumnt usage and practice rtspecting discretionary power in
overseas seIection of Independent immigrants.

1.2

Dicey and the Rule of Law
In any system of law, there are really ody two options for the expression and

enforcement of law. The

involves discretion, which invests legal authonties with

latitude to determine the ambit and scope of activities that are under the legal punriew.
.

The other entails resort to d e s , usually collected and codified in statutes, that typicdiy

specify with some precision what is to be regulated, the extent to which it is regulated,
and the consequences ofany breach of the d e . Though they seem to be opposites, the
two are actuallyjust reverse sides of the same coin.

This is so since even the clearest rule

often requires some judgment in its exercise. As a result, the fundamental question is one
conceming which of them is to enjoy primacy. In modem Canadian practice, it is
obvious even to the casual observer that d e s are pre-eminent.

This pre-eminence is seen clearly in the following paragraph fiom a judgment of
the Supreme Court of Canada:
The rule of Law, a fundamental principle of our Constitution must mean at least
two things. First, that the law is supreme over officiais of the govemment and
thereby predusive of the iduence of arbitrary power.. .Second, the nile of law
requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive law which
preserves and embodies the more generd principle of normative order. Law and
order are indispensable elements of civilized life.2'

This passage contains two important ideas bearing upon discretionary power, both of
which are grounded in the concept of the 'hile of law". These are that the Iaw is
composed of expücit d e s and that such d e s act as a check on the authonty of
govemmental officiais. By implication, that which is not part of the express law is
included in the potential for arbitmy power. Discretionary authority, of course, exists

ensured that it was to have long and lasting influence? Dicey's own distaste for official
discretion was nowhere more evident than in his classic staternent expounding upon the
d e of law, where he explaineci it as meaning that:

...no man is punishable or can be made to suffer in body or goocis except
for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legai manner before the
ordlliary courts of the land. In this sense the d e of law is contrasted with every
system of govemment based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide,
arbitrary?or discretionary powers of constraint?
Certaialy7by use of the word "discretionary" in the same breath as 'uride7' and
"arbitrary", Dicey left Little doubt as to his pejorative sentiments? More importantly, the
continuhg influence of the several principles expresseci in this paragraph is difficult to
overehate. Through his formulation of the d e of law and its restatement of the
histoncal bias toward discretion, Professor Dicey was able to reinvigorate the prej~dice.'~
And indeed, he remained ever vocal in his suspicion of discretionary power, though in

later writings he softened somewhat by allowing that state provision of social welfare
programs required some freedom for action by administrative officiais. Nonetheless,
even this concession was accompanied by the warning that such powers were always
subject to abuse, if not closely constrauied by law." Similarly, the bias against discretion

in his staternent of the 'hile of lad' was reinforced by the requirement that only a
n ~ h tenth
e
edition of that book, consuitcd for this treatise, is sureIy evidence of longevity, and
circumstantially at least, of continued influence.
Supm note 26 at 188.
BEvans,supra note 2 at 1019, observes for example that "...Dicey seemed to regard the presence of
discretion as inimical to a system of govenmient that was subject to the d e of law."
mSeeH.W.Arthws, "ReethinkingAdministratitive Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17 Osgoode Bail
LJ. 1 at 22, where the author identifies 3 themes in Dicey's work: (1) that discretion is the antithesis of
law; (2) that generality of legal d e s is identined as an important safeguard of individual rights; and (3)
that resolution of disputes by the ordinary courts, rather than ofncials or a Conseil d'Etat, is said to be a
hailmark of legality. Ironicdy, he notes that courts have always had a good deaI of discretion, for
example in detennining what is k i r inherent jurisdiction (ie. fact hding, sentencing and review of

"'distinct breach of law" could provide a legitimate basis for ofncid action. It ensured
that fiuziness in Iegd language and standards, regardless of whether they were regdatory

or pend in nature, was to be eschewed. Clarity and certitude were rendered synonymous

with justice and fair play in the English Iegal mind.
Aithough in many ways Dicey got it wrong, with many of his ideas and theories

discredited or discarded over the years, his views on the illegitimacy of discretionary
power were not so easily forgotten? The influence of those views was such that they
were taken up with some fervour by others. In 1929, Lord Hewart, then Chief Justice of

England, wrote in his book, The Nav Desp~tisrn.~
about the need to bring administrative
tribunals under the sway of the courts in order to check what he called "collectivist
tendencies'? A s W a r rebuke to administrative fieedom was delivered a couple of years
later by Oxford scholar, Sir Carleton Kemp Men, in his work, Bureaucracy

TnumphantJ5

The practical outiet for al1 of this mistrust was the development of an overarching
theme in academic riterature on how best to controf administrative discretion that remains

i n f i o r tn'bunals).

'' Evans, supra note 2 at 1019.

"See for example, Eric Barendt, "Dicey and Civil Liberties" [l9851Public Law 596, where the author
observes that Dicey's real contri'bution was not that he gave an accurate account of the common law. In his
view, Dicey's description was, in fact, wrong in many respects. Thus, at 596, he States that what Dicey
"...wrote about individual rights and fkecdoms mnains important, not so much because it is still a tolerably
accurate account of the basic constitutional position of these h i e s , but rather because his outïook - a
paean of praise to the wisdom of the common law - continues ta innuence modem thinking on these

matters*"

(reprint 1929 ed, London: Ernst Benn, 1945).
The influence of this work apparently reached also m the Canadian side of the Atlantic. See for example,
F E Scott, Comment [193q Can. Bar Rev. 62, where the author uses a reference to this work as the lead-in
to an article decryiug both arbitrary use of deportation powers by Canadian immigration officiais and
unwillingness by the courts to check exercise of such power,
(Oxford: M o r d Univ. Press, 1931).
33

Y

''

evident today. For example, in his autboritative tome, Administrative L m S MSir William
Wade b e g k by describing administrative law "...as the law relating to the control of
govemmental power'ln Like most traditional legal texts dealing with this area of law,

Wade's emphasis is on control and circllmscription of delegated discretionary power,

with little concession to any positive or beneficial aspects that may follow from the
delegation. As such, he describes two inherent characteristics that attach to
administrative agencies. 'Tirst, they are ail subject to legal limitations; there is no such
thing as absolute or unfettered administrative power. Secondly, and con~equentially~
it is

always possible for any power to be abused"? Thus, in Wade's view, it foilows that

"[tlhe primary purpose of administrative Law.. . is to keep the powers of govemrnent

within their legal bounds, so as to protect the citizen39against their abuse"?

This

statement is now so commonplace as to be something of a mantra for administrative
IW~~S.~'

Sir William Wade & Christopher Forsyth, Admini$trative L m , P ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
(hereinafter referred to as "Wade7').
"Id. at 4.
''Id. at 5.
39 Or,very reIevantiy in the immigration law context, even the non-citizen.
Wade, supra note 36 at 5. The use of the word "abusen to descrii misuse of admhhative powers is
perhaps an unfortunate one, since every misuse of power is thus imbued with an aura of deviousness or
malicious intent It is, however, simply a tenn of art that has corne to desmie any use of power not strictIy
permitted within the terms of the delegation that delivered it. Wade does note that govemment is ody
human and so makes &es
k e any citizen might. Thus, he notes h t while "abuse" is bound to occur,
that tenn does not ipsofacto require the existence of any moral turpitude.
See for exampIe, the 1968 Report of the Royal Commission, An Inquis, in20 Civil Rights: Report No. 1
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, Ontario, 1968), chaired by the Honomble J-C. McRuer who, while accepting
the need for discretim in the modem -te, also warned that it needd to be strictly limited. Writing at page
95, Vol. 1, No. 1, he urged h t such power be delegated only to the extent that is "...necessary and
unavoidable in order to achieve the social objective or policy of the statute. It ought not to be conferred
where d e s or standards for judiciai applicationcan be stated Where an administrative power is necessary
aad unavoidable, the power should be no wider in scope than is demanded to meet the necessity." For
simila.views, see also generdy, Kenneth Culp Davis, Dkretiuncuy Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton
Rouge, L a : Louisiana State University Press, 1969)and Denis J. Gaiiigan, Diwretionary Powem A Legal
S&dy of O~@iàl Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
f6

''

Dicey's influence on the attitude of our legal system toward discretion was

important, but it was not his only achievementt4 Perhaps even more significant was that

his ideas were able to influence the very structure of that system. This was so, since he
would make no concession to the uniqueness of administrative Iaw and the nature of the

issues and problems that are its province. Dicey asserted that English cornmon Iaw
would not countenance any such bifurcation as was present in the French legal system,
where the droit administratïfexisted as a unique branch of law, complete with a separate
judicial structure concerned only with the activities of administrative agencies.
Consequently, he brooked no "special treatment" for this branch of law, holding that its
subject matter and issues were on the same plane as any other dealt with in the regular

courts. For him, the d e of law was simple and neat. One law and one system of justice
for dl, so "...that government and citizens alike...[were] subject to the generd law of the
land adminstered in the ordinary court^".^ Regardless of whether the parties to a dispute
consisted of govemment and governed, or just two private citizens, the rule of law meant,

in theory at le&, that all were fkee to corne before the same courts, as equals, to receive
the same measure of justice. This homogenous conception of the oneness of our legal

system has ensured the supremacy of the "ordinary" courts as the pinnacle of our legal
system. Irrespective of whether the subject rnatter involves an issue ofbroad social
policy, or a bit of legal minutia conceming statutory interpretation, the ultimate venue for

**Foran interesting discourse generally on the influence of "Diceyanvalues", see the judgment of Wilson
J. in National Corn Growers Assn, v. Canada 1199012 S.C.R. 1324.
"Evans, supra note 2 at 28, where the authors also note that this conception of government under law has
been the basis for objections to broad discretionîry power granted to the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration to expel non-citizens or p d t or refuse entry to persons, irrespective of whether or not they
have met general admission crite&. Evans desmis the o h open e n d 4 nature of such power as
unsettling for those whose preferences lie wiîh a fixed set of universaUy applicable d e s .

resolution is the sanie.
Since at least the Great Depression of the 1930's, the administrative legai system

has grown explosively and now regulates and manages ever more aspects of daily Me.
Throughout this growth, however, the possibilities for and limitations on administrative
action have been dominated by ideals and principles laid d o m in Dicey's formulation of
the d e of law. In particular, it has provided the jurisprudential basis for courts to

maintain a supervisory role over administrative agencies, even where it has been
expressly denied by legislation." A uniquely legalistic worldview, with the litigation

model as its prirnary paradigm, has, therefore, served to shape much of the form,
fimction, processes and structures that make up cwrent administrative law. Of course, as
with any matter of public policy, there are a number of opinions regarding whether

society has been well served by Dicey's model of the nile of law and the uniforrnity it
wrought? It is just such questionhg which prompted development of the fûnctionalist
critique.
1.3

-

Dicey Undone The Functionalist Approach

Aithough Dicey attempted to flesh out the bones of the ideal of the nile of law, yet
it remained something of an inchoate concept, more significant in foxm than substan~e.~

* Id.
See for example, Evans, id. at 29, who note that the courts' patterns of thought and undmtancüng of law
and Iegd processes have been superimposed upon the administrative machezy for delivery of pubJic
services. To their mind, however, the effort has not been entnely smooth, particularly withrespect to
interests created by the a-tive
state, such as licenses and welfare benefits. They suggest that legai
notions of procedural propriety in decision malring, favouring litigation and more f o d judicial process,
have often left the courts rnyopic to oîher modeis for admhktmtive action.
Evans, id at 27, for example, offecr the following observations:
The d e of law is an i d d to which appeals are regularly made by proponents, and their critics, of
measures relating to the design and delivery of public programs. Like the concepts of lrberty and

45

This seeming defect has perhaps been its greatest strength. Because it was not one thing,
it could thereby be all things to weryone. In 1979, &W. Arthurs noted that while a lot of
the shitnng had been knocked out of Dicey's theories over the years, yet the 'hile of law"
remaineci a d y i n g c y for any who view delegated authonty and discretion suspiciously,
as the fkst and worst breach in the defense of individual liberty." It is precisely because

of its wispy definition that it continues to be a popular catch-al1 rubric fordisparaging any

displeasing govemmental action implicating discretionary authority. And it is precisely
this sort of attitude which Dicey intended to stir up, since his prejudices agahst

administrative law prevented him h m viewing it as other than an illegitimate branch of
law. Certainiy, this flavour is captured, as Arthurs points ouf in Dicey's characterization
of administrative tribunals as somehow ''ideriof' and regular courts "superior"? Even

in the face of criticisrns that the concept of the ' M e of law" is more theory than
substance, it continues to be a very innuential force in shaping lawyers' and judges'
opinions of the proper d e , ambit and structure of ndminishtive

And it is, of

course, a cnticd view of discretion which lies at the core of those opinions.
However, the case against discretion is not all one sided and it was this realization
which spawned the functionalist movement. Functionalism proceeds fkom the

assumption that administrative law should be viewed as facilitative and legitimizing,

democracy, the rule of law has no generally agreed rneaning as applied to law and administration,
The nile of law is also like h i and democracy in that it is rejected by few, although particula.

versions of it are keedy contested.

... However, the root idea, namely that government shouid be

subject to law, is one that, lüce democracy and ri'berty, wilI not go away.
" See

Arttiurs, "Rethdchg Administrative Lawn,supra note 30 at 4-5.

1d

491d.at 5.

rather tha. limiting and restrictive, and that govemment action can be a source of good.'
Developed diiring the 1930's as a reaction to what was seen as the misguidecl premise
upon which Dicey's positivist formulation was based, its leadhg early proponent was
Rofessor John Willis of Dalhousie University Law School. Willis observed that the
Diceyan approach was kated on the fact that a power was granted, and that it was this
point alone which garnered lawyers' attention most, playing to their fears of big
govemment and apprehension of any curtailment of individual liberty. He saw this as a
shallow, knee jerk reaction that missed the t d y salient point. Instead of concentrating on

the fact that a power has been granted, WiEs felt the real focus should be on the uses
power is actuaUy put to. In this way, its most humane and efficacious application might
be ensured. To further this goal, he took issue with the central pillar that held Dicey's

unitary mode1 of the d e of law together - narnely, that "ordinary law" and "ordinary
courts7'were the only legitimate components of the English legal system.
Willis began by noting that the need for delegation of authoriw was a necessary

and established practice, since it was practicdy impossible for Parliament or the
legislatures to directly legislate, adjudicate and regulate the minutiae of the myriad
Contrary to Dicey's assertions that Parliament was
activities within their j~risdictions.~
the ultimate and only source of law, WiIlis cited a long tradition of other bodies
a Functionalists concede that mistakccs and emrs can and are made by tribunais. However, they emphasize
that such mistaka are naturai in any human activity and need not necessarily be the r e d t of iii will or
maiice. Such mistakes, therefore, are not cause for viewing suspiciously ail govemment activity. It is
simply a case of providing the best possiôle procedure, including appropriate scrutiny mechanisms, to
ensure fair and reasonable outcornes m accordance with the mandate for which the power was grantd
" See for example, Wiiiis "Tbree Approaches to Admhktmtive Law", supra note 22 at 55, where he
observes that '[tJhe deIegation of power to a goverrunent department, a practice of very respectable
antiquity, is now u n i v d y recognized by respomile persoas as a practicai necessity if the work of
govefnment is to be d e d on at ail, Why waste the thne of parliament on details or on technical matters

"...laying down general rules for fbture action.. ..'- Arthurs, a later proponent of the
fûnctionalist approach, picked up on this train of thought and put it even more forceMy,

...Diceyysassumption that recourse to "ordinary Law" and "ordinary courts" was a
constitutional right sanctified by actual practice in b~re-collectivisty'
England is
insupportable. Ch the contrary, history and modem practice coaiesce around the
proposition that what is "ordinary" is a situation in which law ernanates fiom
many sources, includingjudges who do aot sit in, and are not part of the hierarchy
of, the superior courts; statutes which perversely and persistently fail to confom
to Dicey's constitutional strictures; and customs and private arrangments which
similarly sink below Dicey's plimsoll h e . In short, Dicey's view of the legd
system.. .was both partial and partisan: partial, because it ignored so much;
partisan, because it emphasized the legitimacy of the common law over ail other
parts of the sy~tem.~
Although fiuictionalists obviously disagreed with the picture that Dicey painted of
the structure and sources of law, they maintained that this did not necessarily place them
at odds with the fundamental principles upon which the d e of law was based. In

Arthurs' words, "[tlhe d e of law does assume a different vision of the legal system than
does administrative law.. .[but] [wlhat divides these visions of law is not a fùndamental
disagreement over the relevance of such basic values as procedural fairness, adherence to
appropriate normative d e s , or accountability; rather, the source, meaning and practical

which it cannot understand? [footnote omittedr
Id. See &O for example, Evans, supra note 2 at 30, where the authors cite the example of ûiiunals,
active already in Dicey's t h e , which were dedicated to worker d e t y in factories, mines and the me.
Arthurs "RethrmSng Admbistmtive Law", mpra note 30 at 13-14. Notwithstanding such criticisms, it is
not difncult to h d examples of the sway which Dicey's d e of "ordmary law and ordinary c o u . "
continues to hold over common law mincis. For example the most recent edition of Wade's text on
Administrative Law, supra note 36 at 12, still d e s m i the fact that ordinary courts, rather than special
-.
admmtstrative triiunals, determine cases invohing the vaIidity of g o v m e n t action as the "...outstanding
characteristic of the Anglo-Amcrican system. ... The ordmary iaw of the land, as modifïed by Acts of
..
ParLiament, appks to ministers,local authorities, and other agencies of govemment, and îhe ordinary
courts dispense it."

implementation of these values are the focus for debate?

Accepting then that power

must be delegated, shared or o t h d s e distriibuted for reasons of practicality and efficacy,
the focus instead is to ask the question - to whom has a particular statutory power been
granted? Such a line of questioning, they postulate, promotes maximum efficiency in
administration by matching power to the body or tribunal best suited to exercise it.

Having settled the initial h e of inqujr, fimctionalism goes on to propose a
subsidiary branch of questioning conceming the oversight process to which exercise of

any discretionary power might be subjected The quest is to determine to what extent and

by what sort of agency such review should be conducteci? It is, of course, a b t order
tenet of the d e of law that "ordinary" courts have exclusive jurisdiction to oversee and
review aU legai processes. For fiuictionalists, however, it is hardly a foregone conclusion
that the courts should, by default, be favoured for the work of administrative review.
Arguing that courts are, in fact, il1 equipped and ill-suiteci to the work of reviewing
statutory discretions, WiIlïs and others have been especially critical of the judicial
straitjacket that has been imposed upon the administrative field by Dicey's parochial
prescription? Functionalism stresses the importance of recognizing that administrative

tribunals are delegates of powers granted by elective assemblies. Because those bodies,

unlike the courts, denve their authority k t l y nom the people, t h ~ have
y
a more
immediate comection to democratic legitimacy. While the courts clearly have a
constitutional and moral position as supervisors. neither should they be empowered to
thwart legitimate poficy objectives enunciated by the legislature. Insteaâ, law should be
Arthurs, id. at 42.

"WilIk "Three Approaches to Administrative Law", supm note 22 at 59.

the means for facfitating the achievement of public policy ends and courts shouid give
the widest deference in this regard? Functionalists assert, however, that courts have not
shown such deference in façt.
The reasons cited for this are many, and include the mistrust that Dicey laboured
to n m e a g a k t discretionary power. However, the problern goes beyond this, touching
upon areas involving court structures and processes that do not necessarily implicate a
deliberate judicial effort to confound and disnipt the administrative machinery. It is
simply that cour!!

by nature iII-suited and ill-equipped for the task of administrative

review. Accordhg to WiIiïs, "@]egaIrights are normdy decided by a court for the
reason, and no other, that they are best fitted for the work of finding fa& and absorbing
new interests into the existing social structure* But the legal mind is not trained to

interpret legislation on subjects of which its possessor is entirely ignorant."'

The

complex and far reaching policy issues present in many tribunal decisions, he argues, are
rnatters typically beyond the ken and experience of the classicdy trained judicial mind.
In particular, the formative process that lawyers and judges undergo fosters a preference
for facts and strict detennination of rights in an individualized decision-making setting
that induces a sort of judicial tunnel vision. Because of it, courts tend to ignore the larger
social purposes and fidl panoply of equities that should properly be part of the e q u a t i ~ n . ~ ~

Evans, supra note 2 at 30.
Id at 31.
Willis ‘mec Approaches to Administrative Law", supra note 22 at 76.
s9 4 as Evans,supra note 2 at 30, notes the hnctionalist argument:
Dicey's disapprovai of broad administrative discretion and his support for giving the or^
courts a key position in the resolution of disputes between the individual and the admbbtntive
state thwarts the effective UnpIernentation of legisîatively eaacted public mterest programs of
reguiation and redisûiiution. The litigation process reduces to a ''question of law"or an issue of
procedural "fiaimess"complex poiicy choices that are more hclpfiilly considered in the context of
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'

Though often guided by a sense of justice and fgir play, the hation of courts in this
regard leads to confusion and uncertainty in many areas of administrative law and
exacerbates the difficulties for agencies to develop comprehensive, effective strategies for

carrying out their overall mandatesw
As Arthurs observes, the obsession with individual justice can and d o a produce

the opposite effect of what may actudy have been intended by the legislation concemed.

In his words:
At.. .[the] root [of incoherence in the judicial review system] is the inevitable
tendency of good judges to want to do the right thing, to shield citizens against
perceived injustices, to vindicate legal values. These tendencies are so strong that
they lead judges to reach results by whatever means corne to hand: strict or
purposive interpretations of the governing legislation, technicd or liberal attitudes
towards the triiunal's procedural and evidentiary requirements, conservative or
creative use of the courts' remedial powers, and most importantly, selection of a
restrained or interventionist attitude towards the judges' own role. What happens
on the sudace of the judgment is, in the end, detemllned not so much by text-book
maxims as by the judges' conviction that the interest of justice will or will not be
served by a particular result? ...But this conviction gives rise to a serious
the program t b t the agency is administerhg, than of generd legd principles and the inevitable
distortions of iitigation.
Evans, id., notes that the functionalist camp:
...has.. .argued that the positivist legal tradition, of which Dicey's thought is part, has failed to
appreciate that law is inextricably intertwmed with policy. Given the limitations of legislative
foresight and the inherent ambiguities of Ianguage, it is normaliy not possible to determine, when
contesteci, the meaning of a provision in an agency's enabling legislation without aIso considering
the consequences that one interpretation, rather than another, would have for the program that the
legislation had been created by the legislature to deliver. The specialist agency is more likeiy than
any reviewing court to be in a position to make an infomed assessrnent of the interpretation that
will enable the program to be most effective. It foiiows, therefore, that if judiciai intervention on
the ground of illegality means h t a reviewing court is encouraged to substitute its interpretation
of legislation for that of the agency, the agency's ability to develop a coherent strategy for
discharging its policy mandate is liable to be undeminecl
A statement which suggests t h d e of law's prescription for one law and equal justice for al1 is stronger
in theory than praetice. The quite mdefSfatl&ble sentiment descriid in this passage by Arthurs is
doubtless common in practice. At a Iuncheon address to the 1996 CBA. immigration Law Conference,
for example, 1 recall a FederaI Court Justice ncountmg bis eXpenence in reviewing a particular case
decision. As he e x p h e d it, he felt comgeiied by the law to confirm the removd of an immigrant
applicant fiom Canada, though the equities of the case apparently troubled him thereafter. He W y
admitted that should the same scenario present itseffagain, he would have no hesitation to decide the case
otherwise. The implication was clear that "justicen wodd be made to prevail over law.

problem: a court's view of '.justice" wiU not necessarily conform to that of the
legislature or of the administrative tribunal it is reviewing."
Functionalists are quick also to point out a number of other significant problems
associated with the practice of judicial review, as it has developed. For example,

although review is said ordinarily not to be concenied with questions of fact, it is
generally a facile matter to convert issues of fact or policy to questions of law."
Moreover, the reality of having courts supervise administrativepractices has the practical

efféct of forcing subordinate tribunais to adhae more closely to formal court-like
processes, than may have bem intended. In particular, the commitment to the adversarial
process, resting as it does upon the notion of individualized processing, robs the
administrative sphere of flexibility in striking "...an appropriate balance between
efficiency and efféctive nghts of participation.'"

Sirnilarly, the judicial preference for

published reasons, rooted in the cornmon law principle of stare decisis, has the effect of
reseicting delegated discretion, since its exercise is thereby subjected to more rigorous

Wiiiis, "Three Approaches to Administrative Law", supra note 22 at 74, echoes the views of Arthm
when he observes that common iaw and equity developed largely h m judges doing what they thought
'%est" under the citcums&nces. It is for this reason that he derides the rule of law as being stronger in
fonn, than in substance. Were it othemkc, he posits that the nile of law's abhorrence of broad powers
vested in public authorities might have stymied the developrnent of the ample social policies for which
Canada is renowned.
H.W. Arthurs, "Protection agaiost Judicial Review" (1983) 43 Revue du Barreau 277 at 284-285.
Willis, "Three A p a c h e s to Aclministrative Law", supra note 22 at 74.
Arthuis, "Protection against Judiciai review", supra note 62 at 289. See also, for example, the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Singh v. Minister of Empfoynient and Immigration, 119851 1 S.C.R. 177, 17
D.L& (4&) 422 (S.C.C.), where arguments conceming administrative efficiency and cost were dealt with

-Y*

W i k , '%e
Approaches to Admhktrative Law", supra note 22 at 74. Willis' views obviously hark
back to a differe~ltera and it is doubtfuf that many today would argue that such scrutiny is necessady a bad
thing. Rather*the argument may have M e d focus to suggest that published reasons may aUow
intervention for the wrong reasons - that because courts have so elevated mdividuai rights, smtiny of
published reasons may tend to focus only on mhor faults and be oblivious to assessrnent of overall justice.

65

Functionalists maintain that the use of procedural faimess as the prhary tool for
defending individual liberty and rights actuaiiy misses the point altogether and causes as
much h m , as good. The demands of "natural justice" and "faimess", they argue, are
more suited to the adversarial processes of the court than of some administrative b o d i e ~ . ~

Rather than enhancing liberty, the procedural f e e s s imposed by courts may actudy
have a dampening effect, inhibiting effective delivery of public pro gram^.^ They point
out that the tendency of bureaucracy is to follow the path of least resistance. Thus, the
true probiem is not that individual rights are in jeopardy, but d e r that the agency

concerned will do as little as is needed to meet the thresholds set by the court.'

The

greater threat, therefore, is that public programs will be under-delivered, with too much
time and energy expended on form and not enough devoted to substance. The problem is

exacerbated by a narrow judicial focus on procedures and immediate parties only, which
effectively forecloses senous consideration of the real purposes for which the legislation
was promulgated. It is a viewpoint that often leads to good individual decisions, but

overail bad law, since both the wider body of intendeci beneficiaries and the public
interest are minor considerations, if considered at dl." The absence of a broader outlook,
involving consideration of the context and totality of the particular program, means that
procedural fairness becomes a substitute for substantivejustice. In such a game, there
may be individual winners, but the reai goals and purposes of the program are left to rest

Arthurs, "Protectionagainst Judicial Reviewn, supra note 62 at 288-289.
supra note 2 at 30.
"Arthufs, ''Rethdchg Achinhative Law", supra note 30 at 24, notes a devehping body of literature
îhat suggests that administrative decision-makers are not ody theoretically committed to obeying law, but
in fact may tend to aiiow discretion to c x y d h e so completely into d e s that they sometimes cease to
fundon effectively, or at least as orighdly man&ted
" Evans,supra note 2 at 30.
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6'Evans,

on a house of cards, more substantial in appmrance than in d t y .

The matter of limited understanding is compounded aiso by judicial procedures
and practices which, though of great antiquity and impeccable pedigree, hobble the
court's ability to expand its horizons and, by extension, those of the administrative world.

In reviewing for legai error, the courts apply canons of statutory interpretation that
assume a word or phrase can have a universal legal rneaning. It is an assumption that
proceeds h m a certain chauvinism that while poiicy may be the province of
administrative agencies, yet it remains for courts alone to interpret legislation and its
application and eEect upon individual rights. The result is that if the agency adopts a
different interpretation to that prefmed by the court, then a reviewable error has
o c c ~ r r e d .However,
~~
the courts have traditionally operateci under a canon of construction
that prevented them h m seeking interpretive guidance outside of the statute itself."
Discretion created under statute must be exercised in accordance with the statute that
creates it. In determinhg whether a body has strayed fiom the limits of what Parliament
intended a power to be exercised for, the canon holds that Parliament's intent is to be

gleaned only fiom the statute, and not nom any traauxprepcruîroires or other secondary
source. This results in the so-cailed Wack box" problem of statutory interpretation,
which can often create a yawnùig gap between policy intent and actual practice, as
pennitted by the courts.

The peculiarities of judicial interpretation have another deleterious side effect.
Statutes are created to teil laypersons how to conduct themselves. However, the arcane

Evans, id. at 29
n Arthu~s,'%thinking Admm~stra
tive Law", supra note 30 at 18.

..

processes of judicial interpretation actually serve to obfuscate, since what is apparent on
the face of the statute rnay w t dways accord with actual court sanctioned practice.
Judicial pronouncements, therefore, may serve to render the law even more
incomprehensiile and inaccessible to the very persons it is meant to serve. Arthurs
suggests a number of reasons for the traditional reluctance of courts to go outside the four

corners of a statute in their efforts at interpretation. These include a preference for
symmetry and consistency over actual objectives, a sense of devotion to ancient common
law dictates that eschew resort to extrinsic evidence and the possibility of a low yield in
results insuiEcient to justify the effort needed to pick through extraneous e ~ i d e n c e .His
~
own inclination, however, is for a theory which suggests that the bias against outside
evidence actually springs fiom a desire to remain true to the Diceyan ideal of one law for
dl, which does not countenance development of separate rules for specialized groups or
interests?
Whatever the reason, Arthurs argues that the courts' attitude to interpretation
should Vary, depending upon whether it is exercising primary jurisdiction or a review
hction. He notes that ifreviewing a tribunal, then the court should be sensitive to the
fact that parliament chose to repose its trust in the interpretation of the îribunal, which

may be expert in the matter. Though there is now a developing trend in this direction, at
least in the case of tribunah considered expert by the courts, it does not enjoy wide
application since only a very few specialized tribimals have actudy been accorded

"fiid. at 19.
"f i i d See also ibid. at 26, for example. whae he notes that one component of the d
same legd d e s be appiicablc to ail equalIy.

e of law is that the

He chmisses this as "nonsense", citing the example of C

immunities, and asserthg that it is in fact a common practice to nnd iaws that are meant to be applied

m

"expert" status." Interpretation of legislation is the business of the courts and so they
continue to prefer their ownjudgment to that of ''infaor" tribrmals. Coincidentally, this
preference for court-like interpretations arrived at through court-like methods has a
homogenizing effect that may serve to stifle innovation and creativity in bureaucratie
procedures and processes? According to Arthurs:

Having judges review administrative processes may have fesulted in a tendency to
teil administrators "do as we do" as well as "do as we say". The legacy of
Dicey's rule of Iaw clearly has developed a culture that produced predictable
results. The structure and staffing of tribimals, the specification of their fimctions
and procedures, and the provision of broad rights of appeal are molding tnbunals
which tend to be more court-like. Life is comllig to resemble art."
In particular, the courts' Litigation mode1 focuses attention primarily on the
individual parties to a suit. The result is an emphasis on processes for protection of

individual nghts which tends to downplay the public interest component of public
programs. Certady, in the immigration sphere, the courts in recent years have been
vigorous in circumscribing discretionary power, both substantive and procedural, usually

One teliing result of this
citing the right of applicants to faimess as the ju~tification.~
selectively to particular individuais or groups.
74 T
he question of curial deference to tribunai expertise, and the related issue of pnvative ciauses, are
matters of some controversy. However, they are not ones which directly affect the subject matter of this
study and so are not be canvassed in aay depth. Suffice to say that there are no pnvative clauses affkcting
immigration. See, for example, Connor et al. v. Canada (Min. of Cirizenship & Immigration) (1995), 95
F.TR 66 at 68 where the Court noted that "...the statutory provisions of the Immigration Act indicate that
privative-clause type deference is not intended" Speaking of the I U . in particular, the Court added tbat
it did not accord a high degree of deference to decisions of that tri'bunaî, since it did not consider the 1.R.B.
to be expert in the same way that a securities commission might be expert in a technical area. Similarl~~
the courts have not k e n inclined to regard visa officers as any sort of expert decision-makers and so have
no hesitancy in reviewing overseas immigration decisions. For more information on the subject of
precIusive clauses and judicial defmnce to t n i i d expertise generally, see Evans.supra noh 2 at 813 965.
" Arthurs, "Retfiinlcing Admmisnative Law", supra note 30 at 28, notes that there i
s Little dispute that
giving supervisory jurisdiction to courts has affected the development of administrative iaw.
76 Id. at 38.
For a more detaiied discussion and specific examples of this phenornenon, see g e n d y Chapter 3
below.

attitude is perhaps seen in fkquent amendments to the Act and Regu2ation.s that have been
undertaken to preserve administrative flexiiility and eniciency. Where the loss of
discretion has had serious resource or other implications for CIC, legislative amenciments
invoking new d e s to replace the discretion have been necessary. Administrators have

thus been forced into a situation of creating an ever more detailed, court-like regime of
intncate rules and obscure procedures to meet judicial objections conceming discretion.
Fominately for administraton, however, d e s c m be fashioned not just to
safeguard appiicant rights, but also to preserve administrative convenience. Though
statutory and regdatory changes have been necessary in some instances, these are more
of a nuisance than an obstacle. On the 0th- hand, however, there must be some doubt as
to whether the court driven move to a p a t e r mass of more explicit niles has been a
victory for applicants and the protection of their interests. A more complex
administrative regime appears to do litt1e to facilitate greater access to the immigration

system or to enhance overall substantivejustice in that system. This is particularly so
when one considers the clientele involved and the barriers many of them face in terms of
their geographic location, language ability, access to competent legal advice on Canadian
Law and the like. An ever more detailed regime of intncate d e s and obscure procedures,
spelling out in more particularity what may or may not be done, simply adds additional
complexity difficult for many applicants to overcome. It is ironic to consider that the
singuiar focus on individual rights, rather than making immigration processes fairer and
more user fiendly, may have had the opposite result. It is not surpnsing, therefore, that
the use of private immigration advisers has spiraleci a s applicants find themselves
increasingly unable to comprehend the myriad rules now applicable even to a "routine"

application. At the same time, a spint of increasing litigiousnessnhas focused ever more
judicial attention on immigration law with the d

t that opportunities for judicid

intervention have also expanded. And so it is that the circle becomes complete, with
more attention and intemention begetting more detailed nile making.
Functionalists, however, wouid prefer less emphasis on individual nghts and more
on the purposes of the legislation and the public policy it is rneant to fbrther. Intheir
view, the methods and processes of the administrative agency shouid be shaped mostly
by the needs of its mandate and public. Ifthis means a large amount of autonomy and

divergence in the practices of administrative agencies, then so be it? AU of this wodd
simply be a reflection of the reaiities of the mandate and more likely to carry forward the

mission of providing greater good to more persans?

" Se+ for example, External Affairs and International Trade Cana& - Al1 Immigration Mission Message
ORD-0074(18October 1991)"Federal Court Challenges". That message descnies a reahtion by
departmental officiais of a change in the ways of overscas immigration processiog, raarked chiefly by an
atmosphere of increased litigation. The document desm'bes a number of departmental strategies for
dealing with same, including mation of a "Litigation Advisoi' position at Headquarters to liaise between
Department of Justice cowisel (who conduct immigration Litigation on bebalfof CIC)and visa officers in
the field. Other initiatives rneant to hclp officers cope with the workload flowing fiam increased litigation
include more training on litigation, human rights and privacy matters, provision of more detailed guidelines
and better reportmg on and analysis of court decisions impactmg field operations
7s See for example. John WiiIis, "The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values" (1968)
18 U.T.L.J. 351. In his reply to the McRuer report, supra note 41,Willis states that its recommendation to
have a mandatory code of statutory procedures goveming administrative maters is simply wrong. In his
view, one of the essentiai features of administrative t r i i d is a less complicated process. At 358-359,he
notes:
If you set up mandatory statutory codes of minimum procedural decencies, however devised, you
di,in my view, inevitably reintroduce into 'non-court' deciding authorities the 'court'
atmosphere that they were createdto avoid - where foliowing the presmied ritual is more
important than gethg at the rnerits, and strings of procedural objections are reguiarly made for no
other purpose than to give the Iawyer who loses on the ments a second string to his bow in the
court of review."
Instead, he argues for what he cab the princïple of 'iiniqueness". "Inat the question of who, ifanyone,
shouid have the nght to overturn the decisions of what authorities on what issues is one that can be
answered only in consideration of ail of the circumscances of the situation at hand The factors are m a and varied and include cornmonsense considerationssuch as speed, expense, expertise?'public opinion'
and many other factors too numemus to mention."
* Arthum, ''Rethhking Admhhtmtivt Law", supra note 30 at 29.

Thus, while fimctionalists have serious misgivings about the appropriateness of
courts as a review forum for administrative action, they do not question the need for a

review mechanism. It is simply that the courts' inadequaîe understanding of the
particular subject matter leaves them best suited to deciding questions of law or
jurisdiction, but nothing more? Particularly in the case of exercise of a discretion, they
feel that what is needed is broader training and experience than just that of pure law and

legal practice. In short, the position is that review panels supenking discretions require
members whose background and expexience encompass the totality of administrative law
and the special purposes for which the particular legislation was enacted Only with

proper appreciation of the entire context in which the decision-making was rendered, is a
reviewing body in a proper position to pass upon the propriety of a specific decision.'*
And indeed, there is some reaiization on the part of courts that they are effectively

outsiders, asked to peer into the b e r workings of a clock whose operation they do not
f U y comprehend. It is for this reason, for example, that they daim no overt interest in
the substance of a reviewed decision and limit their supervision to matten of procedure

alone." This is not to suggest that the administrative realm is entirely fiee of its own

'' There are, of course, other opinions as to the fitness of courts as review panels for administrative
includmg that:
decisions. Wade, supra note 36 at 12, notes some advantages in favour of CO-,
The citizen can turn to courts of high standing in the public esteem, whose independence is
beyond question;
Highly efficient rernedies are available;
There are none of the demarcation problems of division of jurisdictions; and
Goverment is seen to be subject to the iaw of the land
* W ü h , "The Approaches to Administrative Law", supra note 22 at 80.
* Willis, id. at 61-62, who also notes an increase in the classes of discretions that courts were prepared to
control, expansion in the grounds of error for which review wodd lie and the courts evasion of privative
clauses that purportcd to deprive them of jurisdiction to conduct review. In his opinion, such developments
are indicative of "judicialhostility"toward discretionarypower. Of course, thmgs have moved on since
Willis wrote tfus more than 60 years ago, and the range and breadth of areas now covered by administrative
tn'bunais has increased as complexity in society has incrcased Simuitaneously, however, the court's

problems. One of the dangers cited against administrativetribunals by Dicey, for
example is acknowledged by fiinctionalists as a serious concem. It is the problem of such

tribunalsbeing too subject to political influence by the legislatures which establish
h m . " However, for them, it is simply a case of ensuring that proper precautions, such

as sufncient autonomy, are enshrined in any enabhg statute. The danger is not W c i e n t
to justify the courts being the only suitable oversight mechanism.
Although criticizing courts on the one hand as ill-suited to review of
administrative tribunals, fiuictionalists have not shnmk fiom offering suggestions on the
other as to how review by courts might be improved. Presumably, their advocacy for an

alternative review mechanism has been tempered by a certain pragmatism as to the actual
likelihood of courts being completely separated h m this activity. This may in fact be
the strength of fhctionalism and the reason for its continuhg relevame. Though

advocating an alternative vision, yet it has also offered insights for improving the existing
regime." Nonetheless, it is clear that a more positivïstic, d e of law approach continues
to prevail as the dominant approach of the courts in their consideration of discretions in
immigration law and the resuits are manifested in the emphasis on individual rights that
presentiy obtains.

1.4

Why have discretion?
In the Canadian constitutional tradition, Parliament and the provincial legislatures
-

-

--

-

jurisdiction to mpenrise procedurai error has not slackened It is particularly interesthg to note principles
and attitudes developed years ago may continue even today to show vigor and vitafity in the modem
practice of admbistmtive law.
~4 Arthurs, "RethinlcingAchhktrative Law", supra note 30 at 34.
rss See for example. Evans, supra note 2 at 3 1, who observes that functionabmhas become a significant

are sovefeign within their own defked areas of legislative cornpetence. A consequence
of this sovereignq is that they are fke to delegate some or aU of their authorïty to a
Thus, legislation is often drafted
subordinate agency or body, as they deem appro~riate.~

in a %are bones" fashion, with authority for creation and implementation of compendious
regulations setting out the procedures and niles by which an Act is to be carrïed out
passed on to a subordinate body? And indeed, it is delegation of authority that is the
very heart and soul of administrative law. As Wade notes, the reality is that very few

legal objectives are a c W y achieved by the mere enactment and promulgation of
statutes, regulations and orders? Rather, the real work of împlementing legislative intent

and delivering public programs is generally carried on outside of the legislat~re.~
The
creation of boards, tnbunals and other authonties, to whom power is delegated, is the
ordinary means by which that end is accomplished. So it is, in particular, that the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Immigration and
Refugee Board (RB) have been created and empowered to carry out goals and objectives
set out in the Immigration AcP (hereinafter the "Act '7and Immigration ReguIations9'

innuence in Canadian administrative law m recent years, ameliorating some of the shortcomings of Dicey's
positivist approach.
'6 David P. Jones & Anne S. deVilïars, Pnnciples of Administrative Lmv,2d ed. (Scarborough: CarsweU,
1994) at 27.
* Peter W. Hogg, Cunrtihctional Lmv of Canada, 3d e d (Scarborough, Ont: Carsweii, 1992) at 339-340,
notes a practicai justification as to why delegation occurs:
It is impossible for the federal Parliament or any provincial Legisiature to enact al1 ofthe laws that
are needed in its jurisdiction for the purpose ofgovemment in any given year. When a Iegislative
scheme is estabiished, the Parliament or the Legislawill usuaiiy enact the scheme in outline
oniy, and wiü delegate to a subordinate body the power to make laws on matters of detail, The
subordinate body (or delegate) to which this iaw-malring power is delegated is most cornmonly
the Governor in Council or the Lieutenant Govemor in Councii; each of th- bodies is in practice
the cabinet of the govemment concerned [footnote omitted].
Wade, supra note 36 et 4.
IEJSee generally Evans, supra note 2 at 4-20.
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(hereinafter the "Regulations'3. Although the former is an actual department of
government and the latter a semi-autonomous boardg2,both are subordinates of and must

take instruction h m Parliament, in order to carry forward the aims and objectives of

Parliament in respect of immigration matters."
In the words of the curent Minister of Immigration, Lucienne Robillard,
"[i]mmigration issues are rarely cut and W.'" Because of this, while black and white
mies provide the foundation of the immigration program, their imprecision is recognized
and provided against by the device of discretionary authority. Without question, the

central justification for grants of broad administrative discretion has been the
impracticality of devishg legislation sUaciently ample to deal with every possible
contingency and permutation of circurnstances which c m and do occur in the course of
administering of legislation. As Evans notes:
When they enact a regulatory statute, legislatures cannot foresee or answer many
of the policy questions that will inevitably arise in the course of delivering the

'' immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR178-172, as am" See S. 66 of the Act which provides that the IRB shall report to Pariiament through the Minister for
Citizenship & Immigration. See also CIC, Canada 's lmnigtation Law (Ottawa: Ministem of Supply and
Services Canada, 1992), at 23, footnote 2, where it is stated: ''The Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) is
an independent decision-making body. It is empowered under the immigration Act to hear appeals in one
division and detemime refugee status in the other. ...Ali board members are appointed through the
Governor In CounciI."
There are, of course, signincant differences between govemment departments and independent or semiautonomous administrative tribunais.
"Civil servants ...are normally subject to the instructions of their supenors in the hierarchy and to
departmental policy, for which the müister is dtimately responsïble. in contrast, members of
independent administrative agencies are in law immune h m directions fkom coiieagues,
including the agency chair, on how they should decide a givm case.. .Awell publicized exarnple
was the resignation in 1995 of the deputy chair of the IRB following degations by members that
he had tried to "pressure" them over decisions that he regarded as out of line with Board policy.
The problem is that it is very difflcult to reconcile the notion that members shodd enjoy the sarne
degree of autonomy as judges, with the need to ensure that agency decisions made in the
implementation of a public program a .both consistent and mformed by the collective wisdom
and experience of the agency as an institution-" Per Evans, mpra note 2 at 13,
p. CK, News Release # 98-20, "1997 Report Shows the Niimber of Minister's P d t s h e d Holding at
the 1996 Lever' (2 April1998) at 3.

program that they have established. Hence, the broad grants of discretion given
to many independent administrative agencies that they may exercise to make
additional d e s or formulate policies, or case by case?'

Thus, while the Immigration Act and RegrrZatiom paint a reasonably detailed picture of

who may immigrate to Canada, and under what circumstances, they still are insufncient
to provide complete and specific guidance as to the appropriate disposition in every case.
Proper fblfillment of the goals and aims of the Act and Reguiations would be impossible
without a delegation of at least some discretionary authority over the subject matter of
immigration law to the bodies that administer it. Such authority provides essential
latitude for tailoring extant rules to suit irregular situations. for extrapolating beyond the
d e s to deal with cases not directly envisioned or encompassed by the statutory regime or

to permit a determination whether the d e s are at dl applicable in any given instance.

The problem of formulating laws and d e s that c m anticipate and respond
appropriately to every potential scenario is particularly acute in the case of immigration
law, which mus&be capable of implementation both domestically and abroad.
Regdations that seem to make sense in a domestic setting often c m prove difficult of
appkation and interpretation in a foreign context. The matta is M e r complicated by a
sometimes parochial view possessed by legislators. Manbers of Parliament corne nom
many waiks of life and of€enpossess a wide variety of professional backgrounds. But
few have significant experience working or living outside Canada and, more particularly,
Little practical understanding of the diversity of environments within which our
immigration legislation operates abroad. Likewise, the legislative agenda is sometunes
manipulateci in favour of domestic political concems that pay scant attention to the
-

9s

-

-

-

-

Evans, supra note 2 at 17.

problems of global application. AU of this leaves Parliament somewhat myopic to the
problems of implementing and attministering extemalîy law created in Canada, largely
pursuant to a domestic worldview.

Two examples serve to illustrate the problem. Under a former version of the
Regu~ationPY
permanent residents or citizens of Canada were entitIed to sponsor for

immigration to Canada ail of their "dependents", which group included children, parents

and grandparents of the sponsor. The sponsored immigrants were entitled to have dl of
their dependents accompany the-

as weil. The term "dependents" was defined to

encompass all of the immigrant's children of any age, so long as those children had never
been rnarried. Those children were entitleâ, in nirn,to bring with them ail of their never
married children, of any age, and so on down the line. The policy objective sought to be

fkrhered by this d e was (and still is) ". ..to facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian
citizens and permanent residents with their close relatives nom abroad.. ..[emphasis
added]'"

Given this, it is unlikely that legislators had in mind groups of fifty or sixty

people, spanning several generations of a family, being sponsored for immigration to
Canada by a single sponsor. Yet, this was the not uncornmon result when the rule was
put into practice abroad. This led to two concerns about constitution of the family class.
The first centered on who should nghthilly be a member of it and the second related to
just how large a sponsored group of family members shodd be. In choosing the phrase

SOW88-286,19 May, 1988 ( o h referred to as "J88'3. In particular, see paragraph 1 of the Schedule
which amended the definition of "dependant" so that a sponsor m Canada codd sponsor ail of then never
d e d children of any age, as well as any iinmarr;edchildren of such a chiJd,
The Act, supra note 14, s3(c).
9g 1recall king told that the unofficiai record for a single p u p migration under this rule was over 70
persons, though 1 have not been able to verify this number. Sunice to say, in my experience, 1have seen
single groups of up to 20 persans.
%

'hever m&ed children" to d e s d e those who might be sponsored, it is doubtfid that

parliamentarians intended that one sponsor should assume the burden for settling so many

people, at one t h e , into Canadian society? Likewise, parliamentarians came to realize
that some persons intended to be in the family class were being excluded and other

persons, not meant for inclusion, were in fact being found eligible.'" It seems evident
that the traditional Canadian normlO1,where marriage in the third or fourth decade of iife
is common, was the conceptual foundation for the mle. Legislators iikely failed to

* The problem of sponsorship breakdowns doubtless contriiuted in part to the later reformulation of the
"dependent" definition to lîmit it to persons who, in addition to bemg unmatried, are under 19 years of age.
See s-2(1) of the current Regulations. Because selection in this category took no account of an
immigrant's skills, resources, language abiiities and other factors relatmg to settlement potential, even
someone without any hope of self-sufficiency in the domestic economy could be granted entry. Even for a
prosperous sponsor, the reaIity of providing for a large number of unemployable persons posed significant
burdens that could sometimes overwheIm both incIination and ability to provide support. In such
instances, the faiIure of sponsorship support was disastrous for both the immigrants and the public purse.
The problem of sponsorsbip breakdowns remains an ongoing one, with an estimated 14% of sponsored
immigrants continuing to seek social assistance after arrivai in Canada. See for example, CIC Doily Wrap
- Sommaire Quotidien fiereinafier Daiiy Wrap), "Departmental IssuedQuestions Propres au Ministre" (15
December 1997) 1 at 3, detailing a plan by the Peel Region m Ontario to bring action in court against
sponsors who default on their obligations to cover the expenses of persons they have sponsored for
permanent residmce in Canada. Citing stories carrïed on 13 December 1997 in the Ottawa Citizen, London
[Ontanq Free Press and Winnipeg Free Press, the report notes that sponsorshipsare generally entered
into for a ten year period, during which the sponsor is liable for the settlement of the immigrant Peel
Region intends to set up a pilot to sue sponsors to recover welfare payments made to any immigrant
covered by a sponsorship agreement that is still in effkct.
'O0 The incongrnous results possible under the J88 Regdations were illustrated by an example given in a
press release by the (then) Minister of EmpIoyment and immigration, Bernard Valcourt, announcing
changes to the Famiiy Ciass definition in 1992. See Employment and Immigration Cana& (EIC), News
Release 92-1 1, "Changes to the immigration Regulations on the definition of dependency" (20 March
1992). In that release, the Ministet is quoted as saying that changes were to the Family Class definition
were undertakmin order to more accutely "..,reflect the Canadian concept of f a d y dependency." An
example of the type of situation that o h occurred under 588 is given, at 2, where it is stated:
The new regdations replace existing rules which state that children of any age could be sponsored
or included in Family CIass applications as long as they had never marrieci. The current d e s [ie.
J88 d e s ] bave created situations where, for exampIe, pafents could bring in a self-sufficient, 50year-ald bachelor son but not a dependent, 18-year-old daughter who had been widowed
'O' It is beyond the scope of this papa to a d y z e Canadian marriage mnds. The phrase 4'traditional
Canadian norm" is used in recognition of the fact that, Wre so many other aspects of society, b a g e
pattenis and conceptions of w h t constitutes a family unit are not static. 1am reiafotced in my view,
however, that a more traditional view of marriage was involveci in the formulation of the family class
definition by the fact that no accomt was taken of so-cailed "cornmon Law" and "same-sex" rnarriages.
For more on this, see infia note 120 and accompanying text.

account, however, for the fact that in some comtrieP, formal marriage ties of the type
common in Canada (and hence recognized under the Immigration Act), may be
u n c o ~ ~ ~ ~'O5n o n *

Another illustration concerns the method by which Independent category

immigrants are selected.Iw Such applicants are chosen precisely for their potential to
become quickly established in Canada and immediately participate in and contribute to
the economy. To qualim, each applicant is assessed according to a number of factors that

cover such items as level of education, language abihty and vocational training and
e~perience.'~
Under the assessment process, each factor is gauged according to a regime
that allocates a certain number of points for every level of attalnment or achievement. A

score of 70 points is seen as indicative of likely success in the Canadian economy and so
is t h e minimum ordinary threshold for an application t o be approved.

Educational assessment provides one example of the difficuities of interpretation
and application of our immigration Iaw abroad. Since a reasonable level of educationai

For example, my &st foreign assignment as a visa officer was to Jamaica After o d y a short time living
and working there, it became apparent that a paradigm of marriage and f d y different fiom the Canadian
nom, was widespread, û d y in a minority of cases were formal marriage ties of the type common in
Canada, involving elaborate wedding rituais and the necessity of a license, seen. Instead, the "commonlad' scenario was much more common, Of course, this is simply anecdotal evidence fiom rny own
observations and there is an obvious question as to how much inauence Canadian immigration d e s may
have had upon marriage patterns amongst intending immigrants. Again, such a question is beyond the
focus of this study.
'O3 It shouid be noted that the regdation was absolute, pennitting of no discretion. Once the famiiy
relationship was pmven, the entitlementto the immigrant visa was subject only to universal statutory
requirements relatmg to public heaith and safety concerns.
Three broad categories for Qualification as an immigrant are established under Canadian mimigration
iaw. These include the family class (persons within a prescribed degrec of consanguinity who have been
sponsored by their Canadian resident relative), refiigees (persans fleeing persecution) and independents
(persans applying on their own initiative). See generally S. 6 of the Act and Cànadz 's Immigration Law,
supra note 92 at 6-10. Also see Lorne Waldman, Immigration Law and Ractice, vol. 2 (Markharn, Ont.:
Butterworths, 1992) at 13.1- 13.2.
'Os Schedule I, Immigration Regulations. See aIso below, Appendix A to this study, which sets out the
selection factors.

attainment is generally recognized to provide a greater Ucelihood for successfùl
establishment in the current economy, the points awarded under this factor increase in
proportion to the level of education. However, educationai systems can Vary
considerably even within a single country and so it is no surprise that there may be even
more variation between corntries and regions of the world. What might seem at fïrst
dance a simple matter of specifjing, say a high school diploma, as the minimum
acceptable level of attainment, may become an unusually complex matter to determine in

practice. Since the Canadian n o m is twelve years of education for a high school
diploma, one rnight think that s p e c w g twelve years of education would be the end of

the matter. In Yang v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Imrnigrati~n)'~,
however, the
applicant presented evidence to show that, in Taiwan,n o d secondary schooling ends

d e r a total of nine years, with many applicants often proceeding to a college thereafter
for up to five more years. In this case, the court had to detemine whether the equivalent

of a Canadian high school diploma was gained after the nine year period of secondary
~
fornation, or whether it was dependent upon a further five years of ~ o l l e g e . 'This
exampte illustrates, in a minor way, the difficulties often encountered when a system of
niles seeks to rneasure foreign equivalents against domestic standardS.la Ifthere is to be
17 III1IILLK (2d) 229.
In this case, the court fouci, sensibly, that the couege was also to be considered part of the secondary
education for which uni& of assessrnent were to be awarded under the educationai assessrnent system then
in place under the Act. That system aliowed a maximum of 12 points for eclucatioa, being 1 unit for each
year leadmg to completion of secondary schooling. The system did not award points for any years of
education beyond high school and so it was m r t a n t for the applicant to have the college considered, in
order to obmin fbil assessment uni&.
Even p a t e r diffIculties are encountered m the area of vocationai experiencc and guslincation, which
are assessed pursuant to Factors 2 and 3 in Scherhile 1of the Regdations. The system for qualification in a
parti& occupation in one country may bear iittie resembiance to that of another country. Likewise, an
occupation calleci one thing in one locale may be entirely different fiom a similarly titled occupation in
another country.
Irn

"

a fit, inevitably some flexibility and common sense is needed to square the two. A more
fade course of action, of course, rnight be to simply disregard personai and professional
quafitities md me&,

and simply select on the basis of a quota or some other objectively

and readily identifiable criterion. Howeva, such a method does not facilitate selection
for those qualities and attributes which, over time, have been determined to show the best
results, vis-à-vis selecting immigrants possessing the skilis and talents to contniute
readily and meaningfidly to the Canadian economic and social milieu.

It is unlikely

therefore, that the basic scheme of individuai selection will soon be abandoned for

independents, notwithstanding the difficdties inherent in such selection pro~ess.~~O
The Immigration Act and Regulatiom are f i k d to overfiowing with laws and
d e s and regulations.Ii1 Stili, they are inadequate to deal with the multitude of potential
situations and permutations that m u t inevitably mise in the course of dealhg with an
extremely diverse cross-section of humanity, hailing h m every corner of the world. A
combination of personal circumstances and individual characteristics. affecteci by

indigenous conditions, cultures and traditions, and acted upon by local laws, standards
'O9 See for example, CIC,Into the 2 l a Cenîury: A Strategyfor Immigration and Citîzemhip (Ottawa: Min.
of SuppIy and Services, 1994) at 28. One justification for selection on the bas% of skills and abilities is
that "[r]esearch shows that immigrants sefected for their slcills and abilities are more likely to earn higher
incomes than other immigrants, and more k l y to contribute to the economy without resorting to welfare
or making use of publicly-fiinded settlementprogramsw. The independent category thus is seen as
something of a counterbalance to the more humanionented programs found under the refugee and
family classes. The independent class is a dehierate attempt to focus on and boister the economy, which is
not a devant consideration in the o t h a two categories.
"O Indeed, the government's plan is to a c W y increase the proportion of independent immigrants in the
overaii immigration p h See CIC,Into The 2P*Century, ibid., at ix, in the Executive S
v where,
amongst other initiatives, it is noted that, m future, CIC intends that "...a greater &are of immigrants will
be selected on the basis of their ability to contriiute to Canada's economic and social development,
reducing d e d on integration services...."
' I L Certainly, the weaIth of d e s that now govems immigration law appears to be borne out by the sheer
size of the cunent Immigration Act. See for example Margaret Young, Background Paper, "Immigration:
Constitutionai Issues" (October, 1991) (Lib. OfParliament Restarch Branch) at 3, where the author

-

and qualifications, aii conspire to ensure that e v q applicant is unique. Under such
circumstances, application of any immigration law or rule, no matter how cleverly and
clearly devised, wili inevitably be faced with tough cases - classic problems of "square
pegs and round holes". It is for this reason that legislative drafting, paaicularly in
immigration law, tends to be more of an exercise in the law of averages, rather than one
of microscopie precision. The situation was succinctly cap-

by Dickson C.J.C.(as he

then was) who, though speaking more g e n d y , once noted that, "[aJbsolute precision in
the law exists rarely, if at alI."t12
Related to the impracticality of devising sufficiently comprehensive niles to cover

every contingency is the problern of legislative intent- A slippery concept at best,
legislative intent is a perennid source of frustration to courts and administrative tribunals

alike. Even the best example of legislative craftsmanship will nequently be found
wanting in clarity and specificity as to the intent of its fiamers. Yet, it remains a sine qua
non of our legal system that intent is to be given effkct to, no matter how obtuse or
obscure it may be. Perhaps hoping to avoid such obfuscation, Canada's Immigration Act
incorporates a somewhat unique section, at l e s t for Canadian law, detailing the
objectives that Parliament hoped to firrther- The Act provides as follows:

...Canadian immigration policy and the d e s and regdations made under this Act
shall be designeci and administered in such a manner as to promote the domestic
and international interests of Canada recognizing the need
(a) to support the attainment of such demographic goals as may be established by
the Government of Canada in respect of the size, rate of growth, structure and
geographic distribution of the Canadian population;
obsaven that the Canada's nrst immigration statue in 1869 had 14 pages, while the 1952 Act had 34 pages
and the present Act posscsses 122.
Attorney ~ e n e r d
of Quebec v. Invh Toy Dd.; Moreau et aL. Inteneners (1989) 58 D.L.R.(4"') 577 at

"'

617.

to enrich and strengthen the cultural and social fabric of Canada, taking into
account the f d d and bilingual character of Canada;
to facifitaie the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens and permanent
resident with their close relatives h m abroad;
to encourage and faciltate the adaptation of persons who have been granted
admission as permanent residents to Canadian society by promoting
cooperation between the Govermnent of Canada and other levels of
govemment and non-govemmental agencies in Canada with respect thereto;
to facilitate the entry of visitors into Canada for the purpose of fostering trade
and commerce, tourism, cultural and scientific activities and international
understanding;
to ensure that any pason who seeks admission to Canada on either a
permanent or temporary basis is subject to standards of admission that do not
discriminate in a manner inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms;
to fulnl Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees and
to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and the
penecuted;
to foster the development of a strong and viable economy and the prosperity
of al1 regions in Canada;
to maintain and protect the health, safety and good order of Canadian society;
and
to promote intemational order and justice by denying the use of Canadian
temtory to persons who are likely to engage in criminal a~tivity.'~~
Each of these ten objectives is Iaudable and sensible. Taken together, however,
they achially exacerbate the challenge of discerning legislative intent and rnay even
hinder the possibilities for precise subordinate d e formulation. Some of the objectives

are rneant to be facilitative, some are control oriented, and still others contain elernents of
both approaches. There is no stipulation, however, as to whether they are al1 to be
considered of the same urgency or priorw. Likewise, they are also not mutudy
exclusive, with the result that any two or more may potentially be applicable in any given
case. It is in this flurry of f k q objectives that CIC goes about its work of interpreting

and applying rules of general application on a global basis. Can a system that is founded

upon a desire to be "ail things to ail people" work without some discretionary authority in

its interpretation and application? Not Likely.

The only workable solution, therefore, is a relativistic approach, with objectives
shifting up and d o m a scale of prionty, depending upon the particda. facts at hand.
Whether the f d y reunification objective is to be favoured over the public safety
objective, for example, may depend upon the seriousness of the threat to public safety
that a paaicular applicant poses. A senal killer poses a more serious risk than does a

habitua1 thie£ In the latter case, the deleterious consequences of d o r c e d family
sepration may be seen to outweigh the risk of fbture criminal activity in Canada With

the example of the serial killer, however, it is difficdt to imagine the existence of
sufEcient equities to tip the balance away from the public protection objective.I1' It is

apparent from these examples that discretion is axiomatic to a sensible, defensible and
sustainable application of the diverse objectives of the Act. A rote system, listing
objectives in descending priority, might provide greater certsiuity but, in practice, would
be likely to resuit in much hardship and dissatisfaction. It would aiso be less likely to
accord with fundamental societal notions of how justice and faimess are to be achieved.
Similarly, the Act S objectives reflect the broad base of understanding and popular
support upon which our immigration program is founded. Eliminating any of the
objectives, or blindly favouring one over another, might well imperil that support.

"'For a recent example of the public safety objetive bemg favoured over famiIy teunification, see
Estanisho Opewicz, Tamily ties trip up wodd-be immigrant" ï7ze (Toronto) Globe and Mail (30June
1997) A 1. The article details the case of Gerlando Sciascia who was sponsored m the f d y class for
immigration to Cana& by bis son. Mr. Sciascia is alleged to be a Mafia member, connected to the Cosa
Nostra Bonnano organized crime family m New York. Nthough he withdrew his application for
immigration after the degations surface4 the Canadian C o d in New York is noted as stating that "no
h u m a n i e or conipassionate grounds would overcome Mr. Sciascia's inadmissibility to Canada."

The consequences of inadequate balancing of objectives are not to be understated.
Aùnost invariably, a poor weighing of objeçtives resuits in significant and SuSfained

media notoriety that leaves public confidence in immigration policy shaken. Even where
the favouring of one objective is inadvertent or perhaps even unavoidable (say, for
example, an applicant has skilfully misled immigration authorities), the nature of the

media is such that oniy the most sensational aspects of a case will be reported. Although

such instances are comparatively few, they always garner much attention and generaiiy
make nont-page news headlinesn5 From a practical standpoint, therefore, discretion is
essential to achieving a delicate, and yet fluid, balancing and weighing of priorities that
must occur in each and every case.

Words are the building blocks used to construct d e s . Yet words are ~

O ~ O ~ O U S

will O' the wisps, drawing as much fiom context and background, as fkom inherent
meaning. Qwte commonly, words which have a particular and specific meaning in
ordinary parlance may suddeniy be found, by judiciai interpretation, to mean something
entirely differmt, or even opposite, to that ordinary meaning.lI6 Likewise, the meaning of
words has a tendency to change and shift with tirne, usage and context. It is impossible,
See for example, Miro Cemetig, " h g suspect let into Canada'' The (Toronto) Globe and Mail (22
December 1993) A 1. ui that case, Lee Chau Ping,the so-cded '?ce Queen of Southeast Asia", obtained
an immigrant visa as a busmess immigrant in the Independent category. Ms. Ping is aUeged to have been
the kingpin behind an organization that manufacturedand cüstri'buted worldwide an illicit drug known as
"ice". She apparently has gone underground since "fanding"in Canada and has yet to nirnup.
Nonetheles, the sustained media notonety that this case has engendered weli illustrates the need for
careful bdancing of objectives in every instance. This case is a .example where, whether advertenly or
not, the econornic development objective that guides the business immigration program was given
precedence over the pubiic protection objective. The resultant fhor leaves iittle doubt that few would
Il5

agree with the *%aiance" that was struck.
'16 See for example, the word "shall", which is ordinarily understood to be mandatory. However, in certain
conte* courts will fïnd it, instead, to be merely permissive. The same is tnie &O for the word "may"
which is ordinariiy undersfood to be permissive. "'In the interpretation of statutes, it has often been ruled
that may is to be mderstood as @valent to &al1 or must". R. v. S. (S.) (1WO), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 115 at 128,

therefore, for legislative drafters to conceive of every possible twist of circiunstsnce,
interpretation and usage in advance. In the end, they are often forced to settle for doing
what can feasibly be done; create laws premised upon and dealing with the "average"
case.

At the same tirne, however, the inadequacy of d e s remains troubling. Inevitably,
it seems, not all desenhg cases are included by the d e s , nor all unworthy ones
excluded. These are the situations it is presumed that the legislature intended, or should

have intended, to capture, but which the vagaries of language and paucity of draf€er's
imagination coospired to prevent being reduced to paper. Our sense of justice and
propriety do not permit a complete abandonment of responsibility for equity and fairness
to the shortcomings of statutory drafting and interpretation.'17 The result is that legislative

intent is fixed upon as a way to make up for the deficiencies of words. Lf parliamentary
intent is to be favoured, and there is iittle doubt that we do favour intent over black and
white words, then some means of "supplementing" the d e s must be incorporated into

the system. It is here that the "'equity" of discretion meets and comrningles with the
"common law" of formal, ngid rules. Discretion is the modem 6'chancellor's foot" and
comes in a size suited to fit every shoe. It is just the item to infuse some common sense
into the rules, ensuring that justice and fair play are not heedlessly overlooked, nor

unduiy taken advantage of '18 Flexibiiity, then, is the inhaent, dominant characteristic of

129,77 C R (3d) 273.1 IO N E 321, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254,49 C.R.R 79,41 O.A.C. 8 1, per Dickson C.J.C.
This sort of thinking is even part of a ' s own corporate d h u e and is captured in the foliowing
statement: "Canadians' belief that every human king should be treated with fairness and dignity must be

reflected in the policies and practices of their governmat." CIC,Into The 2ls* Centwy, supra note 109, at
xiv.
Il8 See for example Ca11 Schneider, '?>iscretionand Rules: A Lawyer's View" in Keith Hawkins, ed, The
Usesof Discretion, supra note 9,47 at 56, where the author maka the ironic point that our common Iaw

discretionary power, allowing the blunt edges of the law to be sofieneà to suit our own
notions of what may be just in any given situation.
But discretion is more than just flexibility. It is also innovation. Once cast in the
stone of statute law, d e s are sometimes difncult to manipulate or mcind, even after the
rationale for their formulation is no longer apparentt119In our parliamentary system, it is
commonly the case that broad consensus and agreement is needed before an outdated d e
can be varied or replaced. And yet, particdarly on thomy issues of social policy,
legislative consensus can be difficuit to assemble and sustain. Formal laws excel in
following societal developments, but only rarely do they lead. In those instances when
political leadership is absent, broad consensus elusive, or legislative time mavailable,
discretion sometimes is applied in the breach to provide a workable solution.
A case in point is to be found in CIC policy on processing of same sex partners for

permanent residence in Canada. The Act and Reguiatiom do not formaily recognize
Likewise, in the
homosexud marriages for purposes of Family Class spons~rship.~~
cment climate of polarïzed debate generally on the topic of acceptame of gay nghts,
legislative reworking of the definition of marriage in the Reguiatiom has not been a
political priority. Nonetheless, the governent has not been altogether insensitive to the
-

system, while viewing discretion with suspicion, nonetheiess seems "... & n o ~designed to promote the
exercise of discretion." He notes that discretion is founded in a concern to preserve doctrinal fiexibility,
which is evidenced in a preference by judges "...for making fine distinctions so that justice can be done in
each case."
'le Sec for example, G l a n d e Williams, ''Discretion in Prosecution", [1956] C e .LR 222 at 224 23 1,
where he discusses this problem in the crimulal law context He notes that discretion is sometimes used by
police, prosecutors and even courts to decline enforcement of obsolete or controvemial Iegklation.
Although exercise of this power sometimes generates criticism, he observes, at 226, that most often what is
criticized is actually insuff?cientuse of discretion, rather than ovemse.
Neither, for that maiter, does the legislation recognke the so-called "common law mamiage" which is
widely pmaient in Canadian society today. See the definitions of "memberof the family c h " ,
"marriage" and "spouse" at S. 2( 1) of the! Regtrlations and the policy guidance on pmcessing of same sex

-

hardship that c m foliow h m enforcecl separation of partners in contrnitted relationships.
Responding to susfaineci lobbying and an increased propensity to litigation by individuals
and gay rights groupsJZ1,
the govemment has &en its tacit approval to a creative

deplopent of discretion by the immigration bureaucracy that has relieved some of the
pressure for a f o d legislative solution1?

Section 2.1 of the Reguiutiom pennits the Minister to exempt any person h m any
immigration regdation, where she is satisfied that an exemption should be granted
because of the existence of humanitarian or compassionate grounds. In June 1994, a

messageJPwas sent to ail immigration processing missions advising them that
homosemal partners of Canadian citizens or permanent residcnts might be processed for

lauding under S. 2.1, where "...undue hardship couid r d t h m separation.. ..".lu

The

result was that what could not be accomplished directly through Parliament by a bold

and "common law"partnm contained in CIC IM,"Oveneas Processing", Chap. OP-1, para. 4.2.2,at 6-7.
Most noticeably, by LEGIT (The Lesbian and Gay lannigration Task Force), located in Vancouver B.C.
See generally "LEGIT lobbying gets the word out" LEGïï News (The Newsletter of LEGIT), Fall1995 at
1.
1t2And thus resolving, at least for the time being, the govemment's conundnun of being forced to alienate
one segment of the population in order to appease another. For a brief overview of the question of sexual
orientation and its treatment under Canadian immigration law, see John A. Yogis, Sexuai Orientation and
Canadian Law- An Assesment of the Law Agecting Lesbian and Gay Persons (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1996) c, 8.
'" CIC AU Mission Message ORDO150 regarding processing of same sex partners; ais0 see generaiiy CM:
All Mission Message ORDO 149 on use of humanitarian and compassionate discretion.
CïC IM Chap. OP-1,Section 4, "Principal Applicants and Dependants" Paragraph 4.2.2, (ver. 12-95) at
6. Ln reatitty, use of R2.1 authority is directcd by this manuai to be used only as a last option. Instead,
officm are directed fnst to consider whether the appiicant might qualify as an ordinary independent
applicant. Faiting this, positive discretion under R. 1l(3) is mandateci. This is genefauy used where an
independent applicaut falls a few points short of the p a s mark needed, but otherwise appears to have good
settlementpotentia.1. Failing eitha of these two options, then R 2.1 may be invoked Li recognition of
''undue hardship" which might resuit fiom enforced separation of the partners. See also CIC IM, Chap.
OP-5,Section 2, para 23.1 (ver. 05-97) "Commw law and same-sex partners".

"'

legislative stroke, instead was done by judicious application of discretionary authority,
with little fatlfare or notoriety.lu

The problem of volume provides yet another aspect to the flexibility and
innovation justitications for discretionary power. Handling large numbers of applications
is a featwe cornmon to many adminimtive tribunals. In the case of immigraiion, the
government has implernented a five year plan to

up to two hmdred and fifty

thousand immigrants yearly.ln As mentioned, these immigrants are selected based upon
their ability to qualify in three broad categories; Refbgees, Family Class and
hdependents. Though the specific requirernents Vary from category to category, most
immigrant cases are likeIy to entai1 at least some assessment of educational, language,
employment and other criteria relating to potential for resettlement in Canada?

In

addition,the Act and Regulatiom stipulate other exigencies, such as those relating to the
protection of public health and safety, which must be undertaken for every applicantl?

'= This raises the issue of politicai accountabilityof the discretion holder, an issue which those opposed to
discretionary power are most sensitive to. The obvious answer is that R 2.1 discretion resides ultimately
with the Minister. Since she is directly accountable in parliamen5 the power must inevitably be exercised
in a mamer she is prepared to defend,
Defined at S. 2(1) of the Act as being "lawful permission to establish permanent residence in Canada".
ln The figure of 250,000 i
s simply a "target", with the a d number of immigrants landed varying h m
year to year, according to a number of factors such as number of applications received, resources avaiiable
to process them and the like. In 1996, for example, there were actually 225,3 13 immigrants landed
although the official target had not changed- See CIC, You asked about ...immigration and citirenship
(Ottawa: Min. of Public Works and Govemment Services, 1997) at 5. Likewise, the target is adjusted fkom
year to year to reflect what is considered feasible in any givem year, Pursuaot to S. 7(1) of the Act, the
Minister is required to lay before Parliament yearly an immigration plan deciiling the projected
immigration levels for the coming year. Thus,for 1997, the total number of immigrant and refbgee
landings is expected to be between 195,000 and 220,000 persons, CIC, Staying the Course= 1997 Annual
Immigration Plan (T'bled on Dctober 29, 1996) (Ottawa: Min, of Supply and Senrices Canada, 1996) at 3.
'* Sûictly speabg, f d y class immigrants and refbgees seleetcd within Canada by the IRB are not
"assessed" on these criteria for purposes of detemiining their ability to qua1i.Q for immigration, as is the
case with independents and refugees selected abroad, However, some assessment of them is conducted
pursuant to these criteria for statistical reasons and for purposes of deka. - g their need for any public
settlement assistance, language training, etc.
'= For example, medicai examinations and amiinnl and security sacaimg.

These are fïxed statutory requirements, set down by Parliament, which CIC cannot
ignore. In the meantirne, CIC has not been sheltered h m the effects of the debt crisis
facing the Goveniment of Canada Like most other departments, it has been called upon
to share in the burden, with $75 million cut fiom its budget in recent years.Im The result
has been the need for "restruchiring" and the inevitable "downsizing" With a fixed
legislative mandate, a static caseload volume and reduced fiscal and human resources, the
department has been placed between the rock of reduction and the hard place of unabated
senice expectations. Mer years of cutbacks, the euphernism of "doing more with less"
is simply no longer tenable. The chosen way out of the dilemma has been resort to the

twin options of 'ke-engineering" and "restrU~turirg".~~~
Reducing overall workload,
automating processes, and concentrating resources to achieve economies of scale and cost
savings have al1 been implemented under this regime. Though application volumes and
legislated requirements have remained largely unchanged, discretion vested in the
department as to how best to meet those needs has proven to be the essentid grease for

keeping the wheels of immigration processing tuniing. On a more fundamental level, the
availability of discretion to individual officers as to how best to implement the reductions

and new procedures on an individual case basis has resuited in signincant savings. For
example, in some types of routine cases, officers may waive interviewst3*
that are

'30 For a more detailed discussion of the d a c k s and the effects they have wmught, see g e n d y below,
Chapter 2, and also CIC inteniet home page at http://cicnetxi.gc.ca.
13' For more particulars, see CIC You asked about .... supra note 127 at 7-9, where initiatives such as
standardkation, the role of Case Processiag Centres and Caü Centres, and seE-assessrnent are discussed
See also below, Chapter 2, for more detailed discussion of the effect of the reductions on use of discretion.
13* For example, the Immigration Regionat Procesmg Ccnm i
n Bunalo, N.Y., which receives a i l
applications for immigrationto be processed by Canadian visa offices located in the United States, advises
that interviews are waived in more than hai€ofaîi such cases. See "Applying for Permanent Residence in
Canada:Changes to Immigrant Processing m the USA",insert dated April 1, 1996 placed m immigration

determined unnecessary, saving t h e , money and fiutration for both the client and the
department.'" Without such discretion, both on a department wide and an individual
officerbasis, it is doubtfid that even "doing the same with lessy7would have been
possible. Quite simply, flexibility in detexminhg its own procedures has enabled CIC to
prevent a massive caseload f b m overwhelming the system and choking off altogether the
flow of completed cases.
A M e r rationde for discretionary power concems the problem of interpretation
for enforcement purposes. It is here that the notion of discretion as equity, descnbed
earlier, is most apparent. As Evans states:

Because many situations are not foreseen at the time of enactment, statutory
provisions require interpretation by officials. The process of f i b g in the silences
and resolving the ambiguities in statutory language that interpretation so often
involves can be described as the exercise of an implicit discretion to elaborate
unclear or incomplete legislative instructions. Second, even the most detailed and
precise regulatory codes are not self-enforcing typically, officials are left with
ample, and unstated discretion about the circurnstances in which they will actually
be enforced against individu al^.'^
It is discretion, wielded a s an implement of interpretation and enforcement, which takes
the rough edges offof the law and nI1s in the mvices and cracks between the legislators
appiication kits provided by the Processing Centre, at 3.
'33 This is just one aspect of an overail strategy of reducing intensive case processing requirement that was,
at one point, captured in the slogan '%veserve you better by seeing you less." CIC's response to fiscal and
other imperatives is dealt with more fùiiy in Chapter 2, below.
Evans, mpra note 2 at 1021-22. Discretion in enforcement is a partidarly relevant issue in the
criminal law field. See for example, Kenneth Culp Davis, Dkcretionq Jwtice, supra 4 1. Davis notes the
considerable discretionary power g e n d y wielded by police officers with respect to enforcement of the
law and was concemed about its abuse. For a more recent example of discretionary law enforcemen&see
Sheni Aikenhead, "Daring to bare: How long b é h : ~.71ziengo topless in HaIifax?,, The (Hai@itj Dail&
News (22 June 1997)at 21. The article discusses a ment court niling in Ontario which is cited as
permitting women to legaily doff their tops in that province. Nova Scotia police, however, do not appear
to appreciate the Iogic of the judgment in question and are quoted a s being ready to continue to force
women to cover up. Their strategy for enforcement, however, evidences a certain amount of enforcement
discretion. According to a Halifax regional police spokeswoman, "If somebody is wallcing down Spriug
Garden Road [in Halifax]topless, they'll first be asked for identification and then asked to cover up.. .. if

broad brush strokes of rneaning. It rem&,

therefore, for officiais in the field to provide

interpretations and applications that best meet the intended objective or purpose of any
given provision. While the Act and Regdations often provide blanket d e s that seem
mandatory in nature, yet it is understood that legislative intention rarely wishes to have
such provisions rigorously applied to even the most trivial innaction. A case in point
concerns medical insdmissibility. Section 19 of the Act baldly provides that no one
suffering h m diseases or disordm which might endanger public health or safety, or

which might lead to excessive demands on health or social services, may be gmnted
admission to Canada~3~owever,
policy guidance provided by CIC makes clear that this
d e is not absolute. lx Thus, visa officers are directed in dl such cases to consider
whether any extenuating circumstances exist to justiQ admission, prior to issuing a
refusal.ln Selective application and enforcement in such cases ensures that particular
decisions are made in the context of overall intent and objectives, rather than the vacuum
of a specific rule.

DBering levels of entitlement to nghts or privileges is another reason for
extensive use of discretion under immigration law. This is perhaps most clearly
illustratecl in the example of criminal inadmissibility. Under Canadian immigration law,
the person refiises to cover up and says no, they'il be arrested
Section 19(l)(a)(i) and (ii).
IJ<
Liltewise, the courts have held that medical inadmissiiility m u t be assessed in each case against the
purposes for which enûy is sought. Thus, greater latitude is to be shown m sponsored dependent cases,
since applicants in that category wiU benefit fkom close family support. A Iess discretionary approach,
however, may be appropriate in independent category cases, since they wiU tend not to have such support
avaiiable. Deol v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Immigration) (1992), 18 ][mm. L A (2d) 1 (Fed. C.A.).
ln See CIC IM Chap. OP-5, para. 3.3.1 (ver. 05-97), "What to do in m e d i d y inadmissi'ble cases", which
advises visa officers that "[wjhen the appficant or dependent is found to be inadmissible for medicd
reasons.. ., you may consider whether there are humanitarian, compassionate or economic grounds for
issuing a Miilster's permit to allow the person to enter and remain m Canada notwithstanding the medical
hdmissiiility." See ais0 CIC hi Chap. OP-19 for factors to be considemi in recomending issuance of

'31

persons with criminal records, or who are guilty of comrnitting acts or omissions which
would be crimes punishable domesticaliy, are prohibiteci to enter Canada.IY Exception is
made for those who have satisfied the Minister that they are rehabilitated or that their
entry wodd not be detrimental to public safety or other national interest concems. The
Act prescribes a yardstick for gauging the gravie of the crime, which is somewhat

reminiscent of the summary/indictable split used under the Criminal Code.'3gOffences
considered "less serious" are dealt with more leniently, while more stem treatment is

reserved for those considered "most serious". But even within these two categones, there
is a vast array of offences evidenced. Thus, in the less serious category, we might find a

destitute student convicted of shoplifting a sausage for bis supper, a college professor

guilty of an assault on his spouse, and an incomgible, unernployed alcoholic with a

lengthy record for dnink driving offences. Each raises unique concems and equities and
it wouid clearly be inappropnate to treat them all with the same level of vigorous
bureaucracy. A single, minor act done in extremis is rnanifedy less deserving of short
shnft at a border entry point than is behaviour which forms part of an identifiable,
prolonged pattern and which poses signincant nsks to public safety. Likewise, a minor
offence against property is vastly different than an offence involving violence against the
person. But here again the problem of formulating a rule that is sensitive to al1 of the
nuances and subtleties of each specinc case arises. And, the problem is intensifid by the
a Minister's permit,
See g e n d y subsetions 19(l)(c) to (I)
and 19(2)(a) to (b) of the Act.
Ii9 RS.C 1985, Chap. C-46. Admittedy, the Immigmtion Act yardstick i
s only roughly equivalent to the
summary/iidictable split used in the Criminal Code. While a range of punishments are available with
respect to both sunmiary and indiaable offences, the Immigmrion Act relies upon a potential penalty under
or over 10 years as the set point for distmguishmg between "Iess serious" and "more serious" cases. See
the Act, S. 19(l)(c) & (c. 1) (max tenn of 10 years or more) and 19(2)(a) & (a.1) fmax. term of less than 10

decision-maker to sort out equities and to priontue entitlements, without the necessity of
conferring fixeci entitlements that might prove unpopular or embarra~sing.~~

. .
The example of a cnminally inadmissible visitor and an ordinary Family Class
immigrant provides a vivid contrast for illustrating the notion of differing entitlement, but
the notion of a sliding scale also works on a more subtle level. Différing levels of
entitlement are present even within and across immigrant categones. Refugee claimants
who are in Canada143,
for example, are accorded an assessment process that is less
discretionary in nature than that provided for Independent applicants. The rationale is

found in the basis for selection in each of the categories. Refugees are persons in fight

fkom persecution."

Canada has assumecl an international obligation to protect any such

persons who enter its territory1* Because of the urgency of their circumstances, and the
potential dire consequences of a remal of sanctuary, a formai, court-like determination
process has been implemented for assessment of these cases. It incorporates safeguards,

like the nght to be assisted by counsel at hearings, which are similar to those found in
ordinary courts of law." Likewise, once a determination of Refugee statu is made, there

"' Young v. Canada (Min.of Employment & immigration) (1987), 1 Imm.L.R. (26) 77 (F.C.T.D.).
For more on the use of discretion as a means for sorting out entitlement and the Merences between
visitor and immigrant categories in that regard, see infia note 176 and accompanying text
"Even within the g e n d category of "refiigee claimant", Canadian law makes a distinction between
those cfaiming status in Canada and those claiming abroad Those claiming abroad are subject to a more
discretionziry process- See infia note 153 and accompanying text
See the denaîtion of "Convention Refugee" contained at S. 2(1) of the Immigration Act.
'" Convention on the Status of Aejigees, (1951), 189 U.N.T.S.138; 1969 Can, T.S. No. 6 as am- b y
Protocol Relating to the Status of Reficgees ( 196ï), 606 U.N.T.S.267; 1969 T.S. No. 29.
See for exampIe, Gatgano v. Canada (Min. of Citrzenship & Immigration) (1994), 25 hm.LK(2d)
292,85 F.TX 49. There, the court observed that whik the right to counsel was not absolute, yet unfair
deniai of the opportunity to be represmtedcodd r e d t in a denial of naturai justice. Failure m this case to
provide an adjournment in order to retain counsel prevented the appiicant h m receihg a fair hearing.
By contrast, an irmnigrant applying for a visa abroad bas no generai right to be represented by counscl in
any interview.
14*

'"

is no discretion in the decision-maker to withhold the grant of status for reasom such as
lack of ability to settle successfully or h u d in obtaining entry to Canada.In
A similar proposition holds true for Family Class applicants. These are close

family members sponsored by relatives in Canada who have agreed to assume
responsibilïty for their settlement. Once the requisite family link has been established,
the immigration official is, in efféct,functus ofleio. She has no discretion to withhold
the immigrant visa despite concems, perhaps, as to settlement prospects for the particular
individual, or the depth of the sponsor's personal commitment to the settlement

obligation.lu The case is otherwise with Independent immigrants. Selected precisely for
their personal abilities to establish in Canada, their acceptance or rejection rernains

subject to discretion in the visa officer. Processed on the basis of a points assessment
scherne, the decision-maker retains authority to ignore the points tally, where she believes
that it does not accurately reflect settlement p~tentia1.I~~
Because selection as an
- -

14' There is, of course, an exception in any case where crimimd or secufity concems are present Kowever,
this is Iargely a matter of statutory requirements, rather than exercise of discretionary power, though there
is admittediy some discretion as to whether the statutory provision shodd be applied m any given case.
For the present discussion, 1 am focusing on the example of discretion relahg to assessment of settiement
potential and fiaudulent entry, for purposes of contrasting its use in relation to levels of entitlement and
rights. Once rekgee status is granted m Canada, it is subject ody to the statutory exceptions for serious
criminality and the Like. This is to be contrasted with the U.S.position where the grant of asyhun (U.S.
terminology distiaguiçhes between a ''person seeking asylum", being someone that appiies h m within the
country, and a "refiigee", who applies fiom abroad) is much more discretionary. In the U.S.,since the
grant of asylum is entirely discretionary, any pre or post entry misconduct may be used to justi@
withholdiug of status. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 11S8(a) which provides that an
"aiien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General". See ais0 A. T. Fragomen, Jr. and
S. C. Bell, Immigration Fundament&: A Guide tu Law and hactice, 1992 ed. (New York: Practisïng Law
Institute, 1992) at 6-33; and S.H.Legomsky, Immigration L m and Policy (Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation
Press, 1992) at 840-84 1.
14s Assuming the sponsor has given an undertakmg, pursuant to section 6 of the Reguiutiom, that she will
assist the immigrant. In assessmg such undertakings, immigration officers consider a schedule that sets out
a suggested minimum income that a sponsor should have to give such an undertaking. There is no
guarantee, of course, that even with such a minimum income, the sponsor will honour the undertakmg or
tbat it will be sufficicnt to provide for the particular needs of both the sponsor and the immigrant,
Regulations, S. 1l(3).

'"

Indepeadent immigrant is merit based, these applicants simply have less entitlement to

landing than do Refugee or Family Class applicants, and this is reflected in the
discretionary power accorded the decision-makers.
~ ~ it,
Aithough the privilege - right dichotomy is somewhat out of favour t ~ d a y ' yet
continues to animate the use of discretion in immigration la^.'^^ At common law,
immigration was conceived of purely as a privilege. No one had a nght to enter, except

at the Merance of the sovereîgn and even then, only on terms imposed by the
sovereign? Doubtless, this notion of pnvilege fostered the tremendous reliarice upon

lm See for example, the judgment of Wilson J. in Singh, supra note 64, 17 D . L X (4&)422 at 46 1, who
declined to apply a 'Yights-privilege" mentality to interpretation of the Charter- She states, "[tlhe creation
of a dichotomy between privileges and rights played a significant role in narrowing the scope of the
application of the Canadian Bill of Righfs.... 1do not thmk this kind of analysis is acceptable in relation to
the Charter." Generally, the distinction is no longer seen as a justification for withholding a minimum
level of fairness to aii applicants. Regardless of whether a 'kight" or a "privilege" is implicated, our law
wilî require that any determination shodd be anived at ody in accordance with requisite procedural
faimess. The specifics of such procedural fairness, of course, Vary in accordance with the level of
entitiement, considerations of justice, etc. So it is that refugees are entitled to a more court-like process,
with substantial safeguards, whiie an independent appiicant is entitled ody to a more informal process,
possîbty even without benefit of an oral hearing. Everything depends upon the interests at stake and the
possible repercussions that may f io w fiom the decision.
IS' See for example, D. Bagambüre, Canadian Immigration and Reficgee Law (Aurow: Canada Law Book,
1996) at 365, footnote 2, who notes that the tendency to create a rights and privileges dichotomy continues
even to&y, notwithstanding the adrnonition of Wilson 3. This attitude is evident even in the pracîichg bar.
In "Medical Inadmissibility: Selection Without Standard?,,, Paper presented to The 1996 Immigration Law
Conference (Vancouver:Canadian Bar Association, 1996) at 2, Cecil L. Rotenberg, a senior Canadian
immigration lawyer, states the foiiowing: ''The writer does not d e the laws but only want (sic) a
universally fair and legal application of the laws to aU prospective immigrants mile immigration is a
prM'Iege, proposed immigrants are entitled to legd and fair processing. It is up to us as their Iawyers to see
that this happens. [emphasis added]"
In the Canadian context, Attorney G e n d of Canada v. Cain [1906] A.C. 542 (J.CP.C.) rernains a
classic statement of the comprehensive and wide ranging nature of state power to regulate entry by nonnation&. The court said there, 542 at 546, that '[olne of the rights possessed by the suprme power in
every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter h t State, to annex what conditions it pleases to
the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport fiom the State, at pfeasure, even a fnendly aiien,
especially if it considers his presence in the State opposed to its peace, order, and good government, or its
social or material interests." See aIso Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1975), 52 D.L.R.
(3d) 383, [1974]: 1 SIC& 376,3 N R 3û4 where the court observed that at common iaw, an alien had no
right to enter or remain m Cana& except with leave of the Crown. The common law has been essentially
codined in S. S(1) of the Act, which states: 'Wo person, other than a person descriid in section 4 Cie.
citizens, permanent tesidents, convention refbgees and uidians registered under the Indian Act], has a right
to corne into or remain in Canada."

'"

discretion in immigration matters which continues to be evident in cunent law and
practice. The common law concept of the complete sovereignty of the Canadian Nation
State to resist incursions by foteigners has slowly been chipped away at on several h n t s .
An obvious example concems the case of Refügees. The United Nations Refugee

Con~ention'~
resulted in recognition of rights of asylum and sanctuary for displaced

persons. Having acceded to the convention, Canada has a duty to provide refuge to
persons within its ambit The duty thus translates into a right belonging to Refugees to
c l a h and obtain sanctury. Interestingly, though, the nght is one belonging only to those
Refugees who are able to make theV own way to Canada For those not so fortunate as to
possess the ability or resources to get to Canada, there is no nght to refbgee status and
asylum. Canada's convention obligations extend only to persons physically present on
our soil. While we do select Refugees nom abroad for resettîement on our own initiative,
this is done as a voluntary act of compassion only. It is not the fulfillment of any legal

duty. Consequently, there is an element of discretion pervading the foreign seleetion of
Refugees that is not present in the domestic conte-

Like Independent Class immigrants,

foreign selected Refugees are assessed as to their ability to successfully settle in

Canats
More recently, the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and FreedmtYs
(hereinafter the Charter)has led to a m e r erosion of the common law primacy of the

ln

Supra note 145.

"See ''Convention Refugees Seeking Resettlmenf', S. 7, Inunigmton ReguIations, which mquires visa
officers to consider various economic and educational factors in amviag at an opinion as to whether a
convention refugee is capable of becoming successfiitry estabiished.
lSs Canadim Charter of R i g h and Freedoms, Part 1of the ConniMion Act, 1982, being Schehilc B of the
Canada Act 1982 (UK),1982, c. 1 1.

State to ded with foreigners as a matter within its complete d i s c r e t i ~ n .In
~~
Re Singh and

M.E.1 ln, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the Charter S guarantee under section
7 to "life, Liberty and securiv of the person" was applicable to any person physicdly
present in the country. Aithough thaï case dealt with the situation of Refugee claimants,

it ensured that anyone, including a non-citizen, wouid be entitled to a reasonable measure

of procedural fairness in any processes Ieading to their removai.

In summary then, discretion is used as a tool to permit a fluer level of sïfüng,
according to entitlement, both within and across categories. In cases where entitlement is
deerned to be low, then the presence of discretionary power is generally greater. Where
entitlement is high, a duty exists which tends to displace discretionary authority. Thus,
depending upon notional entitlement, the existence of discretion will fluctuate across a
spectrum that spans the rights and privilege dichotomy. Figure 1 provides a graphic

representation of this situation, which might be termed a righwprivilege continuum.

Figure 1 - RightslPrivilege Continuum
Nondiscretionary
1Right = Duty
Power

f.5

Discretionary
1
Privilege =

Wïat is discretion?
Examination of the 'bvhy" of discretion highlights the fact that it is both

ubiquitous and, arguably at least, indispensable. But what exactly is it? Definhg

'%

For a discussion of the effeçts of the Charter on immigration law generaUy, see Bagambiire?supra note

151 at 365-391.

discretion is a difficult ta& at best, largely due to the fact that it is a multi-dimensional
concept, with shades of meaning that depend upon the circumsfances in which it is used.

Unlike d e s , which are hard and fast (or at least relatively more so than discretion) and
easi1y coilected, analyzed and quantifieci in volumes of legd texts, discretionary power
SUffers fiom an amorphous nature. This is so since discretion beguis where Iaws and

rules leave off.1s6Since primacy of d e s is favoured in our Liberal democratic legd
tradition, it is inevitable that discretion should reside only in the space not taken up by
rules. Existing, therefore, only in relation to d e s , discretion necessarily dwells in a
penumbra of fluid uncertainty on the edges of those d e s . More cogently, it is also an

inescapable fact that where there are d e s , there wili be di~cretion.'~
There is sornething of a presumption in our legal tradition that niles are "safer"
than discretion, since their rneaning and scope of application appear to be more precise

and focused. This, in turn, suggests that rules are less arbitrary, more predictable and,
ultimately, fairer. Such a concIusion, however, may not be quite as certain or reliable as
it seems.Im In reality, our legal tradition, with its preference for certainty and fked
boundaries, actually demands that d e s and discretion should infoxm one another.
Moreover, though dissimila.on a superficial level both draw their guidance fkom one
common pool of fundamentaI legal principles. Accordingly, there tends to be a
sutpnsingly Worm, cornmon scope for legitimate action, regardless of whether niles or

in

Supra note 64.
Ke~eth
Cuip Davis, Discretlbnary Justice, supra note 41 at 3.

' ~ 9See for example H a w h , supra note 9 at 35, where the author notes that d e s and discretion are not
discrete, opposing entities. Rather, in bis view, discretion sufhcles the interpretation of d e s and their
application.
"A point which 1atampt to make h u g h o u t this work. In particular, however, socioiogical work m
ment years has attanpted to debbuiil the notion that discretion is as arbitmy as traditionally pfesumeci.

discretion are implicated. The limits for one tend to foreshadow the iimits of the other
and so the discrepancies between the two may be more apparent than r d . Likewise,
though the virtues of written laws are often extolled as the ideal model for regulation of
our society, the reality is that discretion is stiU an essentid part of that model. The
difficulties of ever devising a complete set of d e s of absolute clarity and precision are

such that discretion must always be present, to some degree or other, in any system of
d e s . Thus, it exists as both a procedural device, assisting interpretation and application

of d e s , and as a substantive tool, supplementing shortcomings in the d e s themselve~.~~'

Typically, both types of discretion are present in some measure in any regime of d e s or
laws. In practice, therefore, d e s and discretion, occur in tandem and may be as much

identical as fiaterna1 in their exercise.

Like d e s , discretionq power is a ubiquitous substance, pervading every area of
law and every field of legal endeavo~r.'~~
At a fundamentai level, Iaw is an exercise in
rationalization of facts, values and influences and it is these three ingredients which Davis

-

This point is examined in greater depth below, at section 2.3 Discretion and Sociology.
16' This distinction is deait with more M y below, at h p t e r 2, section 2.1
The Selection Process.
Indeed, a 1975 study by the Law Refonn Commission of Canada, upon a review of the revised statutes
of Canada, reckoned ttiat those statutes contained 14,885 grantts of discretiomy power. See Phiiip
Anisman, A Catalogue of DrSmetionary Powers (LawReform Commission of Canada, 1975) at 23. The
powers bestowed by such grants were classifïed as "judicial" (5938), ' ' d e rnaking" (3467),
"administrative" (2933) and "investigative" (1298). Within the Immigration Act, Anisman calculated there
were a total of 173 grants of discretionary power, broken down as foilows: "judiciai" (lOl),
"administrative**(20), "investigative" (19) and 'hile mafring" (33). AIthough the Act contained in the 1970
revision of statutes was repiaced in its entirety by the current Act (ie. Immigration Act. 1976), there is no
m o n to believe that the situation in respect of discretionary powers is any different now, as then. In
considering these statistics, it is p ~ d e nas
t well to bear in mind Anisman's caution, given at page 23.
'Wevertheless, it shouid be stressed that powers enumerated show onLy the tip of the iceberg. Many
express powers are not included m the tables, none of the discretionary powers granted in the regdations
themselves were considered, and, most important, no attempt was made to discover the numba of impiicit
powers capable of exercise or actually exercised [footnote omitted]."

amibes to the make up of dimetioda The facts include actions (or even inaction) and

rules which m u t be applied to those actions. Values are the grease dong which the
interpretive exercise slides, buffeted ali the while by influences such as the characteristics
of the litigants, the manner in which the suit has arrived in court or even, one supposes,
by the state of the judge's digestion. Given the diverse factors which can influence the

make up and exercise of discxetionary power, it is inevitable that the end result is a multifaceted mature existing on various planes cutting across our legd system.
There is, nonetheless, a single thread running through every attempt at definition

which le& inevitably and inexorably to one notion alone - power. Thus, Evans offers
that discretion is ". ..anexpress legal power to choose a course of action fiom a range of
permissible options, including the option of inaction".'"

Grey takes this a step fiirther by

asserting a sort of complete independence in the decision-maker. He postdates that
"[d]iscretion rnay best be dehed a s the power to make a decision that cannot be
determined to be right or wrong in any objective way."lU Similarly, in the view of
Kenneth Cuip Davis, discretion occurs "whenever the effective iimits on the power of a
public official leave freedom to choose between possible courses of action or inaction".'"
Regardless of how the precise statement is formulated or expressed, it is apparent that the
idea of power lies at the root of every attempt to define the concept of discretion.
1.5.1 'Of Doughnuts and Discretion'

- The Relationship to Rules

While power may be something of a given, the more intricate and subtle question
Davis, supra note 41 at 5.
Evans, supra note 2 at 1021.
la J.H. Grey, "Discretionin Administrative Law", supra note 1 at 107.

about discretion concerns its relationship to niles. Although it entails power, yet it is not
an absolute or unbridecl power. The traditions of our legai and political systems have

engendered a lively and enduring suspicion of umegulated power, which is thought to be
anathema to democratic society and the 'hile of Iaw". Accordingly, discretion does not
exist freely in our society without reference to standards and prin~iples.'~~
It is for this
reason that much jurisprudential time and energy have been expendeci in defining and

describing the proper relationship between d e s and discretion.'"
For John Austin, a lgmcentury proponent of the positivist school of thought,
discretion existed at the 'furry edges'Iw of d e s , where decision-makasare empowered
to make new d e s or to rework old niles to deal with unique or unanticipated difficult
cases."0 Here, discretion obtains as power to devise or refashion d e s . H.L.A. Hart,

though developing an even more elaborate description than Austin of rules as a system,
still clung to the basic tenet of Austin that d e s were everything. Hart's version of the
de-based system was comprised of primary and secondary mles.17' The primary d e s

are the laws, orders and ordinances themselves, which confer rights or impose
obligations. The secon-

rules are rules of recognition, dealing with how and by whom

'66As
cited in Hawkins, supra note 9 at 16.
The exact nature of those soindards and principles is discusscd below, Chapter 3 "The Limits of
Discretion".
See for example Hawkins, supra note 9 at 14, who observes that obsession with rules is the major
difference in approach that law and social science bring to the study of discretion. Legal philosophers
think in terms of the relation&@ between rules and discretion while &s
scientists prefer to focus on
decision making.
'" As descriid m h d d M. Dworkin, "TheMode1 of Rules,"(1967) 35 W.Chicago L.R., 14 at 18, citing
J. Austin, The Province of JurirprudenceDetennïned, 1832.
17' This is, of course, simply an older version of Kenneth Culp Davis' assertion, see supra note 41 at 3, that
'bvhere iaw ends, discretion begins." This is the optimist's view. Davis also quotes a more pessimistic
version, a s c r i i to W i l h m Pitt and engraveci on a stone m front of the Justice Building in Washington,
D.C., that States: 'Where law ends tyranny begins."
17' H.L.A. Hart, The Çoncept of Law (Oxford: CIarendon Press, 1961) at 77-96.
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1call both of these senses weak to distinguish them h m a stronga sense. We

use ""discretion"sometimes not merely to Say that an official must use judgment in
applying the standards set him by authority, or that no one will review that
exercise of judgment, but to say that on some issue he is simply not bound by
standards set by the authority in question.174

Applying these senses to Canadian immigration law, we find that the nrst weak
sense, a decision dernanding the exercise of judgment, is one that is found throughout the

immigration program. V W y every application for a visa, regardless of whether it is in

an immigrant or a non-immigrant category, involves some level of discretionary
judgment. The only variable concerns the level of dismtionary power that may be
present in any given instance. In some cases, it may be more open-ended, while in others
it will be greatly restncted. For example, in the Family Class, an applicant's right to an
immigrant visa crystaUizes upon proof of the requisite f d y link.Discretionary
judgment in such an application is Limited to the adequacy of the proof offered. It does
not extend so far as to perrnit any judgment regarding the motivation of the applicant in
seeking entry to Canada.175

In contrast, a visitor visa applicantm is dso required to provide proof as to certain
substantive requirements, such as possession of a valid passport or travel document'n or
suficient fun& to facilitate the traveP However, it is not enough for such an applicant

'' Ibid-at 32-33.
''' This is not to make light of the difndties that can sometimes be present in proving relationships m
family class cases. For an example of such diffïdties, see Secretary of Statefor Externui Affairs &
Minakter of Employment & Immigtution v. Menghani and Canadian Human Rights Commission ( 1 993) 2 1

CHJLR. D/427(F.C.T.D.), rev'g in pari (1992) 17 C-HJUL Dl236 (Cdn. H.Rîs. Tni.). As this case
illustrates, when the applicant is h m a counûy or region where record keeping and documents are not
reliable, proving f d y ties can be almost as difncult as proving intent in viçitor cases.
"6 The term "visitor" i
s dehed at s. 2(1) of the Act as "a person who is tawfb.üy in Canada, or seeks to
corne into Canada, for a temporary purpose."
ln Regulations, S. 14(3).
See for example, Toor v. Canada (fi.
of Employment & Immigration) (1987), 1 Imm L.R.(2d) 104,9
F.TR 292 (Fed T.D.),where the applicant's inability to &ord the travel in ~uestionwas found to be a

just to prove these prerequisites. They m u t also satis@ an Officer of the temporary

nature of th& proposed visit.'" This is an additional element, which involves judgment
and assessrnent of intent. Intention is very obviously a more dinicult criterion to assess

than is a claimed relationship to another person. There is often no single best piece of
evidence that an applicant can present to ver@ that she intends only to travel to Canada
for a finite period and purpose. Since intent is only a state of min& the adequacy of the
proof will be dependent upon a i l of the circumstancw. Moreover, in practice, the result
may well be that what satisfies one officer may prove insunicient to another. The

absence of a fixed standard to be mechanicaily applied in every case invariably vests
considerable latitude in the examining official. The nature of what is to be proved in
visitor cases creates a greater scope for discretionary decision-making in those cases, than
is apparent in Family Class immigrant applications. ui the end, however, both examples
concern the measure of discretionary power available with respect to the sufnciency of
proof, and so the only real clifference between them is simply the size of the hole in the
doughnut.

The second weak sense, where an official is not subject to review, is also present
in the operation of Canadian immigration processes, as it is in most areas of
administrative laws.
-

-

In our legal tradition, decisions of administrative Officials are not
- --

-

----

-.

- -- --

legitimate ground for denial of a visitor visa
The discretionarynature of the grant of a vintor visa and the minimum indicia of a temporary purpose
are set out in section 13(2) of the Regulutions which States:
A visa officer may issue a visitor's visa to any pason who meets the requirements of the Act and
these Regdations if that person estabiishes to the satisfiction of visa officer that he will be able
(a) to return to the country fiom which he seeks to corne to Cana*
or
(b) to go h m Canada to some other country.
lm''Wealr" i
s perhaps a poor choicc of terms for a seme of discretion which imports the sort of power that
unreviewabilty speaks to. Dworkh might have been better advised to draw a clearer distinction of this

'"

generaily reviewable on the merits,only on the matter of jurisdiction, which uicludes the
process by which a decision was reached.lS1 While an error in process will aUow the
courts to intervene (most ofien ordering that the matter be reheard), they will not
ordharily examine the equities or substantive features of the case. These are for
consideration and assessment by the hearing officer alone. In this sense, then, an
immigration official is not subject to review. Their decision as to the merits and demerits
of a case is beyond dispute, both by the courts and by higher level of fi ci al^.^^
FinaUy, Dworkin's thUd strong sense, discretion unbounded by any standards,

though mer in practice than the nrst two, is stili evident in immigration practice.lu For
example, section 2.1 ofthe Regulations empowers the Minister to ". ..exempt any person
fiom any regulation made under subsection 114(1) of the Act [pursuant to which the

Immigration Regdations have been promulgated] or otherwise facilitate the admission to
sense by r e f d g to it as a rnid-level or medium type.
181
Grey, "Discretion in Administrative Law", supra note 1 at 112; see also JH.Grey, Immigration Law in
Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984) at 1-5. There is some inconsistency in the Iiteraîure regarding the
grounds for judicial review. Some authors, such as Bagambiire, supra note 151at 346 -349, refw to many
grounds for review, such as abuse of discretion, breach of natural justice or procedural faimess, acting
beyond jurisdiciion, without jurisdiction, fading to exercise jurisdiction, error of law and so on. Others,
like Grey, simply lump aii such distinctions under îhe broad notion of jurisdiction. For reasons of
economy and practicality, 1am here adopting the latter approach,
182
This is, of course, the theory. In reality, however, it is not u n d for higher level officiais to intervene,
at l e s t where a negative decision is concerned if that decision is thought to be indefensible, senior
officials may direct that a positive decision be substituted, or if the case has been appealed to the courts,
CIC will oAen consent to a judgment in the applicant's favour. The contrary, however, is not true.
Because the d e s of fairness dictate that "she who hears must decide", higher level officials are not able to
dictate negative d t s , since this wodd be an unwarranted fettering of the decision-der's discretion.
Such cases are ripe for review in the courts, who will not hesitate to find a breach of the principles of
fainiess. Thus, wMe discretion may apparently be fettered in a manner h t benefits an applicant, the
converse resuits in misconduct that will not be toterakd. In theory, one supposes that a lower level official
who is overturned by supaïor level officials might have justifiable cause to appeal such actions,
particuIarly where those overhirning the decision have not otherwise been directly involved in the
assessment process. In practice, however, it is unheard of for lower level officials to appeal such
occurrences.
'O Although some argue that is extremely rare. See for erample, David Feldman, Book Renew of The
Uses of Diwetzon, by Keith Hawkins, ed, [19941Public Law 279 at 289 who notes that "...it is central to
Dworkin's thesis that strong discretion in law is cxtremely rare, if it exists at aE"

Canada of any person where the Minister is satisfied that the person should be exempted
fiom that regdation..

Clearly, while the Minister possesses the authority, or

discretion, to waive a requirement of the ReguIatio~ts,she may not be compelled to do
soY This is so because the legislation provides no standard to guide the exemption

power. The lack of any standards for the exercise of this extraordinary discretion
effectively renders it immune to any sort of review. A dispensation fiom the Regdations
is an exceptional matter that remains entirely within the judgment of the Minister and her

delegates? Neither the courts, nor any other official, are in a position to substitute their
own opinion for that of the Minister in these decisions.ImIt is this type of authority

Supra note 91.
This is very clearly evidenced in the case of Khalon et al. v. Canada (Min&- of Citizmhip &
Immigration) (1995), 101 F.T.R 297 (F.C.T.D.).That case dealt with a request for exemption from the
application of the rules for immigration contahed in the Act and Regulations, pursuant to a humanitarian
and compassionate review under S. 114(2) of the Act. The applicanîs had been denied a favourable review
and so applied for judicial review. In dismisshg the appiication, Muidoon J. noted the extraordinary
nature of the exemption to be granted under S. 114(2) and was criticai of attempts to bring its operation
of the courts. In his judgment, at 301, he states that
under the p u ~ e w
Applicant's counsel keep attempting to expanci and over-judicialize the application of the H&C
[humanitarianand compassionate] review. ft is well to rem&
what was stated by Strayer, J.
(as he was), in Vida2 [Vidal and Daàwah v. Minister of Employmen t and Immigration (1991), 4 1
F.TE 118, 13 irnm. L.R. (2d) 123 (TD.)], ...on the nature of subsection 114(2) of the Act. Three
of the six propositions stated by him are:
(1) In subs. 1i4(2) Parliament has authorized the Governor-in-Council to make exceptions to the
rules found in the Act and in the Reguiationr. There is therefore nothing inconsistent with the
Act in the Governor-in-CounciI creating such exceptions by regulation.
(2) The exceptions so made are for the benefit of those in whose favour they are made and do not
detract h m the n o d application of the general d e s to aU others. ïïzose who me
complaining that they have not been made a beneficiary of a regdation adopted under subs.
114(2) are in @et compluining that they have not received u special ben@. ...
The H & C review is a sort of last resort after having failed the legal Miteria: it is a privilege. One
wonders if some newly devised last, last discretionq mort were to be mvented, if the bar would
attempt to judiciaiize it, too.
See also Christopher Vicenzi, "Extra-Statutory Ministenal Discretion in Immigration Law" [1992]
Public Law 300, where he discusses existence of a prerogative in the Minister to "underdorcen the
immigration des. While the Minister may choose to waive a d e for rasons for compassion or justice or
any other reason deemed sufficient, the detexmination is entirely within the Minister's purview and may
not be compelied.
See for example, Young v. M.E.1 et al., supra note 141, where the applicant sought a Minister's Permit
on the basis of a departmental policy. The court found such poiicies do not m a t e legd rights enforceable
by way of mandamus.
las

which undoubtedly most rankles opponents of discretionary power. But even this
apparentiy unbridled authority does not lead automaticdy to despotism. As Dworkin
states, this type of discretion does not mean that an official "...is f?ee to decide without
recouse to standards of sense and faimas, but only that his [or her, as in the case of the
current Minister of Immigration] decision is not controkd by a standard funiished by the
particdar authority.. .."lm More precisely, while there is no legal standard to guide the
exercise of discretion in this instance, yet there may weU be other standards in play.Im

The salient feature is that while this type of decision may be subject to criticism as UIlfair,
stupid, illsonceived and so on, yet it cannot be said to have deprived an applicant of
either a substantive decision or a procedural cornmitment to which he or she had an
entitiment under law.
1.5.2. Explicit and lrnplicit Discretion

Dismtionary power is bestowed in two manners; as an explicit delegation of
authority and as an implicit, but necessary, adjunct to any rule-based decision-makùig.lp0

An example of this duality is to be found in section 1l(3) of the Immigration ReguIatiom,
1978, which states:

'" 'The Model of Rules", supra note 169 at 34.

'" The immigration Manuals do provide policy guidance as to whm and how this authority should be

invoked. Though this is mere departmental policy, and not law, it is still signifïcant that some guidance is
thought necessary. Likewise, there may be other controis of a more practical nature, such as public opinion
and political oversight by Parliament. For more on this generaliy, see below, section 3.4 Extra-Judicial
Influences on Discretion.
'O The ïxplicit fonn of discretion is often seen to be a cornponent of the notion of "jurisdiction"that is
used m admmistrative iaw. See generaliy Evans, supra note 2 at 1021-1022, who notes that d e s often
contab implicit discretion regarding how they are to be interpreted and enforced. See also Stanley de
Smith, The Right Honourable The Lord Woolf & Jeffiey Joweli, Judicial Revïew of Administrative Action,
5'" e& (London: Sweet & Maxweii, 1995) at 300 - 302 (hereinafter refnrcd to as "dc Smith"). The authors
specificaliy note, at 302, that because of the necessity for mterpretation, statutory discretions "..-y
be
conferred impiidy as well as expressly."

A visa officer may
(a) issue an immigrant visa to an immigrant who is not awarded the number of
uni6 of assesment required by section 9 or 10 or who does not meet the
requirements of subsection (1) or (2) [all of which relate to the immigrant
having received sufncient uni& of assessment on the independent immigrant
point selection system], or
(b) refuse to issue an immigrant visa to an immigrant who is awarded the number
of units of assessment required by section 9 or 10,
if, in his opinion, there are good reasons why the numba of units of assessment
awarded do not reflect the chances of the particular immigrant and his dependents
of becoming successfully established in Canada and those reasons have been
submitted in writing to, and approved by, a senior immigration o f f i ~ e r . ~ ~ ~

Here, discretionary authority is expressly delegated to the visa officer to make
determinations as to whether an assessment under the Independent category selection
system accurately refleçts settlement potential. While the visa officer is ordinarily

required to apply the d e s in orda to arrive at a determination, there is an express
discretion hanging over the process which can be employed to overcome any perceived
defect in the d e s . The visa officer may take, or may refuse to take, action to relieve
against the rules, where she is of the opinion that there are good reasom for doing so.

The opposite proposition also holds me. The visa officer has authority to deny the
benefit of the d e s , if there is sufficientjustification to believe they have inordinately
favoured an applicant Either way, this delegation involves a classic grant of express
discretion and could hardly be any clearer. The visa officer may take a certain course of

action, but is not necessarily compeiied to do so. She has a choice to exercise that
depends upon al1 of the circumstances. If she is not properly satisfied of the propriety of
the case for action, she rnay refuse relief.

19'

Supra note 91.

hplicit discretion, on the other h
d
,
though more subtle, is equally extant in this
example. The entire gant of explicit discretion is premised upon the conduct of a points
assasment'" Assessing the applicant on the points selection system requires that the

visa officer take stock of the personal and professional background of the applicant, with
a view to determinkg how many points are appropriate. Every applicant wili, of course,
present a unique combination of personal qualities and qualifications. The object of the
exercise in Independent migrant processing is simple - to h d and select those persons
who are likely to "becorne successfully established in Canada".'93Fomulating a set of
universal rules that will consistently achieve that object is, however, decidedly less
simple. In many cases, it may never be possible to devise d e s of general application that
are absolutely certain and clear in theu meaning and application, in every situation. Such

generality o h gives nse to vagueness that necessarily leaves interpretation of the

meaning of niles somewhat unpredictable. As a wnsequence, some discretion in
interpretation and application of the rules in each individual instance is indispensable.
But even procedural discretion to interpret the meaning of the d e s , according to the

facts, rnay not be enough. Vague d e s also encourage grants of substantive discretion,
such as that seen in section 1l(3) of the Regulatiom, as a means of reconciling

idiosyncrasies or failings in the d e s that prevent them nom achieving the object of the
statute.

Thus, section 11(3) allows that the visa officer may ignore the rules, where good
reasons exist. In this instance, 'good reasons' are stipulated as those relating to the
The workings of the points seiection system is descnied in greater detail below, section 2.1
Selection Process.

The

Likelihood of the immigrant and her farniiy of becoming succasficlly estabïished in
Canada. Although this prescription is rneant to provide guidance in the exercise of the
explicit discretion, it is not entVely obvious what successful establishment entails.
Likewise, there is no exhaustive iist of factors under the Immigraton Act, *ch
enurnerate when successful establishment is conclusively proven. Since some
interpretation of the phrase "successful establishment" is necessary, it is not surprishg
that the d e requiring it cannot be self-executing. Some interpretation of its meaning is
necessary. Such interpretation inevitably involves a range of possibilities within which
choice may be exercised. Likewise, facts and other evidence must be assembled and
categorized, and their individual weight and collective relevance assessed. The power to
conduct an assesment of evidence and apply d e s to that evidence entails an implicit
gant of discretion, inherent ab Nlitio in the decision-maker's jurisdiction to perform the

task. This is Dworkin's nrst weak sense in action. Wherever a diversity of potential fact
scenarios is combined with a requirement for assasment of sdciency and cogency of
proof, the rules will be incapable of mechanical application. Choice, or discretion, will
need to be exercised in sorthg out the relevant and the probative fiom the superfluous
and the irrelevant. The choices made in this process are very much subject to review and,

if indefensible, then they will be overturned. However, this does not deny that the
decision-makex has an irnplicit fieedom to interpret and apply the d e s . It is simply that
this type of implicit discretion is more closely controlled than is substantive discretion,
which may also be granted implicitly or explicitly?

See section 8 of the Regufutions.
Indmd, discretion in interpretation and application of d e s is one of the more rigorously scrutinized

Returning once more to Dworkin, it is interesthg to note the place that discretion

in interpretation and enforcement occupy in bis analogy. Suggesting that they fit neatly
into a hole surrounded by a ring of niles, does not adequately capture their tme nature as
sinewy entities that act upon the d e s themseives. It is for this reason that some criticize
the doughnut as deceptively imprecise, conveying an image of distinction and dennition

that does not obtain in all cases.[eSGiven that interpretative and enforcement discretion is

perhaps better analogized as commingling with the fibers of the ring of d e s , the
doughnut may actuaily look like a sponge cake,'%with a large hole in the middle and a lot
of little holes shot al1 through it.
Applying this to immigration law, the hole in the xniddle of the doughnut can be

likened to the explicit discretion wielded by immigration bureaucrats. Within that middle
void, they are free to choose fioom among any assembled options. Their power of choice
is relatively ample here, being immune to review, at least on the merits. This is
Dworkin's second weak sense. Within the surmunding band of nila, there are also often
choices to be made among and between the rules. This type of discretion is most ofien
granted as an implicit matter, though it may also occur as an overt matter. The necessity
forms of discretion, primdy because courts see themselves as expert in this field. Lnterestingly, section
1l(3) represents an u n d example of an explicit version of substantive enforcement discretion, which
more often exists an iinplicit power. tmplicit enforcement discretion is most oflem associated with criminal
law, where police, prosecutors and courts have authority to detennine whether or not charges should be
laid or, if-laid, whether they should be withdrawn. See for example, Glanville Williams,"Discretion in
Prosecutingn, supra note 119 at 222, where the author states that "[i]t is completely wrong to suppose (as is
sometimes done) that the institution of prosecutions is an automatic or mechanical matter."
l* See Galligan, DUcretiormy Powers supra note 41 at 32 where he notes h t the doughnut analogy
"...cm be misleading in suggesting ...a clear division between the surrounding standards and discretion; in
the clearest cases of discretion that division may be clear, but more typicdy the two are interwoven, with
discretion ocamhg where there are gaps in the standards, or where the standards are vague, abstract, or in
conflict"
'% For another interpreeaton of the doughnut, see Lame Sossin, "Redistrr'butingDemoaacy: An Inquiry
into Authority, Discretion and the Possïbitity of Engagement in the Welfare State", (1994) 26 Ottawa L . k

A final aspect of implicit discretion that bears mention concems power to set
procedures, methods, forms, timing, degrees of emphasis and a host of other subsidiary
factors. Aithough these appear at hrst glance to be relatively trivial procedural matters,
yet the* manipulation cm have a significant impact on how substantive choices are
effected? Again, the ability to exercise discretionary control over these items arises

either by implicit or explicit conferra1 of authority. Under S. 114 of the Act, for example,

express authority is delegated to the Governor in Council to create regulations dealuig
with a wide range of matters affêcting who may qu&@

for immigration and in what

manner. On the other hand, the local manager of a visa office abroad, or a CIC in

Canada, wili also have significant latitude to set processes and procedures that can impact

upon deiivery of services. Matters such as office hours, preferences as to documentary
evidence that should accompany an application and the lk*, al1 have an affect on
immigration processes. If unreasonable, such stipulations cm result in deIaym3,or even

denial, of service. It is apparent then that this implicit bureaucratie discretion can be as
powemil, in its own way, as an explicit gant of discretion.

Canada (Min*
of Ernployment and Immgration), [1990] F.C.722,9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 243,34 F.TX 26
(F.C.T.D.). There, the Court found departmental guidelines to be unddy restrictive as to the sorts of
matters which might be considered upon a humanitarian and compassionate review.
Davis, supra note 41 at 4,
See for example, Bunalo APC appiication kit insert, supra note 132, where stipuiations of this sort are
enumerated.
An exampIe of this can bc seen in the ment experience of a Nova Scotia man who sponsorrd his
Americau spouse for permanent residwce in Canada. The matter is detaiied m Parker Bass Doduun, "For
better, for worse" The WaIrlf~]
Sunday Dai& Navs (22 June 1997) at 4-5. The story purports to recount
what happened "...when a happy bride's bid for Ianded-immigrant status became a 14-month ordeai when
the red tape ran amok.'' In particdar, this couple was dealing with two different CIC offices at one point,
one in Canada and another located abroad. One bit of delay in the case is ascnid to the fact that whiie the
Canadian office would accept payment by charge card, tbe foreign office would not. The Canadian office
was apparentIy unaware of this diffefence in procedure and had counseled that credit card payment was
indeed an option at the visa office.

1.5.3

MinisteMl and Delegated Discretion

At the federal level, legislative authority for creation of regdations to flesh out the

procedures and d e s by which a statute is to be camied out is most often delegated to the
Govemor in Corncil." The Governor in Council is, in reality, simply the executive arm
of govemment, commonly known as cabinet?

It is composed of the Prime Minister and

other ministers, including the Minister of Immigration."

In the case of immigration law,

some of Parliament's legislative authority has in fact been delegated to the Govemor in

C o ~ n c i l It
. ~is pursuant to this authority that the Govemor in Council has created the
Immigration Regulatiors, which provide a mass of fine detail supplementing the more
g e n d overall scheme set out by the Act.
It is salient to note also that the Minister of Immigration is herself a delegatee of

power. Though she is a cabinet member, and hence "part" of the Govemor in Council,
she has no direct authority of her own, Save that which has been accorded to her under the

xu Evans,

supra note 2 at 9-10.
Pm Hughes J. in South- West Oxford (Township) v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1985), 18 O.M.B.R. 2 1
at 24,50 0.R.(26) 297,S C.P.C.(26)92, 15 Admin. LX. 1 (HC.),
w h m in speaking of the Lieutenant
Governor in Council (the provinciai cornterpart), he observed that "...the Lieutenant-Govemor in Council
is the expression of a fiinction and not of any group of mdividual ministers...." See ais0 section 35(1) of
the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21 which provides this definition:
"Govemor General in Councii" or "Govemor in Cound" means the Governor General of Canada
acting by and with the advice of, or by and with the advice and consent of, or in conjunction with
the Queen's Frivy Council for Canada
Hogg, mpra note 87 at 26, terms it a "strange practice" in Canadian Iaw that statutes never refer to the
Prime Minister or cabmet, preferring mstead to donate power to the Governor in Councii, No matter what
the delegatee is called, however, he notes that the conventions of responsibIe government ensure that
effective power is always shifted "into the han& of the elected m i n h y where it belongs".
See Hogg, id at 343-345, where the author states that because of retention of the British mode1 of
government in Canada, there is a close Lintr between the executive and Iegislative branches, which condmply with the United States or Austraiia, where the sqaration of powers is more compIete. Thus, he
observes h t there is no general doctrine regarding separation of powers in Caaada and so no requinment
that legisiative and executive powers be exercised by différent bodies.
Section 114(1) of îhe Act sets out a Iirt mat- o v a which the Govemor in C o d is empowered to
make reguîations.
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legislation? Nonetheless, as a hinctiond matter, it is she, rather than the Governor in

Council, who heads up the immigration bureaucracyyAccordingly, it is to hm that
immediate responsibiliiy and authority for the &y to day workings of the Immigration
Department falls. This authority necessitates delegation to the Minister of a broad range
of powers to enable her to administer and enforce the Act. and ensure that govemment
policy on immigration is carried f o r ~ a r d . ~

While many powers are nominally accorded to the Minister in her role as
functional head of the immigration bureaucracy, few of them are a c W y exercised by
her directly. Instead they are usually delegated in tum to s~bordinates."~
The reality of

the size and complexity of the immigration program is such that it is inconceivable that
the Minister herself could deal persondly with every case that might implicate her
discretionary power. As a matter of practicality, therefore, she is permitted to delegate

some of her authority, either as an express or implied matter."'

Thus, for example, S. 114(2) of the Act contains an express provision permittting the Govemor in
Coucil to authorize the Minister to exempt anyone h m any regdation.
For a discussion of the potential checks on the authority delegated to the Minister of immigration, see
The Minister.
below, section 3.4.1
''O Section 121 of the Act provides:
Subject to subsection (1. l), the Minister or the Deputy Minister, as the case may be,
(1)
may authorize such persons employed in the public service of Canada as the Minister or
Deputy Minister deems proper to exercise any of the powers and perfonn any of the duties
and functions that may be or are requircd to be exercised or pdormed by the Minister or
Deputy Minister, as the case may be, under this Act or regulations, ...
Any power exercised or duty or function performed under subsection (1) by any
(2)
person authorized to exercise or perfonn it W be deemed to have been exercised or
performed by the Minister or Deputy Minister, as the case may be.
Courts WUimply an authority to delegate because of practicd concerns. See for exampie, Vidal v.
Cmtada (Minister of Employment and Immi'ation) (199 l), 4 1 F.T.R. 118,13 hm.L A (2d) 123
(F.C.T.D.). There. the applicant contended that a lack of explicit wording permithg delegation obligated
the Governor in Councii to persoaally p a s upon appiications for exemption b m the Regdations under S.
114(2) of the Act. The Court dhnissed this contention summarily, however, noting the practical
Mpossitbility of the Govemor m Council personally deaihg with thousands of such apphcations, Because
of this, it found tbat an extensive deiegation system must be impiied. This system d o w s review of
individual cases by immigration officers who, in tiirn.provide recommendations to the Minister. AAer

Express delegation arises in those instanceswhere the Immigration Act and

Regdations distinguish between discretionary powers wielded by the Minista of
Immigration and those exercised on her behalf by other officiais, such as visa offi~ers."~

It is accomplished by way of delegation instnunents, which are made public. In order for
the Minister's delegate to be lawfully constituted, they m u t corne within the class or
category of Officials who have been appmved to exercise the particula.power on the
Minister's behalf,2I3 On the other han& there also exist certain powers which the Act
prohibits the Minister h m re-~ielegating.~~~
As a delegatee herself, she is not entitled to
re-delegate h a authority d e s s there is a specific provision to permit her to do so, or the
circumstances of the Act suggest that this is permi~siblef~~

Thus, in some instances, where no explicit characterization is made as to who may

receiving those recommendations, the Minister, usualiy acting through other officiais within her office, is
fiee to decide cases a s she deems appropriate in the circumstances. See &O Minirter of Employment &
Immigration v. Jiminez-Perez (1984), (19841 2 S.CR 565, Cl9851 1 W . W R 577,9 Admin. LX.280, 14
D . L R ( 4 9 609,56 N R 215 (S.C.C.).
See for example, S. 2.1 of the Inimigmrion Regulatiionr which aiiows the "...Minister to exempt any
person fiom any regulation made under subsection 114(1) of the Act or otherwise to faciiitate the
admission to Canada of any person where the Minister is satisfied that the p a o n should be exempted fiom
that regulation or that the person's admission should be facilitateci owing to the existence of cornpassionate
or humanitarian considerations." On the other han& see text of S. 1l(3) of the Regulations accompanying
note 191, supra, which accords a discretion exercised directly by visa officers.
2'3 See below, section 3.3.3.1
Protecting Discretion, discussing the concept of "DeiegatusNon
Potest Delegare" and the importance of a properly constituted deiegation of power.
'14 These are prescribed in the Act. at subsection (1.1) of section 121, which reads:
The Mïnister or Deputy Maiister, as the case rnay be, may not authorize the exercising of
(1.1)
the powers or the performing of the duties and hctions referred to in [thk Act
under]subsection 9(5), paragraphs 19(l)(c.2), (f), (k)and (l), subsections 39(2), 40(1)
and 4O.l(l), subparagraph 46.0 l(l)(e)(ii), paragraph 53(l)(b) and subsections 8l(2) and
82(1).
Essentialiy, ail of these provisions reiate to persons who pose security or serious criminal risks.
Apparently, because of the sensitive nature of these cases, the Minister (in cooperation with the Solicitor
Genend, in some cases) m u t personally determine whether to deny admittance or, if the penon is already
in Canada, to diow deportatioa
'"See John Willis, "Delegatm Non Potest Delegaren, (1943) 21 Can.Bar Rev. 257 at 259. "A discretion
confmed by statute is prima facie intendcd to be exercised by the authority on which the statute has
confemd it and by no other authority, but this intention may be negatived by any contrary indications
found m the language, scope or object of the statute.. ,."

exercise a power, it may still be mderstood that the Minister has authority to delegate her

powers to lower level officials. This implied delegation will be 6 s e d fiom ali of the
circumsfatlces attendant upon the grant. Ifdelegation is not expressly prohibited, then

even considerations of practicality and necessity may be cited by the courts as
justification for implying a ri@ in the Minister to pass on her authonty? The reality,
therefore, is that many of the powers and duties granted to the Minister are actudly
exercised by officials acting on her behalf. In such cases, "[tlhe officia1 is not usually

spoken of as a delegate, but rather as the alter ego of the Minister or the department;
power is devolved rather than delegated.[footnotes omitte~i]'~~~
Regardless of who actuaily exercises a power, the propriety of a discretionary
decision may be challengeci by way of an application for judicial review. The centrai
question in any judicial review concerns the nature of the power in question, whether it

was exercised in a fit and proper fashion and whether it is amenable to review by the
courts. Certainly, there exist some discretionary powers that the courts will decline to

supervise too closely. In particular, those characterized by the courts as purely
discretionary are often found not to be amenable to judiciai interference. This is even

mer where exercise of the power implicates broder political questions or considerations
See for example, Vidal v. Canada, supra 21 1 where the court readily implied an extensive delegation
system, In doing so, it rejected an argument by counsel for the applicant tbat applications for
"humanitarian and compassionate" consideration pursuant to S. 114(2) of the Act required pers04
consideration by thc Governor in Councïi. For practical Rasons stezxuxing îkom the volume of such
applications, the Court found it 'Snconceivable" that ParLiament should have intended to prohibit
delegation of authority and responsibility over such matters to the Mmister.
2 1 7 ~Smith,
e
supra note 190 at 369, where the authors note alsa:
In generai, &=fore, a M
. is not obliged to bring his own mind to bear upon a matter
entnisted to him by statute but may act through a duly authorised officer of his department, The
officer's authority need not be conferred upon him by the Miaister p e r s o d y ; it may be conveyed
g e n d y and informaIly by the officer's hierarchid superiors in accordance with departmental
practice.

that exceed the scope of the particular case at hand.

In Winn v. Canada (Attorney G e n e r ~ l )for
~ ~exampie,
~,
the applicant applied for
mandumus to compel the Attomey General to provide consent to institute a prosecution.

The court noted that a decision to prosecute was entirely discretionary on the part of the
Minister and that there were no statutory or other guidelines as to when, how and under
what circumstances that discretion should be exercised. h the face of such a broad
discretion, the court declined to make an order. In its view, judicial restra.intwas
warranteci where a purely discretionary power, ill suited to judicial review, was in issueF9
Such powers generally implicate a special privilege not ordiaarily avaiiable. In the
absence of a duty on the discretion holder to act, or a right in the appLicant to compel the
exercise of a discretion, the courts will not act This is especially so where the matter
involves questions of politics or public policy, which are more suited to the political
arena than the co~rtroorn.~

The hesitancy of the courts to act in the face of a so-called "pure discretionary
powei' is reinforced by the nature of the remedies available. Judicial review in the Trial
Division of the Federal Court is the primary vehicle by which overseas immigration
(1994), 28 Admin, L R (2d) 254,84 F-TK 11S.
For a similar result on similar facts, see also Balhtyne v. Duplessis (1938), 76 Que. S.C. 448 (Que.
S.C.). There, the Attorney General failed to noti€y an appficant as to whether consent to commence an
action, which was needed pursuant to a statute goveming employment, wodd be given. The court noted
that the giving of consent was discretionary- Under the circumstances, it was found that the Attorney
General's lack of response indicated that discretion had been exercised with a negative d t .
See for example, William v. Canada ('Mjnisterof Citizenship & Immigration) (1997), 35 Imm.L.R.
(2d) 286 (F.C.A.). In that case, the respondent had been declared a "danger to the public" pursuant to S.
70(5) of the Act. The court reviewed the process by which the "Minister"might form an opinion that an
individual poses risks to the public generaily. Strayer J.A. observed tbat mch an exercise involves a
prognostication of potena fiiture activity, which cannot be proven dennitively. As such, the Minister is
required to engage in a weighing of the factors, both for and against the appficant. In his view, however,
this is an activity perfectiy suited to the Minister, since "...there is dways a risk [in such cases] and the
extent to which society shouId be prepared to accept that risk can involve poiiticd considerationsnot
81'

decisions may be challenged.*' The usual remedies in such cases include writs of

ceMorari, mandamus and prohibition, which may be sought aii together, or in any
Certioruri is used to quash a decision of a tribunal, while prohiition
c~mbination.~

issues to prevent an anticipatory breach of the law. Mandamus, on the other hand, issues
to compel performance of a duty owed to an applicant."

Though it may be used to

compel the exercise of a discretion, it cannot be used to dictate a particular o~tcorne.*~

AU of t h a e writs are prerogative rernedies whose issuance is discretionary in the
court? Thus, a court is under no obligation to afford them, even where aprUnafacie
case has been made out by the a p p l i ~ a n t .Indeed
~ ~ ~ they may be refbsed despite that the
public authority in question has been found to have acted in contravention of the l a w F
Likewise, the "...scope of the prerogative orders reflects the general principle that it is
not the role of the.. .Court on judicial review to substitute its own decision for that of the

inappropriate for a minister".

"' There are, of course, exceptions to this proposition.

One of the most obvious is the right of appeai, in
sponsored immigration cases, to the Immigration Appeai Division (1AD)of the Tmmigration and Refiigee
Board (IRB) under S. 77(3) of the Act. However, any chabmges of LAD decisions are also dealt with by
judicial review in the Trial Division of the Federal Court, pursuant to S. 18.1 of the Federal Court Act.
Bagarnbiûe, supra note 151 at 356.
For morr on the nature of thae remedies and the circumstances unda which they may issue, see
generaiiy Bagambiire, ibid.at 335-363; and de Smith, supra note 190 at 693-704.
*POU- v. Ward. [1947] 2 W.W.R.193,55 Man. R 2 14, [194q 4 D.L.R.316 (Man. CA.), revershg
[194q 1 W . W K 807 (sub nom. Pozier, Re) (Man.U.).
zzs De Smith, supra note 190 at 695; J.H. Grey, "Discretion in Admhkîmtive Law'', supra note 1 at 113,
footnote 40. For a discussion generally of discretion m the court upon judicial review, see de Smith, id. at
805-820.
zx See, for example, Sashi v. Outuda (Min of Employment & Immigration) (1987), 3 hm.L.R. (2d) 288
(Fed. T.D.). In that case, the appîicant sought to sponsor his adopted ûaughter. However, the application
was denied on the basis that the strict requiiements of the foreign adoption had not been complied with.
The court noted that the conclusion of the visa officer, though not unrtaso~ble,involved some
interpretation of foreign Iaw. Accordingly, procedrual fairness required that the applicant shouid have
been given some opportimity to respond to the mterpretation. This was not done. Under the
circu~ll~fances,
however, the court saw no substantid injustice and, since the relief sought was
discretionary, dismissecithe action.
De Smith, supra note 190 at 695. The Lemedies may also be denied because the conduct of the applicant
is such as to warrant a denial of relief, See Bagambiire, supra note 151 at 355.

"

original deciaon-maker[footnote ~ m i t t e d ] . ' Accordingly,
~
in order to meet with success
on an application for review, it is incumbent upon the applicant to demonstrate some duty
owed to her. If the decision in question entails a pureiy discretionary power, then such

duty is absent. Mandamur, in particular, will not issue except where the applicant
possesses a legal interest in the duty whose compulsion is sought. This fact was evident
in Robinson v. Canada (Minister of CitPzmhipl2Lq where the court set out the elements to
be demonstratecl for a successful application. "[T]he applicant must show that: 1) it has a

clear legal right to have the thing sought by it done; 2) the duty whose performance it is
sought to coerce is actuaily due and incumbent upon the officer at the t h e of seeking the
relief; 3) the duty is purely ministeriaP in nature; and 4) there has been a demand and a
refusa1 to perform the duty"P1 Frankly, therefore, if the matter involves a "purely
discretionary" decision, the Minister or her delegate will be fiee to act in a highly
subjective fashion.
As an elected official responsible for shaping, implernenfing and administering

govemment immigration policy, it is inevitable that political considerations wil1 be
present, to a greater or lesser extent, in ahost every decision that the Minister of
Immigration is cailed upon to make. Accordingly, courts are more iikely to show greater
deference to discretionary decision making engaged in by the Minister, than that of a
lower level official acting pursuant to a delegati~n.~~
In this light, it is pertinent to note
--

De Smith, ibid. at 698.

"[1990] 1 FC. 362, 10 Imm. L.R (2d) 224 (F.C.T.D.).
The Court is not using the tenn "ministerialwbere to connote a power wielded by the Minister of
Immigration, Rather, its meaning in this context relates to a mandatory act or duty that admits of no
personal discretion or judgment m its performance.
t5Supra
'
note 229,lO Tmm- L R (2d) 224 at 227.
232 This i
s made abundantly apparent in the decision of Nguyen v. Canada (1993), 18 1mm.L.R. (2d) 165,

that, by wtue of S. 114(2) of the Act and S. 2.1 o f the ReguIutions, the entirety of the

selection criteria established by the ReguIati0n.s have been lefi subject to a broad,
overriding discretion in the Minister. She is authorized to reiieve against the regdations
whenever she is satisfied that an exemption should be granted or that humanitarian and
compassionate rasons for doing so exist. It is a sort of statutory "escape valve" which

empowers the Minister to "under-enforce" the law as she deems expedientB3The

plenitude ofthis discretion cannot be overemphasized. There are simply no criteria k e d

100 D L R (49 151.151 N K 69.14 CRIL ( 2 4 146 (Fed CA.). In that case, a permanent retident was
summoned to an msuiry under section 27(3) of the Act to determine whether he should be deported for
having been convicted of a serious criminal off'ce, contrary to section 27(1)(d). The inquiry was
adjoumed when the appiicant mdicated that he wished to seek refiigee status. Subsequentiy, the Minister
of Immigration issued a certifïcate pursuant to section 46.01(I)(e)(ii)(B) [now section 46.01(l)(e)(iii)]
declaring the appiicant to be ineligible for refigee status because he constituted a dangex to the pubiic in
Canada. Upon resumption of the inquiry*the c d c a t e was tendered in evidence and the applicant was
ordered deported Upon judiciai review of that deportation order, the applicant's counsel argued, in part,
that the legislative provisions which permitted the Mioister to issue such a certincate violated the
applicant's rights under section 7 of the Charter not to be deprived of his liberty*except in accordance with
the principles of hdamentai justice. In counsel's view, the lack of any specific criteria in the legislation
to guide the .Uinister m her decision to issue a danger certificate was contrary to fundamental justice. in
the Court of Appeal, this argument was quickly disposed in a manner that made clear that the COLU& had no
qualms about a wide and unstructurcd discretion being granted to the Minister. Speaking for the court, 151
N.R. 69 at 74, Marceau J.A. stated:
With respect to the Iegislation itseif, it is argued that the absence of legislative safeguards to
protect against the issuance of an di-advised certificate, such as a requirement that dangerous
conduct be likely to continue and that the dangeruusness be intractable, coupled with the fact that
there is no provision for a court review of the Minister's opinion, renders the whole legislative
scheme disrespectful to the principles of fimdamental justice. 1 disagree. I do not beliwe that the
Minister needs tu be cornpelled tofollow formai guidelines as to thefactors he should take into
account informing Lis opinion, and I consider the Minister 's opinion in respect of public danger
as reliable as that of a court- [emphasis added]
U 3This ir to be contrasted with the situation in Britain where, arguably, the Minister has not been accorded
statutory authority to 4îmder-enforce'' mimigration law. See Vice- "Extra-Statutory Ministerial
Discretion in Immigration Law", supra note 186, who notes that the Secretary of State (who has
responsibility for immigration in England) exaises a discretion to under-enforce the immigration mies.
In his view, however, English law does not acaially accord power to the Semtary of State to grant
dispensation in the thousands of cases that he actudy does every year. However, he does also note some
case law, at 3 17, which seems to suggest tbat a broad construction of one statutory section may provide the
necessary authority. Whether or not such statutory authority exists, the Secretq of State assumes he has
this power and, of course, those who benefit from it do not challenge i t On the other han4 since it is a
pure disaetion, there is no basis to apped refusal to exacise the discretion. in practice, therefon, this
discretion is immune h m judicial supervision, since successfùi parties do not appeal and unsuccessfai
ones have no basis for a@.

by statute or regdation that the Minister must f o i l o ~ . ~

Moreover, in reviewing exercises of discretion, it is clear that the courts show
p a t e r deference to Ministers than to rank and file civil servants. This c m be seen, for

example, in cases involving crimllial inadmissibility. Where the prospective entrant to
Canada has a CnminaI record of any sort, they must seek a gant of "rehabilitation".

The

authority for granting such rehabilitation, at least with respect to more serious offences,
has not been delegated by the Minister and so she retains direct responsibility for each

determination. The mai procedure is for the applicant to be intewiewed by a visa
officer who, if satisfied genuine rehabilitation has occurred, rnakes a positive
recommendation to the Minister for exercise of her discretion to grant relief. In the
Leung case5, the applicant had been convicted in 1989 in Hong Kong of the& forgery of
a document and uttering a forged document and sentenced to four months irnprkonment
on each count. Upon his later application for permanent residence under the Independent
category, Leung was able to satisfy the visa officer of his genuine rehabilitation, with the
result that the visa officer forwarded an enthusiastic positive recommendation to the
Minister?

The Minister, however, without giving reasons, deched to exercise her

Tho@ admittedly, this discretion may not be compIetely devoid of criteria guiding iîs exercise.
However, the criteria applicable usuaiiy are those set by the Minister herself, in the fonn of poiicy
statements contained in the Immigration Manuals, Operations Memoranda and the me. The Minister is
under no obligationto formulate such policies to guide exercise of her diçcretion. However, once adopte&
the courts wiU act in the intefests of fairness to ensure that they are applied evenly and consistently. For a
fiiller discussion of the legal position of policy statcments, see text accompanying note 556, infia,
Chi Wah Anthony h n g (14 April1998), Federal Court File No. IMM-1061-97 (F.C.T.D.)
[unreported], as cited in Labase - The National Infonnutton Networkfor Immigration Practitioners
(hereinafter refened to as "kbase") 9 5 (May, 1998 Sending) at 14.
236 The enthusiasm of the officer is evident in an extract h m the rehabilitation recommendation forwarded
to the Minister. It reads: "It is rare in the course of an Immigration Officer's career that an applicant for
permanent residence in Canada exudes so ~damentallythe features of rehabilitation, remorsefulness, and
contriteness as portrayed to myself as the interviewhg officer and miter of this rehabilitation submission."
Id.., 14 at 15.
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power in favour of the applicant After apparently failing to obtaui leave to directly

challenge the Minister's determinationm,the applicant applied for judicial review by
questioning the visa officer's d e in the matter. The central issue concernai the duty of a
visa officer to question the reasonableness of the Minister's decision. Though the
Minister's apparent disregard for the ringing endorsement provided by one of her own
officials seems on its face somewhat perverse, the completely discretionary nature of her
authority and the deference courts will pay to it is seen in this statement by Gibson J.:

It is worthy of note that the responsibility for rehabilitation decisions has been
vested in the Minister, not in officials such as visa officers. It was for the
Minister to detennine whether or not she was satisfied and the fact that the visa
officer who prepared the submission to her was himself satisfied is of no
~onsequence.~
Accordingly, the Court found no obligation on a visa officer to inquire d e r the propriety
of a Ministerial decision. hdeed, the Court went so far as to distinguish a Ministerial
decision fiom those rendered by officials employed in her department, by using the
example of a medicd officer's opinion. Medicai officm provide opinions to visa officers

as to whether applicants meet statutory requirenients respecthg health. Such opinions
often involve a significant elernent of discretion in their formation. Though visa officers
have no medical training, the courts nonetheless have found a duty in them to assess the
reasonableness of Medical Officer opinions.
The result is somewhat incongrnous. The very expertise of visa officers lies in
assessing the personai quaiitia, achievements and general character of visa applicants.

The selection factor of personal suitability, for example, applicable to all Independent

=' Id.
==Id.

migrants, requires officm to fomi opinions regarding the adaptability, motivation,

initiative, and resourcefüiness of individual appli~ants?~These are very closely related
to the sorts of qualities that might be assessed in detemiining whether genuine
rehabilitation has a c W y taken place. Assessing the fitness of medical opinions,
however, draws upon a whoie different skill set and howledge base than visa officers are
likely to possess. The oniy explanation for the differing roies of visa officers in these two
scenarios is the laissezfaire attitude of the courts toward Minister7sdiscretion.
The point is furthex illustrateci by the case of Bhatnage?,

which showed that

courts are w i l h g to be pragmatic in the context of Federal Court practice, at least where
senior govexnment officials are involved as iitigants. Faced with the question of whether
or not to hold goverment ministers personally responsible for the actions of their
departments, the majority of judges in the several levels of court traversed by the
Bhatnager case reiied upon their own judicial discretion to avoid a result that the mie of
iaw seemed to dictate.
In Bhatnaget, the applicant had been sponsored for permanent residence by his

wife, a Canadian citizen. Though the application was submitted in 1981, it was still
under consideration in the Immigration Section of the Canadian High Commission in

New Delhi,India in 1985. Understandably k t r a t e d with the pace of matters, the

sponsor filed a Notice of Motion in the Trial Division of the Federal Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Minister of Ernployment and Immigration to process Mr.
-

Schedule i, Factor 9, Regrclationi.
Canada (Min. of Employmmt & Immigration) v. Bhahager, [1986]2 F.C. 3 (Fed T.D.),rev'd 119881 1
F.C.171 (Fcd. CA),aff'd [1990]2 S.C.R. 217,44 Admin. L X 1,111 N.R. 185,71D L R (4th)84,43
CJ.C. (2d) 213,12 hm.L.R (2d) 8 1.
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Bhatnager's application. In the course of the mmrdamus proceedings, an order for

production of the visa office file was made by the Trial Division to facilitate crossexamination upon a£fïdavit.ul The order, addressed to the respondent Minister of
Employment and Immigration and the Secretary of State for External A f f ' ,stipulated
that they should give direction to their officials for production of the file. In the result,
however, the file was not produced with sufncient almity to meet the deadline set by the
Court. As a resulf Bhatnager sought to have the respondent Minister and Secretary of
State held in contempt of court for failing to heed the order. Although the order for
e it had
production had not been personally served upon the respondents, fomal s e ~ c of
been accepted on their behaifby counsel, in accordance with procedures set out in the
Federal Court Rules governing such matters?

The contempt proceedings placed squarely before the court a comerstone
proposition of the mie of law - that no one, not even a govemment mlliister, is above the
law. As was observed by the Trial Division of the Federal Court, "[tlhere has never been

any doubt in this case as to whether ministers and other government officials are subject
to the law, and therefore subject to duly issued orders of t h i s Court. This is a principle
which has been recognized for centuries in the system of public Iaw we inherited in

At that point in the proceedings, the Secretary of State for External M a i r s was also added as a party to
the proceedings, since foreign service visa officers were then employees of the Department o f Extenial
AfEairs and International Trade Cana& (now the Department of Foreign M a E s and International Trade).
Bhatnager v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration and Secretary of Statefor Extemal Anairs),
[1988] 1 F.C.171 at 176 (Fed.C.A.).
Ut There does not seem to have been any dispute concerning whether tüe Ministers ever had personaï
knowledge at any tirne material to the question of contempt of court. As Strayer J. noted, supra note 240,
119861 2 F.C.3 at 19: "In the present case there was no suggestion that the orâer of the Associate Chief
Justice of August 15 [reqWring production ofthe nle] had ever been served personaiïy on the respondents
or otherwise brought to their attention pnor to [the dedine of] September 3."

C d a , It is an aspect of the d e of law. [footnote ~ m i t t e d ] ' Though
~
the theory of

that p ~ c i p l was
e beyond doubt, its actual application in practice was decidedly l a s

certain, as evidenced by differences of opinion in the Courts. In the Trial Division,
Strayer J. relied upon the common law to reject the argument that the Federal Court
Rules, perrnitting sentice of an order upon a party's solicitor of record, were sufncient to

fix a party with knowledge of an order in contempt proceedings. Betraying a pragmatic
k

e of minci, he stated the following:
It is true that paragraph 31l(l)(a) of the d e s of court of the Federal Court
provides that service of a document, not being a document that is required to be
served persondy, may be effécted by leaving a copy of it at the address for
s e ~ c of
e the person to be served. By virtue of the defuition of "address for
service" in Rule 2(1), this term in the case of a party who has an attorney or
solicitor on the record meam the business address of that solicitor, While the rule
says nothing specific as to personal service of an order subsequently relied on as a
basis for a proceeding in contempt of court, 1believe that h m the common law
principles it must be deduced that in such cases the order must be served
personaIiy on the party if s e ~ c ise later to be relied on as the basis for knowledge
by that party of the ordcr which he is aiieged to have violated. ...I do not accept
that mere laiowledge by the solicitor alone of the order is sufncient to afFuc his
client with such knowledge of the order as to render that client guilty of the quasicriminal offence of contempt of court?

The Court of AppeaI, on the other haad, took a more positive view of the
deference to be accorded to the d e of law principle, revershg Strayer J. to fïnd the
respondent ministers in contempt. Discounting any role for cornmon law principles, Une

J. held that the Federal Court Rules were complete on the matter and entirely
detenninative of the issue. In his opinion:

...the Federai Court Rules.. .provide a comprehensive code for the mamer in
which notice of court orders is to be effected. On the evidence there can be no
-

- -

Per Strayer J., Cl9881 3 F.C. 383 at 384, m the assessment of penalty hearing following fiom the Court
ofApped's decision, mpra note 240, reversmg his eariierj,dgment that conternpt was not made out.
U* Supra note 240, [1986J 2 F.C.3 at 20.

doubt that those Rules were fùily complied with in this case so that both the
pronouncement of the order in open court in the presence of the duiy authorized
representative of the respondents, and its subsequent semice on him, constituted
notice to them as surely as ifthey had been personally present and sened
here~ith.~

tn short, the Court found the d e s to be the d e s , and equaily applicable to all. Further,
suice the rules mentioned no distinction concerning the nature of the proceedings, it made
no difference whether they were quasi-criminai or civil in substance.
The 1 s t word, of course, remaineci for the Supreme Court of Canada. Speakulg
for the Court, Sopinka J. prefened the more functional methodology adopted by the Trial
Division. Advertkg to a long tradition in the common law requiring "...personal senrice
or achial personal knowledge of a court order as a precondition to liability in
contempt.. . - he noted that in the absence of express provision to the contrary, the
Federal Court Rules could not be taken to have altered that position. This was
particularly true where a serious offence like contempt of court was implicated? He
went on to add that a such approach was particulariy appropriate where, as here, the party
to be cited was no ordinary litigant.

In the case of Ministers of the Crown who administer large department5 and are
involved in a mdtiplicity of proceedings, it would be extraordinary if orders were
brought, routinely, to their attention. In order to infer knowledge in such a case,
there must be circumstances which reveal a special reason for bringing the order
to the attention of the Minister?

The Court noted that there was no evidence nom which to infer actuai knowledge by the
Minister and Secretary of State of the court order and that vicarious liabiiity did not exist

Il9881 1 F.C.171 at 185.
U6 Supra note 240, (1990) 12 Imm.L.R ( 2 4 81 at 88.
Id. at 90.
U8 Id. at 89,
US Supra note 240,

in criminal Law to impute icuowledge and responsibility to a Party. In the result, the

Minister and Secretary of State were exonerated of the contempt charge.
Perhaps the most interesthg question conceming the existence of a wide

discretion in the Minister of Immigration is why it was felt necessary to accord her such
power. The obvious answer is one reviewed earlier in this paper, conceming the
difnculty of devising d e s that provide for substantivejustice in every case. However,
consideration must also be given to the question as to what extent this provision may
have been innuenceci by political considerations. Anyone who has worked for any period
of time in the field of immigration law and policy will appreciate the fact that they are
perennial "hot" topics in the public agenda. Major newspapers camy almost daily
accounts of individual immigration cases that present some sort of cnsis. Generally,
these stories tend to portray the "system" as having fded in one of two ways - either by
negligently omitting to keep out an undesirable or by obstinately and unreasonably

keeping out a desirable. While the first case can only be made up by often protracted and
notorious remedial enforcement action through the courts, the second is amenable to a
deft exercise of discretion under section 114(2) of the Act. Thus, should the coverage on

a refusa1 case become critical of departmental action, with significant public support
mobilized in favour of the wronged applicant, expedience may dictate defiising the
situation by judicious and timely discretion.
Whether or not this is appropriate is likely a matter best left to the legislators. For
in the end, it is in the House of Commons and the forum of public opinion that such

actions are ultimately accountable. Fortunately for the Minister, the demand for
discretionary action is usually more vocal and strident than any call against its use. Thus,

there is o£€enl a s political "damage" to saying "y& than 'ho". This is especially so

since there tend to be few effective Iimits on positive discretion used to accord special
benefits, outside of the operation of the ordinary rules of generai applicatioa Certainly,
those benefiting h m it are unlikely to cornplain. The other immediate party, the

Minister, also is unlikely to appeal the use of positive decision by any of her delegates.
Moreover, because of privacy concems, decisions in individual immigration cases are not
~ ~a result, the public is unlikely even to be aware
ordinarily made publicly a ~ a i l a b l e .As
of when positive discretion has been exercised.
1.6

Chapter Summaüon
Evans asserts that "[ilt is obvious to aii that discretion is the very iife blood of the

administrative state? Be this as it may, it does not mean that discretion as an
administrative tool enjoys universal acceptance. In fact, it remains a subject of some
controversy with a wide diversity of opinions and jurisprudential philosophies evident on
questions conceming its propriety and the circum~fancesof its usage. What is more
certain, however, is that discretion occurs in many forms and on many levels; ministeriai

and delegated, positive and negative, and implicit and explicit. Additionaliy, wherever it
occurs and however it is employed, discretion must be conceded to be power. But it is
more than that, and leaving the description there is, as one reviewer has noted, to paint it

The Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, generally prohibits dtsclosure to third parties of information
coilected by the federaI govemmenf except upon the consent of the individual concerneci. See ako
Government of Canada, Access to Information Act and Privacy Act (Onawa: Treasmy Board of Canada,
undated information pamphlet). For a f d e r discussion of the roIe of the A7vacy Act m immigration
ma-,
see below section 3.4.4
Human Rights, Privacy and Access to Infomtion.
UO Evans, supra note 2 at 28.
'"9

as a caricature of itseIKs1 Choice is redy what discretion is most about It is the
fkeedom that power imports to choose between alternatives. But they are not just

arbitrary choices. Rather, the choices reqwed by our law are between procedural
cornpliance and substantivejustice. Discretion is that which can put autocracy into
bureaucracy or forge compassion and empathy into administration. It is an animating

essence that p d t s a choice between blind adherence to d e s or blindness to the
sometimes othemise inflexible dictates of d e s . It is dso a double-edged sword,
allowing for both facilitation beyond the strict constraints of d e s and for control withui
the letter of the law. And in the end, it is this dichotomy which has ensured that
discretion should remain a subject of enduring interest and controversy.

CHAPTER 2
2.1

- THE OVERSEAS CONTEXT

The Selection Process
As noted in Chapter 1, immigration to Canada is camed out pursuant to three

broad categories, comprised of the Family Class, the Refugee Class and the Independent

category." The Family and Refugee Classes are intended to fbther goals centered on

family reunincation and protection of persons from persecution.lo The Independent
category, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the econornic and culturai

development of CanadaLYWhile the nnt two proceed f?om a sense of compassion and

humanity, the Independent category is unabashedly concerned with the best interests of
the country. In a very reai sense, Independent immigrant selection is what Canada does

for itself and this is reflected in the rnamier in which such immigrants are chosen. Family
The Independent category itself contaias several sukategories. These mclude the Business Class,
Assisted Relatives and ''regular" Independents. Business Class immigrants are persons whose intention it

is to start a business or invest a specified minimum amount of capital into designated immigrant investor

fun&. This class is, in turn, comprised of three sub-categones; Entrepreneurs, Investors and SelfEmployed persons (See definitions for each contained at S. 2(1) of the Regulatiom). Assisted Relatives are
persons who, though having a reIative in Canada, do not qualify for processing in the Family CIass. As a
remit, they are made to q u e according to the criteria for regular Independent immigmts. However, in
recognition of the fact that they have a relative in Canada who is presumably willing to support their
application, the overail total that they need for qyaiification is reduced by five points, as compared to other
Independents (See section 10(l)(b) of the Regulutions). Tme Independents, on the other han& are those
who have no close relatives in Canada and whose intention it is to enter the labour market. They must
qualiSlsoleiy on their own merits, according to a selection grid (See Section 8(1) and Schedde I of the
ReguIatioris and the Selection Grid at Appendix A, below). In order to contain the ambit of this papei; I
have dehberately chosen '?rue" Independen&as the principle focus for this paper. Accordingly,
considerations relating specificaiiy to Business immigrants and Assisted ReIatives will not be discussed,
otber than as an incidental matter.
Sec objectives set out in section 3(c) & (g) of the Act.
* See objectives set out in section 3(b) & (h) of the Act. To this, one might also add the attainment of
demographic goals, as per section 3(a) of the Act. This is parlicularly true in the case of Independents since
their n u m h are, at least at present, the most closely controiîed of aay category. Such control is exercised
primarily in the form of a demographic factor (See factor 6 of Schedule 1to the Reguiations, below, at

Class applicants need to show a close relative in Canada, willing to sponsor their
migration, while Refuges must establish a "well-founded fear of persecution'?

Once

either of these propositions is satisfactorily demonstrateci, the applicant wiil quali@ for
admission, regardless of their personal attributes, education, language abiiity, job skills or
other similar qualificati~ns.~
The case is otherwise with Independent immigrants. They are selected precisely
for those qualities and skills which are thought to ensure their swift and easy resettlement
into Canadian society. In the wor& of the Immigration Manual, "[s]uccessful appiicants
in the independent class wiii be selected primarily due to their ability to make a

significant contribution to the economic, cultural and social fabric of Canada.'=

The fact

that hdependent selection is largely a matter of national self-interest is further connmied
by the locus of selection. Unlike the other two categories, Independent selection is an
activity carried out exclusively overseas. This facilitates a greater degree of control over
who may enter and avoids the lengthy hvolvement and expense that deportation or
removd of unqualified candidates can entail. And, quite simply, there are few equities
that militate in favour of Independent migrants being granted entry in advance of
s a t i s m g entry requirements. It is the national interest, rather than the interests of
applicants which is favoured and the requirement for application outside of Canada
Appenduc A), which is applicable to hdependent migrants alone. S a ten accompanying note 259, infu.
=' 1amjust r e f e g here to Refbgee claimants selected fiom witbin Canada pursuant to a decision of the
Convention Refugee Detennination Division of the Immigration and Rcfùgee Board. Refbgees selected
abroad for resettlemmt in Canada are subject to requirements not applicable to those who have been
selected domesticdy. Sec subsections 7(1)(b) and (c) of the Regulatiom which stipulate, for example, that
overseas refbgee appiicants must demonstrate some f;nanciaI resourccs available to aid their settlement and
skills which suggest potential for becoming successfiilly settïed in Canada.
zs Subject, of course, to any statutory requimnents under S. 19 of the Act, relating to health and public
safety, that may be applicable.

s h p l y reinforces that o d y those with the qualities sought will be granted entry. Thus,
pursuant to section 9(1) of the Immigration Act, every immigrant or visitor to Canada

must apply for and obtain the appropriate visa, before presenting tbemselves at a port of

entry. Aithough exemption is granted for those cases which are "prescnbed", no such
prescription exists for Independents as a class?
Moreover, this self-interest ensures that overall management of the flow of
Independents to Canada is conducted on a more discretionary basis than is the case with
,

other categories. This is done through the device of the "demographic factor"."
Sometimes called the "levels control", it is one of nine factors contained in Schedule 1 to
the Immigrution Regulutiom~,which provides the basic assessment scheme under which
Independents are selected. The "levels control" exists to facilitate rapid policy changes to
suit the political climate and the policy w h h s of the governrnent of the day. So long as

the flow of such immigrants is seen to be an asset and beneficial to the country, the tap
will be aiIowed to remain more open. Ifthe trafic is, however, suspected to be causing
deleterious consequences in the economy, social Life or other aspects of society, then it

can be quickly reduced. Only the Independent class is subject to the use of the device of
demographic factor."' This control device is easily manipulateci and is effective by its
CIC iM, Chap. OP-5, para. 1.1.

"Though there is the possibility for Lndependents to be selected from withiu Canada pursuant to a
''humanitean and compassionate" review under S. 114(2) of the Act. However, the emphasis in such cases
is on exigent personal circumstances thatjus* extraordinary processmg, rather than the normal selection
criteria employed when selection occurs abroad. On the other han& whiIe F a d y Class applicants are
subject also to the general d e that they should apply fiom abroad for their visas,spouses and chilchen of
Canadian citizens or permanent residents are routinely granted exemption b m this requkement, The
family connection is ordinariiy deemed to provide SuffiCientevidence of compehg circumstances.
U9 Regulations, Schedule 1, item 6.
For a table xtting out the selection factors, see below, "AppendixA - Independent immigrant Selection
&idv7.

"' The number of units awarded unda the demographic factor is a matter cmtirely within the discretion of

sheer simpiicity. AU Independent immigrants must obtain a score of 70 points or greater,
according to the selection grid, for a successful application. By raising the demographic
factor, the number of applicants who might qualify is increased. The reverse situation

holds where the demographic factor is reduced?
While the dernographic factor allows for control over the gross number of
applicants that will qualify for immigration to Canada, a m e r selection criteria, known
as the c'occupational factofW, is used to exercise control in both a quantitative and a
qualitative way."

hirsuant to S. 11(2) of the Regulntiom, every applicant must score at

least one unit of assesment for the occupational factor in order to be successful. In this
regard, a "General Occupations List" of occupations open to potentiai immigrants is

maintained, which accords an occupational demand factor, from 1 to 10, for every lïsted
occupation. If an occupation is not listed, then it is considered a "zero demand"
occupation and so will not facilitate Unmigration. By reducing either the number of
"open" occupations, or the occupational demand factor assigned to particular
occupations, the flow of immigrants can be increased, reduced or cut off altogether.
Within the selection process itself, discretionary power occurs in many places,

either overtly, as express statutory grants, or implicitly, as a matter of procedural
practices and interpretation. Numerous examples are found throughout the Act and
Regdatiom, the policy manuals and Ui the daily practices of visa offices. Without
-

---

- -

---

-

-

-

the Minister, notwithstanding that factor 6 states that such "[ujnits of assessment shall be awarded as
detenniued by the Minister c@erconsuitation with the provinces and such ottier persons, organilations and
institutionsas he deems appropriate...," [emphasis added]
Se+ CIC IU,Chap. OP-5, para. 4.1.6 disnwing the demographic factor.
'63 Regulatiom, Schedule I, Item 4
.
Of course, the selection system as a whole operates so as to effcct qualitative seletion, according to the
stipuiated criteria

"
"

attempting an exhaustive Iist, this section will provide an overview of the selection
process and the presence of discretion, as it occurs in the light of statutory grant and in
the shadows of procedure and interpretation?
2.1.1

Procedural Discretion

Discretion enters the seiection process as a factor of procedural practices and as a
consequence of delegated authonty for administering substantive requirements and
stipulations. When employed as a procedural device, it affects the marner in which an
application will be handled and the steps that it may be required to undergo, in order to
satisQ the substantive requirements for qualification. Substantive discretion, going to the

merits of an application, detennines whether it is ultimately successfil.
Unfortunately, the distinction between the two is not always obvious in practice.
Procedural discretion may be implicated in the exercise of a substantive discretionary
power and vice versa For example, a decision to waive a selection i n t e ~ e wimplicates
both a procedural and a substantive step. By waiving the interview, the officer has opted
to make a substantive decision that the applicant is qualified and that points awarded
upon paper-screening are an accurate portrayal of settlement potential. This decision
necessarily imports some substantive discretion concerning sufnciency of the evidence
oEered, weight to be attached to the individual pieces of evidence, and so on. But it also
involves procedural discretion - interview, a significant procedural step, has been waived
to aUow the applicant to move M e r dong the process. As is apparent, there rnay only
-

-

See Appendix A "Independent Inrmigrant Selection Grid" for a List ofthe qualifymg factors agamst
which Independents measured. See &O Appendix B "Independent immigrant Selection Process Chart" for
a schematic overview of the seIection process.
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be shades of meaning sqatating procedurai and substantive discretion in any particular
situation. Despite the difficulties of providing definitive characterizations in every
situation, the distinction between procedural and substantive discretion is perhaps most
useful to au understanding of discretion in everyday immigration practice, and so it is one

I use for the balance of this study.

The burden of proof in all immigration cases rests squarely upon the shodders of
the applicantB This is so since section 9(4) of the Act makes clear the discretionary

nature of the power of a visa officer to issue any type of visa It mandates that an officer
must be satisfied that issuance of a visa is not contrary to the Act or Regulations.

Applicants attending overseas selection interviews are not entitled to be represented at
such hearings, as the attendance of counsel is an entirely discretionary matter in the visa
officer?? In the view of CIC, since it is the applicaut's own qualifications and personal
qualities that are under review, it is for her to put her own best case forward. The

presence of an advocate, acting as an intermediary between the client and the interviewer,
would be Likely to distract the focus of the inquiry and perhaps add unnecessary

formality? Thus, notwithstanding that she may have retained counsel to assist her, it is
the applicant's responsibility to present cogent and clear evidence at interview of her
ability to qualify.

See Act, s.8(1), which provides: "Where a pemon seek to come into Canada,the burden of provïng h t
that person has a right to come into Canada or that his admission would not be contrary to this Act or the
regdations rests on tbat persoa"
47 ûn the discretion of a tn'bunaI to permit or deny the presence of counsel at a "hearing", see generally de
Smith, supra note 190 at 450-454.
Tbere is an analogous problmi associated with interviews requiring interpretm. In such cases, the
officer may end up, in effect, interyiewing the interpreter rather than the appiicant, if sufficient care is not
taken to ensure genuine communication.
~6

"

This was evident in the Hajarhala c a s e for example, where the court
highlighted the need for provision by the applicant of al1justification and documentation
relevant to a determination of admissibility. The Court observed that the Act and

ReguZations impose no positive obligation on a visa officer to provide information,
counseling or other assistance to an applicant, though these may be OEered as a matter of
departmental policy or individual officer initiative? Thus, there resides a discretion

within each officer to follow the dictates of her conscience and the demands of her
workload, as to how far she may be willing to go to assist any applicant to meet the
requirements of the legislation. Obviously, in an environment where officers carry heavy
caseloads and feel harried and pressed, they will lücely possess less time and inclination
to go beyond the minimal requirements for assistance placed upon them by law. Practical
matters, therefore, such a s institutional pressures and constraints, caseload and personal
initiative may legitimately, at least according to law, influence accessibility to the
immigration system.
To put an application into process, an applicant m u t provide sufïïcient
information and documentation to meet a procedural threshold that varies somewhat nom

~9

HajanivaZa v. Canada (Min. of Ernpioyment & Immigration) (1988), 6 Imm. LA. (2d) 222,34 Admin.

L.R 206,23 F.T.R. 241, Cl9891 2 F.C.79 (Fe& T.D.).
It is a m m g to note that there is no obligation in law to be "helpful". Couid Hajariwala be said to
to be bureaucratie? Contrast the HajanwalZa decision, however,
stand for the proposition that it is lawith that of Choi v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Immigration) (1991), 15 Imm. L A (2d) 265, (19921 1
F.C. 763 (CA.) where the court was drawn to the "irresistrile" conclusion that CIC poiicy was to withhold
information fÏom applicaats about the possibility of making a fùU appiication forthwith, without the need
for a prehnhary assessment via a Pre-Application Questionnaire (PAQ). Although the court viewed the
PAQ pejoratively, seeing it as a means by which the department avoided the work burden associated with a
fidl appiication, this does not teil the whole story. While there c m be no dispute that the PAQ was
intended to deviate some burden on the department, it also was meant to save tirne, money and fiutcation
for those applicants who were iinlikely to quam. Unforhmately, Choi and Haja~waiasuggest that the
department is better off to be unhelpfhi, than to attempt something that may later be conmed as
mischievous- For a fuiier discussion of the Choi decision and its implications, see text accompanying note

office to office. The level of that threshold is adjusteci by each office according to a
number of factors, including administrative convenience, the type of documentation
common in the office's jurisdiction, the reliability of same, and so on."' Ifthat threshold
has not been met, the application may be retumed by the office concemed without the

case having been acknowledged and c'locked-in".m Once the lock-in hurdle has been
cleared, the application is launched on a pmcessing track that concludes only when a finai
disposition is rendered. There are just three possible dispositions - gmnting of a visa,
refusd, or withdrawd of the application by the applicant herself.

The handihg of applications for immigration by Independent category applicants
has been described as a "...two-stage assessrnent process during which it is the visa
officer's duty to apply criteria set forth in the legislation and award points based on the
ability of the applicant to become successfidly established in Canada?

The first of the

two stages is a file review, or ccpaper-screening''as it is often called. This entails an

660 infia.

'7'CIC M,Chap. OP-5,Para 2.1.1 (Ver.09-97), "What is a completed application?' provides the
foiiowing guidance to visa offices with respect to Independent cases:
A completed application consists of:
a signed IMM 0008 for the principal applicant, M e r spouse and a l l dependents 18 years of
age and older;
supporting documentation to aliow you to render a decision on the selection criteria;
the correct cost recovery fees.
As a technical, legd matter, it is a dubious proposition that a visa office requires more than just the
correct cost recovery fees and IMM 0008 application forms at the outset, at lest for purposes of locking in
the me. While some visa offices may require more documentation to accompany the initial application,
this is a matter of preference that an insistent applicant may choose to ignore. Howcver, providmg only the
minimum wiii not aid the exercise of procedural discretion, such as a decision on whether or not interview
should be waived, for example,
* For more on lock-in and k importance, see ni* note 371 and accompanying text Again, "hile
individual visa offices may stipulate particular items that they expect to be included with an initial
application, there is no statutory authority for this As a d
t
,
an applicant may submit only his completed
IMM8 application form and the correct processing fees, Failure by the visa office to accept these, at l e s t
for lock-m purposes, would result in a reviewable error.
Zeng v. Minïkter of Employnzent and Immigration (1989), 27 F.TR 56 at 57 (F.C.T.D.) per Jerome,

A.C.I.

examination of the application for completeness of the submissionn4,categorization as to
class of application and, rnost importantly, substantive assessrnent as to ability to meet
selection criteria.
An Independent applicant who fails to obtain at least 60 points at paper-screening
rnay be refused without i n t e ~ e w The
. ~ ~matter is not quite so cut and dried, however, as
simply securing the requisite number of points. The paper-screening officer may exercise
a discretion that is both procedural and substantive in character to put an otherwise failed
application into process. Of her own initiative, or at the request of the applicant, the
officer rnay determine that there is some aspect to the case which militates against strict
adherence to the cut off suggested by the points regime. There may be any number of
reasons that will impel an officer to exercise her authority in this regard. Typically,
however, the decision proceeds fiom a conclusion that the points t d y has somehow
failed to adequately reflect tme settlement potential.

The second stage of the assessrnent process involves an intemiew of the applicant
by a visa officer. In reality, this stage is most ofien skipped by those who have obtained

the outrîght p a s mark of 70 points at paper-screening. Waiver of interviews is now
commonplace6and so an important hurdle for most applicants is simply the question of
whether an interview will even be convoked. This decision is entirely discretionary

"

Although C E attexnpted at one point to introduce the concept of "one-step application" as a matter of
unifonn worldwide procedure, it has now largely been abandoneci, in part because of the difflcdties of
providing a single set of instructions that accoimt for aii of the local conditions that each overseas visa
office must wrestle with. For more on the one-step application, sce infi-anote 370 and accompanying text.
Regulationr, section 11.1.
n6 See for exatllpIe, Buffalo APC application kit hsext, supra note 132. mentioning a waiver rate in excess
of 50%.

though, as a policy matter, the Department endorses waiver whenever p ~ s s i b l e .The
~
advantages of a waive~of interview are many for both CIC and appiïcants. Waiver saves
workload for CIC and improves processing times since the matter of case processing is

rendered an entirely paper exercise. For the applicant, it means that time, effort and
expense associated with attending an i n t e ~ e w
are avoided.
Waiver is generally granted when it is clear that the applicant obtains sufficient
points to qualify and is not obviously affecteci by any statutory bar. Recognizing the
imprecision of the selection grid, however, departmental policy does permit waiver of
interviews, even where the applicant has not obtained the 70 points needed for a clear
pass?

For example, where the applicant indicates experience in an occupation for which

there is apparent demand in Canadam, significant work or study experience in a North

American conte*,

and sufncient hancial resources for establishment, or at least

reliable support nom a f d y member in Canada, waiver of i n t e ~ e w
may still be
granted. In such circumstances, CIC recognizes that there is little '%due added" to
---

rn See CIC iM Chap. OP-5,Para. 3.7 (Ver. 06-97) "Intewiews", where the following guidance is offered:
R22.1 provides officers with the right to c d any applicant andfor any of the applicant's
dependents (wheîher îhey plan to accompa.or not) for an interview provided the interview is for
the purpose of assessing the appkation.
Applicants who meet one of the followhg criteria would not normaUy be interviewai:
a) if the information provided on the application f o m and accompanying documents clearly
shows that an applicant will accumulate sufficient unit. of assessrnent to meet the pass mark
for their particdm occupational group;
b) ifappiicants fail to accumulate SuffiCient uaits of assessrnent and have no chaiice of
accumuiating sufficient additionai uni& during an interview.
AU other cases should be considered for interview.
This is particularly tme for cases where the ilpplicant obtains between 64 and 69 points on paperscreening, since 5 to 6 points is the average taiiy for personal suitability awarded at intewiew. Thus, if
there is nothing on the nle to suggest that an appiicant would obtain l e s than the average number of points
for personal suitability at interview, holding an interview adds little value to the selection process.
Either pursuant to the General Occupations List or an o f f a of employment that has been confmned by
way of validation through a Cana& Employment Centre (CEC) in Canada.
Which tends to confïrm language ability, adaptabitity and other factors pointing to potential for
s u c c e d settlement m Canada.

processing in routine cases by holding an intewiew.
Waiver of interview connmis that the selection criteria have been met. Though an
application may still be refused thereafter for failure to clear statutory requirernents
relating to health and public security, it would be u n d for a negative decision on
selection criteria to follow a waiver decision. That said, however, such a circumstance
might arise, for example, where it appeared that the assessment underlying the waiver
decision had been somehow erroneous and that the selection criteria had not been
properly satisfied. Because it is entirely discretionary, the decision to waive intenriew
can be revoked at any time so as to require an applicant to appear at an interview. Thus,
if the waiver decision was thought somehow to be faulty, the likeliest result is that the
applicant would be called to interview since, most often, they would have gained at least
enough units of assessment to clear the papa-screening threshold of 60 points.
The importance of providing fidl and complete information with an initiai
application is obvious then for several reasons. Fht, it prevents delay due to the
application being retumed for more information or documentation and facilitates lock-in
at the earliest possible opportunity. Second, it assures that a fully infomed paperscreening is conducted, thereby maximuing the potential points an applicant might
receive. Third, since the legai burden rests upon the applicant to prove her case, a welisupported application reduces the nsk of outright refirsd at paper-screening."l FinaUy,a
wealth of infornation facilitates the possibility that positive procedural discretion wii1 be
exercised to waive the necessity for a personal interview.

"' This, of course, raises an issue about the importance of good counseling mataials being provided by
CIC to potential applicants so that they are M y informedas to what ought to go into the application.

Although intentiew can be waived at any stage of the process, the best chance for
obtailiing sarne occurs at the outset, at paper-screening. Once a file has been set for
interview, responsibility for it usually shifts fiom the officer who has conducted paperscreening to another who will conduct the interview. At this point, a sort of institutional
inertia can take hold to make waiver decisions difficult to obtain. Between the time of

paper-screening and interview, there rnay be no one individual who has responsibility for
it. Even where the file has been assigned to a particular officer. that officer rnay have
Little time for case review outside of their interview schedule and rnay not have

familiarity with the file much in advance of the interview. As weU, since t h e has been
set aside in the interview roster for deaihg with the matter, it rnay appearjust as easy to
resolve any outstanding issues at that tirne.
Interview itself imports a significant degree of dimetion, both as to the range of
issues that might be canvassed and the depth to which they will be explored. To a large
c m be influenceci by the care taken in paperextent, the parameters of the i n t e ~ e w
screenuig. A meticulous paper-screening usually guides the interviewing officer to
examine just one or two, often very focused, issues of concem. A cursory paperscreening, however, provides no such guidance and often leaves the interviewing officer
to conduct an open ended examination that only becornes more focused as the interview
progresses. In either case, it remains to the discretion of the interviewer to determine the
issues and the extent to which they will be examined. Since paper-screening rnay not be
used to fetter the interviewing officer's discretion, they are fkee to pursue even those
matters that only become apparent at interview. Likewise, while paper-screening is used
to point out areas of concem, it rnay not be used to suggest an outcome fiom any

intewiew. As such, insofar as ïntenriew is concernecl, paper-sCreening senresjust two
purposes - determining whether interview rnay be waived and, h o t , then identifying

relevant issues of concems so as to reduce the amount of time that may be needed at
interview.
2.1.1 Substantive Discreüon

Selection

In the case of Independents, the assessment proccss involves cornparison against
the selection grid found at Schedule 1 of the Reguiutionsm There are nhe factors
contained in the grid for which Independents eam points. Some of the factors are purely
objective in nature*while others contain a blend of subjective and objective elements. Of
course, any activity importing an ekment of subjectivity inherently gives rise to some
scope for discretionary power.
Education and occupation are examples of two selection factors that implicate
both subjective and objective elements in their assessment. Under the education factor,
applicants are awarded points according to the highest level of schooling they have
completed. As noted earlier in this workm, assessment of educational attainment is not
nearly as clear cut as it might seem at h t glance. What passes for a high school diplorna
in one country rnay not be the sarne as in another country. Inevitably, therefore, some
assessment and interpretation of local scholastic standards and levels of achievement may
be needed if the proper points are to be awarded. The same is true of assessment of

See Appendix A below.
For a discussion of the difflcuities of educationai assessment on a global basis, see text a c c o m p ~ g
note 106, supra.
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occupationai experience and training. An occupation descn'bed as an engineer in one
country might only be equivalent to an engineering technician or technologist in another.
Indeed, the generic nature of the term ''enguieei' is such that it is often used in some
countries to describe occupations that would not ordinarily be associated in Canada with
any type of engineering. In assessing occupational formation and experience, form is not
nearly so important as substance. Eveiything depends upon the circumstances of the
training and experïence and what they actually entailed. Regarâless of what the

educational or occupational attainment is caUed, it is the formative program and process
by which the designation or title was attaùied that is most important. Cogent and clear

proof that qualifications are equivalent to a particular level of attainment in Canada can
sometimes be difficult to obtain. In the absence of such proof, the assessing officer wili
have a greater scope for exercising subjectivejudgement, or discretion. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the greatest scope for adjudicative discretion Lies in evaluation of the
sufnciency of the proof that wili cause the points to be awarded.

A number of factors on the selection grid, such as the demographic factor or age,
are entirely objective and so admit of no substantive discretion. The former is awarded as
a matter of course, while the latter involves a simple calculation of points according to
age. Perhaps the most discretionary of the selection factors are language ability and

personal suitabilïty. In both instances, the latitude for discretion is a result of the lack of
statutory or regdatory guidance given for their assessment. For example, though the
selection grid in Schedule I of the Regdations mandates that language ability in French

and Enghsh should be assessed against the standards of "fluently", '%veil" and 'bvith
difficulty", no instructions are provided in the Scheduie as to the differences between

these three levels of proficiency. In addition, there is no standard test for language ability
recognized under the Act or the ReguIations. The only guidance on this matter is found in
the policy statement contained at Appendix A to Chapter OP-5of the departmental

immigration Manual. However, even the instructions there leave a wide scope for
discretion. For example, the Appendix distinguishes between the three levels of ability in
the context of spoken language by offering the following:

Fluent& - The applicant speaks and understands oral communication with
approximately the same ease as that of an articulate native speaker.
WeZI - The applicant is able to comprehend and to communicate effectively on a
range of topics.
With DzBculty - The applicant is able to communicate only in a very limited
way?
Quite obviously, the imprecision of these gauges for language ability ensures there are
many applicants who fali somewhere between any of two of them. And, in the absence of
a standard test, there is significant scope for debate as to whether mch an applicant is
closer to one level than another.

The assessment of personal suitability is likewise more subjective and hence more
discretionary because of a paucity of guidance in the legislation. And again, the

Immigration Manual provides little more policy guidance as to assessing personal
suitability than is apparent in Schedule I of the Regulationr. The entire Manual passage
d e a h g with this factor is as follows:
Determination of the number of uni& of assessment to be awarded an applicant, to
a maximum of 10, rests on the judgement of the intewiewing officer. The
qualities of adaptability, motivation, initiative, resourcefulness, and such other
attributes, admirable or otherwise, as the applicant may display, are characteristics
on which the officer may base his determination?
- .--

"CIC IM Chap. OP-5, Appendix A at 37 (Ver. 06-97).
'U

CIC IM,Cbap. OP-5, para. 4.1.9. See ais0 the guidance provided thcre for assessment of reading and

As is evident, where the Act, Regulotiorts or policy have specified more criteria, the scope

for discretion is reduced. Where the criteria are comparatively few, however, then
discretionary authority is inevitably greater."

Against this, however, it must be

recognized that the scope for discretionary action in the selection grid is subject to some
hts.

The N o elements of language ability and personal suitability are still guided by

some criteria, no matter how loose they may be. Thus, even with the factor of personal
suitability, for example, which is undoubtedly the most discretionary factor on the g d ,
the scope for discretion is not unlimited?
2.1.3

R. 11(3) Discretion

Officially, discretionary decision-making in overseas immigrant selection by CIC
runs at two percent a n n ~ a l l y .However,
~
this does not disclose the tme story. This
figure only represents actuai selection decisions which c m be tracked in the Cornputer
Assisted Immigration Processing System (CAPS) used by visa offices abroadYgIn that
system, immigrant selection decisions, whether positive or negative, are assigned a
numericai value which can be monitored, collected and andyzed. Such tracking is
effective only for decisions entered into the system as selection decisions. Thus, what is

writing skills, which is simiiarly imprecise.
By way of contrast, see Waldman. supra note 104, at 14.9 in 0 14.25, for an assessment as to the
discretionary nature of a visitor visa. In bis view, the visitor visa is highiy discretionary because of the
minimal criteria applicable to its issuance. As he States: "Clearly the Act provides the visa officer with a
discretion. The only requirement on the visa officer is that he or she consider the application, act fairly in
his or her decision and not unduiy fetter his or her discretion."
The iïmits on the selection factor of pmonal suitability have been the subject of much attention by the
courts and so is discussed in -ter
depth, beIow, at section 3.3.5
Personal Suitability.
E-mail discussion with R Kurland, Barrister & Solicitor, April1997, citing idonna1 discussions with
CIC officiais. This is evidently comparable to similar figures for U.S. immigration processing.
i s C offices in Canada use a different cornputer system, called the Field Operational Support System
(FOSS), than that used in visa offices.
U6

captured are simply those cases involving a discretionary substantive discretion pursuant
to sections 2. lm or 1l(3) of the Regulations. None of the discretionary procedural steps
upon which a selection decision may ultimately be founded are recorded. They are
simply beyond the capability of C A P S , and possibly beyond the desire of the
bureaucracy, to record.

R. 11(3) provides the primary vehicle by which substantive discretion is injected
into the selection process. It is a discretion directly tied to the selection factors and is
intended to deviate any perceived situations of rules failure, either because the selection
factors have overestimated or underestimated settlement potential. Thus, it exists as both
a positive tool for selection and a negative tooi for exclusion. Positive discretion,
pursuant to R 11(3)(a), is used to waive the interview of an applicant who has obtained
less than 70 ~ t ofsassessment, but whose o v d l application indicates a high likelihood
for successful establishment. It rnay even be used to put a case into process where
insufficient units have been obtained to pass paper-screening.lgl Similady, it may be used
to select in those applicants who have attended an interview, but who have still been
unable to obtain sufncient units for an outright p a s , or who have failed to obtain at least
one unit of assessment for occupational experience or occupational demand. Conversely,

Discussed below commencing at page 115.
See, for example, Shum v. Canada (Minister of Citlzmhip & Immigration) (1995), 30 Imm.L.R. (2d)
233 (FCTD.) where the applicant soughtjudicial review of a decision to refuse his application without an
interview, where he obtained l e s than the necessary 60 points to justrfj. his case being put into process.
The appiicant had asked that discretion be exercised to
him an interview, even though he had
obtained insufncient units. The officer, citmg insufficientunits of assessment, deched to exercise
discretion and grant the intewiew. Upon judicial review, the court noted that discretion under section
1l(3) of the Reguiutions was not subject to the necessity of fïrst obtaining sufncient uni& for the "pass"
mark that justined fiirther processing. AccordMgly, the decision was overturned wit a direction h t the
question of discretion be specificaiiyaûdressed, even in the absence of sunicient uni& to justifjl an outnght
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negative discretion under R 11(3)(b) is available for similar reasons - namely, that
although the required units of assessment have been achieved, they represent an
overestunate of tme potential for successful settlement."

Discretion under R 11(3),

whether positive or negative, is exercised in the local visa office. It is qualified by the
requirement for "good reasons" founding its exercise and is subject to the necessity of
those reasons being put in writing to and concurred in by a senior immigration officer?

By gloss of judicial interpretation, 11(3) discretion has aiso been found to be limited to
consideration of potential for successful establishment in an economic sense only, and
may not be used with respect to potential for social e~tablishment.~
2.1.4

R. 2.1 Discretion

While 1l(3) discretion is meant to d o w visa officers to reconcile inadequacies in
the selection criteria, there exists a further tool that dlows consideration of factors not

related to those criteria. Authorïty has been delegated to program managers at visa
offices abroad to exercise power pursuant to section 2.1 of the Regdations to exempt any
person fkom the requkements of any regulation, if humanitarian and compassionate (''H

"

Obviously, the more contentious of the two branches of R 1l(3) concems the negative discretion
available to refiise an otherwise successfil application. Examples of 11(3)(b) decisions are many and a
few only provide a fair illustration of how the power is used in practice. See, for exampIe, Comg v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1997), 35 Tmm. L K (2d) 128 (FCTD.) where the
appiicant, a mechanical engineer by profession, was refbsed an immigrant visa despite having obtained 7 1
points. At interview, the visa officer found that the appiicant "projected a distinct lack of energy and
dynamism" which, combined with other factors, caused her grave concern as to his settlement prospects.
Muldoon J. found, at 139, that the visa officer did not commit an error in considering "...that the
applicant's hope1essness in the English language made him an economic and employment liabiiity in
Ontario, his Ïntended destination."
zm W e an e x d e of positive discretion under S. 1l(3) r
emes that reasonsjustiQing same be put in
writing, so as to obtain the concurrence of a senior immigration officer, there is no requirememt for written
reasons with respect to a decision not to exercise positive discretion. Chmna v. Canada (Minbter of
Cirizenship and Immigration) (12February 1997), Federal Court Fiïe No. MM-1980-96(F.C.TD.)
[meportedl .

& C') considerations exist to j-

same.=* In essence, the humanitarian and

compassionate review involves a request by the applicant for a dispensation h m
application of the ordinary rules for qualification. As such, it is described by Muldoon J.

as a "'special privilege" involving few countervailing rights or duties for compellhg its
exercise. This is evident h m the following passage, where the Court stated:

When seeking a special privilege, as distinct h m a cast-iron legal right, the
applicants must bring before the V.O. [visa officer] all the data which the
applicants think will move the V.O. to recommend H & C [humanitarian and
compassionate] relief. If th& information be spotty, inconsistent, incornplete or
UILforthcoming, they cannot be heard to cornplain that they were not accorded a
çpecial privilege not generally accorded. The H & C revïew is a sort of last m o r t
after having faiied the legal criteria: it is a ~ r i v i l e g e . ~
H & C power exists domestically as well overseas, but the two types of reviews are
subject to dinerent considerations and standards of fairness. This was made clear by
Muldoon J. in the KhaIon c a s P , where he noted that, "...not only are there different H &

C considerations in overseas reviews as distinct fiom inland r e ~ i e w but,
s ~ ~..~.the V.O.
[visa officer] is not required to put before the applicant any tentative conclusions which

the V.O. may be drawing f?om the material presented to him or her.. .,not even apparent
contradictioris which concem the visa ~ f f i c e r . 'Accordingly,
~
an applicant contesting a
negative H & C decision must show the visa officer emd in law, proceeded on a wrong
See the Chen decision, cited infia at note 605, and the discussion accompanying same.
'Tl & C'power was formerIy centraiized in the Governor-in-Council. However, the power was
delegated to local program managers with the implementation of Phase 1of C-86 regdations in February,
1993. See CIC Aii Mission Message ORDO149 "R 2.1 Humanitarian and Compassionate Discretion",
supra note 123. For a description of the various changes wrought by Bill C-86, see infia notes 563 and
29s

629 and accompanying text.
Mialon, supra note 185 at 30 1.
297 Ibiù.
For example, on an idand rewiew, one might consider how weU estabiished in Canada a famüy haç
become, notwithstandingthat they have no lawfiil status. Such a consideration is not as likely to arise m
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or improper principle or acted in bad faith. However, as Muldoon J. correctly obsewes,
the absence of a Iegai entitlement to demand exercise of this discretion places a "heavy
burden" on the applicant upon a judicial review application.'
As is apparent, R 2.1 discretion is entireIy of a positive character and is used to

relieve against hardshipM1that might be caused by requiring strict compliance with some

The rationale for this power, the circumstances
requirement of the Reg~iatiionr.~
expected to be attendant upon its use and the rnanner in which it differs corn R 1 l(3)
discretion, are set out in a message f?om CIC headquarters to a i i visa offices. The
relevant parts read as foiiows:

...[The] Act, Regulations and delegation instrument (1-32) are silent on which
grounds warrant use of [R.2.11 H and C authority. This is no accident!
During review of Bill C-86 much thought was put into whether H and C
exemption of individual cases was appropriate. Parliament reached the
conclusion that not only should H and C exemption be maintaùied but that Act
should be amended to permit delegation of authonty below Govemor In Council.
Result was arnended section 114(2) of Act and new section 2.1 of Regulations.
Discussions within Department on drafting of R 2.1 revolved around view
that one of strengths of CDN immigration regime has been its flexibility.
Although Act and Regulations are always drafted so as to cover widest number of
scenarios it is inevitable, given the diversity of our clients and their individual
situations, that some worthwhile cases with compelling H and C circumstances
will fall outside the system. With R 2.1, Ministers and Department have now
overseas consideration of H & C.
~9 Khalon, supra note 185 at 300.
'Oo fiid. at 300.
'Ot For example, it is regularly used to overcome a lack of flexibüity within the A a and Regulatiom
regarding non-traditional family groupings. See CIC I
M Cbap. OP-1, Para. 4.2.2 (Ver. 06-96) 'What about
cornmon-law spouses and same-sex partuers?" at 6, and also text accompanying note 120, supra.
'02 More specincally, ovmeas it may only be w d to overcome the requirements of sections 8 and 14(1) of
the Regulations Sec CIC AU Mission Message ORD0149, supra note 123. Section 8 deais with the
seletion criteria imposed on independent immigrants, while section 14(1) imposes the requirrment for a
valid travel document on a i i immigrants. Overseas, R 2.1 discretion is most ofien used to relieve refugee
applicants h m the need for a valid passport- Many of the refugees selected abroad fmd the requirements
of section 14(1) difncult to comply with,since they wili typicaiiy have fled theU home country and no
longer enjoy its protection. Accordingly, they may not possess a passport and may have no way to obtain
one. For more on the use of R 2.1 discretion in t h e cUcwllSfances, set IM Chap. OP-15, Para. 1.4 (Ver.
11-96}"Exceptions for immigrants" at 1.

provided Program Managers with authority to exercise theu judgements in
facilitating issuance of visas in those cases where exemption of Regs 8 and 14(1)
would be warranted. (To exempt fkom other requirements than R 8 and R 14( 1)
visa officers may request H and C exemption h m Minister via case
management).
Although department did consider restricting use of H and C discretion to
list of defined circumstances it was quickly realized that no such list could either
be sufnciently comprehensive or flexible. In the end Department places trust in
the good judgernent and discretion of its ofXicers to recognize when H and C
conditions are sufnciently compelling to warrant exemption of regulations.
Program Managers have been given wide H and C authority with the fidl
expectation that it wiIl be used to resolve these problems.
In overseas context use of H and C exemption has been restricted to Regs
8 and 14(1) which means that Program Manager has authority to overcome failure
on selection points if there are compelling H and C reasons to issue a visa. ... This
is entirely different authority nom that provided in R 1 l(3) whereby senior
immigration officer (LE. Program managers abroad and their immediate
assistants) may use positive or negative discretion if in her opinion the selection
points do not reflect applicants ability to successfdiy estabiish. In effect, R 1l(3)
recognizes that selection points system does nothot identifL al1 independent
immigrants who can successfully establish. R 1 l(3) is nothot intended, nor
should it be used, for passing for H and C reasons independent immigrants who
fail to meet the selection system. On the other hand, R 2.1 recognizes that there
may be compelling H and C reasons to issue visas to immigrants (of all classes) in
spite of hadequate selection points. R 2.1 waiver of selection points is notlnot
necessarily restricted to only those who apply as independent applicants. ...
[Paragaph numbering omitted]"
2.1.5

lnadmissibility

Even with respect to the statutory bars to admission found under section 19 of the
Act, there exists a healthy elernent of discretion While the grounds for inadmissibility

are written for the widest possible application, there is a recognition that it is not always
appropriate to exclude, in every circUmSfitIlce, everyone caught by them. The bars
include inadmissibility for reasons of public s e c u r i v , poor healthMS,inability to be self-

= CM:AU Mission Message ORD0149,n<pm note 123.

"

Set generally subsectiom 19(l)(e), (0,(g), (k) and (i)
which
, deal with a wide range of behaviour
ranging from espionage and tamrism to participation in a govemment that mgaged in gmss human rights
violations.

supporting"", criminaliv and non-compliance with the A c P . Subsections 19(1) and (2)
of the Act contain m a n d a t o p prohibitions on entry to Canada of any prospective

immigrant or visitor who is described by any of the grounds for inadmissibility.
Nonetheless, these grounds can be overcome by the exercise of discretionary powePO

ernanating either fiom the local visa office or h m a more centrai authority. Where the
power is located seerns to be guided by a combination of factors. Beyond reasons
relating to fiinctional practicality"*,these uiclude consideration of the comparative
serioumess of the ground for inadmi~sibili~~:
whether there is more than one reason for
inadrni~sibility"~,
the possibility of inter-jurisdictiond concerrdi4and the fact that some
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Giving rise to concenis about public safety or excessive demand on health care facilities. See section
19(l)(a) of the Act.
'O6 Section 19( 1)(b) of the Act.
Subsections 19(1)(c),(c. 1), (c.2), (d), 0)and 19(2)(a), (a. 1) and (b).
Subsections 19(1)@)and (i), and 19(2)(c) and (d).
10> Both 19(1) & (2) use the word "shaii" in specifyiag that entry is to be denied to criminals.
'O Note that the prohibition on admission contained in 19(2)(b) i
s the only barrier under section 19 that
does not import an element of discretion, at least in so far as permanent relief is concerned I9(2)@)
prohibits entry to persons who have been convicted, either in Canada or abroad, of two or more offences
that would constitute summary conviction offences under any Act of Pariiament. Presumably because such
offences are seen to be more minor in nature, mere efflwrion of thne will serve to overcome their effect as
a ground for inadmissibiiity. According to CIC IM Chap. OP-18, para. 3.2 (Ver. 09-97), at 3, "Persons
described in A l9(2)(b) do not need rehabilitation approval. Their inadmissibility is removed by the
passing of the statutory five-year period." This differs, of course, f?om other grounds for criminal
ioadmissïbiiity set out under section 19. In t h s e cases, it is not enough that the five year period has
passeci. To obtain "rehabilitation" under the Act, the party will stiU have to satisQ the Minister,or her
delegate, not only that the statutory period has passeci, but ako that m e rehabilitation has, in fact, taken
pIace.
"' For example, since it is intent at time of admission that is relevant, the c o n c m set out in 19(1)(h) and
19(2)(c)are most cornmonly dealt with at a Port of Entry, at the time entry is sought See CIC IM Chap.
OP- 17, Para. 1. I (Ver. 06-96), at 1.
Subsections 19(1) and (2). for exampie, prohibit the entry of anyone who has been convicted of c r i a
offences either abroad or in Canada, or even of persmi who there are reasonabIe grounds to beiieve have
c o d t t e d acts or omissions abroad that would constitute offences if c o d t t e d in Canada. Section 19(1)
deals with more serious offences, while 19(2) proscrik entry for persons @ty
of less serious offences.
As a g e n d matter, the more serious offences desm'bed in 19(1) may ody be overcome by a direction
fkom the Minister. However, for most criminal offences desrnid m 19(2), authority has k e n delegated
by the Minister to local program managers in visa offices to ovmome the inadmissibiüty. For more on
eriminai inadmissibility,see generally IM Cbaps. OP-17 (Evaluating uiadmissibility), OP- 18 (Criminal
Rehabilitation) and OP-19 ( M h k m ' s Permits).
For example, authority has been delegated to program managers in visa officesto appmve rehabditation,

"'

"'

aspect of 'hational interest" or wider public policy may be invol~ed."~In cases where
bctionality seems to demand it, or the ground of inadmissibility is viewed as relatively
minor or routine, discretionary authority to provide relief has been delegated to local
offices. Power over ail other grounds of inadmissibiIity, however, remaius centraiized in

the Minister's office directly or, in some cases, at a regionai headquarters level. In such
cases, though a visa office may recommend favourable consideration, approval must be
granted by the relevant higher authonty?
As a general matter, discretionary relief under section 19 of the Act may be

obtained in one of four ways, depending upon the type of inadmissibility involved. The
purçuant to section 19(2)(a), for persons affected by a single conviction that i n v o k d a potential penalty of
less than 10 years Unprisonment Where two or more such convictions arc extant, authority for granting
rehabilitaîion may only be exercised by the Minister. See CTC Operations Memoranda (OM) EC 95-06e (2
August 1995) "DeIegation of Authority to Grant Approval of Rehabilitation" describing the terms of the
delegation of discretionary authority for rehabilitation approval to local program managers carried out
pursuant to Bill C-44.
The question of medical inadmissibiiity implicates provincialjurisdiction over health and social
services. if a person with a serious h d t h condition re-g
expensive medical treatment is granted
entry, medical costs may be inctured which wii pose a drain on the provinciaï public purse. It is for this
reason that authority to grant entry to such persons mut be sought fiom a Director or Director General of
the Tmmigration Regional Headcpmm servkig the intended province of destmatioa The process to be
followed in such cases is set out in CJC JM Chap. OP-19, Para. 3.1 (Ver- 01-97), at 7-8 which states:
The Director/Director General wiii seek concurrence or input h m the responsïble provinciaI
health authorities, w h m they have indicated a desire for such involvement. The Director
GeneraV Director will ensure all public safkty, quarantîne, heaith care access, eligiiility for
provincial public health insumnce, financial and provincialjurisdictional faciors are satisfactorily
addressed before concurring wiîh permit issuance. [emphasis added]
'15 This may be the rationale, for example, underlying the prohibition m section 19(1)(1) on e
n
w of senior
officiais fiom regimes that have engaged gros human rights violations or crimes agakst humanity. In
such instances, the Minister wiU need to be satisfied that entry 'bvouid not be detrimental to the national
interest". Similarly, lg(l)(k) refers to persons, not otherwise desmbed under 19(1), who ccnstitute a
danger to the security of Canada. The seriousness of this ground of inadmissiiility is such that it is one of
the few instances under the Act where the concurrence of both the Mniisteer of immigration and Solicitor
G e n d of Canada are needed, before entry rnay be granted See CIC iM Chap. OP-17, Para. 5.3 (Ver. 0997), at f 5, which provides the foiiowing guidance to visa officers:
A19(1)(k) is a residual class. It desmies people who are a danger to national security, not
covered by any other of these classes [ie. 19(l)(e),(f) and (g)].
You should not r e h e [such] an application ...without approval fkom Security Review (BCZ),
Case Management,National Headquarters. You &O require writtm approvai of the Minister and
the Solicitor Generai to use 19(1)(k).
Which approval may be withheld, notwithstanding any favoitrable recommcndationby the mvestigating

first, involving the so-called "dismtionary entry", is set out under section 19(3). It

provides as foUows:
A senior immigration officer or an adjudicator, as the case may be, may grant
entry to any person who is a member of an inadmissible class describeci in

subsection [19](2) subject to such terms and conditions as the officer or
adjudicator deems appropriate and for a period not exceeding thkty days, where,
in the opinion of the officer or adjudicator, the purpose for which entry is sought
justifies admission.
This power is only available at a Port of Entry and is meant to aiiow for handling of
emergent, usually unforeseen circumstances."' Typically, the gromd of inadmissibility

officer. See the decision in the Leung case, supra note 235.
' I r See CIC IM, Chap. PE-IO "Senior Immigration O
fficer Functions at a Port of Entry", Para. 4.4.2 (Ver.
0 1-94), at 7-8, where the foilowing direction is provided to Senior immigration Officers regarding exercise
of this power:
Factors to consider
When you are exercising discretion under A19(3), you shouid consider the following factors:
a) try to balance the reasons for inadmissibility against the rasons for which a person seeks entry.
The more serious the deged inadmissibility, the better should be the reasons for just@ing en-.
For example, a recent conviction for which a person might be found d e s r n i d under A 1g(î)(a) or
A19(2)(a. 1) is likely more serious than the lack of a document,
b) avoid using A19(3) to overcome a recurring inadmissibiliîy. For example, an inadmisshle truck
driver may be required to travel to Canada in the course of his or her duties; you should not issue
discretionary mtxy each time the person seeks entry,but instead counsei the person on the
requirement. for rehabiiitation or consider i s h g a Minister's pennit.
c) do not use A19(3) to refer persons inland. For example, ifa person who appears to be
inadmissible wishes to enter Canada for three rnonths, it would not be appropriate to grant
discretionary entry for 30 days and advise the person to go to an immigration office inland to seek
a Miniçter's pennit The correct action in such a case would be to consider whether you should
issue a Minister's permit at the POE.
d) consider whether compassionate or other pressing considerations warrant use of your A 19(3)
authonty to aUow entry or whether, in the circumstances, an inquisr wodd serve a useful purpose.
e) you m u t be satisfied that the person seeking entry poses no threat or danger to the public. For
example a person with a recent conviction for impaired &king who arrives by air with some
finends to spend [a] weekmd in Montreal may be considered for 190') (sic) [ie. 19(3)] entry
because the risk of committing an o f f i c e is rninimized by the fact that the person will not be
driving while in Cana&. Due to economic benefits the public mterest is served.
You should also consider:
a) whether the person seeking admission is desmbed in A19(2),
b) the person's motive for seeking admission.
C)the urgency of admission: why did the person f d to comply with the requirements? In
circumstances where a person is genuinely unaware of the visa requirement, if the reason for
seeking a t r y is of such an urgent nature as to preciude obtaining a visa, or if the decision to enter
Canada is spontaneous, it may be appropriate to use A19(3). For exampie, firiends or relatives of a
visitor to the U.S.decide to enter Canada h m Niagara Falls, N.Y.to see the Canadian f a , and

relates to a procedural hhction, such as not possessing a visitor visa, or implicates a
substantive ground not viewed too seriously, such as an old criminai conviction for a
relatively minor offence.
A second method for obtaining relief, reserved excIusively for those inadmissible

by reason of cI.iminality, is known as "rehabilitation". This form of relief is permanent
and may be used to overcome even the most senous criminal record. Effectively, it is the
immigration law equivalent of a pardon.'<' Once granted, the applicant may no longer be
denied entry because of the past misdeed. Since approval of rehabilitation is a
discretionary matter, the applicant is required to afïkmaîively prove that any proclivities
or tendencies which led to the offensive behaviour have, in al1 likelihood, been
pemianently overcome and that genuine rehabilitation has occurred. As noted, authority
to grant rehabilitation in minor cases has been delegated to visa office program
the U.S.visitor meets ali requirements for entry, including re-admissibility to the U.S., but is not
in possession of a Canadian visa. If you were satisfied that the decision to enter Canada was
spontaneous, you might wish to use A19(3) to aiiow entry. If you fomed the opinion that the
person seeking entry simply ignored visa reipimmmts, or had plenty of time to obtai. a visa, you
might decide not to use A19(3) to authorize eatry.
d) whether the purpose for which the person is seeking entry can be accomplished within the 30&y tirne limit aliowed,
e) the extent to which the inadmissibility can be attniuted to neglect or bad faith on the part of the
person seeking admission. For instance, in a criminal case consider the &te of conviction
compared to the date on which the person is seeking entry. 1s the conviction recent, or might the
person be eligiile for relief h m the inadmkibility?
f ) whether the person seeking entry is k e l y to Ieave Canada should discretionaxy entry be
granted. Remember that removd costs become the liability of the department once entry is
granted.
g) whether the person appears in the Enforcement idonnation Index in FOSS.
h) the recommendation of the examinmg officer.
Note that although A19(2)(d) is broady worded, it refers ody to those persons who do not fiilfil
or comply with any of the conditions or requiremenîs of the Act or its regulations. It does not refer
to persons who fall within the inadmissible ciasses descriid in A19(1).
Indnd, under Bill C-44, the pardel to pardons was made more cornpletc by shifting responsibility for
granting of rehabilitation fiom CIC to the National Parole Board of Canada for any immigrant or visitor
affectai by a aiminalconviction obtained in Cana&. Fomierly, even convictions registered in Canada
were relieved against by the process of a grant of "rehabilitation" by the Minister of Immigration. Since C44, however, a Pardon fiom the National Parole Board is the only permanent remedy available to foreign

"'

In other cases, where authority for rehabilitation has been retained by the
Minister, the usud procedure is for the applicant to convince a visa officer that a
favourable report and recommendation should be made to the Minister? The central
determinant in such cases is whether the applicant is able to satisfy that fhther "...fùture
unlawful activities are extremely unlikely...?** In detamining whether or not
rehabilitation has taken place, visa officers are given the folIowing guidance:
You must take a number of factors into account to assess whether a person is
rehabilitated. You may measure rehabilitation by the passage of thne and an
examination of activities and lifestyle pre- and post-offence. Rehabilitation does
not mean there is no risk of M e r criminal activity, ody that the risk is minimal.
The reason for coming to Canada is not a consideration for rehabilitation.
6.1 Type ofoffmce
.. Applicants with a couple of minor offences may have little difficulty
convincing you of their rehabilitation. Normally the offences are isolated, out of
character and not indicative of criminal behaviour. ... In some of these cases an
interview may not be required. ... Applicants with more serious or multiple
offences require closer scnitiny- Normally, an interview will be required. ...
6.2 Rehubilitution considerations and evuluating risR

.

nationals, under the Immigration Act, for Canadian convictions.
Pursuant to BiU C-44, authority to gant rehabilitation under certain circwzlstances mvoiving lg(2) type
offences was delegated to program managers of CIC's in Canada and visa offices abroad. See CIC OM
EC-95-06e, supra note 3 13. The general scheme for rehabihtion under the Act implicates three different
authorities potentiaiiy involved in a grant of relief that wiil overcome a criminalrecord as a statutory bar.
Where the convictions were registered m Cana&, a pardon by the National Parole Board WU suffice to
remove the inadmissibility. See CIC IM Chap. OP-18, Para. 3.2 (Ver. 09-97) "Who cannot apply for
approval of rehabilitation?" at 3. For convictions registered outside of Canada, authority for rehabilitation
is split between the Minister and her deiegates, according to the seriousness of the offence. CIC IM Chap.
OP-18, Para. 1.2 (Ver. 06-96) "Legislaiive intent", at 1, illustrates this as foIiows:
A12 1(1) alIows the Minister to delegate his authonty to public servants. instrument 1-53 in
m g r a t i o n Manual] IL 3 lists immigration officiais (delegated authonties) who niay grant
rehabilitation to appiicants W i e d in A l9(2)(a. 1). The Minister reserves sole authority to grant
rehabilitation to appiicants describeci in A 19(l)(c.1).
Note that while this is the usual procedure, thae is noching to prevent an applicant from applying
directly to the Minister for rehabilitation, Likewise, even where an applicant is unable to convince a visa
officer to make a favourable recomrnendation, the applicant is still fiee to approach the Minister directiy.
CIC IM Chap. OP-18, Para. 1.3 (Ver. 06-96),at 1. Se+also CIC OM EC 95-0% supra note 3 13. The
discretionary nature of the relief is evident in the following guidance provided to program managers
considering requests for rehabilitation:
Applicants must demonstrate clearly that rehabilitation has taken place. Consider the Litcelihood
they will commit M e r offences. Do not hesitate to r&e to recommend or approve on
application, ifthe applicant U unable or unwilhg to demonstrate that there ïs a low rirk of
recidivLsrn. [emphasis added]

'"
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You must assess rehabilitation considerations to detennine the Iikelihood or risk
of applicants' continued involvement in unlawful activities. These include:
Acceptance of responsibility for the offence.
Evidence of remorse for any harm done.
Evidence of restitution, where possible, to victims of their crimes.
Persons whose criminal involvement included, or was the result of, cirug or
aicohol abuse, sexual abuse, psychologid disturbance, or a history of
assaults, o h require counselling (sic) or therapy in order to achieve
rehabilitation.
Evidence of successfiil completion of a rehabilitation program as well as any
evidence of a change in l i f i I e .
Evidence of stability in employment and family life. Applicants who have
been involveci in a criminal Mestyle often exhibit instability in their lives.
Participation in educational and skill training programs, steady employment
and a positive family life may indicate a change in lifestyle?
Since the question of what proof may satisfy an individual decision maker imports some
latitude, albeit constrained by the bounds of good fith, relevant considerations and other
elernents of the notions of naturd justice and fainiess, a large eiernent of discretion is
inevitably present with respect to the granting of rehabilitation.
Another type of permanent relief fiom inadmissibility is the "Minister's Consent".
This tool is used to overcome the inadmissibility described in section 1g(l)(i). which
denies entry to those who have been previously deported or excluded fÎom Canada under

section 55 of the Act." The consent of the Minister is available equally to visitors and

immigrants. Little guidance is provided to visa offices regarding the appropriate
circumstances for exercise of this power. Chapter 1 of the Oversear Processing portion
of the Immigration Manuais provides the following:

-

CIC M Chap. OP-18, Para. 6 (Ver.06-96) "Detennining Rehabilitation", at 9-10.
Under subsection 55(1) of the Act, anyone previously deported must obtain the consent of the Minister
before they rnay r e m to Canada. Those affected by an exdusion order, pursuant to subsection 55(2),
ody require the consent of the Minister during the twelve month period foiiowing their removal or
departure h m Canaâa. Once that period has elapsed, they do not require the Minister's consent. See CIC
M Chap. OP-1, Para. 17.1 (Ver. 06-96) "Who needs Minister's consent?" at 28.
'~2

You must obtain all available information about the removal from the responsible
office in Canada. You should ask the removing office's recommendation about
approving or denying the request. ...Requests for Minister's consent are only
appropriate when applicants are not inadmissible for any reason other than
A19(l)(i).32.'
The absence of detailed guidance, both in the statutory sources and the policy manuals,
obviously leaves much scope for the visa office in determining whether or not to grant
consent."

Authority to grant the consent of the Minister has been delegated to program

managers in visa offices abroad.'=
More generally, a final, albeit temporary, type of relief fkom inadmissibility is
available in the form of a "Minister's Permit"?

Pennits are a sort of catch-al1 remedy

which cut across al1 the grounds of inadmissibility containeci within section 19. They
may be granted for periods of up to three years3=and are designed to allow the Minister
to "...balance the control and facilitation aims of the Immigration Act..

that are set

out at section 3. This is made clear in the policy manuals, which state:
A3 states that policy, rules and regdations made under the Immigration Act need
to sene a variety of aims. Minister's permits (IMM1263) exist to help balance
competing aims in special circumsbnces. For this reason, they are the prerogative
of the Minister.""
Minister's delegates may issue pemits when people who are a minimal risk to
Canadian society have a compelling need to corne into or remai. in Canada. ...
If our social and humanitarian cornrnitrnents, economic and cultural interests, or
international obligations to protect refùgees and displaced persans.. . c m be
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CIC IM Chap. OP-1, Para. 17.4 (Ver. 11-96) ''Reqyests for Minister's consent", at 29.

' ~ 5Further, there is no obligation on the Minister to provide reasons when refushg to grant consent. See
Singh v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Immigration) (1986), 6 F.T.R- 15 (F.C.T.D.). See ais0 Lemg,
supra note 3'15.
CIC IM Chap. OP-1, Para. 17.3 (Ver. 11-96) ''Who can grant or r e h e Minister's consent?" at 29,
states: "Instrument 1-8 lis& officiais delegated by the Minister to grant or refiise consent It inchdes
officers in charge of visa offices."
3nCIC IM Chap. OP- 19, Para. 2.3 (Ver.0 1-97) 'Who is eligiale?", at 2.
'* Immigration Act, section 37(3).
' ~ 9CIC Chap. OP-19, Para. 2.2 'When may a permit be issued?", Ver. 01-97, at 2.
'30 Id., Para, 1.2 'Toiicy intent", at 1.

advanced without unacceptable nsk to the health, safety and good order of our
society.. .or the nsk that our territory will be used for criminal activity.. ., you
may decide a Minister's permit is appro~riate.~~

It is clear then that issuance of a permit involves a process of weighing ri& against need,

in order to achieve a proper balance between control and facilitation. Where the risk of
danger to the Canadian public is low and the need of the applicant is compelling, a permit
is likely to issue. Conversely, high risk generally militates against issiümce of a permif
even when demonstrated need is high. Similarly, whiie authority to gant P a n i t s has

been delegated to visa offices abroad in some circumstances, there remain other instances
where concurrence must be obtained directly h m the Minister or a regional
headqwrters. As noted earlier, the need for concurrence is related to the type of matter at

hand and the various implications it may raise?

In any case, the issuance of Minister's

P e r d s to allow admission outside of the ordinary requirements of the Act and

Replations is a sensitive matter, not undertaken lightly. This is particularly so, since the

Minister is required to give an annual accounting to Parliament for d l Permits issued.'"
Given the political nahue of this forum, a seemingly cavalier attitude to issuance of
peRnits may leave her subject to accusations that she is UIlILllTldfbi of public health and
safety or that she is soft on ~ e a l s Accordingly,
. ~ ~
direction provided by the Minister

Id., Para 2.2 "When nmy a permit be issued?", at 2.
lever of concurrence that may be required for issuance of a Minister's Permit,see
Appendix C,below.
Immigration Act, S. 37(7), which specines that a report shall be tabled mually before Parliament
detailing how many perrnits were issued and what the categories of inadmissibility were.
3USee for example, CIC News Release #98-20, supra note 94. The emphasis of the news release on the
reduction of Pennit issuance by 75% tiom 1992, and on the static nature of permit issuance fiom the
previous year, is iikeIy more than coincidentai. Certaidy, there is political mileage for any Minister to be
seen as f& but hn. In particular, the news release highlights that permits issucd to criminally
inadmissible persons declined 4.8%over the previous year. OveraU, a total of 3798 Minister's Pennits
were issued abroad in 1997 to persoas seeking to enter Canada.
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as to the circumstances under which Parnits are to be issued may influence whether a
broad and large interpretation or a more restrictive approach is employed in local issuing
offices.

In reviewing the curent usage of discretion with respect to the miteria for
selection and the grounds for inadmissibility, the central feature is clearly a split between
the locus of authority over it. Where the matter involves considerations that are largely
confked to the individual case at haud, discretionary power has been delegated, for the
most part, to the local level. Where, however, wider considerations of public policy, such

as heaith and safety of the general populace, are implicated, power rem*
at the upper levels of the immigration bureaucfacy.

concentrated

Further, because the Act attempts to

cary forward the dual, antagonistic objectives of control and faciiitation, a mass of
complex considerations rnay be involved. Given the uniqueness of each case, obtaining a
"proper" balance between these objectives is not a process that is readily reduced to a
system of comprehensive niles capable of mechanical application in every case. While
the factors to be considered can be easily enumerated, the process necessarily involves a

weighting and pnontization that must shifi fkom case to case. It is this which allows for
individualized justice. However, it also ensures that discretion remains inherent in every
case of an exception.

2.2

The Three "R's" and Discretion in the "New CE"

2.2.1

Re-engineering. Reconfiguration and Renewal

Visa offices are staf5ed primarily, though not exclusivelyY: by a cadre of

It has long been the case that the number of regular foreign service officers is less than the actuai

professional foreign service officers ernployed by the Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada (CIC).CIC, in its cment fom, was created in 19933M,
when the
social affairs officer cadre fiom the (then) Department of Extemai Anairs and
Intemational Trade CanadaU7was reintegrated with the domestic immigration service.

The social &airs cornplment was incorporated within CIC as a discrete unit under the
organizational name of the 'Tntemational Region". This reintegration occurred during a
tirne of profound change for the Government of Canada and was just one part of a greater
reorganhtion and rationalization then underway. Beset by economic woes, the

Canadian government was struggling to regain control of its &anciai affairs and so, not
surprisingiy, cutbacks and efficiency rneasures were a central part of the design for

putting the public trust back on a solid and sustainable fiscai footing.
CIC was not exempted fkom austerity mesures invoked throughout the
g~vemment.'~~
Over the fiscal years fiom 1995/96 through 1997/98, it was required to
cut more than 75 million dollars fiom its expendituresm This necessitated massive cuts
-

- -

number of overseas positions within CIC. As a r d t , a considerable number of "Canada based" visa
officers serving abroad at any given time are actually personnel drawn fiom the idand senrice, generally
senring on single assignments (ie. one tour abroad). In addition, the ranks of visa officers are
supplemented by a group of locally fiired program officers, calied "Designated Iinmigration Officers", who
exercise visa issuance authority equivalent to a regular foreign service visa officer (though it should be
pomted out both groups typicaily work under the supervision of a senior visa officer).
335 introduction to Deparimental W o o k on Program @enditUres und Prioritiesfor 1996-97 to 1997-98
as found on CIC home page (http:\\www.cicnet.ingenia.com)as at 2 Fcbruary 1997.
Now the Department of Foreign Affaùs and Inteniational Trade Canada @FAIT).
The pervasive nature of the govexnment wide expenditure reductions is too weii h o w n to ~ q y i r e
fiuthereiaboration here. As an example, however, see Erin Anderssen, "Canada to quit food, drug
research - Scientists say decision pu& Canadian liveç in danger" Ottawa Citizen (1 1 Juiy 1997) Al. That
article detaiis cuts in laboratory research in the food and dmg division of Health Canada's protection
branch. Citing soaring research costs, the government anuounced that 123 research positions would be
eliminated,
339 Supra note 336. See also CIC, Departmental OutIook on Program Expenditures and Rionifies - 199697 to 1998-99 (Ottawa: W t e r of Supply and Services, 1996) at 17, whae îhe foiiowing expenditure
reductions, for Internationai Region in particular and CIC as a whole, are forecast

"

and restruchiring on a sweeping scale. Right across the department, fimm headquarfers
and inland offices to foreign outposts, CXC undertook signincant reductions in personnel

and resourîes. International Region, in particular, was cailed upon to share in the
austerity meames and did so by reducing its overseas positions by 20%."

But simply

reducing overhead was not enough. At the same t h e that its budget was cut, CIC was
still expected to maintain a l l of its core fiurctions, including delivery of a rate of

immigrant landuigs fixed at more than 200,000 per yeaP1Caught between the twin
realities of declining resources and unrelenthg demand, the Department was placed in a
bind. Simply cutting was not enough. New efficiencies fiom remaining resources were

necessary, if the shortfd between demand and necessary output was to be bridged. A
major rethinking, therefore, of how CIC's service was delivered, and exactly what that

Expenditures (CADS)
International Region
Tokai CIC Expenditures

1996-97
60,629,000
6 15,00 1,000

1997-98

1998-99

52,826,000
554,28 1,000

48,333,000
534,176,000

Approximately 50 visa officers, or about 20-25% of the total foreign service immigration officer
complement, were laid off as of April30, 1996. For some apparent insight as to how the size of the cuts
within International Region were arrived at, see 'The 20% Decree" Lexbase (October 1997 Sending) at 3,
citing Access to Information Request 97-125, where an extract of a memo, dated 12 April, 1996, iÏom
(then) CIC Assistant Deputy Minister Raphael Girard to Deputy Minister Janice Cochrane is given.
Discussing the need for redution of costs in inland operations, that memo makes reference to the fashion
in which cuts to International region were settied upon. In particular
With Intemationai pegion], 1simply decreed a 20% reduction in Canada based FTEs Y'Full Time
Equivaleats", being permanent fidi time staffpositions located abroad] in the field because
productivity gains of that magnitude were easily obtainable. it isn't so easy with the Canadian
regions because the residual work is either enforcement onented or complex selection. What 1am
inclined to work toward is a d t s oriented resource base formula that will scan amoss regions.
At the moment, we are getting fewer outputs and more spending - Does that sound familia.?
There are still peopIe out the= who think that if you nui up a backiog you will get more resources.
Aiso, for a longer view of foreign service immigration personnel reductions, see 'Wew Tmmigration
Approaches" (March 1997) 25 Backspace [Canadian Tmmigmtion Historicai Society Newsletter] at 1,
where it is noted that over the preceding five years, the "...number of Cana&-based officers abroad feu
h m approximately 311 to approximately 21 1 in 1997, a reduction of 33%".
The immigration plan for 1998, for example, will see a projected total number of immigrant and refugee
landings that is between 200,000 and 225,000. See CIC,A Stronger Canada - 1998 Annual Immigration
Plan (Tabled 23 October 1997) (Ottawa:Minister of Public Works and Governent Services Canada,
1997).

service should be comprised of was initiated The rationaikations that foilowed were to
affect the entire spectnnn of program delivery. From facilitation to enforcement,
virtually no aspect of immigration processing was left untouched.

In 1994, proceeding nom public consultations, CIC issued its plan for longertermJUstrategic direction. Published under the name of Into the 21sl Centzoy, the theme
of that document revolved around the mandate of CIC to meet government demands that
the immigration program be "...accountable, affordable and sustainable"?

'3usiness

Process Re-engineering'- (BPR) was the name given to the initiative to h d ways to
solve the dilemma of meeting these disparate demands. Its mandate was not just to h d
strategies for maintaining service while digesting cuts. More ambitiously, it was tasked
with hding new and innovative ways to improve service, even in the face of those
cuts?

Budget reductions meant that staffhaci to be let go and offices closed, for
example, but BPR meant that this period of upheaval could be viewed as an oppominity,

rather than just as a challenge, with a seerning situation of adversity tumed to advanbge.

Under BPR, dimption fiom reductions was CO-optedas a means for effécting
CIC "htothe 2 P t Centwy ",supra note 109 at iïi, where in an introduaory "Statement by the
Honourable Sergio Marchi -Minister of Ctizenship and Immigration" it is mentioned that the document
represents a strategic fhmework meant to provide guidance for program and policy development over the
next ten years.
"Interview with a Ministef: Tallring to Sagio Marchi" (1995) 12:3 Bout de Papier 8 at 9. See &O ibid.,
CIC "lntothe 2 P t Cmîury", "Executive Summary - Prioritis for Action", at viii, where the following is
given:
[The] ...world lis] increasingly characterized by sweeping and rapid change. ...Part of this
change is Canada's own fiscal reality. We must be mindfirl that resources once plentifid are now
dear. In this context, our citizenship and immigration program must be more than f& and
cornpassionate, it must be affordable and sustainable.
U* CIC "fntothe 2 P t Centtny", ibid. at 66.
Ioid., where it is stated: "Signifiant productivity advances are a<pccted h u g h CIC's Business Rocess
Re-engineering Project, now entezing its system development phase. Notably, it will reduce coss at the

rationalization and maximization of remaîning resources and to undertake a general
"renewal" of CIC. So, for example, the need to close some offices to achieve savings was
seized upon as a way to carry out a larger 'Le-configuration" of the network of CIC
offices, both domesticaliy and abroad, in ways that would also facilitate productivity
gains.

Discretion was also a subject for BPR rethinkùig. It is, of course, a labour
intensive selection tool that entails highly detailed and individualized case consideration.
Obviously, such individualued processing is more "costly" than a comparable decision
proceeding strictiy fiom an application of d e s . Beyond mere economics, a confluence
of other trends, including globalkation, fiscal realities, Charter-sensitivity and judicial
notions of f h e s s , was also beginning to push the bureaucracy to conclude that broad
adjudicative discretion was no longer appropriate in the selection process. Speakhg
about the challenges that these presented and the need for new thinking they created, the
(then) Deputy Minister of Immigration, Peter Harder, had this to Say:

On the international side, if we are pursuing an Immigration and Refigee
program in a world which has fimdamentally changed in terrns of globalization,
we have to both deliver our program in that context and also provide a new
context for public policy thinking.
Let me just list a few of the implications. The 1976 Act, which is the
fundamental Act of the Immigration Program, came into force at a time when we
had 1200 refugee claimants in Canada a year. And they were al1 fleeing
cornmunism. It was pre-Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] so you didn't need a
lot of rules to Say yes or no. There was a lot of discretion in the system. Since
then the world is people on the move. The collapse of communism means that the
sorting out of good guys and bad guys in a refugee sense is complex and nonideological. It is human rights based, not ideology based. The numbers are
pater. With the Charter, it is a more litigious atmosphere in which we manage
the program. It means we have to have more Charter-proof and Charter-sensitive
procedures. You need legislation to Say 'ho" and to pumie that in a meaningful
same tmie it improves client service."

way. 'Wo" has to have some W t y and there has to be some ability for the
program to manage the consequences of a negative decision both here [ie. in
Canada] and abroad. We have had to adapt the Iaw and our h e of reference
significdy in the Iast number of y e a ~ s . ~

Harder's comments highlighted a centrai difficulty facing CIC. Fiscal cutbacks
required it to cut staff and reduce some senices, but ail of this had to be accomplished

while maintaining a Ievel of faimess sufficient to satis@ the courts. Certaidy,as the

Si@

case earlier illustrateci, courts are unimpressed by pleas of poverty as a justification

for selection process inadquacies that compromise basic notions and standards of
faime~s.~'
Although citing the particular example of refugee selection, the generality of
Harder's cornments makes clear that he envisioned a wider application for them, to
immigration as a whole. As the senior departmental civil servant, his views were those of
the bureaucracy and so provided ample evidence of the profound sea-change in thinking

regarding use of discretion that was under way. Conceiving a more d e s based, less
discretionary, selection system was thus added as another goal of the BPR agenda

The sweep of BPR did not end with simply reducing processing burdens and
increasing efficiencies, however. That was still not enough to solve the fiscal side of the

""Immigration from the Top, the Inside and Abmad: Views h m e Newcomer and a Veteran (Exceqt
fiom an interview with Peter Harder)" (1995) 12:3 Bout de Papier 30 at 30.
Singh, supra note 64, 17 D.L& 422 at 469. in the words of Wilson J., "..-1have considerable doubt
that the type of utilitarian consideration brought by M..
Bowie [that oral hearings for every refugee case
would constitute an unreasonable straiu on IRB resources] can constitute a justification for a limitation on
the righfs set out in the Charter." Courts generally are rinlikeIy to want to trade off rights for fiscal
concem, particularly if they affect substantive consideration of a case, For example, in Johl v. Min. of
Employment & Immigration (1987), 4 Imm. L E (2d) 105,15 F.T.R. 164 (F.C.T.D.), the applicant appiied
inland under the defacto iilegaI residents policy. The court noted that the shortage of personnel to handle
such applications was no excuse for it not to be handled properly and fairIy. ConverseIy, see M a n i v.
Canada (Min. of CilizetlshIp & Immigtation) (1997) 36 ImmLR (2d) 47 (FCTD.), where a two year
delay between intewiew and the issuance of a refusal letter for criinadmissibiiity was found not to be
unreasonable. The difference in the result of these cases suggests that a cnishing work buden wiU not be
fauited if it simply causes procedural deïay. However, if it goes to substantive consideration of the case,
t'hm a reviewabIe error has occurred.
~4'

dilemma, at least. As a generai stnttegy, govemment was increasingly resorting to user
fees to offset program costs, on the theory that those ushg the service should be most
responsible for paying its costs."

Immigration was no exception. For some time, it had

been apparent to govemment administrators and hance specialists that immigration need
not be viewed simply as a cost item. Rather, because of the nature of its business, CIC
held the promise of becoming a cash-cow, potentialIy capable of generating sufficient
revenues to sustain itself?

Accordingiy, in conjunction with program expenditure

reductions, significant new fees were added and existing fees hiked. Govemment, at least

in the case of CIC,was now truly in the business of business. And increased fees added
to the quandary of doing more with less, since higher fees inevitably lead to greater
expectations for prompt and efficient service."

Although BPR promised client service

improvements as part of its program, such a promise would obviously be difficult to keep
when the means for delivering that service were to s W . Clearly, the task before CIC in

juggling these various demands and expectations was formidable.
But what were the specific strategies adopted under BPR to meet the need for
The importance of cost recovery fees to the goveniment's bottom he (and it is a governent wide
bottom iine, since immigration fees are poured back into the government's general revenue fünd, rather
than to a specfic CIC fiindl is evident fiom the fact that they now o a e t a signincmt portion of CIC*s
operating costs. According to CIC's own estimates, gross revenues [generated by processing fees]
represent 54% of p h e d program expenditures for 1996-97. This wiIl rise to 63% in 1998-99 as planned
expenditures decrease. This is consistent with the approach of sbifting a iarger proportion of the cost of
our program fiom the generai taxpayer to the direct beneficiaries." See CIC,Deparhnenttzl Outlook on
Program Expenditures and Pnoritits, supra note 339, at 18.
Y9 The pressure on CIC to generate sufncient fees to pay at least part of its own cos& a<ises h m an
agreement with Treasury Board, the Govemment of Cana& agency that controls fimding for aii
departmenîs, whereby CIC must generate a total of $330 &on in revenues fiom its various user fees.
Under the agreement, if such revenues are not provideci, then shortfalls m u t be taken out of CIC's own
operating budget The importance of fees coiiected overseas is apparent by the fact they that represent
more than 50% of aii revenues coiiected by CIC,totaling more than $200 million. See "Looking aheadAn intewkw with Gerry Campbeii, Director-Generai, Intemational Region" (Winter 1995lSpr9ig 1996) 11
Entre-nous at 6.
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accountability, af3ordability and SuSfainability in the new CIC? And, more particularly,
what was their effect upon the availability and use of discretion in overseas selection of
independent immigrants? The balance of this section explores the various initiatives
instituted and the changes they have wrought, and provides some comments and
assessments on their efficacy and whether expectations have been met.

2.2.2 Specific Initiatives
BPR set out an arnbitious plan for revarnping and revitaiization of CIC operations
and processes that was to be carried out in stages over a period of several ye;ars.'51 At
National Headquarters, reorganization was carried out so as to focus dl activity on three
central activities - "service lines" (relating to policy development and program design),

"program delivery" (organized essentially dong geographic lines and cornpnsed of the
International Region and five domestic regions) and "strategic support" (which includes
branches providing Ministerid and executive support services, strategic policy and

planning. and management of legal services, information technologies and human
resources). Concurrently, redeployment of field resources was undertaken. The
attainment of the imperatives of reduced costs and increased efficiencies was sought there
principdly via a tripartite approach focused on centralizing resources, pushing work
"down" to the lowest possible levels and standardizing methods, procedures and criteria.

"Somewhat ironicaily, as weU, the augmentationof fees has actuaUy added new work burdens associated
with coilection, processing and, where necessary, rehds.
"Lookhg ahead", supra note 349, w h m it is stated that BPR was completed during the 1995-96 fiscal
year. The projected savïngs fkom BPR initiatives is apparent in the following: "CIC completed its intensive
BPR review which identified a series of principles for Departmental renewai and some % 35 - 45 miiiion in
potential savings. Evaiuations of pilot projects are ongoing."

''

2.2.2.1 Centralking Resources

"We serve you better by seeing you less" was a slogan c o M in CIC to descnbe

the notion that there could be profit for clients in having a less intimate relationship with
decision-makers. Though the slogan was soon abandoneci, the concept was not. One
method of achieving savings was to strive for the economies that often mise fkom the
sheer size of an endeavour. With this in min& a network of "super-visa offices" was
conceived to replace many of the smaller, less efficient offices typical of CE'S overseas
operatious. These new offices, called Regional Processing Centres (WC's)

'5are

designed around the concept of bulk processing. Central to that design is the fact that

their operations are restricted to processing of paper and so they are largely inaccessible
to clients. These offices are intendeci to receive almost ail applications submitted
worldwide for immigration to Canada. They are supplemented by a network of smaller
offices whose job it is to conduct any interviews, ver@ documents and carry out other

work that cannot conveniently be undertaken at the RPC's usually remote location.3a The
ultimate configuration of the overseas office network is described in the following
passage from a CIC publication:

Immigration processing ...wiUbe centralized in eight to ten locations around the
world. These Regional Program Centres (RPCs) will be supported by a network
of Satellite offices which will assist RPCs with immigrant interviews, [and]
perfonn other core functions. A number of standalone Full Service Centres w i l
continue to deliver all aspects of the immigration program. Missions at which
immigration applications cm be processed will be reduced while missions issuing

'"Or,aitematively, "Area Processing Cenims" (APC). This, of course, reflects the mode1 that was
similnily implemented in Canada through creation of two Centralized Processing Centres (CPC's), located
at Vegreviïie, Aiberta and Mississauga, Ontario, that handle receipt of ail domestic applications.
' ~ 3in some cases, ntch as the Buffalo, N.Y.operation, for exampIe, a "sateIlite" visa office is CO-located
with the WC.

visitors visas will increase,fn
The fkst pilot of an RPC was launched at the visa office in Buffalo,New York It
sewes as the hub of a network of visa offices in the U.S.that includes satellites in New

York City, Detroit, Buffalo, Lus Angeles and Seattle. Work patterns in the RPC revolve
around case selection conducted in the absence of personal interviews. primarily on the
basis of documentary evidence. Interview, once the heart of all Mmigrant selection, is
now the exception rather than the d e ? The rationale for this move is evident in the
words of a former manager of the Buffalo RPC, Murray Oppertshauser, given at an
immigration law conference hosted by the Law Society of Upper Canada:

"Ailapplicants used to be inte~ewed",Mr. Oppertshauser observed, but now, he
tells his interviewing officers that they "can't H o r d to bring in the folks and have
a chat." We are moving the resources nom interYiewing out fiont to the analysis
of the case before the interview. This is a fiindamental difference in how we do
business", he oaid. Since the most expensive commodity he has are interview
officers, the fewer interviews the better. If an applicant has easily venfiable and
understandable qualifications, and the application looks good on paper, then an
interview will be waivecL3"

In cases where the interview can be waived, the RPC is tasked to process the file to
conclusion as a purely paper exercise. In the event that an interview is deemed necessary,

the RPC farms out the file to whichever satellite office was indicated by the applicant as
her preferred location.
Since the exercise in the RPC is confined to a simple review of the case on paper,

CIC, Departmental Outlook on Program Expenditures and Pnorities, supra note 339, at 14. Note that
standalone Fuii Service Centres are to be retained in certain locations because of communications or other
difficulties which render the RPC/Sateiiite office mode1 non-viable. See also "hoking ahead", supra note
349 at 6, where the h a ï contiguration of visa offices is envisaged to contain "...8-10 Regional Rocessing
Centres (RPCs), 10-12 F d i Processing Offices (FPOs) and 30-35 satellite missions reporting to RPCs."
'" See supra note 276 citiug a waiver rate in excess of 50%.
'"Derek Luady "Assemble complete applicationpackage if s e e b g waiver of intaview: lawyer" nte
Lawyers WeeWy 16:30 (13 December 1996) at 12.
'Y

staEat the RPC are not me-

in the ordinary course of events, to have direct, personal

contact with clients. Thus, clients no longer are able to persondy meet with immigration
personnel to provide verbal explmations and descriptions of any unique circumstances or
to request discretionary processing. More importantly, if the client is unaware of
opportunities for discretionary processing, she may not even think to mention
circumstances that might justiQ it?

Maaiféstly, the W C model works best with a

ciearly d e h e d set of d e s for qualincation that are as objective as possible. As a general

d e , substantive discretionary decision making is not rneant to be part of the role of a
case analyst in an RPC and it is not something which would ordinarily be considered by
them of their own initiative.

One exception to this is where an applicant falls a few points short of a pass mark
on paper-screening, but otherwise appears to be a "'goodcandidate" who is likely to gain
those necessary few points on an interview. In such a case, the case analyst has authority
to waive the interview, since it would add little '%due7'to processing of that application.

In the event that the applicant f d s short of the pass mark,but has positively asked for
discretionary processing, the matter is most likely to be passed on to a satellite office for

an interview to review ail of the facts of the case.
Waiver of interview obviously lies at the core of the RPC/Satellite office model.

The dnve to waive interview wherever possible was conceived of and developed under
the concept of "riskmanagement". The risk management policy is designed to reduce
"The matter of availabüity of discretionary processing is not deait with adequately, or even at di, in
many of the application materials provided by CIC. Given that the applicant bears the burden of providing
su.cientinformation to cany her appiication forward, tbis deficit of information is ail the more
significant For more on the applicant's bwden of proof, sec g e n d y the discussion above, under section

time and effort devoted to sifting and sorting of files so that resources are fieed up for

other, more vaiuable work Thus, if it is clear on papa that an applicant is likely to be
passed at interview, and no sipnificant security or safety issues are evident, then waiver of
interview is appropnate. But risk management invoives more than just a simple
calculation of points as a means for gauging the necessity for interview. More
importanüy, it involves a radical new approach to processing that actually seeks to have
decision-makers re-

h m an activist appmach in their handling of each application.

This is evident in the words of a senior departmental officiai who described it as an
oppominity for ". ..his officers to have the time to use their judgment on important,
borderline cases - and not to get caught up in paperwork. Visa officers should not gel
bogged d o m in lookingfor every possible ground of inadmissibility or in checkhg every

fumzly relationship". [emphasis added]ln
At the same tirne, nsk management has also been seized upon as an important
method by which system integrity might actually be enhanced. Since aimost al1
application intake is done in a lunited number of locations, with a limited number of
persons conduchg paper-screening, an opportunity aises to capitalize on the fact of
concentration. Fewer people looking at more cases can facilitate waiver decisions by
allowing the case reviewers to develop skills for ascertainhg and assessing potential
problems. Thus, "[a]n important element of the centrai processor is that a small number

Procedural Discretion, cornmencing at page 102.
2.1.1
Gerald Owen, "List of 'desipated occupations' for immigrant selection is k i n g expanded" The
LaYyers Weekly 1323 (22 October 1993) 10, quoting (former) Assistant Deputy Minister Raphael Girard.
The context of the discussionquoted in îhis source specüically concemed use of discretion and Mr.
Girard's cornments were meant to convey that the department wished a bmader appmach gmerally to be
taken to case processing. Risk management necessarily hvolves a large element of discretion, since it
entails a decision as to whether or not a particufar part of an application bears detailed investigation.
3n

of people - six case analysts in Buffalo - look at a large number of cases. As a result,
they can pick up trends and identify questionable d~cuments.'~~

The development ofwaiver of interview as a procasing tool raises issues of
concern for both the Department and the bar.- CIC, for its part, sees waiver a s a
discretionary tool that obviates work burdens associated with interview, but only where

no problems are evident on the file. Lawyers, on the other hand, would prefer a more
formal, rules based policy on interview waiver enabhg them to predict when a client is

Likely to be called for interview?' It is the classic struggle between preferences either for
positive rules or a more fhctional approach. The upper hand in the debate, of course, is
held by CIC, since the matter of waiver is nowhere encoded in statute or regdation." As

such, it remains an extraordinary exemption nom the ordinary requirements of the law.

Thus, a whole new element of discretion, though primarily of a procedural nature, has
Lundy, supra note 356.
Although lawyers generally favour the interview waiver policy, offerhg as it does speedier service to
clients, the iack of personal contact between decision-&ers and applicants even causes them some
anxiety. See Owen, supra note 358, where the reactions of some Iawyers to the advent of widespread
interview waiver is discussed:
...(Toronto iawyer Peter] Rekai suggested that a whole system of phantom immigrants is
developing, with neither oficials nor lawyers meeting their clients. Eatlier [at a CIC-CBA
meeting, lawyer Howard]. ..Gteenberg had said that he ofien deals with clients o d y by fax and
telephone: "1 can't tell you how many people I've never met" Carter C. Hoppe of Hoppe and
Jackman remarked that he had spoken only to the v o i c e d of one client. "Who the hell is seeing
these people?" exclaimed Mr.Rekai. He reported that before the panel staxted ML Girard [the
CIC official attending the meeting] had said i n f o d y that the immigration departrnent wiii corne
to look more like Revenue Canada. Correspondingly, immigration lawyers are king turned into
accountants, in Mr. R e W s view.
Both sides of this issue were canvassed in an iafonnal internet email "chat group"that the author
participated in with members of the Immigration Subsection of the Canadian Bar Association in 1996.
Because of the shifting membership of that group, it is impossible for me to achowledge the individual
participants, other than collectively, for their contributions to the present discussion.
~2 hirsuant to S. 8 of the Regulations, visa offices are required to asses applications from independent
category applicants against the factors set out in Schedule 1, Section 11.1, however, merely uses
permissive ianguage to say that an interview need not be held, if an applicant fails to receive certain
required units of assessrnent set out in the Schedule. This device permits refisai of applications on paper
without the necessity of i n t c ~ e w .It does not purport to p u t applicants dispensation fkom the
requirement of interview.
'~9

MO

been injecteci into immigrant p m c e s ~ e s .Further,
~
while broad guidelines have been
developed to inform and guide the application of waiver policy, it remains for each

individuai office to fix the specifics of that policy, as it is appiied to its own caseload.
Whatever the case, for professional immigration advisors, the visa "game" is no longer so
much one of seeking out offices whose decision rnakers are most k e l y to be sympathetic
to applicants at interviews. Rather, it may be even more important for those advisors to
figure out how best to influence the discretion inherent in the interview waiver d e c i s i ~ n . ~
Quite naturaUy, a decision centre isolated h m direct contact does little to inspire

confidence arnong clients that their matters are being hanciied expeditiously and fairly.
The distance between the decision-maker and the applicant has been M e r increased by

a drive to reduce direct contact even for routine matters, such as status requests on the
progress of file processing. To make up for the lack of direct contact between decision-

maker and applicant, cal1 centers were instituted to handle client queries that could no
longer be handled at CIC counters."

Such a strategy was consistent with the trend to

363 The decision to waive interview, though ostensïbly just a procedurai step, contains also a substantive
element, since it revolves around the selection decision that is so central to application processing.
A too generous waiver poiicy does not properly balance the facilitaion and control objectives of the Act.
For an example illustrating the importance of achieving a proper balance, see Dianne Rinehart ,'AUeged
triad leader's entry traced to bid to save jobs" Vancouver Sun (4 Novernber 1997) as found at
btt~:/lwww.vancouvef~~ll.com.
That story details the errors which apparently allowed Lai Tong Sang,
aileged leader of the Wo On Lok or Shui Fong (Water Roorn) Macau triad to enter Canada as an investor
immigrant A new program manager was sent out to the Los Angeles visa office in September, 1995, at a
time when office closures and job Iosses at visa offices were under consideration, In an apparent effort to
justif;, the existence of his program and its jobs, he actively recniited applications, including offshore
applications. "His efforts were wiIdly successfiil. In the 1 s t three months of 1995 the office received
1,652 applications - more than the previous aine months or al1 of 1994.. . These figures indicate the office
was feeling the pressure of its self-generated workload." According to a CIC mvestigator who examined
the practices of the office after the entry of the alleged triad figure,the office was deaiing with 2,508 active
applications by May, 1997. "Of these only 140 nles were h m applicants who listed their last country of
permanent residence as the United States!" In the haste to d d with that volume, it appears that the office
cut corners and failed to conduct a routine check with the visa office in Mr. Sang's country of ongin - in
this case, the Hong Kong visa office.
Rather than calling the particular office that is handling the fileto inqui. as to the statu of their

wfinping productivity gains out of the economy of scale that batching of like fiuictions
was intended to produce. Cd1 centres, of course, are a phenornenon of our current so-

cded "information age" They are designed to d o w the delivery of services h m a
central location to widely scattered collsumefS366 and is a particularly cost effective
solution where the service provided is information.

In the case of CIC, call centres facilitated eknhation of counter staffdealuig with
wak-in M c . Instead, Canadian sponsors and applicants are given a toll kee number to
call for updates and other information relating to processing of their applications. The call
centre network, still under development, is envisioned to provide one-stop information
for al1 cases in process worldwide. The downside for applicants, of course, is that call
centre staff typically c m provide only generalized information. They will not be
intimately familiar with case specific details and are reliant upon clear and concise data
entry by decision malcers to explain any uflusual features or difficulties encountered in

processing. Likewise, call centre M m a y have no direct case processing experience and
so may be unaware of the subtleties and nuances of the processes they are describing to

clients. This is balanced, however, by the fact that direct commUllj,cation between the
client and the decision rnaker is stiil part of the processing continuum, at least in so far as
problerns or difficulties become apparent on individual files.

application, appiicants are directed to contact a " c d centre". The client calls one of several regional toll
fke telephone numbers where generai information as to the cunent status of the application is available.
For an account of some of the relative merits and dernerits of telephone cal1 centre service, see Maxy
Gooderham, ''W
centres let consumers dia1 up service" The [Toronto]Globe and Mail (3 March 1997)
Al.
3t56 Id- This article notes benefits to both coqanies and consumers nom "dial up service". Companies are
able to Save costs by ever greater centralization and automation. Simiiatly, at A8, it is noted that
"[c]o~l~~mers
short of tirne demand the convenieence of domg business on the phone and have grown
codortabIe with telemarketing...."

However, such contact is ordinarily initiated by the decision-maker, rather than
the client. This is consistent with policies respecting transparency of administration that

have been adopted primarily to alleviate some of the burdems associated with answerïng
routine status queries. So, for example, an acknowledgement of receipt of application

was mandateci to be sent out within four weeks of receipt of the application. The
acknowledgement is intendeci also to give the appiicant an estimate of how long
processing is likely to take and when they c m expect to receive M e r communication
fiom the visa office. Outside of these time fiames, applicants are discouraged fkom
contacting the visa office, unless the need for contact is other than a simple status query.

Thus, the policy serves to keep applicants informed and redistic in their expectations,
while forestalhg more time consuming labour that can mise when no information is

2.2.2.2 Pushing Work Down
WC's and cal1 centres are not the only measures which have been seized upon as
a means for reducing the number of staffdevoted to answering queries and providing
counseling. Another initiative focused on finding ways to push work burdens down to
the lowest possible level in the processing chain?

The lowest link in the chain, of

course, is the client herself. To this end, detailed client self-assessment kits have been

3m See Lexbme (October 1997 Sending) at 3, cibing an imnamed CIC document accessed pursuant to
Access to Information Request 97-226, where it is noted that the agreement on Standards on
Representations ".. . m m be adhered to by di missions, barring unforeseen circumstances, as failure to do
(sic) may result in the third party representative resorting to alternate means such as requests under the
Access to Information Act."
The notion ofpushing work down to the lowest levels is sometmies also refemd to in popular
managementjargon as "empowennent", which imports the notion that it is not just work which has been
shifted, but ais0 responsiiilityor authority.

devised. Since CIC can no longer provide in-depth, individuali;i:ed counseling, the
purpose of the self-assesment kits is to enable the client to determine for herselfher
chances for a successful application. In this way, the work butden and responsibility for
counseling and application preparation was shified h m CIC directly to the client?

In

conjunction with the self-assessment kit, CIC also devised the notion of the "one step
application". The theory of self-assessrnent and one-step processing is evidenced in the
following extract fhxn the Immigration Manuals:
The one-step application procedure is designed, through the use of seLfassessment kits, to reduce the number of times a file is reviewed pnor to a
decision beina taken, to reduce ~rocessingtimes, and to dace the onus on the
applicant to ensure that only completed applications, including the appropriate
cost recovery fees, are submitted for assessment. Incomplete applications or those
which are not accompanied by the appropriate fees will be retumed to the
applicant and no file will be created?

As is apparent ,the one-step concept envisioned that evexy application submitted
would be complete in every detail, thereby greatly reducing the administrative burden
associated with piecemeal submission of information. This would serve at the same t h e
to increase processing speed and client satisfaction. It was intended that incomplete
applications would simply be retumed unprocessed, with instructions as to rnissing
information. However, the plan was unworkable for several reasons, including the
difficulties of specifying what was needed for every applicant, no matter their country of
origin, and concem with the façt that applicants might be prejudiced by their inability to

See CIC AU Mission Message OMSQ0002 (1 8 January 1994) advismg that:
One of the objectives of the Independent self-help guide is to eliminate the PAQ by shifkg more
responsibility to the applicants. Guides should contain sufficient infolmation to enabIe applicants
to detennine if they are likely to be successful in abtainhg the visa category and if they should
risk the cost of the fee to appIy. [paragraph numbetmg omitted]
CrC IM Chap. OP-5, Para. 2.1 b) (Ver. 05-97) "Self-AssesmentKit".

"

"l~ck-in".~~
'Zock-in" refers to the date that a completed application is received. Its
importance is obvious where regdatory or statutory changes are about to take place,

t
,
the matter of
which might make qualification more diflïcult or onerousY In the d
insistence upon a complete application up h n t has been Ieft to the discretion of

individual visa offices, to be determineci in light of local conditions and overall
feasibility."

In tandem with the move to &if€more responsibility for application completion
onto applicants, there was also a vision that a closer relationship with immigration
advocates could be cultivated, to the mutuai advantage of clients, advocates and CIC.

Thus, initiatives, such as publication of service standards and the development of
directives conceming more open communications with applicants' representatives were
undertaken. The theory was that advocates, being better infonned and so better able to
advise their clients, would also be less Iikely to make fiivolous inquiries wasteful of

departmentai resources. Presumably, by promising greater communication and

"' This was the major concem cited by the C B A . and was the reason that the bar was mwiiling to support
the one-step concept, See text accompanying note 708, infia.
'n For more on the importance of the "lock-in" date, see CIC iM Chap. OP-1,4 (General Rocedurai
Guideiines), Para. 3, "What is the lock-in date?", at 5, which notes that the lock-in date is used to fieeze
certain factors. Ln the case of Independent immigrants, the lock-in date determines points to be awarded
for items such as Occupational Demand and age. According to para. 3.4-1, id., "[tpe lock-in date is the
&y the Department has physïcal possession of,. .an application for permanent residence in Canada (IMM
8). ..,as well as the correct and complete fees (cost recovery processing fees)."
The complexity of the application fomis likely contriiuted to the necessity for some discretion at the
local office level in this matter. The basic MM8 form itself nins to four pages and asks for an abundance
of infoxmation touching upon virtualIy every aspect of an applicant's personal and professionai We. in
addition, the applicant may be tequged to submit various supplernentary forms covering items such as
family composition, consent to disclosure of information by foreign authorities, occupationai assesment
and so on. Though the forms are available in French and English, they are daunihg enough for those
conversant with these languages. The problems associated with thc complexity of the forms and
application process are obviously m a g d e d for those who possess ability in neither language. Likewise,
the sophistication of clientele, at least in te!rms of deaihg with govennnmt and bureaucracy7varies fiom
p s t to post and it was u n . cto expect that a level of cornphce suitable to one region might be
expected in another.

"

transparency, CIC hoped too that advocates might corne to feel a sense of "ownership" in
the program and so might exercise a greater degree of discrunination in the quality of
cases presented. To emphasize the importance of the relationship, a senior officia1 was
designated as the Assistant DepuSr Minister (ADM) - Partnerships."

However, it may

be that expectations were too high. A number of spectacula.incidents of fiaud amongst
some of the less scrupulous advocates also raised concerns as to what sort of partnership
was p o s ~ i b l e .Certainly,
~~
such incidents served to ranind that the interests o f the
Department and of private immigration advisors were not as CO-extensiveon certain key
issues as may have been desired. In the end, the ADM - Partnerships position was

subsumed in the new post of ADM - Corporate sen ri ce^."^
Pushing work burdens "'down" was not just a case of ofnoading responsibility for

'''

Admittedly, "partnmhips" was envisioned as a broader concept that was not just restncted to advocates,
but &O included other levels of govtmment, non-govemmental organktions and the like. The ADMPartnerships was one of two ADM positions, the other being the ADM-ûperations. Both of these positions
reported directly to the senior departmental civil servant - the Deputy Minister (DM).
"s For a number of rasons, not least of which is the diffidty of proving a
d hud, it seems as though
oniy the most egregious cases of dishonesty and deceit result in charges being laid against consultants.
Nonetheless, the existence of a signincant nurnber of unscrupuIous immigration advisors is well known
and is discussed in M e r detail below in section 3.4.3
The Role for Counsel, commencing at page
289. CIC's offloading of work onto appiicaats and their counsel raises interesting questions about how far
the departmentai expectation can go that the applicant is properly represented. Quite simply, is
administrative fairness observed where applicant's counsel is incompetent? What onus is there on the
department to intervene where the applicant appears to be poorly represented? In one case, the federal
court was prepared to hold that total mcompetence of applicant's representative at an immigration hearing
was, on the facts, grou& for hoIding that there had been a reviewable breach of the d e s of p r o c e d d
per
fairness. Shirwa v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) 1199412 F.C.5 1 (F.C.T.D.),
Denault J. See also Canada (Attorney General)v. Sorkun (1988) 34 Admiu. L.R 131 (F.C.T.D.). In this
latter decision, the court recognized the dangers of aliowing cases to be buik on allegations of
incornpetence by representatives but felt that this could be controiled by carefiil exercise of judicial
discretion and a requirement of exceptional circumstances for intemention. For a discussion of this
problem generally?see Evans, supra note 2 at 147. The obvious criticism of this approach is the siippery
slope argument that there wouId be difficuIty in getting finality in admmistrative decisions.
'''See CIC A l Mission Message "Senior Management Structure" (04 November 1997). More recently,
CIC has also issued new guidehes for dealing with client advocates that flatly rejects the notion of a
"partnership", at l e s t in a case specific context See CfC OM OP 98-1SIPE 98-13 (29 May 1998) "Policy
and Instructions on Dealing With Client Representatives". In particular, para l(i) of that OM sates,
"[cllient representatives are not our processing partuers whenever they represent individuai cases."

application preparation on clients. It also meant that decision-making authonty was to be

de~entralized~~
and devolved lower into the organi~ation.~~
In particular, more case
processing decisions were to be made directIy by locally engaged staff, rather than by

Canada based visa officers, who are viewed as one of the more expensive components of
the immigration program. Thus, part of the redesign initiative involved evolution of the

job package of Canada based visa officers away fkom actual processing decisions and into
more of a managerial role. According to one senior official, "[tlhe h c t i o n of the
[foreign service] visa officer will continue to change and the involvement of officers early
in their career in actually doing the processing and making processing decisions will
continue to shift towards managing the process using more locaily engaged staffand
having technology do the work of screening and documenting people who want to corne
here.'qm The implications for discretionary decision making remain to be fûlly
deteRnined, particularly since the process of reorganization is yet to be Mly completed.
However, the hiring cnteria for locally engaged program officers are less rigorous than
for the foreign service? Accordingly, locally engaged officers may be less well
educated than Canada based officers and perhaps more parochial in their outlook and
experience, since they generally will not have had the same opportunities for travel and

CIC, Depumental Outiook on Aogrmn Expenditures and Priorities, supra note 339, at 15.
See for example the delegation of rehabilitation authority cited at note 295, supra.
"TmmigrationfÏom the Top, the Inside and Abroad", supra note 346.30 at 35.
Thae are several leveis of locaiiy engaged staff that may be involved in applicationprocessing. Most
senior of these are the "DesignatedImmigration Officers" who have been accorded full visa issuance
authority pursuant to section 109(2) of the Act. Such officers possess the same authority as regular foreign
below the level of Designated
service visa officen. Then are various other local -positions
Itnmigration Officer, such as Immigration Rogram Officers and Program Assistants. None of these,
however, possess visa issuance authority.

service in Merent

2.2.2.3 Standardization and Simplification
As may be apparent, an increase in standardizationwas essentiai to achieving
success in pushing work burdens down. Such standardization is evident, for example, in
procedural matkm such as the self-assessrnent kits (meant, as far as possible, to be the
same worldwide) and the move to one-step processing. However, the scope of
possibilities for standardization was limited in many ways by the procedural requirements
placed upon the selection process by the courts. In particular, the doctrines of
reasonableness and faimess have Limited the corners that could be cut. This is especidly
tme for cases which involve featura or issues that are not straight forward. As a result,

the greatest gains from standardization have been achieved in the handling of the majority

of cases which are routine and ultimately result in approval and issuance of visas. That
said, however, even the matter of refusals has not been untoucheci by the efficiency drive.
For example, faUness does not require an oral hearing in every instance and CIC has
incorporated this notion into the design of its processing strategy for completion of paper
screening decisions. What fairness is reaiIy concemed wiîh is the adequacy of the
opportunities provided to an applicant to put her case forward and to lmow the case she
must meet.'= CIC has worked around the notion of administrative fairness by placing

"' Aithough generalizationsare, of couse, fiaught with penZ it has been my observation that locally
engaged officers sometimes tend to be more critical of their own countrymen than is the case for Cana&
based officers. 1cannot say whether this is some sort of chauvinism or simply the product of a better sense
of Iocal culture that enables a finer ability to sort the plausible fiom the fantastic. Who the decision-malcers
are,thougb does seem to have a bearing on how and when discretionary decision making will be
undertaken. For more on îhk, see generaliy section 2.3
Discretion and Sociology beginning at page
165.
See for example Wilson J. in Singh, supra note 64, 17 D L R (4') 422 at 465, who givcs these criteria

much emphasis upon development of adequate, standardized self-assessment kits. Not

only do better kits shift some of the work of application preparation to the client, but they
also provide more complete information as to the hurdles she must cross. Being better
infomed at the outset, she has less cause for cornplaint if her application is not succasful
at paper-screening. Fuller and more cogent information also gives less cause for the
courts to intervene in the interests of procedural fairness.

In addition to irnproving application materials, another important feature of
standardkition involved enhancernent of computerization and use of computerized
methoch to improve client service and elimuiate work burden. Thus, CIC has been
innovative in adopting new technologies to provide better and more current information

in more cost-effective ways. Application forms and counseling materials, for example,
are now provided by some posts to their clients on computer floppy disks and CIC
maintains an internet World Wide Web site for the same purpose. From an intemal
administrative perspective, one computer standardkation project in particular held great
promise for delivering the increased efficiencies envisioned by BPR planners. CIC
currently operates with several different cornputer systems that are Iargely
incompatible? A project was conceived, therefore, to develop a uniform, departmentwide, modem computer system that would provide a continuum for following each client
fiom initial receipt of an immigration application right through to an eventual grant of
citizenship. The benefits and advantages of such a system are obvious - a file wouid be
in relation to a refbgee hearing.

'* The primary cornputer systemp employed by CIC for case processing are the Computer Aided
immigration Processing System (CAPS), used exclusively overseas in visa offices, and the Field
Operational Support Systw (FOSS), used by domestic CIC's. The two were developed independently of

created only once and would be accessible nght across the spectrum of senrices that a
client might require. Unfortunatelly. however, fùnding problems have put off this project
indennitely.
Standardization was not just limited to procedurai and administrative matters. It
also included substantive components. In particular, a major initiative was to develop
"generic9' selection criteria for the Independent category that were as objective as
possible. Such objectification fiuthered severai goals, including a desire for global
consistency. Because processing occurs in widely scattered offices, consistency of
decision making has always been difficult to achieve. This is particularly so with respect
to discretionary authonty which draws as much h m mindset as nom legislation and
written policy. By standardking the application process and objectifyuig the selection
criteria, consistency would be enhanced. Just as importantly, by importing as Little

discretion as possible, selection can be reduced to an almost routine application of well
d e h e d rules that could be carried out by even the lowest level of decision maker.
Indeed, a clearly defked set of mles would even empower the client to effectively act as
her own decision-maker, thereby potentially reducing work for CIC. If it were clear to an
applicant at the outset that she would be unlikely to qualify. presumably she would not
bother even to submit an application. Further, well-dehed selection criteria facilitate
automation and more comprehensive use of cornputers and other technology for conduct
of application receipt and processing work. The apparent incompatibility of discretionary

each other, at a time when the immigration Foreign Service was still a component within the (then)
Depariment of E x t d Affairs and hteniational Trade Canada.

decision making with uicreased efficiencies was made clear in a message nom CIC

headquarfers to oveneas immigration ofnces. It reads:
This is year one of the Departmental Strategic Framework. Although,
within the ISG btemationai SeMce Group, now "International Region'l, it is
very much a transition year in terms of how the program looks on the ground, our
business this year is largely that of processing the remaining applications in the
cment selection system while we attempt to shift gars and rebalance the
program in a way that attracts a larger share of economic migrants?
Concomitant with this change. we need to develop a selection system that
is more transparent to the people whom we wish to attract. We simply do not
have the resources to do a lot of sifting fiom among the millions of people who
might be ternpted to give Canada a try. To me. th& means that we will not be able
to rely too hemavr&
on the use ofpositive discretion by an oficer should the
selection system prove to be dysfuncfional. In the not too distant f h r e there will
be far fewer people whose job will be to smtinize applications that are initiaiiy
rejected on basic selection criteria, and then to retrieve them, if the individuals
concerned seem to have what it takes to settle successfully in Canada [Paragaph
numbering omitted, emphasis addedI3=
There was, therefore, a very conscious shift away fkom a more traditional view
that positive discretion would be available as a remedy for system design and
implernentation shortcomings. Recognizing also that the needs of the economy often

shift faster than immigration law's ability to keep pace, the Department detemiined that a
new standard for Independent selection was sorely needed. To this end, an initiative was
undertaken to attempt to de-link the Independent movement fkom specific occupations,

"A goal of the Strategic Framework is to redistniute the balance between humanibrim and economic
categories for immigrants coming to Canada. In 1994, for example, economic migrants represented 43%
of the total intake, wMe 57% was represented by aii other categories. The plan is to shift this balance so
that by the ycar 2000,53% of the intake wiii be rqresented by economic migrants and only 47%by other
categories. Sec CIC,'Wghlights - Into the 21" Cmhiry: A Strategy for immigration and Citizenship"
(Huii, Que.: Min of Supply & Services Canada, 1994). See also CIC Departmental Outlook on Program
Erpenditwes a d Pnoritiie, supra note 339 at 5, where it is noted that the "...projected rhift between the
economic and famiiy categories, ...expected to be achieved by the year 2000,was achially realized in
1995."
CIC Ail Immigration Mission Message OEB0049 (unclassified), 23 Febniary 1995, at para. 3-4.

allowing for selection on a broader, more generic basis.Js The wisdom of devising more
gen&ed

selection criteria focusing on ski11 sets, rather than training and experience in

a particular occupation, was obvious for labour market reasons. But such a selection

system also held the promise of facilitahg selection processing to proceed on a less
intensive basis, since genaic criteria, importing more objectivity, are easier to apply in a
rote manner. In drafting a completely new set of selection criteria, emphasis was placed
on devising and incorporating elements revolving around the basic premise of
Independent selection - namely, that they are motivated persons who possess the assets

and talents to establish quickly and easily as self-supporthg individuals, able to
contribute immediately to the economic and cultural life of Canada This premise, of
course, is the same one that has been the foudation of Independent selection since
promulgation of the curent Act. The differmce was to re-jig the selection Cnteria to
better emphasize those skills thought most important to successfûl establishment withh
the economy particularly, and society more generally?
The first step was to move Independent selection away fiom the specific job ski11
focus that was the core of the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations
(CCDO)? This occupational dictionary was imported into the selection critena, via the

from the Top,the inside and Abroad", supra note 346 at 3 1, where the
Deputy Minister, respoading to a question about how immigration and domestic economic policies
complement each other, stated that "[tlhe immigration program in Canada is no longer linked to specific
job d m & . ... Immigration is linked to a more gmeraliy stated objective that "we are in the
[independent] immigration buSmess for the economic interest of Canada.'"'
'"This is a goal which bas recently been niterated in a report by a Legislative Review Advisory Group
that was stmck by the Minister of Immigration to examine possiile reforms. For a discussion of the
reco~~~lendations
of this Group, see below, section 4.2
Reforming Discretion Immigration
Legislative Review Report, commencing at page 314.
Manpower and Immigration, Canadiion CZassijication and Dictionq of Occupatiom 1971 (Ottawa:
Monnation Canada, 1971). This main volume was supp1emented by five additional volumes, adding new
occupations, reIeased between 1977 and 1986. In addition, a guide volume was issued annually up to the
3uSee for example, "Immigration

-

factors set out in Schedule 1of the Regulatiom. It provided the standard against which
potential unmigrants were required to demonstrate their training and experience in the
particular occupation that was the basis for their sele~tion.~"The focus of the CCDO is

on detail orientecijob descriptions, describing the training, qualifications and work

elements that each occupation entails. In the late 1980's, updates to the CCDO were
stopped dtogether. Although no longer updated, the CCDO was cemented by regdation
into the selection cnteria as the backbone of the Independent selection system. The

results were predictable. The selection system spiraled out of touch with the economy, as

immigrants continued to be selected according to increasingiy antiquated job
At the same tirne, restructunng in the Canadian economy and shifts in
requirement~.~~

ninth and final edition in 1989. See Occupational and Career information Branch, CCDO Guide, 9* e d
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1989). While supplements added new occupations fkom
tirne to time,occupations descriid in the original 1971 vofurne were not as a mle updated.
389 The importance of occupation to Independent selection i
s obvious fiom the fact that four of the nine
selection factors listed in Schedule 1reIate directly to occupation. These are specific vocational preparation
(now "educationai training factor'?, experience, occupational demand and a m g e d
employment/designatedoccupation. A fifth factor, education, also c o n t h strong links to occupation,
since points niay be awarded under this factor for certain types of occupational or professional training,
'"The incongntity caused by outdated CCDO job descriptions and a judicial tendency to enforce the strict
Ietter of the law, no matter the resuit, is seen in Hmrghton v. Canada (Minkter of Cituemhip &
Immigration) (1996), 34 Imm.L.R.(2d) 284 (F.C.TD.). There, the applicant applied in the Independent
category pursuant to the alternative occupations of "executive secremy", "secretary" and "administrative
assistant". In refusing her application, the visa officer found, at 285-6, that Haughton lacked:
...the requisite experience or training in the above occupations m that you have no experience or
training in the operation of a personal cornputer; word processing, database andor spread sheet
software applications, facsimile technology, local area networks, electronic mail systems,
electronic voice maii or office telephone networks, all of which are standard equipment and tools
of a secretary, executive secretary or administrative assistant in a Canadian office setting.
The CCDO dennitions for these various occupations, having been written in the 19709s,made no
mention of the technology and job duties cited by the visa officer. Rothstein J., in overturning the decision,
noted that the CCDO definitions were imported as the standard for measuring specific vocational
preparation under Factor 2 of Schedufe 1to the ReguZations. Contrary to the Minister's position that the
CCDO definitions were meant to be a guide, rather than a complete set of defÏnitions, he found, at 287, that
the legislative scheme left "...no room for a Visa Officer to import his or her own criteria into the
requirements for a specinedjob."
It is interesthg to speculate what the result might have been, had the opposite facts been present. What
if the secretary in question bad been expricnced in aU of the modern equipment and technology cited by
the visa officer, but had no experience using a typewriter, did not know how to make multiple document

labour market ne&

were creating demands for new occupational skill sets and kmw

how, iinknown and likely mimaginable to the authors of the CCDO at the time they

crafted their work. Because of tbis discomection between the CCDO and economic
realities, it was often the case that the particular occupation selected for was not
necessarily the one that an immigrant would actuaiiy end up working in upon arriva1 in

Canada.391
The CCDO was replaced by a new standard for measuring occupational
qualifications, the National Occupational Classification (NOC) guide? Unlike the

CCDO,the NOC focused on skill sets seen to be common to a particular level of
occupation. Under the CCDO,an applicant might be found to be unqualified in her stated
occupation if she had no experience in a variety of functions that rnight be ascnbed to that
occupation. However, with the NOC, the precise details of the applicant's experience or
training in a particular occupation are no longer so important Rather, the salient question

is whether she possesses the general ski11 set specified for that level of occupation. The

NOC system was thus essential to the development of a more generic selection procedure.
copies with a carbon paper and was g e n d y unfamiliar with other office processes common when the
CCDO description was written. This sort of scenario was not uncornon, particularIy toward the end of
CCDO usage. In my experience, counsel were usually quick to ask for use of discretion to supplement the
obvious siioricomingsof the CCDO and one suspects h t courts would have sympathy with an argument
that discretion was improperiy fettered, if not exercised in such circumstance.
See also Lee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1995), 29 hum L K (2d) 222
(F.C.TD.) (CCDO is a binding document and job requirements not specified therein are invaiid) and
Prajaputi v. Canada (MinrSter of Citlzenship & Immigration) (1995), 3 1 Imm L.R. (2d) 182 (F.C.T.D.)
(Visa officer is obliged to take the whole of a CCDO occupational description into account and to interpet
it appropriately).
'Ihe expanding disconncetion baween the occupational definitions of the CCDO and the r d needs of
the labour market inevitably phced ever more importance on the use of positive discretion as a means to
supplement the shortcomings of the selection criteria. For example, many of the newer cornputer related
speciaity occupations were not descn'bed at d under the CCDO and so visa officers were required to use
some imagination in ascribing suitable occupations to individuals employed in such fields.
Hul~tanResources Development Canada, National Occupan'onal Clussrficatifion(Otîawa: Minister of

However, while the NOC may have rernedied many of the defects of the CCDO,it is not
abmdantly clear that it has displaced the need for discretion, at least in so fm as it relates
to interpretation of qualifications and application of the selection criteria to same. Since
skill sets are more personal than occupational experience and achievement, adoption of
the NOC rnay actually have increased the necessity for adjudicative discretion.
In the end, the drive to more generic selection aiteria SUffered a setback that has
yet to be overcome. The NOC was just one element of the new selection criteria and
other important changes were envisioned. In addition to honing the details of specific
selection criteria, it was intendeci also to redistribute the weighting accorded to various
factors, so as to place greater emphasis on those seen to be crucial to successful
establishment. Increased emphasis, for example, was to be attached to knowledge of the
English and French languages. Likewise, the factor of 'personal suitability", UivoIving a
subjective assesment by a visa officer as to the applicant's "adaptability, motivation,
initiative resourcefulness and similar q u a l i t i e ~was
' ~ ~ to
~ be replaced by an "adaptabilitf'
factor. Stiff opposition to these changes was encountered fiom immigration lawyers who
found the new adaptabiiity factor, in particular, to be too "vaguely definecl and
evaluated"?

Their concerns about the poor definition of this factor were compounded

by the fact that its value was pegged at16% of the overall points tally. This was an

increase over the "personal suitability factor", which accounted for only about 10% of an
applicant's potential score. According to a brief delivered to CIC by the CB.A.'s
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Supply and Services Canada, 1993).
S n Factor 9 m Column I of Schedule 1to the ReguIarianr.
'% Set Lila Sarick ''New immigrant seledon d e s put on hold" Ine poronw Globe and Mail (9 January,
1996) A8.
'O

Immigration Subsection, the new fxtor gave too much discretion to visa officers and

made the setting of universd standards impossiile."

Scheduled for implementation on

Febmary 8,1996, the new selection criteria were put on hold indefhitely while CIC
examined further the "cornplex issues related to selection standards'q%that they raised.
The problems associated with the CCDO, however, were too pressing to wait for fbther

study and so its replacement by the NOC went ahead nonetheless.'* Although the
government still intends to corne forward with new selection criteria, the exact date when
that will happen remab uncertain.
CIC's move to standardization has also incorporated the conceptualization of
immigrant services as product lines. For planning purposes, such lines are counted,
tracked and tabulated through cornputer systems, as though they are UfLifonn units. The
problem with this approach, however, is that it tends to view immigrants more as a
commodity and so may underestimate the iadividuality of each applicant. This is
especially so with "problem" cases that present unique feahires or difficulties that take

them outside normal processing parameters. In short, those cases where an exercise of
discretion, or at least consideredjudgrnent, may be necessary. With the pressure to meet
productivity targets that are relentlessly monitored as units of production by unbhkïng
cornputer generated statistics, there is a danger for discretionary authority to be reduced
to a mere coping mechankm for overworked officers. Saying "yes" is, of course, easier
and faster than saying "no'' since the burdens of justifjing a positive decision are Iighter

than those for a negative decision. Certainly, it is the case that most of the gains in client
-

39s

Id.

CIC Deparimental Outlook on Progrmn Erpsàitures anù Priorities, supra note 339 at 10.

service have corne in processing that vast majority of cases which fit the mold of a square
peg into a square hole, and scant attention has been paid to factoring in allowances for
difficult cases. While tracking and tabulahg for purposes of resource planning and
deployment is appropriate and indeed, necessary, the curent methods for devising those
statistics are faulty and do not reflect the totaiity of the workload that is present in field
offices. This is a cntical fact that central plamers must to be cognizant of when setting
individual office workload targets. If nof the nature of "commodification" is such that it

will force discretion to move in one direction, regardless of whether that direction is
justifieci or intended.

The importance of dialogue and information exchange between the field and
headquarters during the implementation of BPR initiatives is obviously crucial, if
expectations and results are to be matched. Certainiy, it has often been the case in the
past that headquarters' initiatives that were too particularized in their detail, or which

were instituted without sufncient regard for field input, have gone awry. The Right of

Lmding Fee, for example, which was originally implemented as an up-fiont fee,
collectable upon initial submission of an application, proved ill-conceived. As a
"privilege fee", rather than a "fee for service", it had to be refunded in the event an
application was not g~-anted.~~
The work in refiinding monies to failed applicants proved

The CCDO was replaced by the NOC effective May 1,1997.
'Ihc dinerence between the two fees is explained in the following pmgraph taken fiom CIC's 19971998Expenditure Plan EsnMates, as cited in the Juiy 1997 Sending fiom LEXBASE,at 3: 'Under section
19(2) of the Financial Adminirtration Act wS.C. 1985,c. F-101..., the level of fee cannot exceed the cost
to provide a service. CIC's processing fees recover a différent portion of the delivery cos& for each
service; for example, CIC recovers 82% of the processing costs of adult immigrant applications, 90% of the
processing cost of visitor visa applications and 55% of the processmg cost of citizenship grant applications,
based on the Ianuary 1997 fee schedule. The Right of LandMg and Right of Citizen&@ fees were
established under the author@ of section 19.1 of the Financiai Administration Act. They are priviïege
397

SUfficiently resource intensive to offset some of the gains firom the fee. Though it was
apparent to the bar and officers in the field that the up-hnt nature of the fee would pose
problems, fiscal imperatives and headquarfers' judgment were allowed to prevail over
practical application issues. After much trial and error, the poiicy has recently been
changed to allow for collection at the time of visa issuance or landing instead, thereby
alleviahg r e b d p r o b l e m ~ . ~ ~
Fortunately, cenbralization of routine case processing in dedicated paper-screening
units has siphoned off much of the rote workload, dowing those conducting inteMews

more t h e to concentrate on the unique aspects of those cases called for interview. And,
in the end, dealing with such cases has been largely left to the creativity of individual
missions, who are able to fashion solutions that work best for them. In fact, some
recognition of the need for field sensitivity has been factored into BPR models for a
reworked office network and processing system. Headquarters plannefs have explicitiy
stated that they do appreciate that "a wide degree of operational flexibility''400is needed in
the implementation of specifics of the overall redesign. This is evident in the fact that
there is no expectation, for example, that interview waiver rates shouid be the same at

- -

fees, not processing fees. Pnviiege fees are designed to partially compensate Canada for the many
intangible econornic, social and Iegai rights and priviieges that Canadian residence/citizenship confers. By
regulaîion, privilege fees are not associated with the delivery of any specifïc s e ~ c provided
e
by CIC."
'* The problem of the center dictating a course of action, however dficult or impraticai of application is,
of course, not a new one. See for example, R Sampat-Mehta, Intmatiunul Barnmen,supra note 12 at 121123, where he relates the situation of E. S. Doughty, a Special Tmmigration Officer for Canada m Hong
Kong before and during WWTr. In 1939, Doughty cabled headquarters in Ottawa to seek direction on how
to deai with a large number of dispiaced p o n s , most of whom were destitute, applying at his office to go
to Canada. The response h m H.Q.was simply not to offa any hope of admission to t h As SampatMehta obsmes, at 123, "[tlhis may have been one of the advantages to having an Immigration office
thousands of miles away in Hong Kong - refusal was so easy for Ottawa officiais who did not have to be in
contact with applicants.. .."
400 CIC unpublished discussion paper entitled "The Clverseas Network: Charting the Course" at 1.

every satellite or RPC? This is also clear h m the way conduct of interviews has been
conceived of under the RPC/satellite office model. Where an interview is deemed

necessary, it is expected that the WC would provide a rationale for the interview to the
satellite office conducting the interview. The intention is to keep the interview short and
focused. At one point in the BPR planning cycle, there was talk of a '20 minute"
interview as the standard for such interviews. However, this expectation dwinciled off in
the face of the realities that the new interview mode1 presented. GeneraUy speaking, only
cases presenting unusual feahues or difncult issues wert to be called for interview and

since no "easy" cases were to be interviewe& the intensity and complexity of interview
loads was increased. Likewise, although the W C is expected to specify the particular

aspects of a case that should be the focus of the interview, it is recognized that such
direction cannot serve to Iimit or restrict the i n t e ~ e w i n g
officer's latitude. Thus, the
following instructions were provided by CIC on this point:

Notwithstanding a short, focused interview, applicants must still be accorded the
elements of procedural fainiess and be given an opportunity to respond to issues
unresolved at interview. None of the RPC's instructions are meant to fimit or
prevent the interviewhg officer h m reviewing any aspect of the file which is
deemed necessary. The officer, naturally, retains the flexibility to go wherever an
interview leads regardless of the focus initidy directeci by the RPCF

On the other hand, though many of the ways and methods of case processing have
changed, one thing has not. Each mission, regardless of whether it be an RPC, a satellite
or a full processing mission, continues to be assigned a yearly target number of cases that
it shouid complete (refmed to within CIC as "fininal dispositions" or "FD's").

Headquarters planners are most pre-occupied with that numba and it is one standard by

"' Id. at 10.

which the performance of individual offices and managers are judged. It is a number
which presents both oppommities and challenges for each office. Since it is assigned as a
global figurea, it remains for each program manager to rnarshal her resources, as she
judges best, to meet the target. As a result, considerable needom remains for creativity

within individual offices as to exactly how the required FD's will be delivered. This is as
it should beyfor local peculianties are always such that the inherent burdens of file loads

differ fkom office to office. The real tnck in this process, of course, is for individual
offices to realistically assess their own capabilities and to adequately convey this to
headquarters planners.
Unfortunately, the process for setting of FD targets is hampered by an incomplete
appreciation by headquarters for the differing resource commitments involved in
generating positive and negative dispositions, that has been alluded to elsewhere in this
study. Likewise, dislocation between expectations and deliverables is heightened by the
fact that more than one measure of FD performance is used within the department. Visa
offices are expected to deliver FD's, regardless of whether they be positive or negative in
character. The Minister, however, delivers a yearly plan to Parliament that prognosticates

the total number of immigrants who will arrive, or "land', in Canada over the next twelve
month period. The Minister's number is entirely based upon positive decisions, since it
requins that a f%ed number of bodies actually tum up in Canada, and takes no account of
any positive to negative ratio that might be involved in actuaUy delivering those bodies.

Id.
1use the texm global in the sense that it is unially an absolute number that the partinilar post is expected
to achieve. Withm the overail figure, an expected ntmiba ofFD's within various categories, aich as
Refiigees, Quebec destined cases, etc., may be specified.
402

Though laadings and FD's are obviously diffaent mûasures, yet it is ultirnately the
Ianding number that is used for purposes of setting Uidividual office FD targets.
Merendy, there is a dislocation between the two that is susceptible of creating
expectations that are difficult to W U . This, in tum, may generate pressure on individual
offices to produce FD's that exceeds what rnay be feasible under all of the circumstances.

Not surprisingly, such pressure could foster a tendency for offices to focus on the Ieast
difficult or tedious work with the highest FD retum ratio, and to ignore or put off

complicated or difficult work with a lower FD payoff. This problem of two different

measues, of course, is one that pre-dates BPR and has not been the subject of any
research or discussion heretofore. It is impossible to Say, therefore, whether the problem
is real in practice or not. What is important, though, is that CIC planners should be
cognizant of if and should ensure that it is not inordinately impacting upon discretionary
decision making, in pdcular. Similarly, as the renewal initiatives within CIC are rolled
out to their conclusions, it will be important for the Department to be sensitive to placing
too much emphasis on productivity and monitoring of statistics.

2.2.3 Conclusions on BPR
Credit must be given to CIC for the rernarkablejob that has been done in meeting
the many challenges thmt upon it and over which it had Little control. Budget cutbacks,
increased pressures nom globalkation and ever more litigiousness, just to cite a few,
have demandeci significant responses and serious rethinking of ways, means and methods.
And clearly, the stakes have been high for CIC, since they implicate such fûndamentals as

relevance of the program to the needs of the country and the economy, overall system

integrity, and the crucial nature of a broad base of public support. In the hnal analysis,
however, while some work burdens have been reduced and much efficiency achieved, the
renewed CIC envisioned by BPR remains incomplete and may never be quite fully

As noteci, a number of important initiatives, like one-step processing, adoption of
new selection criteria and cornputerkition have d e r e d setbacks, so that promised

savings, both in terms of efficiency and reduction of work burdens, have not been
generated. Likewise, many legislative bits of the puzzle m a i n unfinished and so CIC

has only incomplete control over the resoufces that it must expend on application
proces~ing*~
Substantive discretion, too, remallis codified in the same places within
legislation that it was before BPR, and the locations for its exercise in the process remain
unchanged. The hope that it could be eliminated as an adjudicative tool, or at least
reduced, has not been fulfilied And, while institutionally its use may not be favoured,
yet the reality is that it continues to be asked for by clients and exercised daily by line
404

For example, there are few restrictions on when, where or how o h an applicant may apply. Though

section 10.1 of the Act gants the Miaister authority to dictate where an applicant might submit their
application, CIC has been loathe to impbment same. The oniy exception has been its recent use to
designate 9 visa offices as "Business immigrant Centres", tasked with receiving ail such applications. As
of June 1, 1998, all applications in the Entrepreneur, Investor and Self-Eniployed classes may only be
submitted at one of these Centres. The Minister is quoted as statiag that "[~Joncentratingthe appropriate
personnel in a limited number of centres provides al1 applicants access to our expertise in business
immigration. At the same t h e , we cm beâter screen applications for h u d or inappropriate business
activities, thereby ensuring the intcgnty of the program is maintained globdy." See CIC News Release
98-27 (26 May 1998) "Centres To Process Business Immigrants".
However, no such restriction has yet been placed on any other immigrant category. Thus, a nonbusiness category appiicant may legitimately have applications processing in two or more different offices,
in separate regions of the world, in different immigration categones. Further, an appiicant is fiee to submit
application after application, evni while another may s t d i be in process or even immediately after a
previous rehaL The reaiities of the legal doctrine of fairness, with its requirement for individuaiized
processing requiring fresh consideration of each application, are such thaî a stubborn applicant need not
necessarily be dissuaded by past experience. The oniy real deterrent to persistent applicants may be the
significant application fees that are now part of îhe immigration hdscape. A possible suggestion for
legislative change might be to litnit independent applicants to one application every year or two, so that

officers. There is obviously much work left to be done if the renewal agenda on
substantive processing issues is to be moved forward.
The procedural side of matters, however. presents a ciiffirent story, with big gains

having been realized. For example, consistency of decision-making, a cornplaint of long

standing,has been enhanceci by the move to fewer decision centres. At the same tirne,
dramatic improvements in o v d l productivity, application processing times and general
client satisfaction have also been registered. Perhaps the most interesthg observation
to be made about these gains is that they have actuaUy served in many instances to
invigorate procedural discretion. Indeed, it is fair to Say that this form of discretion has
achially provided many of the efficiency gains reaiized.
While the new system eschews the sort of intensive labour associated with
positive substantive discretion that must be exercised in the setting of individual client
interviews, it does favour use of such discretion as a procedural tool for batch processing.
Ironicdy. this has only added justification for the retention of some rneasure of
substantive discretion in the selection process. The desire to waive interviews, even for
applicants who do not obtain suf6cient points for an outright pass mark, requires that
some substantive discretion be exercised in tandem with the procedural discretion
granting such waivers. Thus, BPR reductions and efficiency measures seem to have
rendered positive discretion, of whatever variety, more essential than ever.
Moreover, the changes are not just iimited to positive discretion. New thinking

-
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there is time for fie& circumstances to accrue.
'OsCeRaialy, productivity incfea~s
are evident in the fact that the same number of immigrant visas have
continued to be issueci evm afler staff redutions w m made. Likewise, waiver of interviews have helped
to reduce processing timts, at least in routint cases, which has obviously increased client satisfaction.

affects the use of negative adjudicative discretion as weli. Just as the systern no longer

has the resources to devote to sifting closely for those who have fallen through the cracks,
so too it does not have the resources to closely scrutinize ail those who are winnowed in.
Thus, fewer persom are Likely to be screened out by the negative exercise of substantive

discretion.
The revitalization of positive discretion has, however, wrought profomd changes
on the ways of unmigrant selection which need to be recognized. In particular, it has
fostered a situation where the "packagingy'of clients is emphasized more, while their
intrinsic merits and abilities perhaps count for les. Though substance stiU has
precedence, form has clearly been elevated in importance. C-y,

a client who puts up

a good h n t on papa is more iikely to ease through the system than is an applicant who
devotes less attention to completion of forms. This is hardly surprising, since one of the
goals of re-engineering was to shift work burden nom CIC to its clientele. This has
placed greater control over the supply of information to decision-makers in the hands of
applicants and their advison. The perils of this are manifest, since the selection process

may be more easily derailed and is in greater danger of not selecting those candidates
who are seen as essential to the continued viabiiity of the economy and cultural life of

Canadaa The situation is compounded, of course, by the fact of fewer people doing

a For a critique suggesting that at least one part of the Independent immigrant program, the Immigrant

lnvestor Category, has been seriously compromised for such reasons, see Shar Levine and Andrew Phillips,
"Citizenship on sale" Maclean 's (1 Jdy 1996) 14. That article focuses on the hvestor immigrant flow
fiom Taiwan and details problems caused by unscrupuious consultants taking advantage of CIC resource
constraints. In parti&,
at 14- 15, the foiiowing is stated:
In effect, Say the critics, Canada has given up control of a major aspect of its immigration policy
to foreign-based consultants, many of whom use unscmpuious methods including falsificationof
m with the
documents to qualifl their clients for Canadian visas. ... Canadian officiais f
trade Say that many consuitants operating in Taiwan have become so sophisticated in preparing

more work. With less time available to spend on any one particular case, the possibility
for mors and oversights by decision-makers is increased.
It is a situation where increased vigilance by decision-makers and efficient,
effective quality control methods are necessaryM Some of those measures are apparent

in the system design, such as the concentration of case screening in the han& of a small
number of case anaiysts who are well placed to spot trends and patterns.-

Just a s

irnportantly, CIC has shown a willingness to profit tiom its mistakes and to accept that

some initiatives just don't work. This flexibility will be important as the full BPR
program is rolled out in the next severai years, since other adjustments are sure to be

necessary. For exarnple, the trend to specialization and the gains it has offered in ternis
of productivity and protection of system integrïty must be offset by a realistic assesment
as to feasible workloads. This wiil require ongoing monitoring and a willingness to

adjust targets, as experience and under~tafldingabout the optimum outputs fkom the new
methods is acquired. Likewise, given the fact that BPR changes have not been
implemented to the extent originally envisioned, CIC might do well to consider a study to
assess the trade-offs that have been made and their impacts on the selection system as it

now exists. The effect that al1 the changes have had upon discretionary decision making,

their clients' applications that they - not Canadian immigration officers- effectively control who
can get into this country through the mvestor immigrant and entrepreneurprograms. "There isn't
staff to check aU the applications," says the Immigration ofncial. "It's mostiy a paper transaction
between lawyer and consuitant. it*sa Potemkin village, a charade, and the taxpayer's interest is
not being s e r v e
Time will tell whether the perds of placing greater controf over the flow of information into the han& of
applicants and advisors is ill advised or not. Cleariy, however, intemiew waivers present many
opportunities for misleadmg and misinfonning decision makers. For an apparent example of interview
waiver facilitating the entry of a crimmal in the busmess category, see Dianne Rinehast, supra note 364.
This same justification was evidentfy behind the Minister's recent decision to designate nine visa offices
as "Business Immigrant Centres". See note 404, supra.

in particular, certainly merits in-depth assessrnent and stucïy. As 1have attempted to
dernonstrate, despite CIC's desire to move in the opposite direction, discretionary
decision making seerns now to be even more central and essential to the way immigrant
selection is conducted, than it was before BPR.

2.3

Discretion and Sociology
Sociological studies of discretion draw a strong Iink between organizational

settings and the manner in which discretionary power is exercised. Admittedly, the full
extent of the massive institutional and organizational changes underway in CIC and the
ultimate impact they will have upon discretionary authority rem& to be seen.
Nonetheless, during this period of transition, it is usefid to consider the insights offered
by sociology and the possible implications they suggest for immigration discretion that

a i s e out of institutional renewal.
Rather than focusing on discretionary power as an aberrant phenornenon within a

system of d e s , sociologists have instead employed a holistic approach, much like that of
the hctionaiist school of jurisprudence.* It is not just a case, however, of studying

discretion in context. Sociologists take this a step M e r by asserting that consideration
must be given to the influence that context holds over discretionary power. In their view,
while discretion is both pervasive and indispensable in any system of rules application,
institutional, organizational and situational factors ensure that it is neither so
unconstrained nor unpredictable as traditional jurisprudence might suggest.

In the view of social scientists, the structure and values of an organization shape
'09

For a discussion of this school of jurisprudence, see above, section 1.3
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Dicey Undone The

and mold workers' understanding of their discretionary power and impose expectations as
to appropriate outcomes that tend to make discretionary decision-making much more
regular and predi~table."~It is a viewpoint which asserts that discretion is more than just
a property of rules - it is also one of behaviour and perception.41tWhile context is
important as a background to the exercise of discretionary power, it is more than that. It

is also a dynamic force, acting upon discretion to guide and shape its exercise. Thus, the
factors that affect discretion are not just formal legal rules, but hclude a multitude of
informal d e s arising out of social, situational and pragmatic concerns. Recognizing this,

one's eyes are opened to the fidl panoply of influences and dictates which can direct the
use of discretion in any given case. Just as importantly, these factors tend to act much as
formal legal d e s , leading to structuring and containment of discretion, and fosteruig
greater predictability as to its exercise.
Sociologists do not just acknowledge that discretion is an inevitable component of
d e s , they maintain that it is actually good. They cite functional benefits for legal
systems, such as filling in gaps between rhetonc and reality, and obscuring lack of
consensus or ambiguities in the law and p01icy."~ Further, d e s devised to attain some
general purpose may give rise to conspicuous lack of justice when applied in a phcular,
concrete case, dernanding a decision to mitigate or even to avoid their effects. Keith

FunctionaiistApproach commencing at page 23.
See generally Martha Feldmao, "Sociai Limits to Discretion: An Organizatiod Pmpective" in Keith
Hawkins,ed, The Uses of Discretion, supra note 9,163 at 163-183.
Richard Lempert, "Discretion in a Behavioral Perspective: The Case of a Public Housing Eviction
Board'' in Hawkins, The Uses of DLscretion, id at 226.
21' Keith Hawkins, "The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives fiom Law and Sociai Science" in Hawkins,
The Uses of Dimetion, id., 1 at 37.
*'O

"'

Hawkins refers to this as the "gap problem'"13,when notiondy impartial d e s give rise
to uiequitable or unjust results in a given case. In his view, it is an irony that viewing
discretion as a concem in socio-Iegal studies has been to view it critically, as the reason
for a lack of fit between the values and d e s of the written law and the practices of legal
actors. He asserts that legal actors tend to behave more consistently than is recognized,

though he acknowledges that apparent inconsistency does exist. Arguably, however, such
apparent inconsistency may achially be justice at work - that each case is individuai and
so demands an individual, particularized result. Somewhat paradoxically, this is often an
ostensible goal of d e s , too. However, d e s are b a t suited to mgendering consistency

and uniformity in outcomes, but such outcomes may be derived without regard to the
unique traits, characteristics and needs of each applicant. To atîain those outcomes, there
is an emphasis on process, the theory being that fair process must inevitably give rise to
fair results. Such a focus, however, sometimes leaves substantivejustice sacrificed at the
altar of procedurai faimess.

Discretion, on the other hand, can act as the bridge between procedural faimess

and substantivejustice. Sociologists see it as the essential interpretive behaviour behind

a sorting and prioritization that often must occur between rules and of discerning the
applicability, meanhg and effect which should be given to them. But they dso see this
process as a two way street, with use of discretion shaped and informed by d e s though,
again, these may be social and organizational in source, rather than legal. The
signincance of this thesis is seen in the fact that, for sociologists at any rate, it explains
the perception of despotic power which clings to discretionary decision-making. As

4"

Id. at 38.

Hawkins explains:

...the 'arbitrariness'

or 'capriciousness' of discretion (as laand others might
see it) resides in the disjunction between expectations prompted by a reading of
legal d e s , on the one hand, and the pattemed forms of behaviour engaged in by
legal actors in their routine work, on the other. It is the lack of fit between the
legal expectations about how a decision shouid be made and how it is socially
detennined in practice which may give rise to accusations of arbitrariness or
irrationality?"

Thus, the differiug attitudes towards discretion, apparent between sociologists and

lawyers, arise inevitably because of the disparate viewpoints Eom which they tend to
conduct their investigations fiom. For legal philosophas, the primary focus is on words

and d e s and the choices these appear to allow for discretionary decisions, while social
scientists orient their focus instead on the processes and goals that may be inherent in a
system?" It is this ciifference in emphasis which causes Richard Lempert to argue that
traditional jurisprudence has failed to account for the host of social and other factors
which may contain and structure discretion. In his view:

Legal philosophers tell us that, when d e s authorize discretion, it means that
decision-makers are fiee to choose fYom a range of legally permissible options.
Yeî, if we look at how adjudicative discretion is actudly exercised - that is, at the
pattern of decisions generated - Little advantage may be taken of this supposed
fkeedom. ...What the law gives in discretion - that is the authorkation to reach
one of a number of possible decisions and the awareness of this fieedom - social
forces may take away. This is not surpishg, for what legal discretion necessarily
accords is the fieedom to be influenced by factors other than the law?
But just what are these social forces and how do they act upon discretion? In his opinion,
discretion is a factor of d e s , of behaviour, or of the sense that decisioa-makers have of

-
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Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Lempert, supm note 4 11 at 226-227.

their own scope for needom of action?

Because any one or more of these factors may

be present in any given decision, it is sometimes difncult to discern where one factor has
left off and another has begun. However, some examples of these influences in action are

not difficdt to provide.
2.3.1

Serial Discretion

Serial discretion occurs where an individual decision can be seen as just one in a

sequence of decisions. While each decision may be conceptually or even legally
conceived of as a unique creature unto itself, yet it does not occw out of context and so is,
inevitably, a creature of that context. Thus, a decision-maker who is reliant upon another
for the collection of information or preparation of reports upon which the decision is to be
based, may be influenced by the f o m of the evidence, the tone of the report and other
factors."' The watershed case of Re Singh and M.E.L419' for instance, contains just such
an example, albeit in the context of refugee determination. Under the procedures then

extant under the Immigration Act, Refugee claimants were required to be examined under
oath about their c l a h by a Senior Immigration Officer. A copy of the c l a h and a
tmnsaipt of the examination were then focwarded to the Refugee Status Advisory
Committee which reviewed these items and forwarded an opinion to the Minister as to
whether status should be granted. In this case, the Minister's decision was predicated
upon a pnor decision by the Refügee Status Advisory Committee. Though the Minister
possessed discretion to disregard or accept the Cornmittee's opinion, quite obviously that

4"

Id. at 185.

"'See Hawkins 'The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives fiom Law and Social Science'', supra note 412
at 31.

opinion was infiuential to the Minister's decision making process. Similarly, in the event
that the Minister's decision was negative, the claimant was entitled to appeal to the
Immigration Appeal Board for a reconsideration of the matter. However, that Board,
beyond considering mataials and information supplied by the appellant, was also
required to consider an opinion f?om the Minister of Tmmigration, who had previously
passed on the merits of the claim. Beyond certain rudimentary reasons, the claimant was
not afforded an opportunity to know the details upon which the Minister's determination

was based and so to counter them.
Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the applicant's

right to "lfe, liberty and security of the person" under S. 7 of the Charier had been
hfkhged, since the process was defective in ternis of fimdamental justice.

The

Immigration Appeal Board's mode of adjudication in this instance was serial in naturey
depending as it did upon receipt of an opinion by the Miaister." Though there was no
suggestion that the Board was partial or biased in favour of the Minister, yet the
procedure raised concems as to what weight and efféct the Minister's determination
carried. Was the Board the Mciently independent not to be overly swayed by the
Minister's opinion? Further, given the secrecy surrounding the Minister's detennination,
it was impossible to say with certain@what facts and matters had been considered by the
Minister. In the absence of an opportunity for the applicant to respond to such facts and
mattm and to counter any deficiencies, the Court felt that there was a danger that the
Board would simply accept that the Minister's opinion was sound and shocld be
--

-

-

-

- -

Supm note 04.
Though, for that matter, the Minisîe~'sdetermination &O appeared to be of a scrial variety, depcndmg

foiiowed.
The problem of serial decision-making seen in Singh has since been obviated in
Refiigee detemnination cases by the adoption of revamped detennination procedures that
are much more judicial in nature than was formerly the case. NevertheIess, the type of
serial decision seen in Singh is still a cornmon occurrence in Canadian immigration law.

The issuance of a Minister's Permit to overcome inadmissibility, for example, often
requires that field officers seek concurrence k m senior officiais at headquarters. Those
senior oEcials, having never seen the applicant, depend upon a report and
recommendation h m the examining officerto aid them in their decision. A similar
situation obtains with respect to discretion mder sections 2.1 and 11 of the Regulations.
In both instances, the determination by an examining officer that an exercise of discretion
is appropriate requbes the concurrence of another more senior officer. Of course, the
senior oficer typically has not seen the applicant and is reliant upon the assessrnent and
recommendation of the examining officer.
Another example of serid discretion which was considered in the BPR plan, but
never implemented, centred on CIC's office network restmcturing plan. That plan has
adopted a hub and spoke system of offices, with a central "rnother office" at the hub of
the system, receiving all applications. The mother office processes to completion all
routine cases. More problematic cases are farmed out to smaller satellite offices, where
personahxi investigation and consideration c m be completed. Although the satellite
offices now have complete responsibility for the nle once received, under an earlier
model, it was envisioned that they might ody investigate the particular aspect of a case
as it did upon the recommendation of the Refiigee Status Advisory Cornmittee.

seen as problematic. In this "split-inteniiew" scenario, the satellite was to undertake an
investigation and report back with a recommendation to the mother office, which would
then complete the nle as deemed appropriate. The theory of this model was that the

investigations of the satellite office would be simply that - an investigation but not really

a decision. Serial decision making, of course, is often anathema under our legal system,
since it nuis contrary to hdamental notions of administrativejustice and fair play seen

in maxims iike "she who hears must decide". One assumes that the "split-interview"
model was discarded for the reason that it was lmlikely to witbstand serious smtiny upon
judicial review or appeal.

Serial discretion is also implicated in situations where stafkg rnay be inadequate
to keep up with volume. In those circumstances, resort rnay be had to a sort of binary
typification system, whereby cases can be quickly disposed of by classifjmg them as
either 'good" or '%ad"?

Discretion in such situations rnay tend to err on the side of

caution. Paper-screening at high volume case processing centres. in partïcular, rnay be

highly prone to such caution. In the paper-screenhg vetting process, officers are required
to categorize the application in one of the immigrant classes and then briefly w e s s it for
content, completeness and, most irnportantly, cornpliance with criteria for approval in the
particular category. If the case appears to be within typical parameters for such cases, the

officer rnay choose to waive the requirement for interview. If there is anything even

slightly amiss or missing, the decision rnay be taken to convoke interview where more
time is available to sort out such detds. The consequences of i n t e ~ e w
are substantial
for both CIC and the client, involvkg outlay of additional resources and effort. This is

particularly unfortunate if the matter is one of minor detail that might be easily resolved
by a simple telephone cal1 or letter. However, productivity and other comtraints may
lead to a sort of buck passing, where the case is s e n t on down the iine to a location where
volume is l e s valued. Likewise, productivity concems may put a case into a process
where lack of personal responsibility leads to a total failure of discretion. In such an
extreme, an application rnay flounder in limbo awaiting a small, but essential exercise of
discretion. The lack of a single responsible decision center, coupled with absence of an
effective oversight system, may leave a cornplete application in limbo, resulting in greater

energy expendeci M e r down the line to salvage the matter." It is important, therefore,
for managers of high volume case processing centers to be sensitive to the balance that is
necessary between short t e m productivity goals and overall efficiency. Too much
emphasis on the fonner can give nse to overly sïmplistic binary typification that may
eventually obviate any gains.
Somewhat related to the problem of binary typification is that of "consecutive
discretion", a phenornenon which Lempert refers to as "familiarity breeding pre~edent".~~

As he describes it, high volume tribunals, in an effort to reduce work burdens, may
actually restrict their use of discretion by developing shorthand ways of typifjhg cases.

In his study of a public housing eviction board, for example, he found that the more cases
the board heard, the less time was achially devoted to each case. He saw this tum of

"' Hawkins, supra note 412 at 39-4 1.
For an apparent example of ttiis, see Parker Bans Donham, "For better, for wone",supm note 203.
There, a Nova Scotia resident married a U.S.citizen, whom he sponsored for permanent residence in the
family class. The article details a "14 month ordeal of red tape" suggesting bad information,poor
communication and absence of individuai responsibility by and withui CIC. The matter was apparmtly
finalized only after direct involvement by the M W e r of Citizensbip & Immigration.
423 Lempert, supra note 4 1 1 at 208.
422

events as a factor of precedential experience being built up over

As the board

gained in e x p h c e and as its caseload increased, it relied upon precedent to reduce the

work burden each case entaileci. He concludes, therefore, that authorities which process
large numbers of factudy similar cases tend to act to curtail theu discretion as a coping

mechanism." Discretion, it seems, rnay be a lwury reserved mostly for small volume
tribunals which tend to hear factuaily dissimilar cases?
Serial discretion may also be seen at work in more general instances as well.
Where a client has been refused a particuiar service in the past, that r e k a l may create
presumptions that the client wili need to positively overcome in order to obtain a contrary
decision. For example, a previous deportation suggests a willful disregard by the
applicant for Canadian immigration law. This presumption speaks to credibility and
character and so may well influence subsequent decisions on re-admissibility, at least in

so far as there may be an elernent of discretion available in any such d e c i ~ i o n .Further,
~
because of institutional and other factors, immigration officers may be hesitant to
countermand previous decisions made by colleagues in that office or other offices."

Id, at 207.
This observation presents an argument in favour of the importance of judicial review as a m e c h a n .
for monitoring administrative triiunaIs. One of the most important grounds for review, of course, is the
allegation that a tribunal has unduly fettered its discretion,
426 He uses the example of the U.S.Supreme Court as such a tribunal, which tends to prefn to retain its
discretionary authority, See Lmqert, supra note 4 11 at 208-209. See &O Schneider, "Discretion and
Rdes: A Lawyer's V i d , supra note 118 at 82-83, who observes, for example, that "[tpe more work a
court must do, the less time it wiii have for the work of exercising unfettered discretion. Such a court may
then exercise discretion in deciding how to decide cases, but will have an incentive to consûuct principles
of decision that are d y applied and to foUow &ose principles as routinely as possible. Such a court will
thereby have constrained (although not entirely prevented) its own exercise of discretion in the future.
[footnote omittedr
Se+ S. 55(1) of the Act d e t . g the ~qukmentfor "Minister's Consent" to overcome the effects of a
previous depon For a review of the discretionary nature of a grant of consent by the Minister, see Singh v.
Canada (Min. of Employmmt & Immigration) (1986), 6 F.T.R. 15 (Fed. T.D.).
This is partiCulady so, s* offices confronted by an application for Minister's Consent are advised to
4U

Certainly, where the fact of previous refusal surfaces, standard procedure is to investigate
the circumstances giving rise to that refusal. Only where there has been a material
change in circumstances, or the decision is shown to be in error, is the applicant likely to
receive a different outcorne,
Clearly, senal decision-making rnay implicate an untoward degree of fettering of
discretion, if the subsequent decision-maker perceives herself to be bound by the previous
decision. But where she considers that pnor decision as just one fact or matter arnong

many to be considered, and so long as she stays alive to al1of the circumstances as they
currently exist, she is unlikely to be faulted for fettering her discretion.

2.3.2 Rule Constraints
Sociologists emphasize that d e structure has important implications for the
relative fteedorn or constraints that may aise in the delegation of a discretionary power.

Where the delegation is accomplished by way of a simple d e , there is likely to be less
relative fieedom for the exercise of discretion. Simple d e s tend better to capture the tnie
essence of what a power is actualiy about. A more complex rule, however, is more EeIy
to obscure real intent and leave decision-makers with a wider scope for interpretation and
action? It might be added, as well, that a simpler rule is less likely even to incorporate

seek input fiom the deporting office. See CIC IM Chap. OP-1, Para, 17.4 (Ver. 11-96) "Requests for
Minister's consent", at 29, which provides the following direction for visa offices:
You must obtain all avaiiable iafomtion about the removai fiom the responsi%Ieoffice in
Canada. You should ask for the removing office's recommendation about approving or denying
the request
See Hawkins, Npra note 412 at 36 who statw: "The f o m and complexity of a d e have importaut
implications for the degree of discretion created ...[Tlhe simpler the d e the more likely it is that the
principle embodied in it wiU be adhered to, whiie the more complex the d e the greater the discretion
available to individuai decision-makers in its mterpretation and application. Similarly, complex systems of
des, though highiy specinc, may also have the effect of creating greater discretion in practice.. .."

"

an element of discretion ab initio than is a convoluted rule, which may be accompanied
by r e m s of explanatory material. An illustration of this might be the poiicy conceniing
processuig of applications for permanent residence h m religious personnel. Nowhere Ui
the Act or Regulatiom is provision made for handling of applications fkom priests, nuns
and other religious personnel. While such applications are processed in the Independent
category, no religious occupations are listed on the Open Occupations List. ûrdinarily,
this would be fatal, as lack of "occupational dernand" is a complete barrier to a successful
Independent application?

However, a single, short paragraph in a policy manual

provides authority to overcome such a defect?

So long as the religious official has an

uifomal offer of employmentu' fiom a church in Canada. and it appears that adequate
provision for a "reasonable standard of living" has been made, then the application has
met the substantive requirernents stipulated for such cases. So short and cursory is this
policy statement that it leaves little room for discretionary action. A letter signed by
someone who purports to be an official associated with the particular church or
congregation is generally sufficient proof of the job offer. Likewise, most church groups

See section 11(2)(a)of the Regdations which prohibits a visa officer fiom issuing a visa to Independent
category applicants who do not obtah "...at least one unit of assessment for the factor [of occupational
demand] set out in item 4 of column 1of Schedule 1.. .." A demand factor is attached to each occupation
on the Open Occupations List. Those not on the list are considered to be "zero demand".
O' See CIC IM Chap. I
S 1.36.
"'This is opposed to the more formal 'talidatedjob offer', which is the n o m in Independent category
cases. Validation is a two step process involving the Labour Market Services section of the Canada
Employment Centres (CEC)and the overseas visa offices of CIC. If an employer is able to satisfy CEC
that îhere is a paucity of domestically available workers willing or able to cske up the offered employment,
then CEC will issue a validation that is of one of two types: temporary or permanent. A temporary
validation will enable a foreign worker to obtain only an empIoyment authorization of a fixed, though
usuaiIy renewable, duration, A permanent validation, on the other hanci, typicdy WUenable the foreign
worker to qfor both permanent residence in Canada and an employment authorization to tide them
over whiie the permanent rcsidence application is in process. See S. 20 of the Regdations and also,
generaiiy, J.R Bart & B.J. Trister, Work Pennits and Visas (Scarborough, Ont.: Carsweii, 1995) at 191 214.
'30

tend to be registered for tax purposes as non-profit societies and cm usually provide
evidence of their existence by way of some sort of registration. There is d s o little scope

within the policy even to question the qualifications of the immigrant to engage in the
calling of a religious minister.'"

As a practical matter, therefore, the only real scope for

discretion arises in relation to the question as to sufficiency of the hancial and other

arrangements providing for a "reasonable standard of living". Although CIC occasionally
publishes guidelines suggesting the amount of incorne a typical immigrant requins for
successful establishment in metropolitan areas of various sizes, these are mere guidelines
only and everything is dependent upon the particular circumstances in each case. In
practice, it is recognized that the support of a religious congregation may well mean that
while the achial salary is low, yet the applicant will be able to draw upon considerable
community support. Likewise, the nature of the religious calling may be such that the
particular applicant may have relatively simple needs. Hence, discretion tends to favour a
lower threshold than might be expected of regular Independent category applicants?*
The concept of nile constraint, however, is not just as straightfomard as saying
simpler rules leave less room for discretionary decision making. Changing the rules, for
example, to eliminate discretionary power may not, in some cases, actuaily elhinate it.

Instead, it may simply cause such power to be shifted to another location on the

1recatl, for example, issuing an immigrant visa to a steelworker with no previous specializcd religious
trainmg or experience as a miniskr. The policy contains no stipulation as to qualincations and so
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congregations in Cana& are fiee to hire whomever they see fit to minister to their spiritual needs.
Indeed, this example may also s m e to illustrate the difficuities that may be inherent Hi attempting to
produce a fixed d e for a i l cases. Nuns and monks, for example, tend to follow a vow of povexty that
requires them to eschew worldly possessions. Moreover, they may be required to forego any sort of
regular income or even to rely entirely upon the largesse of strangers. Though not impossi%le, a fixed d e
of g e n d application dealing with d of the variety and complexity iuherent in the personal circumstances
in each of these cases would tax the abilities of even the most imaginative legislative cirafier.

The particular way in which discretion will be exercised may not be predictable

kom the particulin forms of rules. ... Since discretion is adaptive in character,
niles may serve to displace discretion to other sites for decision-making within a
legal system, and thereby possibly to enlarge it, or to create conditions for its
exercise in more private, less accountable settings. A telling example of this
effect is to be found in the efforts to curtail discretion selectively to release
prisoners on parole in California by use of legislatively fixeci, presumptive
sentences which served to push effective power to dispose of serious criminai
cases into the han& of those who engage in pre-trial bargaining?

In the context of CIC operations, the cost saving drive that has seen reduction of
staff and centralization of processing in high volume offices, insulated fiom direct client

contact, appears to have driven more control over discretionary authonty into the han&

of applicants and their counsel. Interview waiver is heavily reliant upon case presentation
and f o m becomes almost as important as substance, when the process of selection is
cornpleted without any personal contact between the client and the decision-maker. The
client, or her advocate, has greater control over what will be seen and considered by the

decision-maker. Just as the California law pushed more power d o m to offenders to
achieve plea-bargaining, so does i n t e ~ e w
waiver push more opportunities into the han&
of applicants to gain a favourable selection decision. Since the advocate representing a
client may be the only person to actualiy see the client, the advocate's bargainhg position

in 'hegotiation" for a positive selection decision is enhanced. Accordingiy, skilled
lawyers and consultants understand that presenting cases in the "right" fashion is essentiai

"

See gennally Joel Handier, "Discretion: Power, Quiescence, and T d in Hawkins, ed,n e Uses of
Discretion, supra note 9 at 33 1-360,who notes that the importance of discretion can arise in situations
removed h m the point where it might obviously be employed.
Hawkins, supra note 412 at 36.

to obtaining a favourable exercise of waiver discretion?

This implies not just simply

subrnitting a M y completed application form and fbil documentation, but also

emphasizing skills, qualities or attributes of the applicant that might be considered
desirable in a prospective immigrant. This c m be done, for example, by including
information or materials not strictly relevant to the selection criteria, but which may
reinforce the notion that the applicant is a "good p e r ~ o n " . ~ ~
Another facet of the d e constn.int notion is the s m e that decision-rnakers may
have of beiug constncted in their discretion, even when the niles do not actually restrict

them. That is, a multiplicity of d e s may actualiy induce an mneous sense of Little
effective fkeedom. Or, conversely, though the d e s may specifjr a fkeedom of action, yet
the decision-maker may misapprehend the scope of action available to them. This can
arise for a number of reasons, including a lack of confidence arising through inadequate
training or preparation, a perceived lack of support for "fiee-wheeling" judgment within

an organization or even because of an undue regard for the possibility of appeal.
See Derek Lundy, supra note 356 at 12, where the following is given:
Toronto lawyer Joseph R Young told The Luwyers Weekly that to represent clients
properly, lawyers should put together as complete an application as possible to increase the
chances of getting an interview waiver of the personid interview.
Waiver will expedite getting a visa, and could cut down the t h e it wïli take a client to
get into Canada to three or four months, fiom a year or longer if the client is put into the intewiew
queue. ...
ML Young noted that a completed M M 8 form and fee payment was technicaUy an
application, but that a complete appiication should inchde a l i the documents the government
needs to decide on eligiiiiity and waiver of interview.
Though such information may not be directiy relevant to the s e l d o n criteria and qualincation for
immigration, it may suggest that the applicant is a weii-rotmded individuai and w i i i get on well irrespective
of the number of points awarded on an assesment conducted pursuant to the selection criteria. This, of
course, is the sort of information which may motivate a visa officer to consider a grant of positive
discretion. in one case, for example, I recall seeing an applicant who had d e r e d polio as a child, with the
result that one Ieg was atmphied Nonetheles, he did not allow this to prevent him nom pumimg a
passion for badminton to a semi-professional ievel. Any shortcomings in his application were rendered
insignincant in light of the personal courage and drive this story reveaied In my opinion, it is exactly this
sort of initiative and motivation that the selection criteria a<tempt, though inadequateiy, to descn'be and

This latter case can be seen in the discretion accorded to visa officers under
section 11(3) of the Repiations. Though both a positive and negative discretion are

available, officers have the perception that the two discretions are not equaLq CIC is
d i k e l y to appeal a positive exercise of discretion by one of its own and, since a
successful applicant is dso unlikely to cornplain, any repercussions fkom granting a

dispensation are either non-existent or inconsequential. On the other hand, officers know
that an exercise of negative discretion is almost certain to resdt in an application for

judicial review by the applicant. This invariably resuIts in extra work for the officer. in
the way of preparation of affidavits, cross-examination on affidavit and the like. If little

credit is given for such work in overall work targets, an officer rnay be hesitant to engage
in any decision-making viewed as ca-g

an "appeal risk"? Further. notwithstanding

the notion of civil servant anonymity under the doctrine of ministerial responsibility,
there is the possibility on review of being persondy chastised or otherwise found lacking

in common sense or decency, an invariably unpleasant expenence.*I Such public

capture.

The perception a M y has some grounding in realitty, in part because of the restrictive approach taken
by the courts with respect to negative discretion. See generally the discussion below in section 3.3.4
Negative Discretion, conceming the courts*handling of negative discretion,
See Roy Sainsbury, "Aâmhismtive Justice: Discretion and Procedure in Social Security DecisionMaking" in Hawkins, ed,The Uses of Dlscretion, supra note 9 at 295. Sainsbury notes that the appeai
process is double edged. While it forces decision-makers to scrutinize their own decisions more closely
and d o w s for bad decisions to be righted, it may also retard discreîionary decision-making. He States, at
319-320, that it may ..encourage.. .taking the easy option in hard cases by aiiowing a c l a h where
pmhps it is not justifiecl. This prevents appeais, since c m t s awarded a h e f i t generally do not
compIain, and, even ifthe decision is not justifie& there is only a slim possiiitity that the case w i l l be
scnitinized as part of a monitoring check Such practices are not officiaiiy sanctioned but are attractive to
busy adjudication officers."
"' See for exampIe, So v. Canada (Mùr. of EmpZopent & Immigration) (1995), 28 Imm. L.R. (2d) 153,93
F.T.R.153 beinafter cited to 28 hm.LX], where the actions of the visa officer are d e s r n i d by Justice
Rouleau, at 155, as the most blatant example of willfiilbad faith and abuse of discretion he had ever
encountered during his tenure on the bench, For another example, see also Tmng -Yang Hu v. Mhister of
Citùenship & Immigration (5 Novernber 1995), (F-C-TD.)[unreportedl where, ahhough the visa officer's
decisioa was sustained by the court, the court did so using mixed metaphors, sayirrg ..wMe the visa
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censure, of course, also carries the risk of wide ranghg negative publicity for the
employer. Because the media tends to prefer to focus on what has gone wrong, rather

than what has been done right, a siege mentality c m develop, whereby officials are even
more hesitant to act for fear of embarrassing themselves and their employer and to avoid
potential negative career consequences.

Another significant organkational factor that may dramatically impact upon
discretionary decision-mabg is the pressure that both the courts and the central
Unmigration bureaucracy may impose upon functionaries to confom to a single, narrow
ideal of what discretion is or should be. Such pressure is ofien gussied up as consistency,

which is generally seen as a good thing and fundamental to our notions of justice and fair
play. Simply stated, it means that iike cases are to be treated alike. This principle is
derived largely nom the cornmon law courts, where it is known under the Latin term,
stare decisis. And indeed, precedent is the platform upon which d e s are built.

Discretion, however, exists on the other side of this principle, as a tool for doingjustice
where the d e s are incapable of doing so.
The eariier example of the bureaucracy fiowning upon one officer iightly
ovemiming the decision of another officer is a good specimen of a mild form of the
favouritism shown to the ideal of consistency. From a management perspective, it is also

useful to encourage conformity since it aids the achievement of productivity goals. Since
niles offer the clearest guidance, they are central to any drive for increased efficiency.

For these reasons, an environment striving for productivity wil1 inevitably relegate

officer may have been somewhat h a .in hir asscssmcnt that no dcpaidnicy existed, in my view, it couid
not be said that his detemiination was so unreasonable as to warrant the interference of the c o ~ "

discretion to secondary importance, whether or not that result is intended."

However, a

potential d o m i d e may arise, if decision-makers feel themselves forced into a sort of
garne playing just to meet production targets. This occurs, for example, when decision

makers choose to handle a case in one fashion rather than another, even if that other is
more expeditious, simply because greater credit is somehow given for a particular method

of case handling.

In discussing rule con.straints, it must be recognized that an exceedingly
important source of influence affécting exercise of discretion must come k m the very
ideology upon which a particular statutory regime may be founded. Though a statute
may provide a host of d e s for application in any case, yet there is inevitably a guiding
ethos hanging over the whole exercise. In the case of Canadian immigration law, that
ideology is one of facilitation, rather than control. At common law, the d e was quite
simply that no foreigner had a right of entry except with leave, which might be arbitrarily
withheld or, if grantecl, might be subject to very onerous tems.-

The Immigration Act

represents a fundamental shift fiom the comrnon law position, taking for its primary
raison d 'etre the facilitation of M m i g r a t i ~ n .This
~ principle stands nrst and foremost

among those declared for our immigration law and wields considerable influence as to

how discretion is viewed in the immigration bureaucracy, the judiciary and the legal

Hawkins, mpra note 412 at 39.
Attorney General of Canada v. Cdn. supra note 152.
U4 See for example, HczjculwuZa, supra note 269,6 Imm.L.R.(2d) 222 at 226, where the following
interpretive guidance is provided:
..it is important to bear in mind that Parliament's intention m enacting the Immigration Act is to
defîne Canada's immigrationpolicy both to Cananians and to those who wish to come here h m
abroad. Such a policy cannot exist without complex reguiations, a good many of which appear to
be restrictive in nature, but the poticy shouid always be in-reted
in positive t e m . Zïze purpose
of the statute ir to pennit immigration, not prevent it. [emphasis added]

.

community gene~alfy.~
And it is this concept, positioned as a sort of "super-de" over
all other d e s , which percolates down to the lowest levels of the immigration bureaucracy

and provides an animus for dl other

Notwithstanding this, however, it is also

true that our immigration law does provide for controls in various circumstances. The

conflict is resolved simply by a compromise that says immigration shall occur imless
otherwise prohibited.

It is apparent then that decision-makers can be subjected to competing,
antagonistic influences that pull in opposite directions. These can be contained in the
d e s themselves or they may be found in the approach taken toward the d e s . The fact

of potentially cross purposes being embodied in a single system creates a sort of
administrative schizophrenia that is indeed a hallmark of our immigration Law. For
example, while the system tends to favour niles and is wary of discretionary power, yet
strict adherence to rules is synonymous with b~reaucracy.~~~
Though, it is often a fine

and difficult h e to walk between compassion and indifference, it is nonetheless one that

our immigration system demands unrelentingly. The difficulty of following that h e is

"Skeptics will, of course, cite parti&

cases as examples militating a g a k t the proposition that the
bureaucracy sees itseif primarily as facilitation onented Such cases, however, need not be viewed as
disproving. Of the ten objectives listed in S. 3 of the Act, eight are essentially directed to facilitation while
only three have a predominant control orientation. The public, on the other hand, appears to have a much
more mixed understanding of the purposes of the Act, as reflected in opinion polls and the media. Some of
this is doubtless attn'butable to lack of familiarity with the Act and media influence which tends to dwell on
sensational cases that represent the extrema of what immigration is really about.
At leas&it does so in the case of those whose prirnary job fimction is to process immigrant applications.
There is, however, an interesting dichotomy in philosophy that seems to obtain within différent branches of
CIC. Port of Enûy officers, for example, appear to be more affected by a control orientation than are visa
officers situated abroad, engaged primarily in seletion. Drning my four year tenure as Deputy Immigration
Program Manager at the Canaâian Consulate G e n d in Seattle, Washington, the tension between these
two outlooks was a constant source of frustration, since the fdout h m control decisions at nearby border
crossing points invariably wound up at the Consuiate for ultimate resolutiou. In many cases, a ciifference
in philosophy between the POE and the Condate was apparent. The problem was not simply a
POE/Consulate one, however, for a more or l e s rigid control orientation could also be seen between

such that discretion may harden over time into des, which become a shield to deflect

criticism. The bureaumat may tend to act more bureaucraticdy in order to avoid
responsibiiity for difficult decisions that are seen as ris@.
The real question, of course, is how to keep discretion dive in order to avoid
bureaucratization. Obviously, fimctionaries within the system must be empowered to feel
that they have authority to mold the discretionary d e s . Likewise, they need to have time
and be rewarded for taking the effort to ameliorate and individualize the d e s , rather than

blindly adhering to and applying them. There must also be a sense of institutional
support for such efforts. An undue focus on productivity and fiscal concerns will
inevitably displace independent action in favour of rote, high volume routine, which

gives litde quater to discretion. In a situation of restructuruig and re-engineering, the
answer does lie, at least in part, by reducing work burdens that add no value. In this way,
resources may be &eed up to devote to the minority of cases where value is added by
intensive, individualizedjudgmeat. So too, since discretion is a habit best acquired fkom
experience and practice, shifting discretion to specialized centres focused on particdar
aspects of discretion rnay offer better use of resources. Officers dealing exclusively with

a waiver decision can hone their skills in that one particular area. Likewise, officers
dealing with discretion only at selection interviews wiîi develop expertise in that
particular situation. Expertise must eventually beget efficiency. Both of these, of course,
are strategies that have been adopted by CIC. The gains f?om such innovations,however,
can be adversely impacted by excessive emphasis on productivity and so CIC needs to

POE's, with k g e r volume POE's tending to be more lenient
See generally Wade, supra note 36 at 360-366 on "ûver-Rigid Poiicies".

remain alive to the necessity for a proper balance between these items. as it continues
restructuring.
2.3.3 Relational Distance

While discretion can be a useful tool for adapting d e s during periods of rapid
social change, yet institutional change may also work to limit the availability. utility or
efficaciousness of discretion. Downsinng and restructuring within CIC has led to
centraiization of resources in high volume fiow centres. Given that client contact is not
part of the nomai operating methodology of such facilities, the availability of
adjudicative discretion is inevitably reduced. This may be both good and bad. A lack of
intimacy between the adjudicator and the subject, while fostering greater objectivity, may
also result in more indifference?

Thus, geographic isolation or physical insulation c m

give rise to a distance that is potentially capable of being both facilitative and restrictive.

Such a separation between decision-maker and applicant is referred to by social scientists
as relational distance. Relational distance, however, goes beyond mere physical
separation. It also implicates an important connection between discretionary decision
making and the social and professional backgrounds of the decision-makers. The social
status of both adjudicator and client are factors that can increase or lessen relational

distance between these parties. The greater the relational distance, the greater the
likelihood that discretion will not be exercised in the applicant's favour, while the
opposite holds tme where the separation is less. The character of both adjudicator and
applicant are thus highly relevant, according to this theory.
MS.Baumgartner, "The Myth of Discretion" in Hawkins, ed,The Uses ofDiscretion, supra note 9,

In respect of the decision-makers, Feldrnan posits that profasionals, Like doctors
and lawyers, hired by bureaucraties tend to behave less bureaucratically than do other
types of w ~ r k e r s .These
~ ~ bureaucrats, rather than shrinking fkom discretion, prefer
instead to engage it actively in carrying out their duties. And, "[wlhen there is a conflict,
professionals tend to value theü professionaljudgment over their bureaucratic duties and
affiliation"."

Beyond professional formation and experience, decision-makers also bring

to their work social backgrounds that may influence how they react in the use of their
power. A person f b m a particular socio-econornic background is more likely to relate
favourably to others with a similar background, since they wiiî feel a greater personal
connection? In a system dealing with immigrants, a practical effect of this influence is
that one could expect immigration officers with some recent immigrant experience in
their family or close circle to be more generally predisposed towards immigrants.
Another aspect of the concept of relational distance relates to the social statw of
both decision-maker and applicant. In particular, social scientists describe a connection
between high status and case outcomes. As Baumgartner states, "[wlealth and
prominence have a consistent and pattemed effect on official decision-making.. .."" She
assets that a higher status official will generally tend to be more authoritative in their
decision-making than is a lower status official. On the bais of her studies of legal
personnel, Baumgartner concludes that if perrnitted to exercise fkee choice, they will

129 at 131.

Feldman, supra note 4 IO at 166- 167.
Id. The obvious implication seerns to be that w h m more discrrtiomy decision-making is desimi, then
a more highly educated staff is necessary, Convmely, a less skilled work force would seem to lead to a
less discretionary environment.
Baumgartner, supra note 448 at f 52.
'= Id. at142.
450

consistently favour some gmups of people over others for reasons that are not strictly
related to the dictates of the law. For example, she observes that black judges are less
Iikely to convict than are white judges and that better educatedjuries tend to convict more

The upshot is that legal personnel are
ofien than their less weil-educated counte~parts.~
not so interchangeable as legal ideology might claim, or at Ieast desire? Rather, those
personnel tend to respond in ways that are consistent with their social background,
culturai identity and other f i e n c e s .

Moreover, since moral evaluation is implicated in decision-making, the makeup
of the applicants themselves is an important source of influence on any discretionary
decision-making. In the case of immigration, the importance of this notion is not to be
underestimated. In marginal cases, at any rate, where a positive application of discretion
may be necessary to overcome an impediment, it suggests that a high status applicant is
more Iikely to receive the benefit of any doubt. However, it does not stop at the notion
that some types of applicants may be favoured by some types of decision-makers. It also
means that advocates too wiU tend to work harder for clients considered by them to be

high status? Thus, they may atternpf for example, to obtain special treatment for such
clients like pre-vetting of the application by the intended office of filing, or a conference
with the officer in charge to discuss handling of the case."

Certainly, if sociologists are

correct in ascnbing considerable importance to social standing of an applicant as an
Id. at 155.
Id- at 156.
45S It is not uncoxnmon, for example, to receive representations on a case wherein the statement is thrown
out that "these are good people." The apparent implication is that the applicants are high status and hence
desirable.
Such mdividualized taaiment is prohibited by CïC. See CIC OM OP98-15PE 98- 13, "Policy and
Instructions on dealing with client representativesw,supra note 376. Howevef, this does not prevent some
4"
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influence on discretionary decision-making, then this is a point not lost on lawyers and
consultants. It may be one reason why they wilI persist in their efforts to make personal
contacts with decision-makers. By doing so, they will hope to gauge the decision-maker

and obtain a sense of what sorts of factors, including social status, may be considered
particularly weighty or relevant to that decision-maker. Although the status of the
applicant is not likely to be the only factor determining how a case will be handled, it
may be a significant one in the mincis of some decision-makers. More familiarity with the
particular decision-maker thus enables advocates to predict more accurately the sorts of
decisions that might be expected.

The notion of client status and respectability has other interesting implications.

The importance of paper-screening is such that the client must have their best foot
forward if they are not only to clear this important hurdle, but also to gain a waiver of
interview. And good advocates know that the applicant's "respectability" may mean the
diffaence between smooth sailing, a rough ride or no ride at dl. Regrettably, therefore,
in the current environment, it seems there must inevitably occur some favouitisrn for
clients with sufncient resources or wherewithal to seek out a professional to ensure the
job of presentation is done right. It is not just a case of application preparation expertise

that is being purchased though. Immigration middlemen also make it their job to discem
patterns of acceptance and rejection, so that they may offer advice to clients as to where
best to file their applications.
Certainly, it is this which underlies the entire matter of f o m shopping, a well-

m e r s fiom attempting to seek it out nonetheles.

known phenornenon in immigration case pro~essing.~
Forum shopping goes on because
no geographical restrictions are imposed under Canadian immigration law to iimit where

applicants might apply. Since applicants are not obiiged to submit their applications to
the visa office serving their country of origh, they are fkee to apply wherever they
choose. for whatever reasom suit them. While the legislative condition which gives rise
to forum shopping is easily dehed, the reasons why it goes on are more cornplex. Those

reasons may be illegitimate, such as a criminal hoping to slip through undetected at a visa
post where his notoriety is not k n ~ w n Or.
. ~ they may be more banai, relating to the fact

457 See for example, Pauktte Peirol, ''Rules for business immigrants pamed - Bid to fut h u d by urging
entrepreneur applicants to appfy in home nations c d e d bad for econorny" ne fï'oronto) Globe and Mail
(12 March 1997) A6, discussing a meeting between CIC officiais and a CBA delegation, At that meeting,
CIC urged that business immigrants and skilied workers apply for immigration at the post serving their
home country. CIC hopes to reduce the risk of criminaIs gaining entry to Canada by discouraging f o m
shopping amongst certain categorieç of applicants. The idea was not well received by the CBA, as
evidenced by the following:
Catherine Ann Sas, a Vancouver lawyer who was at the meeting, said the association agrees in
principle that applicants shodd apply fiom theu home corntries - but oniy when there is a level,
and predictable, playing field in terms of processing times. 'It's not fair to have sorne clients wait
two years and others only four months." She and 0 t h Iawyers readily admit to "visa shopping,"
or hmting for relativefy hassle-free and efficient foreign missions to process their clients'
applications. And that will iikely continue util the processing backlogs are cleared, they Say.
Visa offices in cities such as Los Angeles, BufT'o, SeattIe, London, Manila and Damsacus, for
example, are known to process applications far more quickly than those in Beijing, New Delhi and
Belgrade. ""Ifyour home country is slow, you have no choice, no recourse. And this, I find
o f f a i v e to people in China and India, where volumes are high and resources are d o m " Ms.Sas
said "If you have ail posts operating on the same level, with a six-to- 12 month waiting period,
then you won't see people shopping aromd," she addeci
It is difncult to deny that ifdoffices offered the same processing speed, much fonim shopping wodd
likely be ended On the subject of processing delays, however, it is interesthg to note that one person's
problem may be another's opportunity. For example, pnor to the take over of Hong Kong by China on
Jdy 1, f 997, the demand for immigration out of Hong Kong was tremendous. AAer the take over,
however, and the calming of many fears as to the likely implications of mainiand Chinese d e for Hong
Kong residents, that dema~dhas now ebbed Interestingly, as weU, while speed of processing is often cited
as the justification for fonun shopping, it is not always speed that is sought. in the case of Hong Kong
residents, theù case nles were to be found scattered amongst ahost a l l visa p s t s worldwide. In sorne
cases, their interest was sometimes not in fast processing, but rather lengthy processing. With one eye on
the take over date, their prefmnce seans to have been just to have a case in the queue, as a sort of
insurance policy. Accordmgly, such applicants were williog to wait as long as possible to get a final
decision. Missed int-ews
were common. If pressured under threat of refusal to attend at a rescheduled
date, a request for the nle to be transferred to another office was often the remit.
This problem is a signincant one and causes much embarrassment for the department. For a couple of

that one post may be more convenient because of good transportation linlcs or because it
holds the promise of faster case processing. More saliently for the present discussion,
however, it may also occur because of a perception that a particuiar office may, for any
number of reasons, including status or respectability of particular types of clients, be

more willing to engage discretion than another.
Whatever the reasons, the o p p o d t y for forum shopping afTords a significant
opportunity for outside actors to exert influence on the workings of the system.
Schneider refers to this as "publicly enforced private government"?

It is most effective

on those parts of the system which are least affécted by rigid d e s and allow for
discretionary decision making. During recent reorganktion, there was a period where
CIC actively studied its physical resources in order to determine which offices could be
reduced or eliminated and which could be enlargeci by centralization of labour and capital
assets. While the potential cuts were under consideration, some advocates handling large
volumes of cases saw an opportunity to maximize the potential success for their cases.
Carefid always to mind the h e between legitimate advocacy and conduct unbecoming,
they would inquire about specifics of individual office decision-making in an effort to
ascertain whether the particular office was more or less disposed to be large and liberal in
examples, see " h g suspect let into Canada", supra note 1 15, and "AIieged triad leader's entry traced to
bid to save jobs", supra note 364. Though cases of hi& profle criminafs entering Canada on visas issued
directiy to them are comparatively few in number, they always attract much adverse media attention,
Invariably, such entries are traced to forum shopping and îhe actor haWig taken advantage of an
unsuspecthg immigration post, far removed h m their country of ongin- For this reason, CIC has issued a
policy directive making mandatory the necessity of record checks for non-resident applications. Any
mission receiving an application fiom a person not n o d y tesident in the territory of the mission is
required to conduct a record check with the mission responsibIe for the applicant's usual place of
residency. See CIC "AU Mission Message OFB197" 25 August 1995.
This problem has also prompted the depariment to recently designate 9 "Busineçs Immigrant Centres".
See CIC News ReIease 98-27,supra note 404.
459 Schneider,supra note 2 18 at 56.

-

its interpretation of the Act and Regulations and in the use of discretion?

Given the

nature of the bureaucratic tendency to empire building, the lawyers were sensitive to the
pressures upon individual office managers at that period, when office cuts were under
contemplation, to justify the existence of their operations. As a result, they were not
loath to dangle the expectation of an increased file load as a plum in hopes of obtaining a
favourable reaction fiom a beleaguered office?' In the end, CIC appeared to make office
closures based upon rationalkations focused more on overall geographic sense, and less
on work voIumes in particular offices.
Relational distance may be a phenomenon that is reaching its fullest potential in
the 1990's. As is apparent h m CIC's example, it has been seized upon as a way to
hcrease productivity and reduce costs through reduction of personal interaction with
cIients. However, it is not a phenomenon limiteci to immigration law. It is, in fact, a
trend that now affects many industries. Advances in the potential of electronic
communication and advent of the Intemet have made much of this possible. From email
to Internet shopping, the need for direct human contact has been reduced across many
facets of life today."

As the capability of alternative methods of communication and

interaction has grown, so too has acceptance of impersonal transactions, even from
For a brief discussion of some of the ethical issues faced by lawyers in advising theîr clients about
which visa office to £ïie with, see Cecii L. Rotenberg, Q.C.and Robert J. Moorhouse, "A Practice Note:
Ethics and Muencing Your Client's Choice of V i a Offices" (1995) 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 271.
' 1am unaware of any agreements of any kind king formed between consultants and an office of CIC.
Nonetheless, this does not obviate the fact that there was method behind the madness displayed by such
consultants in their efforts to ferret out which offices they hoped might be more rlisposed to a large and
l f b d approach to selection, and the use of discretion in particuiar, as a means to draw clientele to justïfjr
the continued existence of the office.
a See for example, ''The Virtuai Bankei' The floronto] Ghbe and Mail Repon on Business Magazine
(March, 1998) 106, detailing the experience of the Vancouver-based Citizens Bank of Canada, which
maintains no physical retail branches and which operates entirely via telephone, fax and the internet,
According to Lin& Crornpton, the banlr's managa, their clientele are unconcmed about the lack of

institutions that were once seen as intensely personal, such as goverment, It is not
therefore a case of "pining for the good old days". Rather, the importance of relational
distance is to recognize its impacts and to be aware of its drawbacks. In this way, its

benefits may be fùlly realized and its shortcomings rninimized.
2.3.4

Foms of Decision-Making

Social scientists offer a couple of competing theories to explain the forms that
decision-making can take. The first is rationul decision theov which is premised upon
the view that decisions are purposive choices made by informed, disinterested, and
calculating actors working with a clear set of individual or orgatzizational goals.a The
central focus of this theory is oniy on the end producf with the result that any lack of
unifonnity in outcomes is eschewed. This is, of course, the decision-making
methodology prefmed in legal and judicial circles, where consistency is an important
goal. The major criticism of this theoretical method is that it fails to account for the fact

that decision-makers may not always be entirely disinterested in the outcomes of the
cases before them. For example, it rnight happen that immigration officers, as members

of the communities to which intendhg immigrants are destineci, may be consciously or
unconsciously infiuenced by their own perceptions as to what qualities in an immigrant
might be most suitable to facilitate adaptation to a particular c o m m ~ n i t y . In
~ the
Independent category particularly, the use of a "personai suitability factor" in the
selection process seems designed to prornote consideration of what might be termed
personal contact that v i d banking irnplies, especially because of the convenience that it offers.
See generalfy Hawkins, supra note 412 at 20-24.
O f course, leaving aside for the moment the question as to whether such a consideration is at ail

4%ommuflltystandards" and other unenumerateci criteria Likewise, as in most areas of
decision-making, immigration decision-makers may be faced with goals that are not
aiways fkee of conflict. Thus, while an officer mîght have a production target to meet for

immigrant decisions, it may be such that he or she is struggkg to meet it. The result is
that only b4clean"cases are finaiized, while "problem" cases, involving greater effort, are
left aside. Ciearly, the officer in such a situation is not entuely disinteresteci or
dispassionate as to which cases might be approved and which are refbsed or simply never
resolved.

The Nahrralkt Perspective, on the other hand, has notions of context and meaning
central to it. It prefers to focus on the processes of decision-mag. It has shown, in an

extemal sense, how an appreciation of context and pattern is valuabte in extending the
focus beyond the individual case and in an intenor sense by exploring the significance of
meaning to individual legd actors who must choose. It draws attention to the need of an
individual or organization for survivd. People not only follow d e s , they make d e s ,
noms, and patterns of expected behaviour. Rational decision theory says that decisions
are a result of conscious planning for particular outcomes, whiie naturalisrn says these
decisions and actions are not the result of choice or conscious planning. Naturalism, as a
more holistic approach, emphasizes that decision m a h g is a collective pro ces^.^^
Neither theory is entirely persuasive since, as we have seen throughout this study
of sociologicai methods, the decision making process is infinitely complex and it is
difficult to Say with any certaintyjust how influentid particular factors may be in a given

legitimate.
a Hawkins, supra note 4 12 at 26.

case. A factor considered important in one case rnay prove to be negligible in another.
This may be so because of 0 t h surrounding details, or it rnay be so because one
decision-rnaker rnay not be as troubled by it as another. Indeed, Feldman points out that

an obvious criticism of the sociological approach must be the lack of weight it accords to
the notion of individual choice? Though it is realistic, and doubtless necessary, to take
cognizance of the mdtitude of social and organizational factors which rnay constrain and
tame the supposed Eee-wheeling nature of discretion, yet that nature should not be
altogether overlooked. Examples of decisions that appear to go against the conventional
tide occur fkequently. And though these rnay well be just exceptions to the d e , yet they
do exist.
Sociologists might explain these as the resuit of a deviant decision-maker who
either feels suniciently empowered to nsk stepping out of the realrn of the expected or is
simply so ostracized as to feel no identification with the social forces in play dl around

her. Another view might be to suggest that these decisions are actually the result of
justice in action - that discretionary decisions are being made against the d e s precisely
because the d e s are unjust. Whatever the case, it seems prudent to admit that individual
choice remains a wild-card in the sociologicai deck. Likewise, another criticism must be
the limited weight that sociology extends to legal d e s a s a factor influencing the use of
discretionary power?' For sociologists, the emphasis is on informal d e s . Yet, it must
be conceded that legal d e s still have an important and influentid d e , though it rnay not

David FelRrnan_ supra note 183 at 289.
Set for example Hawkins,supra note 412 at 13 who, in summarising the view of sociologists
conceming the niles that may effect the exercise of discretion, posits that "[tlhese d e s , however, tend not
to be legal, but social and organi7ntiona.iin character."

be quite as strong as traditionai jurisp~dentsmay have thought, or even desired. At a

minimum, it is likeIy that legal d e s retain an influence at least as great as that of more
iaformal des.
Sociology teiis us that discretionary decision-making is an enterprise that is both
intensely personal and yet also inevitably collective. Each decision-maker is unique in
thek outlook and in the personal influences that shape their worldview. However, each
also is part of a larger whole and it is a whole which c m exert considerable pressure in a
particular direction, especially where legal d e s exist to guide judgment. At best,
therefore, it may be safe to Say simply that it is likely a mixture of al1 these intemal and
extemal forces that go into any decision. Notwithstanding this, however, there is stiil

cogency in social scientists' assertion that discretion does not necessaily result in

arbitrariness or capriciousness. Thus, we r e m to their observation that what may appear
irrational is actually the predictable result of these intemal and extemal forces which
work to foster regularity. It is simply, therefore, a matter of recognizing and collating the
forces. If this is done, then the end result typically wil1 produce few surprises.

-

CHAPTER 3 The Limits of Discretion
3.1

Introduction
The amount of discretion available to any administrative tribunal is a factor of the

constituent Legislation establishuig the tribunal. Even then, however, the ambit of such
discretion is directly controlied by any review panel which oversees its operations. In the
case of Independent immigrant selection, that review panel is the Triai Division of the

Federai Court. In this chapter the handling of discretion within overseas Independent
immigrant selection processes by the courts is examhed and the impact that individual
decisions have had on the availability of discretion, in both a procedural and a substantive
sense, is traced. In this post-Charter era, with its emphasis on individual rights, 1argue
that the courts' attention has been focused primarily on safeguarding applicant rights,
with the resdt that administrative discretion has been significantly circumscribed. This is

so, both in the application of substantive discretion to individual cases and in the
procedural discretion available to administrators for formulating new ways and methods
of dealing more expeditiously with case processing. On the substantive side, for
example, it is seen in the approach that the courts have adopted with respect to the
selection criteria, which have been taken as fuced, specific and comprehensive measures

for qualification, rather than as a generai framework withh which selection is conducted.

Similarly, on the procedural side, the courts have exhibiteci intolerance for procedural
innovations perceived as impinging in some way upon the right of an applicant to a fidi

and fair hearing.

It is in fact a more positivist approach which the courts have followed. This
approach has involved scant attention to the difficulties o f the legislative drafter' the
larger public policy underlying Independent selection and the pressures and constraints

facing administrators in maintaining an overseas selection network that is both fair to
applicants and to the public interest. The practical consequemes court decisions have had
on development and application of the Independent immigrant selection systern are
examined in a number of examples aven in this chapter. 1 conclude consideration of the
courts' handfing of discretion by offiring some suggestions as to the balance that should
be sought in Independent immigrant selection matters and how it might be better effected.
Since this chapter is about the limits of discretion, 1 also examine some of the extrajudicial sources of influence that are engaged to contain o r manipulate it. That discussion
includes some analysis as to how such influences work in the selection system and
opinions as to their efficacy.

3.2

Judicial Review

In Canadian immigration law, the domain of discretionary power is found at the
interstices between the formal law and d e s encapsulated in statutes and regulations and
the policy guidance set out in Immigration Department manuals and Operations
Mernoranda. The central purpose of CIC policy formulations is to provide interpretative
guidance as to how discretionary power shodd be wielded to fil1 in blanks le& in the

written law. However, even in the presence of detailed guidance, the proper exercise of
discretionary power is hardly uncontroversial. Regardless of how specific and
comprehensive they may purport to be, even the guideluies themselves will require some

interpretation and judgrnent in their application. Moreover, a determination of the proper
use of the guidelines is inevitably coloured by the philosophical approach of the person or
agency considering their application in individual instances. In practice, the two groups
most intimately involved with the workings of the immigration system - Iawyen and
consultants, on one side, and the bureaucracy on the other - bring broadly disparate views
to the interpretation of guidehm and actuai usage of discretion. Those views can be
roughly divided between the positivist d e of law appmach and the broader view of
administrative action espoused by the hctionalist camp. Positioned between these two
groups is the judiciary, whose role it is to keep discretionary power and nile of law ideals

in an optimum balance?
O w "rule of Iaw" system, of course, does not permit discretion to exist without
limits upon its use. The legd limits are prescnbed by what are called variously as '%ad

faith"¶"excess of jurisdiction", "dishonesty", "failure to exercise jwisdiction" or
"irrelevant considerations"?

Since the nile of Iaw mandates that regular courts should

exercise an oversight function in respect of administrative tribunals, the boundaries of
these legal limits have in fact Iargely been a judicial creation. The common law practice
of stare decisis has seen the Limits expounded and expanded, in an inmemental fashion,
over the course of many case decisions?

Such an inmemental approach, of course,

-H.w. Arthurs, however, would simpüfy this description even fiitther by assertmg h t there are r e d y
only two oppasing views, those harboured by adminimative tri'bunals and the opposite view held by
members of the judiciary and the bar. The bar and bench, in his view, being drawn fiom the same
intellectuai pooi, are unifonn in their suspicions against anministrative power and processes and their
devotion to judicial review as the uitimate and best fonn of protection f?om anministrative excesses. See
generaily H.W.Arthurs, "Protection aganist Judicial Revied', supra note 62 at 277.
4~ For fiiller discussion of the content of these concepts withia the context of immigration law and practice?
see below, section Review: A Bifiucated Approach.
See for example, Grey,supro note 1. Writing m 1979, he observed that a period of expansion of

means that the matter of limits is conticually in a state of some flux and contingent, to

some extent, upon all of the circumstances of a given case."' Despite this, the general
principles which guide the courts' review of discretionary power are reasonably clear and
can be stated with some precision.
The principle concem on judicial review is fmt and foremost on the propriety of
the process that was utilized by a tribunal. Because of the focus on process, the exercise

ofjudicial review is most centrally a study of procedural rights and whether they were

properly observeci? In the mythology of bench and bar, the administrativeprocess is
sometimes portrayed as a stniggle of classic proportions, pitting the collective and
massive might of the government, in the guise of its administrative machinery, on the one
hand, against the lone individual, yeaming for justice, on the other?

Certainly, a

cornparison of the apparently unlimited resources ofthe goveniment, on the one hanci,
and the usually restricted means of the affected private party, on the other, reinforces the

view by some that judicial review is an inherentIy unequal struggle, with individuals at a
disadvantage.
Although this somewhat melodramatically overstates the case, it is not farfetched

judicial control of administrative discretion was then underway. A lot of water has passed under the bridge
since then and the case is perhaps more strongly made today that, at least in immigration rnatters, there is
ample evidence of a judiciai trend towards greater control of discretionary power. See generaiiy
CHAPTER 3 - The Limits of Discretion, below, for more on this.
"' See for example Grey,ibid. at 132, who posited that the trend to expansion of review of discretion was
justined by a corresponding expansion of government and inherent increased potentid for abuse.
4rr See generally Evans, supra note 2 at 36 to 44.
4nSee for exaniple, HJ. M o r d , "Appeah Against Admhkmtive Decisions: 1, The Function of Judicial
Review" (1962) 5 Can. Pub. Admin. 46. Although this article was h t t e n some time ago, it semes to
remind how deeply the roots of mistnist of adminimative power go. Lawford, at 47, provides the
foiiowing example:
Speaking to the Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference in ûttawa in September, 1960,
Donald McInnes of Halifax, President of the Canadian Bar Association, urged lawyers to preserve
the rights of individu& '%om the hand of ruthless and untrained administrative bodies".

to Say that there continues to be a certain amount of mistrust of administrative tribunals
amongst the judiciary and the bar. The trend in recent h a to atford greater procedural
protections to individuals caught in the web of administrative law is a clear manifestation
Procedural rights are the counterbaiance that offsets
of such continuing misgi~ings.~~

administrative power and contains discretion. The role of the courts in reviewing
administrative action is therefore both a study of the scope of procedural rights and the

limits they impose on discretionary power.
3.2.1

Jurisdiction

Courts have long asserted an inherent jurisdiction to supervise the business of
govemmental actionOmHowever, in eariier times, this jurisdiction was marked by a
pronounced teluctance to second-guess administrative outcornes. There has been a
reversal of this attitude in more recent decades, with courts now exhibiting expanded
interest and zeal for reining in executive discretion. They have been particdarly
disdainfil of any declared zone of exclusivity for discretionary power, brushing aside
even privative clauses476in enabling legislation to get at the workings of the
administrative world?

Although, at one t h e , it was thought that some discretionary

powers accorded by statute were simply unreviewable, that line of thinking is clearly no
474 See Evans, supra note 2 at 41-42, who notes that the 'Yaimess" doctrine has resuited in an expansion of
procedural rights during the last 15 years.
47s Wade, supm note 36, at 284, notes that "[tlhe courts of law have inherentjurisdiction, as a matter of
common iaw,to prevent administrative authorities tiom exceeding their powers or neglecting their duties."
See aiso Evans, id. at 24, discussing courts*inherentjurisdiction to conductjudiciai review.
476 That is, clauses which purport to deprive courts ofjurisdiction to review administrative actions.
Canadian immigration legislation does not contain any such clauses.
.
"See for example Arthurs, "RethinlOng Admmistrative Law",supra note 30 at 7, who states that privative
clauses are disregarded "...as a matter of presumption, interpretation, public poiicy, or constitutionai
pn'mciple". See also Jones and d e V i , supra note 86 at 121-122, and Evans, supra note 2 g e n e d y at
*

longer in vogue?

As de Smith observa, "...no statutory power is any longer inherently

unrevie~able."~
Even an 'Wettered", ''sole" or ''pure" discretionary authority may be
subject to review for legality in its exercise?

Quite simply, the presence of a privative

clause or use of expansive words, like "udettered", will not prevent a court nom doing
justice where it sees fit?
Though unreviewability is no longer a part of our law, this is not to suggest that

aU discretions are created equal. As was noted earlie-,

there is a range of deference

shown by the courts to discretionary power, depending upon who wields that power, the
nature of the considerations which are relevant to its exercise and whether it is a "pure" or
more narrow discretion. Minista's discretion is, of course, notable by the reluctance
courts evince to intdering with its exercise. But reluctance will nonetheless give way to
justice and good conscience if illegality, improper motives or illegitimate purposes are
implicated in its use. Thus, while greater latitude may be allowed to some discretions,
none are ever completely beyond the pale of judicial oversight?

813-965.
See Grey "Discretion in Administtative Law", supra note 1 at 127 where he says, "The final conclusion
on unreviewability must be that it is no part of our law. Some discretions (e.g., wartime or prerogative
ones) are stronger (in Dworkin's sense) than others, but ail are subject to review at some point."
De Smith,supm note 190 at 311.
De Smith,id citing PadfieZd v. MUiirter of Agriculture Fishenenes
and Food [1968] A.C. 997 at 1060,
where Lord Upjohn remarked:
[Tlhe use of that adjective [unfettered], even m an Act of Parliament, can do nothing to unfetter
the control which the judiciary have over the executive, namely, that in exercising their powers
the latter must act IawfiiUy and that is a matter to be determinecl by looking at the Act and its
scope and object in C O ~ ~ I aMdiscretion
~
upon the Minister rather than by tfie use of the
adjectives."
See for example, J. Grey, "Discretion in Admhktrative Law", Npra note 1 at 108, footnote 8, who
notes that he attempted vainly to find an example in public law of such bad faith or dishonesty which the
courts declined to rectifl because of what he cailed "unnviewable discretion".
..
au See genefauy above, section 1.5.3
Muusterialand Delegated Discretion
un Evans,supra note 2 at 1021-1022, who observes that there are no "iinlimited public powers" in the
Canadian legai system and so ". ..it is an essential fûnction of the courts to detennine what those limits are,
by reference to the terms of the enabling statute, common law principles and the Cbmtitution Ac&, 1867-

This is the bedrock principle upon which justification for judicial review of
discretion is founded. The case of Roncareili v. Duplesse contiiins a now famous
enunciation of this fact by the Supreme Court of Canada The outemost permissible
limits of discretion are apparent in the dictn of Rand J., who observed:
A decision to deny or cancel such a priviIegea lies within the "discretion"
of the Commission; but that means that decision is to be based upon a weighing of
considerations pertinent to the object of the administration.
In public regdation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute and
untrammelled (sic) "discretion," that is that action can be taken on any ground or
for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator, no
legislative Act can, without express language, be taken to contemplate an
u n k t e d arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however capncious or
irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute. Fraud and corruption
in the Commission may not be mentioned in such statutes but they are always
implied as exceptions. 'Discretion" necessarily implies good faith in discharging
public duty; there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to
operate; any clear depamire h m its lines or objects is just as objectionable as
h u d or corruption. Couid an applicant be refùsed a permit because he had been
born in another province, or because of the colour of his kir? The ordinary
language of the legislahire cannot be so d i ~ t o r t e d . ~
It is clear then that, at a minimum,every official exercising discretionary power

must use it o d y to carry out the purposes for which it was granted. Motives or reasons

not foundeâ in the legislation are an abuse of the discretion and illegitimate. According
to Wade, this d e is derived fiom several central constitutional doctrines; the nile of law,
the sovereignty of Parliament and the power of the independentjudiciary. AU of these
corne together to spawn the doctrine of ultra

the principle avenue through which

most judicial interventions occur. "This doctrine merely states that public authorities

1982."
a [1959] S.C.R. 121,16 DLJL (2d) 689.
In th3 case, a restaurant iipuor iicense.
Supra note 484, S.CK f 21 at 140.
Wade, supra note 36 at 8.

"

must act within powers given to them by Act of Pa~liament."~In practice, then, the
courts are concemed upon review to ensure that the tribunal under scrutiny has observed
and stayed within the '~urisdiction"of the powers delegated by statute.
IUnsdiction is typicdy explaineci in administrative law by parsing it into two
distinct senses; a broad sense, referring to authority for conduct of al1 matters that are

necessary and proper to carrying out the Iegislated activity, and a narrow sense, relating
to authority to undertake the paticular activity at dl." Within the broad sense,
jurisdiction is implicated in such matters as whether irrelevant considerations were taken
account of in the decision-making process, whether the requisite level of faimess was
adhered to and whether the decision-maker acted under direction or other improper
motives. The narrow sense focuses on whether the decision-maker had authonty ab initio

to take any action, such as rendering a decision, respecting the matter in question. In
either event, a decision which does not appear to be in accordance with the intentions of

Parliament will be struck d o ~ n Where
. ~ ~ the statute provides no appeal, courts rely upon
the doctrine of ultra vires to invoke their jurisdiction. This is so since the notion of
govemment under law implies a presumption not only that discretionary powers should
be limited in scope, but also that the agency in question should not have fiee reign to
determine the extent of its own jurisdiction."'

Since judicial review has ostensibly evolved as a singular focus oversight

mechanisru, courts profess Little interest in the "merits7' of administrative decisions and,

Ibid.

"Jones and deViüars, supra note 86 at 120.
'90
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Wade, supra note 36 at 9.
Evans,supra note 2 at 1023.

instead, confine their role to procedurai enforcement? The distinction between merits

and procedure is especially important, since it controls the nature of the hquiry that
occurs upon judicial review. Couris are concemed only with statutory interpretation and
administrative processes, and not with actual outcomes. Since only decisions spawned by
defective processes may be faulted, it means that even good decisions will f d before bad
processes. Conversely, good processes may serve to protect bad decisions.

There are, of course, limits to the doctrine of judicial disinterest in substantive
decisions and outcomes. Those limits are found in the "rule of reasonableness" that
overlays d l of administrative law, and which "...cari be used to control the substance of

an administrative decision.. .."4n Just as a misapprehension as to the scope of its
authority will cause an administrative tribunal to render a reversible erroP, so too will
some types of emors that go as much, or more, to substance than procedure. Often
referred to as an "abuse of discretion", these types of errors are a sub-species of
jurisdictional error found in administrative outcomes sometirnes characterized as
"patently unreasonable7'. They arise when a tribiuial is found to be "...acting in bad faith,
basing the decision on extraneous matters, failing to take relevant factors into account,
[or] breaching the principles of natural justice.. ..''495 A patently unreasonable emor is to
If it were otherwise, the d t wouid be to tum the judiciary into a L'supere~ecutive"
which JuIius Grey
says, in "Discretion in Administrative Law", mpra note 1 at 132, "...wouid probably be adminiatrativeIy
unmanageable, as weii as constitutionally undesirable."
Wade, mpra note 36 at 1O.
This type of mor is c d e d a L'jurisdictionalmoi'. It was d e s m i in Syndicat des Employer de
production du Quebec et de 1 'Acadiev- Gmada Lubour Relations Board [1984] 2 S.CK 412 at 420-42 1
(S.C.C.),per Beetz J. thusly: "A jurisdictional errer results generaiiy in an excess of jurisdiction or a
refusal to exercisejurisdiction, whether at the start of the hearing, during it, in the findings or in the order
disposing of the matter. Such an mor, even ifcommitied in the best possible good faith, wiil result
nonetheless in the decision containhg it king set aside."
495 International Union, Local No. 333 v. Nipmvn Distn'ct StaflNurses Association [1975] 1 S . C E 382 at
389, per Dickson I. (as he then was).
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be distinguished h m a "mere error of law", which is one "...cornmittecl by an
administrative tribimal in good faith in interpreting or applying a provision of its enabhg
Act, or of an agreement or other document which it has to interpret and apply within the
lirnits of its jurisdi~tion."~~
It is an essential part of administrative law d o p a , therefore,

that tribunais have a right to be wrong, but only so long as they have properly observed

their jurisdiction, and acted fairiy and faithfully in doing so? Thus, the notion of
judicial review as a limited exercise, focused only on process and procedural rightP, is
tempered somewhat by the broadness of the concept of jurisdiction. Certainly, it is
jwisdiction which &or&

opportunities for courts to involve themselves in the merits of

individual decisions, if they are inched to overtum sarne.

3.2.2 Procedural Review and the Duty of Faimess
Procedurai rights belonging to applicants translate into procedural duties owed by
the administrative tribunal. These rights and duties are captured in the terni 'haturd
justice", which is a common Iaw creation for describing process obligations?

It is

essentially a shorthand phrase concerning the entitlement of an applicant to a decision by

an impartial decision-maker, afkr a f a .hearing. It is also known as the doctrine of audi

Syndicat des Employer: supra note 494 at 420.
However, jurisdiction is a broad concept which aiiows for considerable scope on any review. in the
opinion of Robert F. Reid, Wot Buttons: An Overview of Recent Developments in Admklmtive Law", in
Philip Anisnian, & Robert F, Reid, eds., Admintktrutive L4W Issues and Practice (Scarborough, Ont.:
Carsweli, 1995) 1 at 5, administrative law is essentidy comprised of subjective principles which are held
out as objective. The concept of jurisdiction is part of this charade, in his view. The practicai implication
of this is that juridiction may be so broadly constnied as to include review for rnatters touching upon the
merits of an appiication, even though, in theory, this should not be the case.
4m See generally Evans, supra note 2 at 36 to 44.
499 Wade, supra note 36 at 10. See a h de Smith, supra note 190 at 377-379.
%
'
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altemm partem ("hear the other ide")^, which stipulates that no one shodd be
'kondemned unheard?

As the range of actors, agencies and circumstaflces in which

duties are owed has expanded, so too has the range of duties. The result is that the tenu

"naturdjustice" has been largely supplanteci today by the more expansive term, "duty to
act fairIf'.*

~ as the
Upon judicial review, the notion of a "duty of f a i ~ n e s sis' ~used

essential yardstick for measuring the fimess of a particular decision. The concept of a

duty of faimess was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Nicholson v.
Haldimand-NorfoIk Regional Board of Commissioners of PolicP as applying to al1
administrative tribunals, regardless of their fiinction. A duty to act fairly, however, is not
the same as a duty to act judicially. Thus, an immigration officer is obliged to act fakIy,

but not necessarily to act like a judge?
Since the duty of faimess is ostensibly a gauge for procedural matters only, it is
not to be applied to the merits of a particuiar decision. There is always, however, a large
question to be answered as to how much courts rnay be influenceci by a bad decision in
fincihg that a bad procedure was u s d m It is not one that admits of an easy answer,

is h d y a static, fixed measure. As Dickson J.
p d c d a r l y since the "duty of fairnessS7

Evans, supra note 2 at 41.
Black S Lav Dictionury, 9'
e é (St Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1979) at 120.
Evans, supra note 2 at 36. The authors note though, that both 'batural justice" and "duty of faimess"
create some confiision since they suggest substantive, as weU as procedural rights.
This principle is known by various other names, such as natuml justice, procedural fairness and so on.
p9793 1 S.C.R. 3 11 (S.C.C.).
S. A. de Smith, Judicial Revïew of Administrative Action, 3d ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1973) at
208-209, as cited in Nicholson, id. at 324-325, per Laskin J. (as he then was) (speaking for the rnajority).
This is a question which is pertinent ais0 b the notion of unreasonabIeness. Set for example, Evans,
supra note 2 at 105 1, who writes: "It may oflen k very tempting for a reviewing court to accede to an
argument that an agency has abused its discretion because it has aîtached too much or too litde weight to an
admittedly relevant factor. However, determining the weight to be given to compcting considerations is at
the very heart of discretion, and courts should n o d y be reluctant to invalidate an exercise of discretion
as based upon an "unreasonable**weighing of the relevant considerations."

"

(as he then was) pointed out in the MartineazF decision, "[tlhe content of the principles
of naturai justice and fainiess in application to the individuai cases wiil Vary according to
the circumstanca of each case.. .." Thus, the extent to which a discretionary power will
be reviewable depends, in every case, upon al1 of the circumstances. As noted earlier, the
existence and strength of any countervailing nghts or duties determine the extent to

which courts will intervene in the exercise of discretionary power. This is true, as well,
for overseas immigrant processing. Depending upon the level of entitlement, courts will
be more or less reluctant to review the exercise of power. The usual remedy is to strike
d o m the impugned decisionm, and order a rehearing upon proper considerations, or to
prohibit any fiuther action, as appropriate.
3.3.3 Review: A Bifurcated Approach

Independent immigrants and visitors have no statutory nght of appeal?
Accorduigly, their only means for obtaining an oversight remedy is to apply in the courts
for judicial re~iew.~lO
If dissatisfied with the decision of a visa officer" l, applicants are
entitled to commence an application for judicial review in the Trial Division of the

Federal Court.s12This is to be contrasted with the case of Family Class applicants who

Martineau v. Mafiqui Imtitution Dbc@lintny Board (No. 2) (1979). 106 D.LK (3d) 385 at 412, [1980]
1 S.CK 602 at 630,50 C.C.C.(2d) 353.

Wade, supra note 36 at 9.
See the Act, S. 770). See &O Brown et al. v. Minister of Employment & Immigration et al. (1988) 3
IimilLA (26)299 (Fed T.D.) where the court confirmed that exclusive jurisdiction for hearing appeais in
f d y class refiisals lies with the M g r a t i o n Appeal Board (now the IAD).
O
'
De Smith, nrpm note 190, at 956, who notes "Where there is no statutory right of appeai, an
immigrant's only remedy isjudicial review."
"'Because of the g e n d statutory scheme requiring immigrants and visiton to Canada to obtain a visa
before presenting themselves at a port of mtry (see the Act, section 9(1)), the decision in dispute wül be
that of a visa officer, rather than of a domestic immigration officer.
Pursuant to section 18(l)(b) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 as am.,S.C. 1992, c. 49, the
triai division of the Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to provide hear applications for relief
509

"'

are entitled to appeal a negative decision to the lmmigtation Appeal Division (MD) of

the RB. The advantages are that IAD appeals are conducted by way of de novo hearing

and equitable relief is available, even where the original decision is detemiined to have
been "correct" in law.Jf3No equitable jurisdiction exists in the courts upon judicial
review and, since review is not a de novo exercise, it is limited to an examination only of

the facts and matiers before the original decision-maker and the process by which the
impugned decision was reached."'

The grounds for judicial review are contained in section 18.1(4) of the Feded
Court Act, which reads as follows:

The Trial Division may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the
feded board, commission or other tribunal
acted without jurisdiction or r e h e d to exercise its jurisdiction;
failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural faimess or other
procedure that it was required by law to observe;
erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error appears
on the face of the record;
based its decision or order on an erroneous hding of fact that it made in a
perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it;
acteà, or failed to act, by reason of h u d or perjured evidence; or
acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
Though courts exercise an inherent supervisory function over administrative

against any decision by a federal board, commission or t n b d .
P r e d l y , the fact that th= is an "affected" Canadian sponsor, whose own rights may be impinged
by the decision, also provides part of the rationale for the unique appeal provisions relating to the family
class. See supra note 509, discussing the IAD family class appeal process that involves a de novo hearing.
Such a hearing, of course, is unavailable to independent immigrants, Note also that the situation of faiIed
refûgee claimants in Canada is somewhat more complicated than might appear at fïrst glace. If subject to
a removal order, for example, they are entitled to appeaI against the propriety of that order to the Appeal
Division of the Immigrationand Refûgee Board, which has solejurisdiction pursuant to section 69.1 of the
Act. For a review of the jurisdiction and powers of the Appeal Division, see generaïïy Bagambiüe, supra
note 151,295-333.
"'Since judiciai review is wt a de novo heariag, for -le,
new evidence, not available to the original
decision d e r , is not ordinarily permitted to be put before the court on j u d i d review-

tribunals5Sthe Federol Court Act makes that jurisdiction explicit by stating that the
Court has authority to review the decisions or orders of any federal board, commission or
other tribunaP6, including those issued by Canadian visa offices located abroad.Jt7
Beyond connrming the impugned decision, the other possible outcomes of a
judicial review are specified in section 18.1(3) of the F e d e d Court Act. which provides:
On an application forjudicial review, the Trial Division may

(a) order a federai board, commission or other tribuai to do any act or h g it has
unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing; or
(b) declare invalid or uniawfùl, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back for
determination in accordance with suchdirectionsas it considers to be appropriate,
prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a federal board,
commission or other t r i b ~ ~ a i . ~ ' ~

The remedies available in Federal Court to effect such outcomes are the so-cailed
prerogative or der^^'^, of which c&orat-i, mandamur and prohibition are the most
commonly used in the overseas context? To access these remedies, overseas applicants
must, of course, file an application for judicial review, in Canada, with the Federal

C o u r P Al1 applicants affected by a decision of a federal tribunal are subject to a thirty
day Limitation period, commencing fkom the time the decision was comrnunicated to

"'See text accompanying note 475, supra.
Federal Court Act. supra note 5 12, l8(l).
"'Section 82.l(l) of the Imi'ation Act states that an application for judiciai review tmder the Federal
S.

Court Act may be taken with respect to "any decision or order made, or any matter arising, under this Act
or the d e s or regulations thereundei', though such action may only be commenced with leave of the
court.
Supra note 5 12.
See Federal Court Act, S. 18(l)(a), which states that the Trial Division of the F e d d Court has
exclusive origid jurisdition "...to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of
mandamus or writ of quo warranta, or grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or
other tribunal.. .."
ao For a discussion of the availabiüty and uses of these m e d i e s m inmiigration matters, see Bagambiire,
supra note 151, at 349 - 360.
ni Section l8.l(l), FederaZ Court Act and section 82.11l), Inmipution Act.

them, within which to file their application for judicial r e v i e ~ For
. ~ overseas applicants,
this limitation period poses obvious special challenges. Ifnot already represented, they
will have to hd,retain and uiseuct counsel in Canada on a priority basis. Altematively,
an applicant might choose to represent herself. For most persons, however, this may be

an unlikeIy option, since it would entail research as to the forms and procedures of a
distantly Iocated foreign court - the Federal Court of Canada. Added to this is the
necessity of appearances before the court. Beyond the expense such appearances might
entail, a failed applicant rnight also have to obtain a visitor visa just to obtain entry to

Canada for the purposes of such appearances? Presumably, because of the peculiar
difficulties faced by oveneas applicants, an application for review of a visa officer's
decision is not subject to the ordinary requirement for lave of the Court as a precondition to commencing such an action?

Just as the range of matters with which administrative law generally concerns
itself is bmad, so too does the range of rights, and entitiement to fair procedure, vary.

Everything is case specific, hinging upon the type of subject matter involved, the type of
procedure that has been provided for by the legislature and the consequences which may
accrue to the individual i n ~ o l v e d .This
~ is evident fiom a series of prooouncements by

"Section 18.1(2), Federal Court Act.
"Granting of a visitor visa to a failed immigrant applicant is by no means a certain proposition.

Like
every other applicant for a visitor visa, a failed immigrant must rebut the presumption fond at S. 8 of the
immigration Act, that she is an intendhg irmnigrant. The prior immigrant application clearly adds to the
difaculties of rebutting that presumption,
"Pursuant to subsetion 82.1(2) of the immigration Act, decisions of visa officers under sections 9, 10 or
77 are specificaiiy exempted fkom the requirement of leave. See Bagambiire, supra note 151 at 340, who
suggests that lack of easy access to Canadian courts for foreign based litigants provides the justification for
the dispensation from the reqpirement of Ieave. He opines that such applicants are less likely to Iaunch
fnvolous applications or otherwise abuse the facilities of the Federai Court.
=For discussion of the v-g
naüxre of the duty of fairness, see geaedy Evans, supra note 2, at 35-43.

the Supreme Court of Canada. Estey J., for example, noted that "[w]hile it is tnie that a
duty to observe procedural fahess, a s expressed in the maxim audi alteram partem, need
not be express.. .it will not be implied in every case. It is always a question of constnllng
the statutory scheme as a whole in order to see to what degree, if any, the legislator

intended the pruiciple to apply. [footnote omitted]'

~26

In Cardinal v. Director of k m t

Imtitutionm, the Court refined this fiutha by stating:
The existence of a general duty to act fairly will depend on the consideration of
three factors: (i) the nature of the decision to be made by the administrative body;
(ii) the relationship existing between that body and the individual; and (iii) the
effeçt of that decision on the individual's rights.. .. [Wlhenever those three
elements are to be found, there is a general duty to act fairly on a public decision
making body.

While the existence of these three elements provides the minimum threshold for
invoking a duty of faimess, a more interesting issue concems how they are measured and,
consequently, the level of fairness owed. Though there is no fixed formula for
prioritizing the three factors, the impact of the decision on individual rights is obviously a
serious concern and may be most important. This point was made apparent in Imhe v.
Canada (Restrictive Trade Practices Comrnissi~n)~.
Estey J., speaking for the Court,
stressed that the existence of any pmonal impact for the applicant must significantly
influence the level of faimess owed to her. As he stated, "[flairness is a flexible concept

and its content varies depending on the nature of the inquiry and the conîequencesfor the
individuaZs involved. [emphasis added]"Rp In assessing the du@ of faimess owed in the

"~ t t o r n e yGeneml of Canada v. Inuit Tupifiat of Canada,[198012 S.C.R. 735 at 755,per Estey J. for
the Court.
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 643 at 653, per Ledain J. for the rnajonty.
sn[1987]1 S.C.R. 181.
=rd. at231.

exercise of discretionary immigration powers, it is essential therefore to ask severai
questions: to what extent has Parliament intended the duty of f a i n a s to apply, what type
of decision is implicated and what are the ramifications for any individual nghts?

The last question is particularly cogent when inquiring as to the level of fainiess
owed to Independent immigrant applicants. Of al1 the immigrant categories, it is manifest
that Independents have the least at stake in ternis of personal investrnent and potential
ramifications. Family Class migrants, for example, may face pmanent separation fiom
close family while Refugees risk potential persecution fkom a denial of opportunity to
enter Canada. Independents, however, are people who voluntarily seek migration,

usually in search of better econornic opportunities. They will ordinarily have no
substantial ties to Canadam and are not subject to the type of pressing humanitarian
concerns that may affect other applicants. As such, denial of an immigrant visa to them

will most likeIy involve only the loss of an ~pportunity.~'
Accordingly, the entitlement
of Independent applicants to procedural fairness, at least on the b a i s of personal
consequences, is less than for other categories of immigrants.

This difference in entitlement to procedural faimess is illustrated by the curious
- ----

-

-- -

no An obvious exception to this would be the "Assisted Relative" subcategory within the Independent class.
These immigrants are defined at section 2(1) of the Regdations as king an immigrant, other tha. a
member of the family class, who has an aunt or uncle, sibhg, child, grandchild or nephew or niece in
Canada In recognition of this co~ection,while Assisted Relatives are made to q u w on the ordinary
Independent selection scale, they are effectively awarded a bonus of five additional points for the fact of a
relative in Canada. Thus, assisted relatives need obtain only 65 points to qualifl for pemmment residence
(S. 10(l)(b), immigration Regulatiorts), which is to be compared to the 70 points needed by "regulai'
independent applicants (S. 9(l)(b)(i), immigration Regtrfations).
In an effort to minimize any consequences to faiied applicants, CICs application and info~mation
materials routinely include an admoni.chment that any plans for departure should not be finalized util the
application has been fidiy approveci See for example, CIC "Applying for Permanent Residence in Canada:
A Self-Assessrnent Guide and Application Kit for Independent Appiicants" (New Delhi Application Kit
version (undateci) c o d t e d for îhk citation) at 24, where the following advice to potential applicants is
given: "PIease do not quit your job, sel1or give away your possessions until you have been issued an

position of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Unmigration law and its seeming
irrelevance to overseas immigrant selection. Generally, persons applying abroad for

immigration services have no entitlement to a determination process that incorporates
Charter of Rights and Freedoms standards. However, other applicants in very simila.
circumstances, but located in Canada, do benefit from Charter protection^."^ The overd
relatioaship of Charter issues to Litigation in the administrative context was noted by
Wilson J. in Re Singh and M.E.Ia3. 'V,as a matter of statutory interpretation," she
stated, '%heprocedural fairness sought by the appellants is not excludeci by the scheme of
the m g r a t i o n ] Act, there is, of course, no bais for m o r t to the Charter."sY Quite
simply, therefore, the Charter is o d y relevant in so far as procedural faUness has been
compromised by a legislatively mandated process. In the absence of such, the applicant
is left to rely upon the usud panoply of administrative and judicial review remedies.
More particularly, while the courts have held that Chartet protections extend to al1
persons physically present in CanadP, they have declined to extend such protections to
persons dealing with visa offices outside Canadam This, despite apparent rejection by

the Supreme Court of Canada, in the Singh case, of the American position where such a

immigrant visa."
For a bnef discussion of this apparent incongniity, see Waldman, supra note 104, at 2.1 - 2.4,§2.1-

B2

2.6.

"Supra note 64.
Id., 17 D . L E (4th)422 at 445.
See id., per Wilson J.

"See CMadan ComciZ of

Churches v. Chnada [1990] 2 F.C.534,lO Imm L X (2d) 81 (C.A.);@d
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 236,88 D.LX (4*) 193 (S.C.C.); and sec also Ruparei v. Minister of EmpIoyment and
Immigration [1990] 3 F.C. 615,36 F.T.R. 140 (C.A.). The hesitancy of the courts tu extend the nile of
Canadian law abroad is a matter whose Iogic is somewhat controversial. For a &ticaI view of this
geographicdy based dichotomy, see Donald Galloway, "The Extraterritorial Application of the Charter to
Visa Appiicants", (199 1) 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 335.

dichotomy is endorse~i.~~~

However, it may be that what the courts have refused to do through the h n t door,
namely apply the C7zarter to cases processed abroad, has actuaUy been done through the

back door by legislative enactment. Section 3(f) of the Act states immigration policies,
d e s and regdations are to be designed and administered su as to ". ..not discriminate in

a manner inconsistent with the Canudian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Thus,

regardes of whether or not the Charter applies directiy, the standards it mandates for
prohibited discrimination, which would be encompassed in the notion of procedural
fairness, certainly do?

However, it will obviously be more difficult to obtain the

Charter's protections when that document is seen not to be directly applicable. And
certainly, refusal to apply Charter provisions to al1 those dealing with the Canadian

government, no matter where situated, has created two different standards for procedurai
fairness that potentially cuts across immigrant categorie~.~~
It follows nom this that
fainiess in the use of discretion in any individual case, while requiring reference to a
common standard with other decisions of a iike kind, cm and will vary fkom one type of
case to another. Since different levels of "interest" or "right" are inherent in the various
categories of applicaîions, the Ievel of fainiess owed shi fh accordingly.

"

Singh, supra note 64, 17 D L R (4th) 422 at 462, where Wiison J. said, "1m u t confess some reluctance
to adopt this analogy fiom Amencan law that persons who are inside the country are entitied to the
protection of the Charter while those who are merely seeking entry to the country are no^"
The obvious ciifference in not having the Charter apply directfy would be to deprive appiicants of
certain remedies, for example.
a9 For example, renigee claimants may apply in Canada or at a visa office abroad Those applying in
Canada w i l i be entitied to rely directiy upon the Charter w M e those abroad wiU be left to attempt to
Unport Charter protections indirectty through the device of section 3(f) of the Act. A similar remit is
possible also for applicants within the famiiy class. Spousal applicants, for example, may be granted a
discretionary dispensation under S. 1f4(2)of the Act to allow their cases to be processed fiom within
Canada.

Notwithstanding this, there is still a minimum level of faimess due even to those
who have no k e d nght to the benefit they seek. A Minister's Penxit, for example, is the

primary tool under the Imrnigm~ionAct whereby a temporary dispensation h m the rigid
letter of the law is granted. With certain excepti~ns,~
the Minister has discretion,
pursuant to S. 37(1), to gant relief to any person seekïng entry to Canada who is a

member of an inadmissible class. In exercising that discretion, the courts have held that
the power to grant a pennit must be exercised fairly and in accordance with phciples
consistent with the purposes of the Act. In the context of a refugee claim, Wilson J.
observed that the "...Minister is requVed to exercise his discretion to give a permit under
S.

37 fairly and in accordance with proper principles and, if the Minister fails to do so, the

Convention refugee may have a right to take proceedings under S. 18(a) of the Federal
Court Act.'"'

The notion that there may be a duty of fairness, even in the absence of any

nght in the applicant to the service or benefit, is rooted in the hypothesis underlying

grants of discretionary power that they must be exercised rea~onably.~~
But what are the minimal components of procedural fairness in the context of
Independent processing? CIC's own Immigration Manual summarizes them as follows:

There are a considetable number of components to the notion of fairness, or natural
justice, that affect ovefieas processes. These have been reviewed and enunciated by
the courts in ample fashion over the years. Some of the more important components
that apply to overseas processes include the following:
Processing must occur without undue delay;
YO See S. 37(2) of îhe Act, which prohibits issuance of Permits to persons under an unexecuted removal
order and failed f a d y cias appiicants whose appeal has been dismissed by the Appeal Division of the

m.

Singh, supra note 64, (1985) 17 D.L.R.(4th) 422 at 448, citing MinUret of Manpower & Immigration v.
Hardayal(1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 465 at 471, [1978] 1 S . C X 470 at 479,15 N.R 396 (per Spence J.); Re
Brempong and Minkter of Employment h Immigration (198O), 1 13 DLR.( 3 4 236, (198 11 1 F.C.21 1.36

N a 323.
YZ

Wade,supra note 36 at 9.

Whoever hem, must decide;
Applicants must have an opportunity to be heard and to respond to any coacerns;
Decisions must be based upon the Imigration Act and Reguiatiom; and
All applicants must receive fair and equitable treatrnenttn
These principles are obviously broad in nature and scope and it rem&

for the courts to

detemiine in every case how they are to be applied and whether or not they have actually

been met? Particdar examples of their appfication will be exploreci in greater detail later

in this chapter. Sufnce to Say at this juncture7though they must be seen as minimum
standards, yet they provide the essential foundation out of which spruigs the duty of
fairness applicable to discretionary immigration decision making.

3.3.3.1 Protecüng Discretion
The courts have an ambivalent relationship with discretion. On the one hand, they

are loath to see it "fettered'' and require that it remain open ended. At the same tirne.
however, they also insist that it be closely confineci and s t n i ~ t u r e d .It~is for this reason

CIC IM ' 6 0 v e r sRocessing",
~
Chap. OP- 1, para. 10 (ver. 12-95) at 17-18.

However, even the notion of procedural faimess and what it entails is hardly fiee fiom competing
priorites, as exemplified by the following two examples. In Costroman v. Canada (Secretary of State)
(1994), 81 F.TX 227, McKeown J., in a case where the CKDJ). elected to proceed with a hearing even
after counsel chose to withdraw, found that the right to a fair hearing takes precedence over the need for a
quick and speedy hearing. However, see also Singh (Gunnit) v. Canada (Minister of Citizmhip and
Immigration) (1995), 106 F.T.R.66 at 70, where Simpson J. opined as follows: "In my view, fairness
requires that an applicant receive a timely decision." Thus, the only conclusion is that the specific details
of procedural fairness will fluctuate according to the dictates of justice in every case.
~ 4 ' This sort of dialectic approach may well be a factor of the two guidmg principles which Grey, in his
..
book, Immmigration Lav in Canada, supra note 181, a s c r i i to admumtrative law generaiiy. He
characterizes the- at 1, as follows:
There can be no power or authority exercised by an officia1without a statutory or a prerogative
source, and all grants of power are generaiiy to be narrowly constnied.
Where a discretion is granted to an officiai, the courts wiil not review bis decision on its merits,
but o d y to see if he stayed within the bounds of his authority and exercised it in a reasonable
manner.
As he descnïes it, these two d e s are somewhat antagonistic and puli m Mixent directions. Though
..
our adrmnistrative law involves a synthesis of the two, it is not a seamies one and so courts perhaps tend
to meander h m side to side, while stili atternpting to steer the middle course. For a more in depth
discussion of this,see Grey generdy, id, at 1-5.
IU

that Wade ascribes two broad categones to the conduct of judicial review; one concerned

with protecting the discretion accorded by Parliament and the other focused on preventing
its abuse."

Sornewhat ironically, then, it seems that judicial review is meant to ensure

that discretion remains ample, but not too ample.

In the £kt category, protecting the scope of discretionary power, the courts seek
to ensure that the power has been exercised by the nghtfid donee, UILfettered and without
artificial restrictions drawn nom outside the ternis of the grant. These strictures are
captured in the Latin maxim delegatus non potest delegare, wwhich holds that power
accorded to one may not be exercised by another. As John Willis States, "[ilts most
important application.. .is to authorities which are by statute empowered to exercise
discretions affecthg the rights and interests of the public.. .

While it is merely a nite

of constructionw, rather than a binding legal doctrine, it ensures that the intended donee
of power is the one to actually use it.Y9The theory is that by tying the power to the
donee, accountability is increased, thereby enhancing the likelihood of its responsible
exercise. Willis notes that this rule of construction is rooted in the concept of the " d e of

law" and the notion that govemment officiais and private citizens are dl equal before the
law."

As such, the delegatus nile is intended to prevent interference, whether political

or otherwise, with the rights and interests of pnvate persons, Save to the extent
Iegitimately permitteci by statutory provision. Irrespective of the type of power involved,

"~ a d esupm
,
note 36 at 9.
"Willic, "Delegatus Non Potest Delegare?, supm note 215 at 257.
De Smith,supra note 190 at 358, who notes that courîs have siornethes construed it as a rigid and
complete doctrine, alIowing of no exceptions. Nonetheless, he points out that it merely raises a rebuttable
presumption. Conversely, both de Smith,at 358, and Willis, "Delegatus Non Potest Delegare", id. at 260,
note that tbe presumption is not diacuit to rebut.
SJg Willis,
See also de Smith,id. at 358.

whether judicial, quasi-judicid, ministerial and so on, the mie against subdelegation is
applicable."'

In the case of the Immigration Act, far more powers are delegated to the Minister
of Immigration than she is able to persondy exercise herself. To get around the d e

against sub-delegation, Parliament has made express provision in the Act to permit çubdelegation of her auth~rity.~~
Notwithstanding this, the convention of ministerial
responsibility in pariiamentary government ensures that the Minister remains ultimately
accountable for the proper exercise of any authority she passes on to iower level
of fi ci al^.^^ Under the Immigration Act, it is o d y immigration and visa officersSs who

have authority to exercise delegated powers. Further, once seized of a matter, the
individual visa officer is required to form her own opinions as to the outcome for a case.
Though she is entitled to seek guidance nom various sources, including colleagues and
supervising officers, the decision remains hers alone and she must not fetter her discretion
by following the dictates of those colleagues or s u p e r i o r ~ . ~ ~ ~
--

Sm

--

Wiliis, id.

De Smith, supra note 190 at 358.

5=s. 121(1).
*a See also s 121(2) of the Act which codifies this convention. Any act carried out pursuant to a power
delegated by the Minister is deemed to have been perforxxed by ber.
Set definitions of "immigration office? and "visa officer" contained at S. 2 of the Act, which simply
distinguishes between them according to whether they are exercising their fûnctions inside Canada or
abroad. In either case, these are officers who have been designated pursuant to s. 109 of the Act. Ln visa
office practice, there are a couple of more officer designations that art relevant. These are the "Designated
immigration Officer @IO)" and the "Immigration Program Officer (PO)". The first has been designated
purmiant to S. 109 of the Act, whiie the Iatter has not. Both categories consist, usuaiiy, of foreign mtionals
hired Iocaliy in their corntries of residence to hande case processing. Since DI03 have the same authority
as regular immigration officers, they are able to render decisions on individuai cases. PO'S obviously do
not possess such authonty. As a matter of expediency, however, they may be found rendering positive
decisions in cases, smce such decisions are never appeaied.
In Baluyuz v. Canada (Min. ofEmpIoyment & Immigration), [1992] 3 F.C.420, 56 F.T.R. 186 (Fed
T.D.),for example, the appiicant sought to quash the decision of an officer refhsing to intewiew her with
respect to her application for permanent residence. The applicant's husband was resident in the Phiiippines
and unable to attend an interview at the Canadian Consuiate in Los Angeles where the application had been

An obvious question that arises in relation to immigration processing matters
concenis the position in law of the copious policy manu&, operations memoranda and
other guidelines issued by the Minister and (SIC Headqwrters to infonn officers in their
use of discretion. These manuals and policy statements are meant to guide the use of that
discretion deemed necessary to fiU in cracks and crevices between the d e s . Where a
general discretion has been delegated, the courts have upheld the adoption of guideiines
guidelines have been noted to serve,
implemented to inform its e x e r ~ i s e . Such
~
legitimately, the purposes of ensuring consistency of decision-making and of providing
objective standards for the application of general discretion to specific cases.5n Evans,
for example, offers the foUowing on the legitimacy of guideluies:

Iodged, The appiicant had explained various cucumstances that d t a t e d aga& her husband being able to
attend an interview in the US,then showed up alone for the intemiew. The officer consulted an
immigration vice-consul about what decision should be made, then told the applicant that the interview
could not be held in the absence of her spouse. The court found in the result that the officer had failed to
exercise her own discretion in the mattex, aiiowing her actions to be dictated by the supervising viceconsui. Mandamus was issued to order that the interview proceed and that the He be transfmed to the
Canadian visa office in Manila thereafter, if i n t e ~ e w
of the spouse was necessary. For a similar result, see
John v, Canada (Min. of Citizemhip & Immigration) (1997).36 Inm. L E (2d) 192 (FCTD.) where the
visa office in Guatemala sent Trinidadian education documents to the visa office in Trinidad for au opinion
as to their equivalence to Canadian educational atcainment. Based on that opinion, the visa office in
Guatemala awarded no points for education to the applicant, The court f o n d this an iinpennissî%le
fettering of discretion, since the Guatemala office blindly applied the opinion offenxi by the Trinidad
office. In the view of Heald D.J., the defect could have been remedied by & o r h g the applicant an
opportunity to respond to the equivalence offered by the Trinidad office, which was not done.
'%sec for example. Burke v. Canada (Employment & Iminigraton Commission) (1994), 79 F.TR 148
(F.C.TD.).
See for example, Vidai, nrpm note 21 1, 13 Imm.LX. (2d) 123 at 142-143. where Strayer 1. stated the
following:
No doubt when Parliament conferred the power under subs. 114(2) [of the immigration Act] on
the Govemor in Council to make exceptions to the requirements of the Act and Regulations it
expected the Govemor m Council to exercise that discretion with some sort of consistency
throughout the country and not purely arbitrarily or by whmL More particularly, by the principles
of parliamentary government the Governor m Council must be responsible to Parjiarnent for the
exercise of his discretion. As the Govemor in Council is in the vast majority of cases dependent
on the recommen&tions of immigration officers, as approved by the Minister, for the exercise of
his discretion, it is highly desirable that immigration officershave some sort of guidance as to
what factors the Mjnister îiünks important m making recommendations to the Governor in
Council in this respect.

It is sometimes assume4 especiaily by lawyers, that while a de-bound solution
to a dispute requires the decision-maker to base it on precedent and general legai
principles, those exercising discretion need to consult only their own preferences.
However, this is a caricature of the exacise of discretion. Dismetionary decisons
must be made not oniy by reference to the statutory piuposes and other legal
limits of the power, but they should also be infonned by anypolicy objectives
formulated by the agency, guidelines that it has ksued. and its past practice.
Arbitrariness is as much the antithesis of the effective exercise of discretion as the
mechanicd application of d e s is of the just adminimtion of Iaw. The
differences between discretionary and rule-based decitions are of degree, not
kind. [emphasis addedlJp

However, b h d adherence to such guidelines is also not permitted. Though the decision-

maker is entitled to educate herself h m the guidelines as to what a proper approach may
be, she must still ensure that her mind mains open to the subtleties and nuances of the

individual case before her. As Wadenotes, discretion must not be fettered '%y selfimposed rules of thumb" and "a distinction must be made between following a consistent
policy and blindly applying some rigid de."" In CabaFn v. Canada (Mintrter of
EmpLoyment and 1mmigration)q for example, Joyal J. noted that close adherence to
ministerial policy not founded in the Act or Regulationr would result in a fettering of

discretion and, hence, constitute an excess of jurisdiction. Thus, while consistency is
desirable, it is only desirable to the extent that it allows for flexibility, which rernains of

the essence to discretion.
Occasionally, it happens that courts will actually enlarge discretion in their

'"Supra note 2 at 1021-1 022.
Wade, supra note 36 at 9. For a discussion theorking as to possible fettering of discretionby
Immigration Medicai Officers relying too cIose1y upon guidelines contained in the Medical Officer's
Haadbook, see P. Harris Auerbach 'Piscretion, Policy and Section 19(l)(a) of the ImmigrationAct"
(1990) 6 Journal of Law and Social Policy 133. But, for a view decrying a Iack of guidelines to controt
Medical Officer discretion, see Roteaberg, "Medicai Inadmissibility: Selection Without Standard?,,, supra
note 151.
[1991] 2 F.C.235, 12 Imm.L E (2d) 287,40 F.TK 147,49 Admm. L.R. 100 (F.C.T.D.).

attempts to protect it. In the Imaili case1, for example, CuiIen J. found part of S. 22 of
the Regulations to be ultra vires the Act, with the result that the discretion of immigration

medical officers was expandeci. That section had been promuigated pursuant to the
authority granted the Governor in Council under S. 114(l)(m) of the Act to make
regdations prescribing factors to be considered in detennllùng whether a person is likely
to be a danger to public hedth or safety or might cause excessive demand on health or
social services. Section 22 contained a list of factors medicd officers were required to
consider in reaching a determination as to the likelihood of excessive demand by an
immigrant with a health impairment."

The factors included any medical reports,

commuaicability of the disease, whether the supply of the particular health or social
senice in Canada was somehow limited, what sort of care or hospitalization might be
required and so on. Bill C-86= had amended S. 114(l)(m) of the Act by deletuig explicit
reference to excessive demand on health and social services. The Court found this to be

fatal to the legaiity of the factors set out in section 22 of the ReguZations vis-à-vis
assessrnent of excessive demand. It was d l fine, however, as concems public health and
safety, since reference to those concems had not been eliminated by the C-86

"'

IsntaiZi v. Canada (Min.of Citizmhip & Irnntigmtion) (1995),29 Imm.LX. (2d) 1,100 F.TR 139.
For an opinion on the effect of this niling, see Rotenberg, "Medical Inadmissibility: Selection Without
Standard?", supra note 15 1.
Every prospective immigrant and their dependants are required to pass a medical examination. Medicai
test d t s are assessed and an opinion as to impiications for public health and safety and demand upon
health and social services is givm by Immigration Medical Officers employed by CIC. That opinion is
then passed to the visa officer who must consider same in rendering a nnal decision. A visa officer has no
discretion with respect to a medical opinion Jaf& v. Canado (Min. of Citùenship & Immigmfion) (24
O a o b n 1995), IMM-4039-93(F.C.T.D.).The officer also has no authority to review the diagnostic
assessment by medical officers. However, the duty of faitness reQuires that the visa officer ensure that the
medical officer's opinion is reasonabie. If not, a visa officer decision based upon an unreasonable medical
opinion will be set aside. Ajanee v. Canada (Minikter of Citûenship & Immigration) (1996), 33 Jmm. L K
(2d) 165, 110 F.T.R. 172 (F.C.TD,).
~n Act to mend the Imigration Act and ofher Ac& in consequence thereo): S.C. 1992, c. 49.

"

amendmentS. Because the amendment had removed the authority upon which the
excessive demand factors in section 22 resfed, medical officers were found to be unduiy
fettering their discretion by routinely relying upon the factors as per their former practice.
Though they were still entitled to consider those factors, they were no longer restricted by

thern? As Rotenberg and Lam note, the effect of this decision was seemingiy to remove
lUnits upon the discretion of medical officers in assessing such cases." Thus, the Iist of
factors were transformeci h m an authontative guide, structuring and codhing medicai
officer discretion, to a mere list of factors that couid be considered or ignored, as the

individual medical officer determined was appropnate.
3.3.3.2 Controlling Discretion
Conversely, in controbg the exercise of discretion, the court is concerned to see
that only that amount of power which was delegated, and no more, is put into play."

If

the administrative action exceeds what was authorized, the decision-maker will be found

to have exceeded herjwisdiction and the action declared ultra vires the authority granted.
See also Ludwig v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1W6), 33 Imm L.R (2d) 2 13, 111
F.TX 271 (T.D.). Medical officers are guided in their assessments by a Medical Officer's Hanclbook
reflecting common medical knowledge. A medical officer is entitled to apply the guidance offered th=,
but only so long as he retains sufficieut flexiiility to look beyond those guidelines and does not feel bound
by them.
w i ~ i I i supra
,
note 561,29 hm.L X ( 2 4 lat 5, where the authors offer a case commentary that
includes the foliowing: "Certainly, when one reads S. 22 of the immigration Regdations with the
immigration Act, limiîs to the medical officers' discretion were circumscriid, Have these limits been
removed? Are we leA to the vagaries of each medicd officer as to what he considers to be excessive and
the facts to be taken into account? [footnote ornitted]" Similariy, see Rotenbag, b'MedicalInadmissbility:
Selection Without Standard?", supra note 151. The position of CIC is even more clear on this point. In
Operations Memorandum (OM) IP 96-08/0P96-05.28 March 1996, "Assessrnent of Medical Excessive
De~aa~lds
A19(l)(a)(ii) and R22". the department notes that "[ilt foilows [ h m the Imaili decision] that
we have presently no authority to regulate the assessment of excessive demands. ...The nilUig does not
prevent medicai officersf?om deciding if an applicant's admission wouid or might reasonably be expected
to cause excessive demands. It simply means they must exmise "discretion" ratber than apply the factors
set out in R22." The OM then goes on to detail how that discretion shouid properly exercised.
=AS de Smith notes, it is h m again that the "ruie of Law' is to be s m in action - delegates may only act
~4

Grey describes discretion as:

...a power that is aimost always or always is attacheci to some level of due.
Review of discretion means determining how f u the power extends and at what
point the "duty" is ignored and the correlative "right"violateci. As soon as that
point is reached, the courts c m interfere; before that they wiil abstain fkom doing
~

0

.

~

~

Accordingly, controhg discretion aiso entails some consideration of the balance that
should be stnick between discretionary power and duties owed to those coming before
administrative tribunais.

In Maple Lodge Farms Lhited v. Government of Canada et al.", the Supreme
Court of Canada reiterated that courts should not Lightly interfere with discretion.
Speaking for the court, McIntyre J. reaffr,,ed this principle while aiso noting the limits
for the exercise of discretion, beyond which the courts will intervene to control it. In his
words:

-

It is...a clearly-estabiished mle that the courts should not interfere with the
exercise of a discretion by a statutory authority merely because the court might
have exercised the discretion in a dinerent manner had it been charged with that
responsibility. Where the statutory discretion has been exercised in good faith
and, where required, in accordance with the principles of naturd justice, and
where reliance has not been placed upon considerations irrelevant or extraneous to
the statutory purpose, the courts should not interfkre?
The notion that discretion may only be exercised for the purposes for which it was

granted is captured under the notion of "good faith". It is this ground of review which
cornes closest to trenching upon the rnerits of individual administrative decisions - an
activity which courts ostensibly are hesitant to undertake on judicial review. And yet,

within the bounds of the power bequeathed to them, and no more. De Smith, supra note 190 at 295.
Grey, "Dismtion in A h i n W a t i v e Law", pro note 1 at 108-109.
sa[1982] 2 S.C.R. 2.
569rd. at 7 - 8.
957

despite this reluctance, the courts do delve into the merïts of cases upon the justification
of good faith. Tn conduchg review for this type of misconduct, the content and ambit of
the power delegated is obviously of geatest concem to the courts. The particulan of the

type of inappropriate action which wil1 cause the courts to intervene agaùist the decision
of a triiunal are evident in the staternent of Lord Denning, who said, in relation to a
power in a govemment minister to issue television licenses:
Undoubtedly those statutory provisions give the Minister a discretion as to the
issue and revocation of licenses. But it is a discretion which must be exercised in
accordance with the law, taking ali relevant considerations into account, omitting
irrelevant ones, and not being iduenced by any ulterior motivesm
Lord Denning's dicta gives some idea of the broad scope of the concept of good

faith. It encompasses a range of problems from perversmess, or patent unreasonability,
of the decision, to more particular matters such as failure to accord weight to relevant
considerations. Though good faith involves an examination of motivation and h

e of

mind of the decision-maker, the courts have held that it is capable of detemination nom
d l of the circumstances of a case? This is well illustrated in the So c a s P , which
Rouleau J. described as the most blatant example of wiUfid bad faith and abuse of
discretion he had ever encomtered during his tenure on the bench?
The applicant So applied in that instance to the Canadian Consulate General in

New York as an Independent immigrant pursuant to the occupation of "head chef'.

no Congreve v. Home m c e ,

[1976] 1 QB. 629 at 649, [1976] 1 All E.R. 697 at 708.

-' See Smirh v. Vanier (Mwicipality) (1972).30 D L R (3d)386 (Ont.H.C-)yat 390-392, where the Court
stated:

In the house of good faith there are many mansions. Good faith or want of it is not an extemai
fact but rather a state of mind that can be judged by verbal or physical acts. To my mind good
faith is a composite thmg refmble to ail the relevant circumstances.
mSo v. Canada. supra note 441,28 Inmi.L X (2d) 153 Bminafter cited to 28 Imm. LX].
lbid at 155.

Though he had just six years of primary schooling, the applicant had worked for more

thm twenty years as a chef in restaurants in Hong Kong a d , later, in Canada. In
addition, he had completed a certifïcate program hCanada whereby he was recognized
by the Ontatio Chinese Restaurant Association as a "Class 1 Chef in Cantonese Dishes".
The reviewhg officer, however, discomted this experience and training, saying that it
was not the sort of fomal program of qualification that would sufnce for the occupation
of head chef. As a resuit, the applicant was assessed in a lesser occupation that redted
in fewer points being awarded to him. Further, though So had been living and working in
Canada for a number of years, apparently becoming suflicientiy weU established to

accumulate rnoney and property during this tirne, the officer did not rate his chances for
successfbl establishment highly. He was awarded just four points out of ten for the factor
of personal suitability as a result. Iri ordering certiorari to quash the decision, Rouleau J.
stated the following:
There is simply no question good faith was not present here. ...Mnmaking his
decision, he [ie. the visa officer] clearly disregarded pertinent and relevant facts,
such as the applicant's twenty years of experience as a chef and bis certificate as a
Class 1 Chef in Cantonese Dishes, and was inauenced, more aptly describecl as
obsessed,by factors which should not have played a role in his decision-making
at dl, such as the applicant's having remained in Canada d e r his status had
expired. His conclusion that Mr. So had only a forty per cent chance of becoming
established in Canada is perverse, in light of the fact the applicant has saved a
substantial amount of money since his arriva1 in 1990, has purchased two cars and
has secured gainful employment as a head chef at the rate of $900per weeken4
Good faith is also called into question by the fact of how much time and attention
a visa officer may give to materials and other evidence provided in support of an
application. While it is a requirement of good faith that due consideration and attention

be given to each application, the actual amount of such attention wili Vary according to
the complexity of the matter, the amount of the evidence offered and other circumstances.

In VUCQv. Canada (Minfiter of Employment & Immigraton)). for example, Cullen J.

found that the consideration extended by an immigration officer was inadquate. There, a
large volume of matenal appears to have been digestecl in the course of a thirty-minute

interview, after which a negative decision issued.
By contrast, in the Williams decision? the applicant f d e d to prove on the
balance of probabilities that insufncient attention had been devoted to her request for
humanitarian and compassionate landing under S. 114(2) of the Act. Though the
interview had been 45 minutes in length, and involved presentation of considerable
materials, the court held nonetheless that it was not credible to infer lack of good faith.
Noting that the decision was not rendered until five days afler the interview, Muldoon J.
discounted counsel's premise that "the immigration officer reviews, cogitates and
ruminates on "h & c" applications, only while seated at his or her desk in a C.I.C.
~ f f i c e " ~Under
.
al1 of the circumstances, the court was satisfied that there had been due
consideration of the applicant's materials and evidence. A related concept is that of a
discretionary decision which is so manifestly wrong that it is said to be perverse on its
face. Such a decision is symptomatic of both a lack of good faith and a failure to accord
weight to relevant considerations, or of having given weight to improper considerations.

In either case, it wiil resuit in a decision to quash the impugned decision?
--

n5(1991) 15 h L J L (2d)315 (Fe&

T.D.).

Williams v. Canada (Min. of CitUenhip & Immigration) (1996), 32 Imm L A (2d) 256 (Fed T.D.).
maid. at 257.
Se+ Willum v. Canada, stcpra note 220,where the court note4 even in thc absence of writtcn reasons, a
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3.3

The Courts' Handling of Discretion
'?t cannot be too often pointed out that the "rule of law", on which our democracy

so largely depends for its sanction, is no stronger or wider than the courts rnay care to
make it.. .,"

wote F.RScott some 60 years ago. These words rernain just as tnie today

as does a corollary - that the nile of law wiil brook only that much discretion as the
courts may choose. Immigration law has provided fertile ground for playing out the
struggle between discretionary power and ruies in recent years. The reasons are not hard
to discem. Twenty years ago, in overseas applications at any rate, it was rare to h d an
applicant assisted by counseI. Today, it is only a minority that is not assisted to some
extent or other by a professional in the preparation and submission of their applications.

And counsel have been resolute in urging the courts to pursue a reductionist, rights
oriented approach toward immigration law and policy. It is an approach that is largely
blind both to the wider policy involved and the difficulty of developing precise selection
measures, capable of being applied worldwide, that are fair and produce consistent
results. Moreover, it is an approach that has been bought into by the courts, but only in a
positive way to benefit applicants. Thus, there has been much judicial activism focused
on constraining negative discretion while, at the same time, nominally at least, a hands
off approach has been followed with positive discretion. The goal of containing negative
discretion has been pursued with such single-minded detemination that the courts have
been seemingly oblivious to the incongruou results that have followed.
Indeed, the overwhelmùig impression that one obtains fiom reading court
judgment that fies in the face of reason will be overturned. Though there may be no requirement for
d e n reasons, a discretionary decision wlli be set aside where it is r n a n i f ' y perverse.

deciQom is that discretion is a highly misuseci administrative tool. Admittedly,
discretion is a highly used tool, employed daily, in one form or another, in almost every
application that is processed. In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, it is used
sensibly to the satisfaction of ail. It is, in fact, only the most egregious cases of misuse
which end up before the courts on judicial review. In many instances, judicial disdain for

discretion as exercised in the circumstances of the case before the court is weii founded.
Regrettably,however, it is the indefensible which prompts judicial pronouncements that
sometimes have the effkct of disabhg discretion in the remaining majority of cases
where its application had benefits for both administraton and clients.
3.3.1

Discretion and the Selection Process

The courts7handling of discretion, of course, occm in the context of the selection
scheme provided for by the Act and ReguIatiom. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider
briefly the approach adopted with respect to selection generally. The preference of the
immigration bar, who favour a strict nghts based approach to selection, is seen in an
editorial by C.L.Rotenberg decrying the use of negative d i s ~ r e t i o n .In~ it, he argues
that, in certain circumstances, use of such discretion offends against the concept of
double jeopardy. Citing informal reports fiom other counsel, he notes a trend to refusal of
Independent applicants for lack of language facility, notwithstanding that such applicants
may have obtained the necessary 70 d t s of assessment. in his estimation, this
constitutes doublejeopardy, since language is a factor expressly provided for in the
-

"F K Scott, Comment [1936] Cae Bar Rev. 62at 66.

CL.Rotenberg, "Conundnmis - 1. Visa applicant refusal where appiicant has more than 70 units for
iack of language facility - Double jeopardy?" (1987), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 72.

selection m e m e s and should not be counted again when the use of discretion is
considered. To do otherwise, he contends, would be to accord it greater weight than was
contemplated by the Governor in Council. Ability to successfully establish has a very
specific meaning under the regulatory scheme, in his view, and is denned by obtaining an

award of 70 or more points. ''The weight to be given to a lack of language fluency is
clearly contemplated by the Govemor in Council as being a numerical factor and no more

than that.'"'

Thus, to consider it again later with respect to R 1l(3) discretion is to

effectively count it twice. Clearly, for him,"successfûl establishment" is demonstrated
by a mechanical application of the selection criteria and is indicated, in a hard and f&

way, by the caiculation of a numerical value that is either acceptable or unacceptable."

This assumes, however, that the selection factor system is more than what it r e d y
is - a sociologicalIy based tool for prognosticatiog fiiture success. It is not an infaliiile
measure. How could it be? The real quality that the system seeks to gauge is not capable
of precise calculation. Assessment of language, for example, is not simply a
measurement of language for its own sake. Rather, it is one factor within a larger system
of measures meant to serve a higher objective - assessing potentiai for bbsuccessful
settlementy*.That is the whole point of the exercise. The tdly system rating language
ability, educational attainment, occupational formation and expenence, age and so on is
simply a grouping of individuai indicators seen to be relevant to an overall assessrnent of
settlement potential. To look at any one of the selection factors in isolation fiom ail the

"'

Id. at 74.
stnOr is it? In a iater article, Mr. Rotenberg admits that, when it cornes to independent immigrant
selection, "[s]uccessfiil establishment in Canada is the name of the game." This would seem to suggest that

he has revised his opinion to mcognize that a more hoiistic approach to the selection criteria is appropriate.

other factors simply distorts the value of that factor by assuming that it is somehow
complete unto itseIf. Yet, this is what Rotenberg urges when he cites double jeopardy as
a concept relevant to Independent immigrant selection.
But obviously, the broadness of the selection criteria suggest that more was
intended. Occupational assessment Lies at the heart of the selection system.= As a more
or less objective measure, it is fkee fiorn many of the cornplaints about capriciousness that
affiict a more discretionary factor, like personal suitabiiity. Still, there is widespread

criticism that occupational assessment does a poor job of selecting immigrants." This is
true if what is sought is simply a particular occupational skili set that is readily applicable
to the cment domestic labour market? Manifestly, however, the selection system is
intended to capture more - it is meant to weigh human qualities too, as evidenced by the
personal suitability factor. And, in my experience, the inchoate human qualities, such as
initiative, adaptability, motivation and so on, are actually the most important.
Professional engineers, for example, have enjoyed high occupationai demand on
immigration occupation lists for many years and there is Little doubt that many job
opportunities exist in engineering fields in Canada However, it is not enough for foreign
-

-

-

-

See C.L. Rotenberg "Conundnim"(1988) 3 Tmm. LX. (2d) 238 at 238.

U,Four out of nine seleciion factors are directly focwd on occupation. These are occupational demand,
the educational~trainingfactor, experience and arrangeci employmentldesignated occupation. A afth factor,
education, also obviously has a close comection to the assessment of occupation.
Sc+ for exampIe. CIC "Daily Wrap" (4 May, 1998) quohg a stoly by Adrieme Tanna carried in the
May 4,1998 editions of the Vàncouver Province and Edmonton Journal. According to Tanner, regardless
of the occupation they are selected against:
...rnost immigrants we chose end up driving taxis,delivering pizzas and washing dishes. Former
immigration department program manager Donald Cameron calls the point systern for selecting
immigrants "a siîiy game." Applicants are forced to measure up to "irrelevant"standards for
occupations they'll never work at in Canada, he says.
It is simply beyond the scope of thk p a p a to explore alternative selection systems that might be
devised. Hence, my focus remains limited to the d e of discretion in the selection system as presenly

configured

engineers to simply turn up in the domestic labour market. Some employers, for
example, rnay be skeptical as to the value of foreign credentials and experience and may

prefer a h o w n commodity - a Canadian trained candidate with Canadiau experience. To
succeed, immigrants in this position need to be prepared to compete in the job market.
Though the particularjob qualification is a startuig point, it is human qualities like
motivation, flexibility, initiative and other personal factors which see an Unmigrant best
through the rough times of settlement in Canada and ensure ultimate success.
This point was not lost on Parliament. Though it struggied to fashion as objective

a set of measures as possible, it aiso recognized that the selection system was not
infaiIi'ble. Thus, it made express provision against the possibility of a failure in the rules
for qualification by the inclusion of an overriding discretion in S. 11(3) of the

Regulatiom." If, as Rotenberg asserts, any selection factor was meant to be simply a
numerical vdue and no more than thai, and if the attainment of 70 units of assessrnent

was really a conclusive, magic number, then the inclusion of R 11(3) is redundant. But
they are not. R. 1 l(3) discretion was left to hang over the entire selection system, for use

in a global way, in consideration of the total sum of dl the parts. A reading of that
subsection makes this apparent:

(3) A visa Officer may
(a) issue im immigrant visa to an immigrant who is not awarded the number of
units of assesment required by section 9 [ie. independent immigrants] or 10 [ie.
assisted relative category i m m i ~ t sor
] who does not meet the requirements of
subsection (1) or (2), or
@) refuse to issue an immigrant visa to an immigrant who is awarded the number
~6 See h g v. Canada (Ninisier of Employment & Immigration) (1989), 27 F.TR 56 (F.C.T.D.).
Parliament has recognizcd, through the device of R l l(3) discretion, that ability to successfully estabIish in
Canada is a considmtion that may outweigh other factors, including accumulation of a specified number
ofpoints.

of uni& of assessment reqyiredby section 9 or 10,
if, in his opinion, üiere are good reasons why the nurnber of &ts of assessment
awarded do not reflect the chances of the particdarinimigrant and his dependants
of becoming successfûliy established in Canada and those reasons have been
submitted in writing to, and approved by, a senior immigration officer.

If it is impermissible to consider the individual parts of the selection system and their
inter-relationship, when determinhg how best to exercise R 1l(3) discretion, then what
else is left? Surely Mr. Rotenberg would not have visa officers considering factors
uncomected to the enumerated seiection factors?
3-32 Formalisrn

Nonetheless, the reductionist course has largely carried the day, with the courts
seduced to the notion that the selection system, and use of discretion, should be
approached in a piecemeal way. Thus, the selection factors have been found to be

individual measmes of specific abilities which rnay not be "double co~nted".~"Not only
is this contrary to the intent of Parliament, but it leads to an approach where strict

Zeng v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigation) (199 l), 12 Imm. L.R (2d) 167 (Fed- C.A.).
See ako Ho v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Inmigration) (1994), 88 F.TR 146. The Court found a
reviewable enor where language ability (assessed undn Item 8 of Schedule 1) was considered in an
assessment of personal suitability (Item 9 of Schedule 1). The problem of "double-counting" is also
highlighted in the Immigration Manuais, CIC IM Chap. ûp-5, para. 2.5.3 "Awnaent of occupations",
where it is stated:
The officer must use care to avoid a double asessrnent of selection factors: for example, the
appIicant has already been assessed on their official lauguage capability. However, if the
occupation is such that Iabour market information indicates that a much higher level of language
proficiency is requU.ed to work in that occupation AND the appiicaut has not prepared f?nancidy
or in other ways for these settlawt problems, the officer may consider negative discretion.
The d e on double countmg has been ameliorated somewhat by the concession that a discrete factor,
otherwise assessed on its own, may k considered again in certain circumstances. In particuIar, a factor
such as age, for example, may be considered under personal suitability, but only insofar as it speaks to the
applicant's motivation, resourcefirlness and other qualities that are the cnaof sufh a personal suitability
assessment. Ahmad v. Canada (Mnister of Ciiizenship & Immigration) (1998), 40 Imm L X (2d) 121
(F.C.T.D.) citing Ping v. Cànada (Mnisferof Citizenship & Immigration) (1997), 37 I r m n L R (2d) 135
(F.C.T.D.); Ste$an v. Çctnada (Mnister of Ci&enship Br Immigration) (1995). 35 Inmr L R (2d) 2 1
(F.C.T.D.).

formalism is demanded fiom the administrativeprocess of selection. Though
administrative law processes are intended and designed to be expeditious and less
involveci than judicial procedures, because of the approach adopted by the courts, the
results in practice have clearly been otherwise.

The assessment process is govemed by section 6(1) of the Act. It States that:

...any immigrant.. .may be granted landing if it is established to the satisfaction of
an immigration officer that the immigrant meets the selection standards
established by the regdations for the purpose of determining whether or not and
the degree to which the immigrant w i H be able to become successfully established
in Canada, as determined in accordance with the regulations.
That assessment, of course, is conducted in accordance with section 8(1) which provides
that :

...for the purpose of detemilliuig whether an immigrant and the immigrant's
dependants...wiH be able to become successfully established in Canada, a visa
officer shaii assess that immigrant or.. .the spouse of that immigrant.. .onthe basis
of each of the factors listed in column 1 of Schedule I?
goes on to provide a series of nine factors
Schedule 1 of the Immigration ReguIati011~
against which applications are a s s e s ~ e d .Among
~~
other factors, an Independent

immigrant is selected on the basis of their intended occupation in Canada. To succeeâ,
however, the applicant must possess any requisite training needed for the occupation, as
well as at least one year of relevant experience.
While the Act establishes the necessity for an assessment, it is not just any
assessment which will do. According to Rothstein J., "[a@ assessment is not an informal

This section has been held to place a positive duty upon visa officm to conduct a formai assesment in
respect of any claimed intended occupation in Canada See @ v. Canada (Min. of Employment &
Immigration) (1991), 12 Imm. L E (2d) 172 (Fed CA.).
1"9 For a lipt of the seledon factors agaimt which Independmis are ocorecl, see Appendk A "Independent
Immigrant SeIection Gnd", below at page ???

or preliminary detennination by a visa officer. The tams "assess" or 6'assessment" mean
the process of applying to the prospective immigrant the factors listed in column 1 of
Schedule 1of the Regulations.""

Quite simply then, the visa officer is required to go

through a fomal process of weighing every claimed intended occupation against all of
the factors set out in the schedule. This is so, no matter how farfetched an intended

occupation may be. Because of this demand for formality nom the courts, visa offices

are not able to quickly shmg off unlikely intended occupations by merely pointing out
that it does not appear to be supported by the evidence on file. Instead, a painstaking
process of calculating points and justifjkg the number awarded must be conducted for
each and every potential occupation. It is a not uncommon practice for applicants to list

multiple intended occupations in an application, many of which may have iittle or no
basis in the applicant's educational and occupationai grounding. This is not to suggest
that an applicant should be denied a fair and full assessment for each and every

occupation. However, the question has to be asked whether the ends of justice might not
be just as Mly served by allowing for a less cumbersome assessment process for

occupations which are ill-founded on the evidence presented with an application. An
assessment conducted in accordance with the Immigration Act and Regdations is a sine
qua non. However, to require that it be conducted in a rigid, detailed manner for each

and every part of an application is to impose a formalism that gives no breath of Iife to
the administrative process to experiment with alternative processing methods beyond

those of a judicial nature.
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Issaeva v. Conada (Min. of Citizaship & Immigration) (1997), 37 Imm L E (2d) 91 at 95 (F.C.T.D.).

Another example is seen in the Hoballahi decision-', where the applicant had

been awarded more than enough units to meet the required pass mark in the Assisted
Relative sub-category of the Independent class. Nonetheless, the visa officer felt the
applicant would not be able to successfiilly establish himself in Canada and so exercised
negative discretion under R. 1l(3) to refuse the application. In doing so, the officer noted
that the applicant's spouse had no "work skills" to assist settlement. The Court, however,
noted that the officer had not mentioned in his refiisal letter the assistance the Canadian
relative might provide to aid settlement. To the Court's minci, it was obvious that the

officer was aware of such potential support, since the application had been assessed as an
Assisted Relative. Failure to specifically mention such assistance led the Court to
conclude that relevant evidence, the potential family support, had not been considered?
This reasoning, however, imports to the administrative sphere the sort of
mechanistic approach that is a hallmark of judicial processes. On the facts, one might
just as easily conclude that the assistance had been properly accounted for. Assisted
Relatives need obtain only 65 points overall for a pass mark, as compared to 70 for
regular Independents. In effect, they are given a five point "bonus" in recognition of
potential family support. hplicitly, the officer recognized this when assessing the
appiicant at the lower Assisted Relative standard. However, it is apparent also that in
exercising negative discretion, she did not feel that the family support would be sunicient
to overcome the applicant's poor settlement prospects. To ask her to expressly and
explicitly deal with the issue of family support in the exercise of discretion is to ask her to
Hoballahi v. Canada (Miniiferof Citizenship & Immigration) (1996), 124 F.TK 164,37 Imm LJL
(2d) 98 (F.C.T.D.)(hereinafter cited to hm.LE).

effectively "double count" it and accord it more weight than it was appafently meant to
have?
Un a number of occasions, CIC has attempted to irnplement streamlined

procedures, o d y to £hd that it has nui afoul of the courts' notions of faimess. It is very
much a dance of "one step forward-one step bacK', with CIC and the judiciary ofien
pulling in different directions. The Lam c a s e provides an illustration of this

immigration "two-step." Shui-Man Lam applied for immigration in the self-employed
catego~y.However, his application was rejected upon initial review (or "paperscreening") without the benefit of an intewiew. Lam had failed to provide dlicient
supporting evidence with his application to convince the visa officer that he could quali@
for immigration, even if an interview was held. The Federal Court, however, f o n d that

the wording of the regdations was such as to leave no discretion in a visa officer to
refuse an application without interview. The practical result was that Literally thousands
of failed applicants had to be afforded an opportunity for interview, no matter how

hopeless their chances of s ~ c c e s s It
. ~was an immense exercise for CIC that consumed

Id. at 100.
Offers of support to Assisted Relatives are to be distinguished h m sponsorships under the Famiiy
Class. Family Class sponsorships are formal undertakings, of a iked duration, whereby Canadian residents
and citizens accept legai responsïbility for settling an immigrant and her family, if any. An offer of support
to an Assisted Relative is entirely different in kind It is simply an iufonnal promise of help for which
there is no enforcementrnecbanism under the A c t or the Regulations. Fwther, with respect to the value of
offers of support in Assisted Relative cases, it is interesthg to note that the '%onus" was once set at 15.
Some years ago, however, Parliament evidently felt this overvaiued such offm and so reduced the ''bonus"
to its present vaiue of 5.
594 Lam v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration). (1991), 15 Imm. LR. (2d) 275,49 F.T.R.. 200
592
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(T.D.).
See Department of External Mairs and international Trade Canada, Telexes OSD-0006(13 I~t~luary
1992)and URR-0143(25 February 1992)"New Caii-In Procedures Foilowing Lam Decision". These
telexes provided guidance to immigration missions respecting c d h g for interview appiicants who had
previously been failed at paper-screening, but were to be afTorded an opportunity for interview as a result
of h m .

vast intentiew resources. Just as importantly, it caused many applicants to expend
considerable tirne, money and effort to attend interviews with little likelihood of success.
The necessity for these interviews clearly held out false hope for some applicants and
doubtîess Ied many of them to draw their own conclusions about Canadian justice and

fair play. In the result, a regdatory amendment was necessary to spell out when a case
might be refused in the absence of a personal

The imposition of court-like thinking and processes upon the immigration system

has led not just to increasing fomalism in the immigration system. It has, in fact, also
contributed to the bureaucratization of immigration processes, with fiinctionaria hesitant
to extend themselves, lest they be faulted by the courts. This is evident, for example, in
the standard form response CIC has developed for dealing with representations by failed
applicants. Although in practice such representations often cause a visa officer to go back
and have a "second look" at the file, there is no percentage in revealing this fact, if the
review still results in a negative decision. Under the Federal Couri Act, an applicant has

thirty days fkom notification of a tribunal decision to undertake an application for review.
That limitation period is subject to a form of novation, if the decision-maker responds in
any sort of substantive fashion to subsequent representations." Appeals, of course, result
~6 See immigration Regulations, section 1 1.1, which was promulgated in response to the decision in Lam.
Also see Employrnent and immigration Canada (EIC) Operations Memomdum (OM)IL 92-02
"immigration Regulatiuns. 1978- Amendment " (07 A p d 1992), descniing the problems for the
department arising out of the Lam decision and the necessity for enacting S. 11.1 of the Regdations which
came into effect on February 21, 1992. At 2, it is noted that "Tmmediately ..,[the Lam]decision entitled
all immigrant applicaats worldwide to a personal interview with a visa officer. It has long been standard
procedure for visa officers to paper screen applications and only mterview those applicants who had some
prospect of meeting minimum selection standards.
Because of the serious consequences of the Lam decision for immigration operations worldwide, the
amendment to Reguiation 11 was instituted on a priority basis."
597 Soimu v. Canada (Secretary ofState) (1994), 83 F.T.R. 285. The court distinguished there between a
"true review" and a mere "courtesy response", noting that a true review after reîüsai constitutes a decision

in additional work burdens to visa officm in preparing the file and afidavit evidence for
judicial review, being available for examination on affidavit, and the like. As a result, a
standard form letter is usually issued simply advising the applicant that her case was
previousiy considered on its substantive merits and, where appropnate, for possible

humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The response goes on to indicate that the
matter was refiised on both accounts and that a letter of a certain date was previousIy sent
to her advising of these events. It concludes by directhg the applicant to submit a fresh
application, if new or different information is available."

The necessity of such an

empty reply is obviously a direct response to the technicalities of judicial limitation
periods. Sadly, though, it contributes to an immigration system that is more Byzantine
and less responsive to clients' needs and interests.
3.3.3 Positive Discretion

With respect to the use of discretion in the selection process, however, formalism
gives way to inconsistency. Immigration counsel, for example, are not consistent in their
opinions over its usage. While they are vocally critical of negative discretion and claim
preference for a positivist view wherein the rules are stnctly applied, yet they do not
hesitate to seek positive discretion to allow exemptions fÏom those d e s . Certainly, when
which w i i i start the 30 &y limitation period nuining anew. Likewise, see Dumbrava v. Canada (Min. of
Citizenshri,& Immigration) (1995), 31 hm.LA. (2d) 76,101 F.T.R. 230 (F.C.T.D.), where the Court
refused to entertain an application that was outside the 30 day apped period. For a discussion of the 30
&y Iimitation period, and the apparent perils and probIems it poses forthe private bar, see C.L. Rotenberg,
Annotation to Dumbrava, id, 3 1 Tmm. L.R. (2d) 76 at 77-79. The problem discussed here is larger than
just the example of novation of limiîaiion periods. It accounts as weii for the reluctance of visa officers to
provide explanatioxts m the vernacula.in refusal letters h t might be more meaningfirlto fded applicants.
-ad,
the safe approach is to recite tried and true snippets ofthe Act and Regdations which wiil sustain a
refiisal upon review. Though these meet the court.' reqyirements, they o h are found obtuse and abstract
by applicants.

it cornes to positive discretion, their only cornplaint tends to be that it is not used enough.

Thus it is that positive discretionary policies are the subject of litigation, if withheld h m
a p d c u l a r applicant. This is true to the point where even the courts must occasionally

throw up their hands in hstration at unending attempts to "judiciaiize" positive
d i ~ c r e t i o nand
~ will generally not gant mandamus to force its exercise.'

Occasionally,

though, it seems that the impulse of good judges to want to do the right thing will even
overwhelm this hesitancy.
A case in point is the Ting de~ision~~',
where the Court felt obliged to çuggest a

substantive outcome requiring an exercise of positive discretion. Zhang Xi Ting had
worked as an interpreter, tour guide and French teacher in Hong Kong. She possessed a
Bachelor and a Master of Arts degrees korn Chinese universities and was also studying at

a Quebec university for a second Master's degree. Her application for permanent
residence as a skiUed worker stated her intended occupation was that of an interpreter in
Vancouver. B.C. Though Ting was apparently fluent in the French language. the visa
officer noted that she was much less proficient in Engiish and so awarded only minimal
points for this language. Noting this deficiency and the negative impact it might have on
Ting's adaptation to the predominantly EngLish languagejob market she was destined to,
the visa officer awarded just four of a possible ten units for personal suitability. The end
resdt was that Ting obtained only 68 points overall, two short of the tally for a succasfùl

"
"

See CIC-AU Immigration Message ORD-0361/E,(30 November, 1993) "Rerponrer to Enquiries a f t r
R@aZ Letter fssued".
See the comments of Muidoon J. in Khcllon. supro note 185, regardhg a propensity by counsel to
attempt to bring every aspect of discretion under the sway of the courts.
Young Y. Canada,supra note 14 1.
Ting v. Ourada (Muiisterof Citizmhip & Immigration) (1996), 36 Imm. L X (2d) 197,122 F.T.R. 238
(T.D.) (hereinafter cited to hLE).

"

application.

Citing a lack of good faith in the visa officer's seeming failure to take into
account al1 relevant circumstances (such as the applicant's university training, proficiency

in three languages and adaptability demonstrated by successful establishment at a French
University in Quebec), Dubé J. set aside the decision and ordered a re-deterrnination.
Apparently vexed by the logic of the visa officer's determination, the Court did not leave
the matter there, however. A confuskg discussion of the proper use of discretion in this
case was also offered, together with the Court's opinion as to the fitness of the candidate,

Secondly, the visa officer failed to exercise her discretion under subsection 11(3)
of the Immigration Regulations, 1978 which allows the visa oficer to issue a visa
to a person who was not awarded the required number of units of assessment if
there are good reasons why the number of units of assessment awarded do not
reflect the chances of that particular immigrant of becoming successfb.iiy
established in Canada. A proper aercise of that discretion would have resuked in
the w d n g of two more units s o as to g m t o visa io this highly qualifed
opplicont. [emphasis added]m
With respect, Dubé J. appears to have lost sight of the distinction between the

discretion available to a visa officer under S. 1l(3) of the ReguIatiom and the discretion
inherent in assessment of the selection factor of personal suitability. R. 1l(3) discretion
may not be employed to award M e r M t s of personal suitability, a s he suggests.
Instead, its use is restricted to situations, precisely like the one in Ting,where the
applicant has failed to obtain sufficient points, but appears to have potential for
settlement in excess of that reflected by the total points award. It cannot be used to boost
the number of points actual1y awarded for any assessment factor. That involves use of

Id., 197 at 200.

any discretion inherent within the calculation ofthe particular selection factor. Though

use of the two kinds of discretion is obviously complementary and overlapping in the
sense of contributhg to the final overall result, they are nonetheless distinct and different.

In the end, though mandamu did not issue to compel the favourable exercise of
discretion, the court certaidy left Little doubt for the visa officer about the appropriate
course of action on reassessment.
Negative Discretion

3.3.4

On the other han& any hesitance against c'judicialkïng"discretion f d s away
when negative discretion is involved, particularly when its application affects substantive
o u t c ~ m e s .A~review of the case law makes clear that, in this current era of a rights
sensitive approach to immigration, negative discretion has increasingly fallen into
disfavor with the courts." Accordingly, it is not lightly tolerated and the courts strive to
contain it whenever possible. This reality is welI illustrateci by the case of Chen?

The applicant Chen had been living and working in Canada and the U.S.for four
years when he applied for permanent residence in the Independent category in July,
1987Y

He was i n t e ~ e w e din September, 1987 and received a score of 73 units of

Even some procedurai discretion, such as the decision whether to give an applicant a PAQ or a full
application, may have a substantive impact. As in Choi, supra note 270, for example, handing out a PAQ
had the effect of depriving Choi of a substantive opportunity to lock in his application, Hence, procedural
discretion had a substantive outcorne.
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, of course, has been a major influence in recent years, harbingering
the trend to emphasis on rights. For a review of its application and impact on discretionary decision
making, see generaily June M-Ross, "Applying the Charter to Discretionary Authority" (1991) 29 Alta.
LX. 382.
Chen v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Immigration), [1995] 1 S.C.R.725,27 Imm. LX. (2d) 1, 179
N X 70, 123 D.L.R. (4th) 536, rev'g (1994) 22 ImmLR (2d) 213 (Fed. C.A.), rev'g (1991) 13 h m L~R
(2d) (Fed. T.D.)172.
-The facbl.21 sunmiary provided h m is drawn fiom the hialcourt's decision reported at (1991) 13 Imm.
LK(2d) 174. In particuiar, see ''background fa&" as set out at 174-177.
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assesment, more than enough to meet the 70 point threshold. In particulin, Chen
received seven of the possible ten units of assessrnent for the factor of personal
suitability. At that t h e , he was advised that his application had been provisiondy
accepted, subject to completion of medical and security checks. In September, 1988, his

work permit in the United States expired. By December, 1988, the security checks still
had yet to be c~rnpleted.~

During this long interval, he contacted the visa officer by correspondence on two
occasions and "...offered to pay any "costs or fees" in order to expedite the matter.'-

Finally, Chen sent a Christmas card to the inte~ewingofficer, enclosing the sum of five
hundred dollars in Amencan fimds and thanking her for her efforts on his behalf The
officer brought this apparent bribe to the attention of her superiors, who convened a
M e r interview for Chen, before a more senior officer. He initially denied sending any
money when the subject of the "gift"was raised. Pressed on the issue, he eventually

"One must have some compassion for Chen's plight.

Some eighteen month after he had been given
approval in principle for bis application, he was stiil in a waiting game. Such delay is sure to annoy and
upset anyone. However, it must be recognized that fault for delay does not dways lie entirely with CIC.
In Chen's case, it was completion of "background checks* that held up matters. Those checks obviously
involve verincation of who the applicant is and ensuring that she is not a criminal,security or other sort of
risk to the public health or safety. This may entail complex and protracted Liaison with police, security and
other officiais, both domestic and foreign. Relying upon information derived primariry fÏom other
agencies, CIC nonetheless remains on the firing line for cxiticism with the slow Pace of background checks.
Though most of the work in completing such checks is ofien not within its actual control, yet it is the
agency which must d e r the criticisrns when an applicant is unduly delayed or, worse yet, a war c r i m i d ,
senior official of a despotic regime, organized crime kingpin or 0 t h undesirable is granted entry because
of a failure in background checking. Every case of immigrant pracessing must involve a balancing of the
rigbt of the appiicant to speedy processing aga& the right of the Canadian public to be protected This is
especiaiiy true where, as in Chen's case, the applicant has d e l i i t e l y chosen, for reasons known usuaiiy
only to her, to apply outside of her country of origin. CIC rnakes no secret that processing in such cases is
delayed by the necessity for r e f d back to the visa office having geographic responsibizity over the
appiicant's country of origin. See the procedure described supra, note 458. Thou& delay to the applicant
is regrettable, the bottom h e must favour the security of society over the convenience of the applicant.
Thus, every application kit contains an explicit w a d g to applicants that they should make no
preparations to move to Canada untii they achially have a properly issued visa in band. Chen's frustration
was understandable, but his actions were not.

recanted and provided various excuses including that it was an Oriental custom to give
presents to "speciai niends" at holidays and, later, that it was to cover any special costs,

Subsequentiy, though the second
such as long distance telephone charges or the likeebQ9
officer did not alter the units of assessment awarded to Chen, a Letter was sent to him
refuskg his application. Amongst other reasons, the officer invoked negative discretion
under S. 1l(3) of the Immigration ReguIatiom to refuçe his application, notwithstanding
that he had received sufficient units of assessment to qualifi. In the officer's estimation,
the points actually awarded to Chen did not reflect his true potential for successful
settlement.

In the Triai Division of the Federal Court, the grounds upon which negative
discretion might be used to overcome an otherwise successful assessment was the centrai
issue. Strayer J. reviewed closely the selection cnteria promulgated in Schedule 1of the
Reguiations pursuant to the authonty of the Govemor in Council under S. 114(l)(a) of the
Act to make regulations.6I0 "While it is nowhere clearly spelled ou&'' he posited, ''the

selection standards authorized for use by para. 114(l)(a) of the Act, and the actual factors
identified in Sched. 1of the Regulations appea.to be essentially related to the ability of

an immigrant to make a living in Canada or to be economically sutaineci other than by
the tat te."^" Because of this apparent emphasis on economic factors as an indicator of
ability to successfûlIy establish, Strayer J. found it "...difficult to read the discretionary
power granted to a visa officer by subs. 1l(3) of the Regulations as allowing him to
Chen, supra note 606 at 175.
I d at 176.
610 See Appendix A,below, which provides a Listing of the selection criteria mandated by Schedule 1of
the Regufations.
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ignore the number of units of assessrnent and to detennine, for essentially non-economic
reasons, that an immigrant does not have a chance of becoming successfblly estabfished

in Ca~ada?~ In the result, he held that the visa officer's decision had impmperly
factored in concems about the applicant's potential for "social success" that were
irrelevant to the statutory selection scheme.

In the Court of Appeal, the majority foimd the opposite to be tme and so reversed
the lower court. In their view, while many of the selection factors had an economic

focus, they were not restricted exclusively to such a focus. Social success, according to
the court, was inherent dongside economic success in factors such as age, education and

language ability."l3 The Court also observed that the factor of "personai suitability" was
defined in the regulation~~'~
as reflecting a person's adaptability, motivation, initiative,
resourcefulness and other similar qualities. They were unwilling to accept îhat these
factors were to be Iimited only to ability to earn a living. To do so, they felt, would
unduiy nanow the phrase '90 become successfully estabtished in Canada" by inserting the
word "economically" into it?

Deaiing with a fiirther concem that Strayer I. had about the apparent open ended
nature of the discretion accorded under S. 11(3), Létoumeau J.A. responded by noting that
that section also contained the qualifyllig words "good reasons", and that these acted as a
limiting factor:

In determining whether there are good reasons to so conclude [that the points

'"Chen, mpra note 606 at 180.
Id. at 181.

'"Per Létoumeau J.A. (Isaac C.J..concurring). Chen,supra note 605,22 hmu L.R. (2d) 213 at 218.
At Item 9 of Scheduie X of the Reguiations.

'"Per Létourneau JA., supra note 613 at 2 19.

awarded do not r e k t the immigrant's chances for successfully estabiishing.
either socially or economically], the visa officer is required to form a personai
opinion which must have an objectivity foundation. To put it another way, the
words "good reasomY'import a measure of objectively (sic) in the process and
ensure that the exercise of discretion under subs. 1l(3) is justifiable in the
circumstances and not arbitrary or capriciousOw

On the other hand, Robertson LA., in dissent, refusecl to accept that subs. 1 l(3)
could have been intended to vest a broad residual discretion in visa officers. He stated
that he was "...troubled by the prospect of giving judicial recognition to a criterion which
hinges on notions of "good reasom" and "social success.. ." and "...the prospect of being
called upon to evaiuate the objective merit of visa officers' subjective as~essments."~~
Accordingly, he preferred the approach adopted by Strayer J. in the Trial Division. A

M e r appeal by Chen to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted, with the result that
the Trial Division judgment was restored. Regrettably, the Supreme Court issued no
reasons for doing so, beyond simply expressing a preference for the views of Robertson
J.A. and Strayer J?
Chen must be regardai as an important decision for administrative discretion in

immigration law, not just because it has been followed in subsequent casesdLg,
but also
because of the narrow approach it sanctioned respectkg discretionary power. As was
evident, even an express statutory grant of power was insufficient to overcome deep
seated judicial suspicion of negative discretion. The text of section 1l(3) does not

Id.
Id. at 222, per Robertson J.A.
Chen, supra note 605, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 725,27 Imm.L R (2d) 1, 179 N R 70, 123 D.LK (4th) 536
(S.C.C.).
See Maria Laveiie, b'Positiveand Negative Discretion Under Subsection 1 l(3) of the Regulations" (3
A p d 1998) 3 (CIC) Litigation Management NewsIetter at 2, where the author States that "[s]ince Chen v,
M.C.I., aii subsequent cases involving subs. 1 l(3) have foiiowed the Chen focus on economic
consideratioas."
6L6
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explicitly refer to economic ability to estabîish an4 as Létourneau J.A. observed, the
court was required to employ an ejusdern generis methodology to read meaning into the

gant of powa that was obvious neither on its face nor in ~ o n t e x t . ~
It is indeed the case that many of the selection factors enumerated in Schedule 1
have either a total or partial focus on economic establishment. This is not surpnsing,
since matters such as job skills, training, work experience and the iike are most readily
adapted to a points assesment scheme. What is less easily captured is the notion of
social success - does this person have the wherewithal to get on readily with life in
Canada, both inside and outside of work? This is not an irrelevant or trivial
consideration. As was noted in the Court of Appeal, social success is a consideration

evident in many of the selection factors, alongside the notion of economic success.
Certaidy, the two are not nearly as neatly separable as the Trial Division, the minonty in
the Court of Apped and the Supreme Court would have one beiieve. Successful
economic establishment, for example, must inevitabiy entail familiarizhg oneself to a
sufncient degree with basic matters such as employment and tax Iaws, regdations

..

pertaining to personal hances, housing issues and the like. Indeed, successful economic
establishment must even involve the acquisition of some howledge of socially
acceptable workplace behaviour and etiquette. These d l import a healthy degree of social
--

n for example, Phiùp L. Bryden, "Developments m Adminimative Law: The 1994-95 Term" (1996),
7 SCLX (2d) 27 at 77, where the author notes that fiom the viewpoint of statutory interpretation, the
decision in Chen is ~lllprising.In his view, it is not obvious h m a textual standpoint that R 1l(3)
discretion should be limitted to the matter of verifyïng that the points system is a true reflection of potential
for economic establishmentalone. As a remit, he ph,id. at 77-80, that the decision may be explained as
a reaction to two concems. First is the courts' traditionai misûust of grants of broad discretion, particuiariy
where it is employed in a negative fashion, and a related fear of an increased volume of litigation, if bbsocial
adaptation" was a ground for refusing applicants. Second is concern that the selection system not be used
as an informal mechaniSm for, effectively, delivering punishment meant to protect the mtegnty of the
mu S

Further, it is simplistic to suggest that abihty to economicaIly establish is just a
question of being able to get a job. Assuming that minimum wage standards reflect a
bottom üne, or at least an officially sanctioned one at any rate, as to the level of h o m e
needed to provide a reasonable Livelihood in our society, it is hard to imagine any able
bodied immigrant who will not be capable of establishing economically. Certainly, many

menial labour jobs paying minimum wage require no particular ski11 set or even a . ability
to read, write or speak one of Canada's official languages. As a result, a refusal on
negative discretion wodd appear tenuous for lack of any job skilIs or training.
Certainly, it seems that the Courts went to some lengths to h d sufEcient
justification to limit R 1I(3) discretion in the fashion that was done. Robertson J.A.'s
difficdty with the notion of courts havhg to judge objectively the subjective decisions of
visa officers, for example, rings hollow. It is actually a cornmonplace for them to be
cdled upon to engage in such activity upon judicid review. This is part of the reason that
judicial review claims not to be interested in the merits of a decision, only the manner by
which it was reached. Similarly, the strictly economic focus adopted in Chen appears
repetitive. By judicial interpretation, negative discretion under S. 11(3)(b)

has been

Iimited to the same considerations covered in S. 19(l)(b) of the Act. It reads as follows:
lg(l) No person s h d be granted admission who is a member of any of the
foIIowing classes: ...
pmons
who there are reasonable grounds to believe are or will be unable
@)
or u n w i h g to support themselves and those persons who are dependent
on them for care and support, except persons who have satisfied an
Unmigration officer that adequate arrangements, other than those that
involve social assistance, have been made for their care and support; ...
immigration system.

It is questionable to coaceive that Parliament would have intended to duplicate this

express power elsewhere in the legislative regimeea
Unfominately, Strayer J. and Robertson J.A. appear to have concluded that the
exercise of negative discretion in Chen was Little more than a covert attempt to punish the
applicant for potentially criminalbehaviour, and so used whatever justificationswere at
hand to strike it down." However, this focus ignores the fact that the behaviour
concemed had a direct bearing upon the qualities and attributes being selected for.
Irrespective of whether or not his actions were criminal, the inappropriateness of the
approach made by Chen is strikllig and spoke directly to the notion of adaptability that is
central to the selection criteria Even those who might regard Chen as good law will
likely concede it is built on bad facts.- This was not a case of a confiised foreigner,

hampered by language barriers, and otherwise addled by his f b t encounter with western
bureaucracy. In reality, Chen was a well-educated professional who had been working at

"' This point appears not to have been argued in any level of court in Chen.
Canadian Iaw, there are a couple of possible offences that may have been c o d t t e d by C'en.
Under the Immigration Act itself, for example, S. 94(l)(m) makes it an offence for anyone to kuowingly
induce any person to contravene a provision of the Act Chen's "@Y', of course, wodd have to have been
offered intentionaliy as an inducement to the visa officer to issue a visa somehow contrary to the scheme
provided for by the Act. More likely, however, is the offence of "fkaud on the govement" pursuant to S.
121(1) of the Cnminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am.,which provides:
Every one commits an offence who
(a) directly or indirectly
gives, offers, or agrees to give or offer to an official ...
(0
a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for cooperation, assistance,
exercise of influence or an act or omission in connection with
the transaction of business with or aay matter of business relating to the government ...
(ii)
whether or not, in fact, the official is able to cooperate, render assistance, exetcise influence or do
or omit to do what is proposed, as the case may be.. ..
Under S. 121(3), every such offence is pimishable by way of indiclment and liable to a maximum term
of imprisonment of up to five years.
This much appears to be conceded even by Robertson J A . hmiseif in his diuenting opinion, whm he
States, "[u]ndoubtedly, there are those who wiii view the disposition of this apped in terms of achieving a
just result. My concems are also noted in the prospect of bemg called upon to evaluatc the objective merit
622 Under

universities in Canada and the US.for five years before this episode. His inability to
profit h m all of that experience surely speaks volumes about his adaptabiüty?
Moreover, this was not a case of theorizing as to how he might adapt. Surely his actual
performance was as good an indicator of fbture performance as any selection aiteria that
legislators might be inspired to deviseF Admittedy, it is a set of facts which raises the
interesting7but diflicult, question as to how much immigrants are expected to adapt to
our ~ o c i e t y "and
~ how far society should be expected to accommodate individual and
cultural differences. At a minimum,however, the iine must be drawn at the threshold of
criminal activity.

There is another aspect to the concern that immigration law was being used to
mete out punishment. The c o u -themselves have always had an inherent jurisdiction to
control and protect their own processes, as witness the contempt proceedings in
Bhumager.

It is a jurisdiction, however, which they obviously are unwilling to allow

for administrative tribunals. Speaking from personal experience, the problem of
inappropriate, and even illicif approaches to visa officers in hopes of expediting an
of visa officers' subjective assessments." Chen, supra note 605,22 Tmm. L k (2d) 213 at 222.
a Not to mntion that his actions would have been improper even in his country of origin. Certaidy,

newspaper accounts of official comrption trials in China malce evident that briiery of a pubric officiai is
also an off'ce there, notwithstanding imy custom to the contnuy.
The selection procas is meant to bc a forward looking exercise. Singh (Gunnif)v. canada, supra note
544 at 70. Givcn the prospective nature of an assessrnent of potentiai for successfid settiement, the need
for some discretion is indispensible since the matter entails weighing a variety characteristics that are
incapable of reduction to precise matiiematicd calculations.
Clearly, legislators mtended that some adaptation by the immigrant take place. This is obvious nom the
fact that the selection factor of personal suitability specificaily identifies "adaptability"as a relevant
consideration, though obviousIy the courts have narrowed it to economic adaptability. This is seen aIsa in
statements fiom Parliament that suggest a wider adaptability, invoIving social settlement, is also within the
expectations of legislators. Regdatory Impact Analysis Statement SOR 92/101 (6 February 1992), for
example, in descn'bing various changes bemg made to hmüy dependency defînitions, begins by stating
that, "[ïjmmigrants coming to Canada are expected to accept the Canadian cuitural reality."
AS noted earlier, m section 3 2 Judiciai Review, the prerogative Rrnedies offéred by courts are

"
"

application is fairy common and it is a rare visa officer who does not have a story to
relate about such advances. Indeed, they are apparently sornetimes taken even to the

highest levels of governxnent? It is interesthg to note that at the time the facts of the
Chen case arose in 1988, there were no mechanisms available under the Immigrnton Act
to ded with an act or omission that might give nse to criminal iiability, but which had yet
to be prosecuted. Perhaps in response to the Chen decision itself, the Act was amended in

1993 by Bill C-86m to p h g this apparent 10ophole.~
discretionary and may be withheld, if the appficant does not "corne to equity with clean hands". See aIso
Bagambiire, supra note 151,at 355.
See for example Shar Levine and Andnw Phillips, 'Fitizenship on sale" MacIeun 's (1 M y 1996) 14 at
14-15, which dean incident where even the Prime Minister was evidentiy asked to intemene in an
immigration case:
The image is striking, but not completely revealing. Prime Minister Jean Chretien d e s out fiom
the pages of a Taiwanese-Canadian newspaper and clasps the band of Gordon Fu, the president of
a hi&-profile company that speciatizes in immigration fiom Taiwan to Canada. What the
photograph does not show is that during the private meeting in îhe Prime Minister's Office in
Ottawa on Feb. 28, Fu took the highiy musuaistep of personally handing Chretien a letter asking
that the Prime Minister speed up his application for permanent residence in Canada. Fu was angry
that although he heads the biggest c o d t i n g company in what has become the hottest Asian
market for Canadian business immigration, his own application had been stailed by federal
officials. ... Later, however, Fu achowledged that it was inappropriate for him to ask the Prime
MUiister to intervene in his case. "That is a mistake," he said, adding that bbculturalciifferences"
between Canada and Taiwan accounted for his gesture.
It is beyond my abilities and the scope of this papa to canvas the issue in other than a cursory fashion.
For the reverse twist on illicit approaches, however, see Adrienne Tanner*"Immigration Scaxns Probed"
Ine Vancouver Province (03 February 1998)A2. That story details aiiegations of bnies k i n g solicited by
l o d y engaged staff in Canadian visa offices in New Delhi and Islamabad. According to Surrey, B.C.
M.F. Gurmant Grewal, who raised the aiiegations, the "...hiring of foreign nationais to work at
immigration offices is risky because they have no interest in Canada."
6w Supra note 563.
aoFor a summary of the many changes wrought by C-84 se+ CIC OM IS 93-01(e)of 12 January, 1993. In
particular, C-86 added the foilowing provisions to section 19 of the Act:
(1) No person shall be granted admission who is a mernbcr of any of the followhg classes:
(cl)persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe
(ii) have committed outside Canada an act or omission that constitutes an offence under the laws
of the place where the act or omission occurred and thai, if committed in Canada, wodd constitute
an offence that may be punishable under any Act of Parliament by a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more.. ..
(2) No immigrant and, except as provideci m subsection (3),no visitor shail be granted admission
if the immigrant or visitor is a member of any of the following classes:
(al)persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe
(ii) have committed outside Canada an act or omission that constitutes an offence under the laws
of the place where the act or omission occurred and that, ifcouxnitted in Canada, wouid constitute

Dubious justifications were met also by a lack of balance in the approach
employed. Rather than a fhctional assessment involving some consideration of the
purposes of the legislation and the nature of the problern before the decision-maker, the
Courts' focus was primady fixated on the proceduraï rights of the applicant. When
account was taken of the purposes of the Immigration Act, it was done so in a unitary
fashion, emphasiàng only that the act was meant to facilitate immigration. In their haste
to contain negative discretion, though, the Courts may have failed to appreciate the wider
implications that follow nom the approach employ. In particular, if negative discretion
under subsection 11(3)(b) is lirnited to economic considerations only, then the corollary

must also be true - that positive discretion under subsection 1 1(3)(a) is Wrewise limited.
Judicial interpretation of negative discretion thus seems to have put a fetter on positive
dis~retion.~~'
More generally, by fighting the "good fight" on negative discretion, under the
banner of the rule of law, the courts may have reinforced the notion that a discretionary
policy, at least when it is positive in character, is largely beyond the pale of judicial

an offence that may be punishable by way of indiciment under any Act of Parliament by a
maximum tenn of imprisonment of less than ten years....
Representations on case Nes e x t o h g the social skiils and virtues of applicants are common. For
example, many app1icant.s provide idonnation as to their past participation in volunîary community service
work. In light of Chen, though, such information is arguably irrelevant, d e s s it can somehow be iinked to
ability to participate in the economy.
However, CIC's own Immigration M a n d continues to suggest a holistic approach toward use of
positive discretion. CIC IM Chap. -5, para. 4.2 provides that "[d]iscretion may be used to overcome
insufficient mits of assessment, a lack of employment experience in a specific occupationai group or the
fact that the applicant's occupational skilis are not among those selected as open for immigration." It is
clear fiom this that CIC itselfrecognizes the limitations of the selection system set out at Schedule 1 to the
Regdations and prefers its visa officers to take a broader view of what the appiïcant has to offer. This is
so, to the pomt of ignoring the occupational fàctors which are at the heart of the economic establishment
potentiai that the courts in Chen were so preoccupied with.

supervisionPU Certainly, by shuttuig down negative discretion, it would be tenuous for

them at the same tirne to adopt an activist role to enlarge positive discretion. The best
that c m be done, thaefore, is for the courts to foilow their traditionai course of insisting
only that positive discretion not be unduly fettered. Thus, cases like Chen may also stand
for the proposition that the many positive discretionary policies of CIC are to rem&
simply that - voluntary policies which, subject to occasional interventions by the courts,
immigration officers are largely f?ee to apply or, most poignantly, not apply.
A case in point may be the ment retrenchment by CIC on a discretionary policy

concerning children of immigrant families separateci because of an obligation to complete
compdsory military service. In some countries, permission to emigrate is not given
unless and until the required period of s e ~ c ise completed. Typically, a family that

migrates to Canada before their children are of an age to serve in the military is forced to

leave those children behind*until the obligation is fulnlled. In many cases, such chiidren
have met d existing immigration requirements and are even issued immigrant visas with
the rest of the family. But, they are unable to use the visas because exit permission is not
forthcoming. Lfthe rest of the family has migrated to Canada in advance of a child
gaining exit permission, under the dependency rules contained in the Regdations there is

a possibility that permanent sepration may occur. Upon completion of the military
service, the child often is too old and not sufficientlydependent to qualify for sponsorship
as a "dependa.~t'*~~
in the Family Class. As such, their only recourse is to apply in the

a2The courtr' treatment of applications for "humanitanan and compassionate" consideration available
under section 114(2) of the Act has been marked by a rehctance to a'judicialize"this positive discretion
made. See for example, Yhap, supra note 200, Vidal7supra note 21 1 and Kahion, supra note 185,
a3Defined at section 2(1) of the ReguZurions. The most common scaiano is kt,by the time of

Assisted Relative subcategory of the Independent class. However, if their occupational

background is comprised only of military service, the child is unlikely to obtain suficient
unie of assessrnent to qualify on their own merits for a visa to Canada. Recogniang that
there might be a significant humanitarian component to such cases, CIC had an informa1
policy to favourably process such applicants.~It was a policy, of course, that had no
foundation in the Act or Regzdatio~s.Instead, it was based upon coments contained in a
Regulatory Impact Andysis Statement descrïbing the effect of certain regulatory changes
undertaken in 1992."' Thst policy, however, has now apparmtly been re~cinded.~

completion of military service, the children are over the 19 year age cutoff set by the family class
dennition.
6Y CICs critics might point out that such pragmatistn may only be necessary because CIC has not
implemented d e s in the Act or Regdations to deal with these situations. However, the rejoinder is
contained in an excerpt fkom the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement SOR 92/10106FEB92, the IX text
of which is cited infia at note 635, where the practicai difficuities of cirafting "a definition which would
satisfjc al1 culhual n o m or cover all situations" is noted.
The entire policy of CIC in this nspect was set out in an AU Immigration Mission telex (Mmber ORD0017, O 1 Febniary 1994) entided "Immigration Policy; Overage DependentsY*,
as foiiows:
Several posts have sought guidance on whether to include dependents doing compulsory military
se~ce.,(sic)This matter was deaIt with in the "Regulatory Impact M y s i s Statement SOR
92/10 1 06FEB92" and the pertinent paragraph h m this statement is worth repeating. It reads
quote Immigrants coming to Canada are expected to accept the Canadian cultural reality.
Furthemore, in many cultures, children b e g h working early and are already independent before
they reach the age of 19. It would be impossr%leto corne up with a definition which would satis@
all cultural noms or cover d situations. A person perfonning military service is n o d y no
longer considered dependent on bis parents. Those under the age of 19 at the time of the
application would,however, be eligiile and could come to Canada once they have cornpleted their
service, provided they were stdi iinmamedunquote. The bottom b e , therefore, is that a child
doing comgulsory military service is a dependent only if the parent has submitted the application
prior to the childas (sic) nineteenth birthday and the child remains unmam'ed.
According to this policy then, so long as the parents of a child submitîed an application for permanent
residence in Canada before their chiid attained 19 years of age (the cutoff age for consideration as an
"accompanying dependent" in the parents application), the parents could proceed to Canada and have the
chiid join them later, a h military selrice obligations were rendered In practice, the chiid was required to
subrnit an application as an Assisted Relative, with such application king approved on discretion pursuant
to this policy. Effectively, this left a large window of opportunity for the child that is illustrated by the
following example. If the cbild entered fidi time pst-secondary studies before at&ining the age of 19, the
abfity to qualiS. as a dependent was continueci, smce children of any age continuously engaged in fbli time
sbldies nom the age of 19 are deemed dependent upon their parents. If that chiid completcd 5 years of
pst-secondary education h m 18 years of age, followed by 2 years of compulsory miïitary s e ~ c eshe
,
was mtitled to favourable prorasing at 25 years of age, notwithstanding that her parents had gone to
Cana& some 7 years eariier.

"'

In the end, therefore, the courts' treatment of negative discretion in Chol seems to
have sent a signal to the bureaucracy to folIow the tendency noted by H.W.Arthurs, and
others in the fiuictionaiist camp, to do as little as is necessary to ca-g

out its mandate.

It is ironic that the d e of law approach argued for in cases of negative discretion may
well encourage development of case processing habits in immigration officers that are
more "discrete" than "discreet" in character?'

It seems that the concept of the nile of law

has been left in a weakened condition. The wording and context of s. 1l(3) clearly
suggest that the discretion granted was meant to be a broader tool, capturing situations

that speak to who the applicant is overall. The notion of adaptability, in particular, is
centrai to the power and such adaptability must, of necessity, include some willingness in
the applicant to buy into the fi.mdamentai institutions and mechanisms of our society.

Few would argue that concepts containeci within the notion of the d e of law shouid not
at least point up a reasonable minimum level of "buy in" that rnight be expected. Among

See Lexbase Sending 1998 - Juiy/Augrcst (Vol. 9, Issue 7) at 2, where under the heading of
"Dependencyand Compulsory Military Service" an extract is given of a leiter &ted June 17,1998 fiom
the Director G e n d Selection Branch, CIUHQ to lawyer Peter Larlee. Apparentiy responding to a query
fkom MLLarlee regarding the policy set out in Al1 immigration Mission telex (Number ORD-0017,Ol
February 1994), supra note 635, the Director General states that CIC actually has no policy to grant
favourable consideration to dependents forced to undergo compuisory military service. Though some
missions had processed dependents in such situations favourably for a number of years, the Director
General suggests that this treatment proceeded fiom a misunderstanding of the meaning and effect of the
Regdatory Impact Analysk Statement in question.
637 My thanks to Carter Hoppe, Barrister and Solicitor, for pointing out the difference between these two
adjectives. That difference is apparent nom the following dictionary entries:
dismete (di-Wtt) adjective
Constituting a separate thing; distinct.
Consisting of unco~~nected
distinct parts. See synonyms at distinct.
-dis*creet(dî-skrêt') adjective
Marked by, exercising, or showing prudence and wise self-restraint in speech and behavior;
circumspect.
Free fiom ostentation or pretension; modest.
The American Hmrage@ Dictionary of the Enghfi Language, Third Edition copyright Q 1992 by
Houghton Mifflin Company. Electronic version ficensed h m INSO Corporation. Ali rights reserved.
Cited fkom Microsoft Corp. Bookshelfl996W Edition.

those concepts are an acceptance of the notion of a society govemed by the d e of law,
where each is expected to abide by the laws of the community, to accept both the burdais

and benefits imposed by those laws and to accept that an orderly society involves
accommodation for both individual rights and the nghts of the whole community. And
certainly, the centrai premise of the rule of law is that no one has the right to expect that
they may disregard the law for their own b d t . It is M

y illogical, therefore, that

wihgness to abide by the hdamental d e s of society is no part of the process by
which mernbership is gained to that society.
3.3.5 Personal Suitability
The courts' treatment of R 1l(3) discretion has been mirmred in its' handling of

the selection factor of personal suitability. It is assessed pursuant to Factor 9 of Schedule
1to the Regzdations, which provides as follows:

Units of assessrnent shail be awarded on the basis of an interview with the person
to reflect the personal suitability of the person and his dependants to become
successfully established in Canada based on the person's adaptability, motivation,
initiative, resourcefulness and other sirnilar qualities.
Personal suitability is, of course, the most subjective of the selection cntena and so a
good deal of discretion is inherent in its application. Of the potential total of 97 points

that may be awarded to a prospective immigrant purniant to the selection factors,
persona1 suitability is worth a maximum of 10 points. Because its comparative value is

low, many applicants are able to obtain a pass mark (and to have the interview waived as
a result) even without obtaining any points for personal suitabiiity. Similarly, an

applicant may not be failed for obtaining zero d t s for personal suitability. As such, it is
sometimes necessary to combine lack of personal suitability with section 11(3) negative

discretion to found a refùsal, unless the applicant is also unqualifieci on other grounds,
such as obtaining insufncient uni& overall? In fact, when a refusal is indicated, the
ordi-

visa office practice is to refuse directîy on the selection criteria, if possibie,

rather than on discretion. As Chen illustrates, discretionary refusals are subject to the

strictest smtiny in the courts and so it is infïnitely more defeosible, and simpler, to deny
an application on a strict application of the selection criteria
Because this factor empiuys terminology conceming "successful establishment"
similar to that in R. 11(3), it too has been limited by judicial interpretation to
consideration of potential for economic success alone. The consequences, however, are
even more fat reaching than is the case with R 1l(3) discretion. With this factor, it is no
longer jwt a case of ignorhg illegal or improper behaviour. hcredibly, according to the
case law, a proper application of the personai suitability factor may actually demand that

such behaviour be rewarded with additional uni& of assessment for personal suitability!
In Kim Miilmg,for example, the applicant had been living and working illegally in
Canada as a hairdresser for fifteen years. Upon his application for permanent residence

as a Self-Employed hairdresser, the visa officer awarded o d y four uni& of assessment for
personal suitability. Commenting upon this aspect of the case, the Court stated:
[The Self-employed class, a subset of the Independent]. ..category usually
involves a judgment as to whether a prospective immigrant possesses qualities
(such as resourcefulness) that make it likely that he or she will be able to become

"

For the need to combine low personai suitability with an exucise of negative discretion, see CIC iM
Chap. OP-5, para 4.3. The question of what weight a subjective factor iilce personal suitability should be
@en in any seiection system is obviously one that the legislative dtafters must have considered when
devising the selection criteria. At present, it represents 10 uni6 out of a potential maximm of 97 units.
There is, of course, no one correct answer and everything wiU depend upon such considerations as the type
of qualities king selected for, preferences regarding a d e s based selection system and the like.
"9 Kim Mui (20 March, 1998) Federai C
ourt File No. MM-1079-97 (F.C.T.D.)as cited in Lexbase, (May
1998 Smding) 9.

established in Canada. It does seem perverse that a person who has been
established herefor 25 years was not @en thefiII IOpoints. ... It is clear that in
making thefirst a~se~smmr
the vim oficer was strongb infmced by thefact
that the applcant had been an illegal immigrant in Canadafor so many years.
[emphasis addedIw
The message is clear - those who establish themselva in defiance of Canadian law
actually enhance the chances for a successful application later on. It is incredible to
comprehend that such an inducement to unlawfiil behaviour could be offered by a
regulatory scheme that ostensibly is predicated upon providing for an orderly flow of
migration. In one masterful stroke of judicial interpretation, the selection system is
furned on its head and its entire ralron d'etre undennined. Those who pay no heed to the
d e s can actually derive an advantage over those who do. This illogical and incongnious
result makes a mockery of the rule of law and sen& a dubious message to the world
about how our legal system operates and what Canadian society stands for. And, it is a
result that significantly alters the balance between fadtation and control that is the chief
hallmark of the Iegislative regime conceived of by Parliament. The consequences remain
to be M y appreciated and realized. Clearly, however, they are potentiaiiy far reaching
and could strike to the very fouridation upon which the immigrant selection system rests -

namely, public confidence in the handling of immigration matters."'
3.3.6 The Case for a Rule
The need for shoring up the control side of the Mmigration equation is
particularly acute because of an increasing disjunction between the legislation and the
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Id., 9 at 10.

"' For a discussion of the importance of maintaihg a proper balance between the facilitation and conîrol

objectives, see infia note 68 1 and accompanying text.

way immigration is actually conducted. The move to a more mechanistic approach to
selection has been accompanied by the development of a sort of self-selecting, honour
system, with interviews the exception and most applications proved only by docmentary
evidence. In such an environment, uicreased opportunities for h u d and deceit are
obvious and the tools available under the present statutory regime are not wholly
adequate to penalize and discourage misconduct and h u d .

The present Act and

Regdations were devised more than twenty years ago, in a different t h e , before the
Charter. A time doubtless when it seemed a more certain proposition that broad residual
discretion could be used to papa over any shortcornings in regdatory language. But the
law does not stand still and a new state of evolution in thought about discretionary power
has corne to pass. Broad substantive discretion is no longer the utilitarian tool it rnay
once have been. This alone should give pause to legislators to consider the need for an
explicit d e to protect the integrity of the selection system. However, the problem is not
solely confined to the fact that substantive negative discretion has been neutered. In fact,
it is aiso exacerbated by the trend to reductionism and formalisrn in the courts, which
encourages strict construction of any gromds for exclusion. It is a trend that has severely
M t e d the efficacy of even the few exclusionary tools that are in the legislation.
Section 9(3) of the Act places a positive obligation upon applicants for
tnithfùlness in their dealings with immigration authorities. It reads:
Every person s h d atlswer trutfifiilly al1 questions put to that person by a visa
officer and shdl produce such documentation as may be required by the visa
officer for the purpose of establishing that his admission would not be contrary to
this Act or the regulations.

The courts have interpreted this section to cover only falsehoods directiy related to the

actual grounds for selection. If the misinformation is not material to the grounds for

selection, at the t h e when a decision conceming admissibility is made, then it cannot be
used as a basis for refusal?

Further, it is only falsehoods that concern the applicant7s

own grounds for admissibility that will sustain a refusal?

Thus, even where the

applicant participates in presentation of false documentation to the visa office to support
the alleged dependency of a ciaimed dependant, for example, it is ody the dependant, and
not the principal applicant who may be denied a visa

AU of this fails to recognize the creative ways in which deception is practiced on
visa offices. One bit of deceit, for example, may be used to found another. Thus, an
applicant may c l a h kinship with another person who is not actually their relative. Once
in Canada, the unmigrant may be eligible to sponsor the third party in the Family Class,

even though a proper relationship does not exist In countries where the keeping of birth
and marriage records is poor or non-existent, visa offices ofien are forced of necessity to

rely upon farnily information suppliai in pnor applications to determine kinship in later
sponsored cases. This is just one example and it is obvious that the limits for creative
deceit are expanded where, as in the cment environment of reduced resources and cost
cutting rneasures, it is weli known that verification of information is unlikely or
improbable.
This is not to suggest, however, that unlawful or deceptive behaviour shouid be an
Kang v. Minkter o f Employment & Immigration (1981), [1981] 2 F.C. 807,37 N E 55 (Fed CA.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refùsed 39 N.R 3531.1(S.C.C.),wtiere it was held that Iying on an application does not render
an applicant inadmissible mder section 19(2)(d) of the Act. See also Smdhu v. Canada (Min- of Employment
& Immigration) (1989), 8 Imm.L.R. (2d) 3 12 (Imm. RB.). With respect, the Kang decision is an example of
where technical legal reasoning leads to a disconnection between legidative mtent and substantive justice, on
the one ha.& and procedumi fairness on the other.
6U Mundi v. Canada (Mn. of Employment & Immigration) (1985), 63 N.R. 3 1 4 2 4 DL&
(4') 285 (Fed.
"2

automatic or complete bar to entry. On the contrary. It is in the best traditions of our
conceptions of justice and compassion to forgive and forget. Equaiiy so,however,
transgressions should not be a reason for reward. Rewards must be made to accrue fkom
adhering to the rules, not b m ignoring them. This is fimdamentdy the way a just

society under the mie of law must operate. What might be appropriate, therefore, is
simply that immigration misconduct should be one factor which, legitimately, may be
accounted for in any overail assessrnent of likelihood for successful establishment. If it
involves a matter, such as deportation or conviction for an offence under the Immigraton
Act, for which a separate rehabilitation process is prescribed, then a grant of rehabilitation

would render it spent? h o t otherwise spent, then it should be an item that the
prospective immigrant is required to address and resolve positively. At a minimum, it
should not be a reason for reward. Anything less sen& the wrong message. As one
newspaper editonalist has stated:
We must have d e s for deciding who qualifies [for immigration to Canada] - and
one of the first qualifications rnust be a willingness to live by them. To do
otherwise is UfZfair to the millions of foreigners who would make excellent
Canadians, but patiently wait outside in line for their t ~ r n . ~ ~

The case for an explicit mie denying visas to dishonest applicants is all the more
compelling in the absence of any consensus or plan for regulating the immigration
consulting commilnity and the advantage that has been taken of the reduced ability of CIC

to closely scrutinize each and every application. Certainly, it is a refom that seems likely
C.A.).

This wouid be consistent with the g e n d scheme for rehabiiitation fkom rriminal offences that is
covered by section 19 of the Act. Smce a pardon or approvd of permanent rehabilitation is a precondition
already pardoned cannot not f o m the b a i s for a negative
to the issuance of an immigrant visa, offtkding on personal suitability or settlement potential,
asCIC 'Paiiy Wrap" (05 January. 1998) at 6. quoting an editorial h m the January 3, 1998 edition of the

to enjoy a broad consensus of support amongst reputable immigration advisors who have

been urging govemment action on this issue for some tirne. Cecil Rotenberg, for
example, has noted the need for more stringent controls. Speaking generally about thr
lack of regulation that d o w s anyone to becorne an ' ' ~ g r a t i o nconsuitant, he is quoted

as observing that:

...m h e minister [of Immigration] has refbed to senously consider some
sort of licensing process to regulate who can represent potential immigrants.
Banisters and solicitors, as the only legal representatives authorized by the
province to deal with matters of legal interpretation, are not provided any greater
standing than a 'representative' in a foreign jurisdiction.
As a result, said Mr. Rotenberg, the public has no way of howing who is
sufficiently qualifieci to act on behalfof a potential immigrant. What is the effect
on the cturent systern? 'Traud, like mosquitos, wiii corne into a room through
any crack which is left open," warned Mr. Rotenberg. "And h u d has certainly
entered the room. Just this past year aione in Toronto, I have dealt with countless
cases involving b u d by immigration consultants. And this is o d y what 1 have
seen. Just imagine what else is out there." ...
The govenunent is downsizing the Unmigration rninistry's staff by at least
20 per cent, he pointed out, and is encouraging "risk managementy', a theory that
potential immigrants do not need an interview where their documents are
adequate. ''This is an invitation to more hud,'' said ML Rotenberg. "The wide
prevalence of h u d in our immigration system has helped to create a cynicism by
which Canadians and foreignen alike laugh at our 1aws.'Although part of the answer in combating h u d may be in regulating the
immigration consuking commm.ityyit is unlikely that CIC wodd willingiy assume such a

burden. Certainlysin the overseas context, such regulation wodd only be possible if CIC
were responsible for venfying who the consultant is and whether she has somehow been
properly accredited. However, in an era of cutbacks and reductions, there is Little interest

in acquiring new responsibilities, let alone one that is on the peripheries of the

Edmonton Journal.
Adam Szweras, "Authoritative immigration lawyer calls for ~ f o r mof ciment system" The Lawyers WeeekZy
(13 December 1996) Vol. 16, No. 30 at 12.
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department's real business.
The oniy practical compromise, therefore, is to ensure that a clear connection is
made between the benefit of a visa and the behaviour that will result in its gant. Often,
both the applicant and their advocate may be Iocated outside of Canada and so beyond the
pale of any effective enforcement by our laws. Quite simply, the denial of a visa is the
most direct and efficacious sanction and is more likely to have a salutary efEect than any

other penalty that might be devised. But how best to incorporate a mechanisrn into the
selection system to prevent the "guilty'' fiom being rewarded? Realistically, the tide is
now so generaily against discretionary power that any enlargement of it is unlikely. The
focus on rights that predominates in the current legal and political environment is so

fimiy entrenched that it is inconceivable that the courts might reverse themselves or even
that sui3icient support for such a turn might be found among legislators or the general
public. Moreover, it is not just a question of overcoming reluctance in the bar, the
judiciary or at the political level. Even the immigration bureaucracy is unlikely to
support this option.

The curent direction in immigration matters is to ever more

reductionism and a greater emphasis on rules. The only feasible option therefore is to
create a nile in the legislative scheme to give CIC jurisdiction to protect the integrity of

its p r o c e ~ s e s .That
~ is the preferable method in any event, since it afTords opportunities
for debate and consensus as to what sorts of behaviours are to be censureci, the factors to

be considered, the extent of any penalties and the process for rehabilitation. Clearly,
however, the penalty should involve at lest some period of disqualification h m the
a7See Bryden, supra note 620, for a similar view that the object of protection of the immigration system is
best achieved by express mechanisms incorporated in the Iegislation, rather than by a roundabout method

prize of a visa
But a rule is not enough. The courts will also have a role to play, if system
integriw is to be safeguardd They need to be prepared to adopt a bctional, pragmatic
approach to their review of any cases where a visa has been denied in such circumstances.
This rnust entail weighing not just the applicant's right to a fair process, but also the
objectives of the immigration Iegislation and the public interest in a maintaining a
reputable system of facilitation that involves controls and qualification on the basis of

merit or other stipulated criteria nie weighing m u t also recognize that, at Ieast in the
case of Independent migrants, denial of a visa involves, at best, the withholding of an
opportunity and not a vested right. Making clear that an application can be refused for
deceit or malfeasance, even where the miteria have been met, will go some distance not
only to ensure integrity, but also to restore some of the public confidence Rotenberg feels

has been lost.
3.3.7 Shortwmings of Judicial Review
As is apparent, the process of judicial review has not been one characterized by
much tolerance for negative discretionary action. Many argue, of course, that that is as it
should be. Certainly, the purpose of review is to infuse accountability. Of necessity,
accountability entails the adherence to some standards and limits. Moreover, there can be
no quarrel that it is properly the role of the courts both to ensure that those limits have
been obsemed and, where necessary, to demarcate the lirnits. Still, a serious question to
be asked concerns how weil the courts have perfonned their supervisory fûnction in

using the seletion criteria.

overseas immigrant selection rnatters. More often than not, the atlswer seerns to be that
there is much room for irnprovernent.
The central reason for tbis is that the courts too ofien are ill-infonned of aU the
realities and subtleties of the processes they supervise, or have hadequate information
placed before them as to the signficance of information that drove a decision. Such
deficits leave them ill-equipped to provide balanceci, well-reasoned decisions, based upon
a proper weighting of aU relevant rnatters. The problem of incomplete information about

overseas processes was highlighted by Mr. Justice Rothstein in the Issueva case. In
discussing the requh-ement for assessment of occupations under the regulatory scheme, he
noted that:
[tlhere was no evidence before me as to the amount of time and effort involved in
an assessment according to the Act and Regdations as opposed to an informa1
preliminary determination in cases where a visa ofncer is of the opinion a
prospective immigrant is not qualified in a claimed occupation. I cannot conclude
that cornpliance with the Immigration A c t and Regdations is an onerous, tirneconsuming process that would be uflfeasonable to impose upon visa officers."
Obviously, where there is an absence of evidence, the court will be hesitant to make a
determination that wouid inevitably have to be based upon speculation and conjecture. It
is not surprising, therefore, that Rothstein J. was u n w i h g to grant any flexibiiity in the
matter before him.
A similar problem was evident also in the Chen case. For example, the question

of why the applicant should be rejected on negative discretion when his personal
suitability points were so high was not directly addressed in the reported case d e ~ i s i o n s . ~ ~

Supra note 590 at 96.
Chen received a totai score of 73, with 7 out of a possl'ble 10 uni@of assessrnent awarded for the factor
of persona1 suitability.
649

However, it was very likely a factor in the min& of the judges as they struggled to
rationalize a discretionary power to reject an applicant who had both surpassed the
necessary overall points threshold and who had achieved a very respectable personal
suitability assessment"0 Certainly, it seems illogical that an applicant should have such a

high personal suitability rating while simultaneously being rejected on negative
discretion. Frior to the Chen decision, however, it was not obvious that a low personal
suitabifity score should be a preîondition to the exercise of negative discretion under R.
1l(3). This is particularly tme since personal suitability may not be used to "double

count" other factors?' Given the apparent need for personai suitability to be considered

as a discrete factor in its own nght, it is k l y that the visa officer felt no particular
compulsion to lower personal suitability points, prior to employing negative discretion?

Rather, positive or negative discretion appeared to be the only tool for dealing with the
Anecdotally, fkom personal discussions with c o u w l nom the Department of Justice, 1understand that
this issue was raised at the Supreme Court by a question h m one of the justices. Couusel, however, was
apparentiy unfamiliar with the subtleties of overseas immigrant processes and was able to offer no
expianation why the personai suitability points were not lowered, either in tandem with the decision to
employ negative discretion or alone (to the point where the appiicant would have failed to achieve a pass

mark).
"' See supra note 587 and accompanying text discussing "double-counting".
The case is now otherwise. In Light of this decision, CIC has issued instructions to visa officers to
ensure that an award of personal suitability points is consistent with a decision to invoke negative
M Chap. OP-5,"Independent Immigrant Processing" ,para. 4.3 (ver. 06-97)
discretion. See CIC I
Wegative Discretion" where the foiiowing is stated:
The court [in Chen] observed that it is conceivable that discretionarypower under
R11(3) codd properly be used where an immigrant was so lackmg in one of the factors Med in
Column 1 [of Scheduie 1of the ReguIattions] that a zero rating [for personal suitability] wouid not
adequately reflect the negative impact of that deficiency of (sic) his abiiity to become successfûiiy
established. This point was not specincally argued.
Further it is recognized that the obligation to reduct personal suitabiiïty to zero as a
precondition to the use of negative discretion would be extremely restrictive. Therefore, m certain
instances, you may h d that the use of negative discretion is warranteci aithough personal
suitability has not been reduced to zero. These cases may give rise to litigation on this very point
and cases must be carefiilly documeated to exphin why you have not reduced the personai
suitability assessrnent to zero before resorting to negative discretion. It is expected however, that
cases recommended for the use of negative discretion wiil aiways rdect low personal suitability
assessment.

'total packagey'. Regardless of how many units were received for any particular item of
assesment, and regardless of the total number of points received overall, it appeared
prior to Chen that discretion, either positive or negative, codd be used to overcome any
failings or idiosyncrasies of the points system. Since C'lien, however, no such flexibility
is available to the decision-maker. Personal suitability should now reflect potential use
of discretion, if a negative decision is to survive scrutiny upon judicial review."

This is an unfortunate restriction, particularly since it does not recognize the
realities of the processing system and the peculiarities of the Computerized Immigration
Processing System (CAPS)used overseas for immigrant processing. As was evident in

Chen, processing in an individuai case can sometimes consume a lengthy pexiod of time
and, as in Chen, relevant information rnay not corne to light until after the selection
decision had been made. Although the selection decision rnay be made on one date, yet

the case may not be halized until another more distant date. The most common reasons
for significant delay between selection decision and nnal disposition generally have very
Little to do with the visa office directly, or the visa officer concemed. The two most
common reasons are delay in obtaining background checks and medicd clearance^.^^
Very often these two items are not complete at the time a selection decision is rendered.

In between selection and hnalization, ofien while awaiting the results of either of these
two, the discovery of new information may give pause to the visa officer to reconsider
Although CIC continues to employ positive discretion as a tool for dealing with the "total package",
notwithstaoding the limitations placed upon negative discretion. See supra note 63 1.
OY See imûucti011~
given by CIC to visa officers, supra note 652.
In ih recent reorganizationefforîs, CM3 has made tremendous gains in speeding up the avaiiabifity of
medicd results. Formerly, medicals were completed by medical staffempIoyed by Health and Wetfare
Canada. However, those medical staff w a e intcgrated into CIC and the initiative to speed up medical
clearances has yielded g d results. It is background checks which remai.the single greatest source of

"

whether the selection decision, or at least a particular element of it, was correctly made.
However, the pecutiar design of the CAIPS system renders it difficult to revisit
selection decisions, once they are entered. Ostensibly because of concerns about
manipulation of data, CAIPS was designed to allow only a "once through", linear type of
processing f'ctiona. with data captined permanently once entered?

Iaformation once

entered on the CAIPS record cannot be changed f i e r the particula. activity is completed.

Thus, notes placed in the electronic file cannot later be deleted or altered. Likewise, once
the selection decision screen has been completed, it is not possible to go back and reduce
the points awarded for a particular factor, such as personal suitability" The only
possible way an addition or correction to the points taily can be accomplished is to close
the file, by showing it as "refiised" or 'kithdrawdw, and then reopening it. Such a
process, however. leaves a permanent record on the file that it was closed and re-opened.
Franlcly, a refusal on negative discretion that shows this kind of history is bound to look
somewhat contrived and to raise suspicions as to what actually went on. T'us, a practicd
result of the peculiarities of the CAIPS system is that they place ernphasis on the
--

-

- - -- -

-

--

-

--

dday. For a related discussion on background checks, see supra note 607.
C A P S was conceived in the Iate 1980's as a replacement for a papa based system that was used in CIC.
It first went into service in 1990 in U.S.visa offices. The structurai design of CAPS is not sophisticated
It simply adapted and converted to an electronic format, the various steps that were part of the papa based
process it replaced paper-screening (called the "T-11" stage in the papa system), selection decision (T12)and finai decision (T-13). The papa system was obviously based on the premise that al1 parts of a
processing stage would be completed more or less simultaneously.
M y informai understanding is that CIC was d e l ï ï t e l y forced to design the system in this f&on in
order to allay fears h m the bar and the bench that " c o d o n s " wodd be made to Hes aAer the fact,
when it became apparent that an appeal or review action was to be taken, The CAIPS record fomis a part
of the official He, which is made available m appeaf situations dong with any papa 6ie that may exiSt.
* In f a a 1understand that the question was raised on appcal in the S.C.C. as to why Mr. Chen's points for
personal suitability were not reduced aAer the fact, but that counsel were t.maware of the peculiatIy hear
nature of the C A P S program and so the question was unanswered See also note 650,supra.
To show it as "accepted" resuits in finalization of the case and generation of a printed visa. It should be
recognized also that closing the filein one of these two methods and then reopening it only enables the

-

"

necessity of getting the selection decision "right"before it is entered

In light of such practical consideratioas, it is not surprishg that the officer in
Chen should have prefmed to follow a straightforward path involving reliance upon
discretion alone. Regrettably, the reasons for the lack of a zero rating on personal
suitability were apparently never placed before the court. And, without a detailed

understanding of the fimctioning of the CAISP system, it may have been easy for the
reviewing courts to misinterpret what took place and why. Had a low rating on persond
suitability been present, Chen would have failed on points and the issue on review rnight
have simply revolved around the propriety of the number of units awarded for this factor.
Alternatively, assuming substantive negative discretion would still have been the central
issue, a better correlation between suitability points and the exercise of negative
discretion might have caused a different reaction amongst the judges. The courts might
have been less tempted to read too much into the manner of handling of Chen's
application and may never have gone so as far as to restrict substantive discretion to
purely economic considerations. Either way, it does seem as though Chen is a bad
decision, based as it is upon apparent miscues by the department and a misapprehension
of the workings of the selection system by the courts.
Another example of the courts' lack of appreciation for the realities and subtleties

of overseas immigration processes is seen in the Choi case6@.The appellant inquired at
the Commission for Canada in Hong Kong about the rquirements for immigration and

was given a Re-Application Questionnaire (PAQ). The PAQ is used to enable applicants
seiection screen, so that the points taUy can be manipdated Che notes previously entered in the
electronic file d
iremain extant in the reopened file and may ody be added to, but not altered or defeted.

to obtain an informal assessment of their ability to qualify for immigration, prior to
payment of the significant, non-refûndable processing fees that a regular application
entails."

Choi received a favourable assasment on his PAQ and so later submitted a full

application. However, the Open Occupations L i s P was changed in the interim so that
bis occupation no longer was included and so his application was failed for Iack of
"occupationai demand'?

There is Little to fauit with the court's determination that

faimess required that Choi be processed on the basis of the criteria on which he was
encouraged to apply. However, in obiter, the court went on to specdate that CIC policy
was to deliberately withhold information nom appiicants about the differences between a

PAQ and a full application. In the corirt's view, the PAQ involved less processing effort

on the part of visa officers, giving rise to an irresistible conclusion that intemal
departmentai policy was to favour its use over that of ordinary applications.

The reaiity, however, is exactly the opposite. Because of CIC workload
accounting methods, visa officer preference is actuaily to deal with complete
applications. Officer productivity is rneasured largely via the CAPS system, which
counts only decisions made on full applications. PAQ's have never been rneasured in

CAIPS and, other than an informal, intemal office accomting method to ensure the PAQ

Supra note 270.

"CIC IM Chap. OP-5,para. 2.1, which notes that "[tlhe PAQ serves as an initial means of assessing an
independent appiicant's ability to meet the selection criteria without requiring the completion of formai
applications for permanent admission (IMM 008) and payment of cost recovery fees."
The Open Occupations List contains a list of occupations in which mdependent immigrants may qualify
for immigration to Canada,
Item 4 of Scheduie 1. Failure to obtain at Ieast one unit of assessnent for this factor resuIts in automatic
refusal of the application in accordance with section 11(2)(a) of the Regulations. Only occupations
contained on the Open Occupations List arr awarded points for occupational demanci. The importance for
an applicant to have experience in an occupation contained on the Open Occupations List is therefore
obvious.

ioad is spread equitably arnongst officers, screening of PAQ's generally receives little
credit in the workload measure of individual decision-makers. Raîher than reducing the
worlcload burden on officers, the PAQ actually increases it, and does so in a mariner for
which visa officers are likely to receive linle recognition. The distribution of PAQ's to
the public proceeds, therefore, not from admlliistrative economy, but rather fkom a sense
of client service and an attempt to obviate the impact of non-rehdable fees. However,
the Court's wiliingness to h d ulterior motives suggests that the attempt was misguided
and is an apparent example of field sensitivity falling before appellate r e v i e ~ . ~
The result has been the virtual elimlliation of the PAQ system and consequent Ioss
to applicants of a fiee, expert opinion about their chances for success. Distribution uf
PAQ's is now an immigration post-specific activity, with their use left to the discretion of
individual program managers." While some posts continue to use them, most do not.

The decision in Choi doubtless spurred development of better application materials by

CIC. In particular, application kits are now provided which contain suificient
idormation to enable potential applicants to self-assess their own chances for s ~ c c e s s . ~ ~

The problem of insufficient information arises not only with respect to
procedures, but also in consideration of foreign evidence. The interface betwem

Canadian law and foreign evidence is a centrai feature of selection conducted abroad.
See for example, H. Wade MacLauchlan, "Developments in Administrative Law: the 1990-9 1 Tem"
(1992) 3 Sup. Ct. L. Rex(2d) 29, where the author discusses the dangers of field sensitivity being
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countermanded by evidentiary review,

"S n ClC IM Chap. OP-5,para. 2.1 "Submissionof applications"which -tes:
The use of P r e b n b r y Application Questionnaires (PAQ's)is the decision of the prograrn

manager based upon processing abnormalities at the post which do not lend themselves to the
sending of a self-assessrnent kit.
Though application materiais are now more complete. they are also somewhat more complicated The
formalism demanded by the Choi decision may have served, at Ieast in some measure, to drive more clients

The major advantage of overseas selection is that the visa office, by being located in the
particular locality, is able to develop expert howledge about local culture, customs and

laws and is well placed to assess their significance vis-à-vis the selection criteria
Canadian courts, on the other hand, while expert in the interpretation and application of
Canadian law, are at a disadvantage with respect to foreign evidence. Certainly, what
may seem so obvious at a visa office abroad oftentimes is a matter whose relevance or

importance is obscure and puzzling in a Canadian courtroom. Commonly, therefore,
courts are reliant upon the visa office for an explanation of such evidence. Unfortunately,

the provision of useful explanations is an uneven practice.
For exarnple, in the recent case of Yong Qi B u et al.

it appears that the visa

office did a poor job of leaving a sufncient record on the file to explain the significance
of a piece of evidence that was crucial to the final decision. There, a visa officer in
Beijing found that one daughter had a different 'TIokou" number nom other family
members, which led her to question whether the daughter was tnily a member of that

family. In reviewing the matter, Reed J. stated that he "...could fhd nothing in the file
that explains what a Hokou number signifies.'-

Accordingly, he found the number to be

a c'problematic"basis for rejecting evidence fiom the daughter as to her relationship to
other family members. In other words, the court did not f k d reliance upon the Hokou
number to be inherently unfiair. Rather, it was simply a lack of evidence as to its
significance that led to the rejection. Presumably, had the visa officer done a better job of
to seek the services of immigration consultants.

Yong Qi Zhu et al- v- Çanada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigrction) (14October 1997) Federai Court
File No.IMM-2710-96V.C.T.D.) [unreportedl per Reed J., as cited in k b a s e (December 1997 Sending)
at 6-7.

explaining the import of the Hokou number and any other relevant subtleties of the types
of proof dealt with locdy by her in the Beijing visa office, the result might have been
diffierent-

Clearly, if their decisions are to be sustained on appeal, visa officers need to
recognize the importance of rnaintaining transparent processes that include proper
explanations of the relevance and weight attached to evidence. This is important, not just
because it aids the court, but it also aids Department of Justice lawyers who represent

CIC on judicial reviews. Many of those counsel, like the courts, have limited exposure to
and understanding of the ways and methods of visa offices and the particular evidence

that they deal with. Full and complete information is essential to their preparation, if an
adequate defense is to be mounted. And indeed, the responsibility for providing fidi
information to the court upon review is a shared one between the visa officer and Justice
counsel. The visa officer is obviously best situated to explain and place on the record of
the file relevant local circumstances that have ai3ected processing. However, Justice
counsel, for the5 part, must ensure that they alert visa officers as to any items of likely
importance that have been overlooked or not fully explainecl. Indeed, the role of Justice
counsel, as an intennediary between the courts and the visa office, is to anticipate items
that may capture the courts' attention and ensure that explicit afndavit evidence fiom the

visa officer, explaining same, is placed before the courts.
The problem of inadquate information is one that the courts themselves
recognize, but over which they apparently have Little control. The fault in this respect lies
to some extent with court processes and conventions that militate against a proactive role

for judges. For example, the conventions of statutory interpretation prevent them h m
going outside the borders of a statute to interpret its meaning. Likewise, the court has
Limiteci abiiïty to compel evidence, even when it is obvious that fiirther information is

needed?

However, it is compounded too by a certain hardness of attitude that courts

exhibit towards administrative tribunals. Though the administrative sphere is intended to
be more informal and expeditious than judicial proceedings, the courts have been
reluctant to make many concessions, at least to immigration law at any rate. Thus,

arguments of economic impwticality in canyuig out detailed, individualized processing
of immigration applications have been consistently rejected. In Re Singh, for example,
~ ' ~ that attitude
Wilson J. dismissed such arguments in the context of Refûgee ~ l a l l n s and
has carried over as well to Independent processing."'

Certainly, the courts have been

oblivious to the problems of visa offices in dealing with volume and have tended to be
critical only of perceived shortcomings of visa office practice. It is an attitude which has

required immigration tribunals to behave much like courts and which has harnpered the
innovativeness of administrators to ded with the problem of volume. This has been an

See for example, id. at 7. where the Court speculated about problems in the Beijing visa office. Reed J.
observed:
...that everything about this file indicates a nished and over-hasty decision by the visa officer. It
may be that the Beijing visa office is simply understaffed for the work load It may be that there
are organizationalproblems there. The court cannot h o w what the siîziatiun is, but it looks fiom
the file as though many of the problems that arose with this decision were the resuit of a toohurried review of the applicants' situation and a too-hasty decision malong process [emphasis
added].
See Singh, nrpm note 64. The conclusion as to a possiblejudicuù double standard seems irresistible
when one considen those IcmarkS in iight of the court's decision in Canadian CounciZ of Churches, pro
note 536. Speakuig for the court, Cory J. appears to have reiied upon such economic arguments to
cirruniscribe public interest standing whm he stated, 88 D.L.R. (49 193 at 204, that, "[i]t is essential that a
balance be stnick between ensurhg access to the courts and preservingjudiciai resources."
m 9 e efor example, the comments of Rothstein J. m the Issaeva case, supra note 590, dismisshg any
suggestion "... h t cornpliance with the Immigration Act and Regdations is an onerous and time
consuming process that wodd be unreasonable to impose upon visa officers."

"

especiaIly important issue during this era of declining r e s ~ u r c e s . ~
Moreover, notwithstanding the signincant expertise that inevitably arises nom

deaiing with large caseloads, the courts have been relucfant to invest much confidence in
the expertise of immigration decision-makers of nrst instance. Thus, while greater

deference has been accorded to specialized t r i b d s which courts consider to be expert in
their particular field, it is not every such tribunal that will benefit fiom such deference.

Securities commissions are a notable example of an agency whose expertise engenders
great respect fiom the courts?

in the immigration field, however, the courts have been

loath to accept that either CIC or the IRB are expert panels desenring of any signifïcant
deference6", notwithstanding that they deal with large volumes of cases. This attitude

was captured in Connor v. Canada (Min. of Citizemhip and

where the

Court observed that although volume may generate significant experience, it is a doubleedged sword, having also "a deadening and fatiguing effe~t'*~~
that may duil expertise.

The courts' apparent lack of regard for administrative tribunais has larger
consequences that are not confineci just to the tribunal concemed. Philip Bryden, in an
essay on the Chen decision, posits that that decision was motivated by a desire to provide

For a cogent discussion of the potential effects arising from an insistence by the courtç on formahm
during a perïod when the mourc& of administrative ag&cies are restricted, Ge Richard J. Pierce, Jr.
"Judicial Review of Agency Actions In A Period of Diminishing Agency Resources" (1997) 49 AdL.
Rev 61. Among the short-tenn effects, he cites a potential circular phenornenon where, in response to
judicid criticisms, resources are reallocated wit& the agency to concentrate on those types of decisions
which are regularly subjected to review. This can lead to poorer decision m a h g andorgreater delays in
that larger subset of decisions that are not regularly reviewed The remiction of quaiity mthe larger kbset
then leads to a greater caseload in the courts, as more applicants seck review.
Sec Perm v. British C o l d i a Sem'ries Commission et al., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557; 168 N E 321; 46
B.C.A.C. 1,75 W.A.C. 1; [1994] 7 W.W.R. 1; 92 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145.
m4 See note 74 for a fiirtber discussion of this matter67s Id*
676 Id. at 68.

"

a unifving theory on use of discretion?

He urges the courts, however, to adopt an

attitude in administrative law that is more concerned with individual trees and less with
the forest, as a whole. In his opinion, productive gains are likelier to be achieved by
focusing more on the inevitable subtle variation that is present in every case. Certainly,
this is to the point so far as discretion is concemed. Given its inherent characteristic as a
case-sensitive tool, the courts should be hesitant to extend themselves too fa.in

developing an overarching approach to guide its use. Yet, it must be recognized also that
there is some peril in the path recommended by Bryden. In bis seminal article, "The New
P r ~ p e r t y ' ~Charles
~,
A. Reich noted the problems that arise when courts approach each
case as unique, concerning only the particular litigants uivolved, and having no broader
'public interest" implications. In his view, such an approach is based upon a

"fundamental fdlacy" that involves a narrowing of the public interest to an irrelevant
point.

The Chen decision may actually involve a blend of the problems identified by

Bryden and Reich. As Bryden states, the courts in Chen were at pains to offer an
ovemching approach to discretion. However, it appears that it was an approach driven
equdly by a suspicion of discretion and by a desire to place rights out of the reach of
discretion. Thus, the u n i m g theory may be as much about protecting Bghts as it is
about discretionary power. Moreover, it is a result that appears to be based upon the
f d a c y described by Reich, ~ 4 .scant
h regard having been given to the public interest?

.

note 620 at 80.
(1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733 at 776-7. Reich's work provides a now ciassic view of the c o ~ e c t i o n
between
the growth of governxuent Largesse and the rise of the admmistrative state.
The problem of public interest standing m immigration rnatters is suggestive also of a buy-in to Reich's
6n Supra

The public is intimately af5écted by immigration and so, not unreasonably, has an

expectation that the program is being managed on their behalfin an orderly fashion,
consistent with the legislation. This necessarily involves not just facilitation, but also
control.
Moreover, while the Court in Chen brushed aside concerns about a just resdt in
favour of judicial convenience~it was clearly a choice made without regard to the larger
public interest in immigration ma-

and any damage that might be inflicted on it. The

Immigrnton Act and Regulations are shot through with oppominities for discretionary

processing outside of the normal operation of the d e s . By including such opportunities,
it is clear that Parliament intendeci that immigration processing include not just a fair
process, but aiso some measure of substantivejustice. It is an intention, however, that

has apparentiy eluded the courts. In their desire to protect rights, they have been b k d to,
or have deliberately overlooked that the public interest in immigration includes a desire
that real justice be done. Certainiy, the popular understanding of our immigration Law is
that it is meant to facilitate entry of deserving persons while simultaneously excluding the
undeserving. More sirnply put, these are the notions of control and facilitation which are
at the heart of the current immigration regime.

The evidence for this view is to be f o n d

everywhere in the press. The public is outraged whenever bureaucratic obstinacy denies

entry to apparently deserving applicants. But the public is equally outraged when
criminals or other undesirables are let in. Quite obviously, the public interest is
faiiacy. See for example, the decision in Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 536, where the
Supreme Court of Canada, in the context of a chailenge to provisions ofthe hmigrntion Act, dealt with the
issue of public interest standing. That decision makes clear that mterestedthird parties wiu not easiiy gain
standaig.

stimulateci whenever a discomiection betweai their perceptions of immigration processes

and the reality of those processes occurs. Decisions that focus exclusively on process and

take no heed of substantivejustice ru.the risk of erodiug public confidence in the ability
of government to exercise control over immigration. And that is a high stakes game with
potentially fa<.reaching consequences. As the United Nations has noted, balancing
facilitation and controi are essential to the "immigration contracPt which exists between
the Canadian Governrnent and the public. That contract engenden high public support

for high levels of immigration primarily because of the appearance that those charged
with carrying out the policy are exercising some control.

Further, the courts have employed a two pronged approach that has sought to keep

positive discretion broad, while simuitaneously narrowing negative discretion. This
approach has also served to de-emphasize the broader goals and purposes for which
immigration is undertaken and contributed to a seeming lack of balance between the
wider interests of Canadian society and the rights of individual applicants. Moreover, the
formalistic approach of the courts to applicant nghts has been pursued without concem
for the means and ability of CIC to respond, and without regard for administrative
flexibility and what might be just and appropriate in the particular circumstances. This
approach has occasiondly forced CIC into a game of legislative amendment, creating a

-.

new, more specific d e whenever the consequences of a court decision constraining
See the conmients of M . .Justice Robertson in Chen, cited supra at note 623.

"' UNEfCR, 'TheState of the World's RejÜgees 1995 (Mord: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 2 12,
where it is stated: 'Vnder the ~ ~ I I Kof
I Sthis arrangement [ie. the '"immigrationcontract''], immigration is
carefûlly controiled,but diowed on the basis of openly-stated criteria: family reunification, labour
r e m e n t s , exiucational anci profesrionai qualifications, iinguistic c o ~ e t m and
a employment-creating
capitai." The article gws on to note, at 213, that the value of such contracts has been recognizedby the
Director General of IOM who sees them as contriiuting to the goal of orderly worldwide migration

discretion have simply not been reconcilable with the public interest or the cause of
administrative flexibility? Usually, of course, the discretion in question has involved
practices seen as adversely impacting the rights of applicants. The resuit is a potentially

spiraling circle of judicial action and legislative reaction that has a net effect of increasing
the complexity of immigraton Iaw and d e s . This is ironic, since there are few who
would agree that increased complexity is a desirab1e feature of any immigration system.
CertainIy, it leads to the formalism that is captured in the epithet "bureaucracy" often
thrown out in fhstration by those who have been stymied by seeming indifference and a

wall of Iegal jargon.
Courts need to be mindful, therefore, that the limits of discretion implicate the
public interest and that it is not always just a case of how best to contain discretion.

Thus, they might do well to follow a course of action that blends the approaches
suggested by Bryden and Reich. The focus indeed should be on individual trees, but
there should be awareness also that there are always two trees to be considered. The
proper line is to give consideration to the needs and interests of both, and to strike a
balance that is reasonable and just for both. Margaret Young has noted in her treatise on
Constitutional issues in immigration law that it is a "very Litigious field'-

of law whose

increasing complexity is to be seen in the size of its goveming statute.* That

processes.
case in point is the Lam decision, where the Court refùsed to accept that there could be any discretion
in visa officers to refbse an applicationwithout interview. For details of this case and the reaction it
provoked fiom CIC, see supra note 594 and accornpanying text.
au Supra note 11 1 at 2.
6U Id, at 3, where the author notes that the Immigrufion Act mcreased in size between its 1952 and 1978
versions fiom 34 pages to 122. This, of course, taices no account of the compendious regdations, policy
manuais, operations memoranda and other materials issued to guide irnplementation and application of
Canada's immigration program.
6a A

litigiousness and complexity has seen opportunities for the courts tu exercise their
supervisory h c t i o n in immigration matters expandexi and increased. With respect to
discretion, it is obviously a supenrisory fiinction that they have engaged actively. It is no
exaggeration to Say, thmefore, that sorne of the most sipnincant lirnits on discretion have
been those set by the courts. And yet, if the series of misapprehensions which Chen was

founded upon are any indication, both administrators and courts should be hesitant to find
too much precedent, not just in Chen, but in any particula. case involving the use of
discretion.
This is not to be overly critical of the courts. A fia& assessrnent must be that
they do the best they can with what they are given to work with. However, as was
demonstrated in Issaeva and Zhu, the courts themselves are often acutely aware of the
shortcomings in their understanding of the processes they supervise and the fnistration

evident in those cases must be seen as something of a cry for help. As I have suggested,
some of the help must corne h m CIC and its counsel, who need to make more effort to
ensure that the courts are given full and complete information. Likewise, however, the
courts need to show more flexibility and employ a more holistic approach to immigration
law - one that strikes a better balance between the interests of applicants and of society.

Fair process is essentiai, but that is not enough. It is tirne to consider also the need for
substantively good decisions, right for both Canada and the individuals concemed. The
starting point must be a better appreciation of the unique considerations that apply to

Independent immigrant selection. The nght of Independent applicants to a faK process is
beyond reproach. However, it must be recognized also that this nght is not incompatible
with substantivejustice. This is especially tme when one considers that these are

applicants with no higher vested interest. By definition, they do not have a close
conuection to Canada and their selection is conducted largely for reasons of national
interest. The only red consequeme to them of a negative decision is the loss of an
opportunity to migrate. Accordingly, the courts should be prepared to p

t more leeway

to decision-makers with respect to discretionary power. 1do not suggest, however, that
they abdicate their supervisory role. However, if more latitude is granted, it may provide

encouragement to fùnctionaries to take more risks and to more effectively and actively
engage their discretionary authority.
The hctionalist school of jurisprudence has argued in favour of a different

supervisory mechanisni for administrative tribuaals than that of judicial review.
However, in my view, there is not enough wrong with the institution of judicid review to
warrant its wholesale dismantling. The necessity of a fair and reputable review process is
obvious - visa officers are not infallible. This is not a case of admitting incornpetence or

incapability. It is simply a reality that the complexity of the law, the weight of
institutional pressures, and a host of other factors ensure that not every decision in every
case is uitimately the right one. It is so in every other area of law and it is no different in

immigration law. Further, the alternatives to judicial review do not appear to offer any
greater hope of rectitude, acceptance and satisfaction than the courts. And it is not that
the courts are incapable or u n w i h g to serve the ends of justice. Recognizing this, the
alternative is clear. The cumnt mechanisms must be made to pdorm at optimum
efficiency. At a minimum,this requires better information before the courts and a better

understanding of the processes they supervise.

3.4

ExfraJudiciaI Influences on Discretion
While this chapter has focused much on the limits set for discretionary power by

the courts, it is important dso to recognize that there are other actors, outside of the
judicial sphere, who have a role to play with regard to those Limits.
3.4.1

The Minister
Accepting the sociological thesis that the discretion of a visa officer is Likely to be

iufîuenced by a host of factors and inputs, and if such influences can be conceived of as a
pyramid of persuasion, with the greatest influence and control found at the pinnacle, then
it is obvious that the Minister of 'Immigration stands alone at the summit. Legally and

politically, it is she who bears ultimate responsibility in the courts, in ParliamenP and in

the forum of public opinion, for each and every exercise of dismetionary authority. It is
to her that discretionary authority, both substantive and procedural, is granted under the
Act and Regulations and it is through her delegation that such power is passed on to lower

level officials.
Though the Minister's office is large and she is assisted by an able contingent of
officials, it is simply not possible for her to attend personally to every case that might
warrant an exercise of substantive discretion. As a r e d t , direct exercise of discretion is
limited by her to exceptional circumstances. In Independent cases, her involvement
typically arises in one of two ways. Either the application irnplicates some form of
- -

- --

--

asUnder the Act, for example, the Minister is required yearly to provide Parliament with the foïlowing:
1. An immigration plan detailing estimates of immigration leveis for the coming year s.7; and

-

A report detailing how many Minister's Permits have been issued to inadmissible persons in
the previous year, and the reasons therefore - S. 37(7).
For more generaliy on the responsïbilities of Ministers and the role ofParliament as a fonn of extra2-

inadmissibility which requires her sanction alone to overcorne or representations are
made directly to her office for a dispensation or other action. In cases of inadmissibility
requiring her direct involvement, the matter is straightfomard. She retains authority to
approve or deny entry and is fkee to follow the dictates of her conscience. Though she
will be idionnecl by the recommendations of the field officer, she may choose to ignore

such recomrnendation~.~
In other instances, where her authority has been delegated, it is rare that she will
intewene directly to instruct a local office how to act. More ofien, her involvement in
delegated decisions arises once a negative determination has been reached. For example,
the visa office rnay be unwilling to grant approval of rehabilitation in a minor criminal
conviction case or may be unwilling to extend discretion under sections 2.1 or 11(3) of
the Regulatiom. There is nothhg to prevent an applicant from approachhg the
Minister's office to plead for reconsideration. Though it is u n d for the Minister to act
unilaterally in a substantive way, it does regularly happa that she will be swayed to
recommend a second look by the visa office. Her procedural discretion thus seems to be

easier to cal1 upon. And, fkankly, once the Minister's attention has been drawn to a case,
it does place some pressure upon the examining officer to at least ensure that fûU and due
consideration is given the matter. Further, her scrutiny often serves to ensure that prompt
attention is given to an application that perhaps has been overlooked and lying moribuud.
judicial control, see de Smith, supra note 190 at 37-40.
See Larng, supra note 235. The refitsal of discreîionary relief by higher officials, notwithstanding the
recommendation of mvestigating officials is not uncornmon- Under a previous Minister, for example, it
was difficult to obtain approvaI for rehabilitation of impaired driving convictions. Presumably, in an
atrnosphere of heightened a w m e s s of this issue in Canada, tliese types of convictioas were seen as too
poiïticatly sensitive. This result foilows, of course, from the principle that discretion may not be uuduly
fettered, Hence, notwithstanding any report by an investigating officer, the dtimate hoIder of the authority

Either way, her interest generally will galvanize the attention of her officiais and ensure
that the strictest level of faUness is observed.
Appeals to the Minister for exercise of her positive authority are regdarly made

by applicants who have failed to qualify for immigration in the ordinary course. Where
she does not choose to exercise that authority in favour of such an applicant, resort is
sometimes had to politicai action to force her hand. Media coverage, for example, is
often sought by failed inland claimants as a means of capturing the Minister's personai
attention, or even embmsing her to action. This type of action generally works best

where the applicant can present sympathetic circumstances that touch the public heart and
mind. Sometimes, this is done in spectacular fashion where, for example, failed Refugee

claimants subject to removal seek sanctuary in churches. This approach relies on the
applicant's ability to generate suflicient media coverage in Canada and so is not much of

an option for applicants located outside the ~ o u n t r y Even
. ~ for those within Canada, the
efficacy of this approach is mixed at best. The Minister will naturaily be hesitant to
accord special treatment to any particular individual. To do so would be to encourage
simila.applications and could, in the long run, detract fiom the integrity of the regular

s a result, many of the sanctuary seekers h d that they have simply traded
p r o ~ e s s .A~

.-

--

.--

- --

-.

--

m u t act mdependently.
Independent applicantsare a d y residmt in Canada, on mident or
Though it k to be ioted that -y
employment authorizatio11~,or even without statu, at the same time that their applications are in process at
a visa office outside of Canada.
The slippery slope of exceptions is to been sem in a recent news story conceming a famîly that has
taken church sanctuary. Advocates in that case are guoad as saying that the d e s must bt "bat"to aUow
them to stay in Canada, because a simiiar exception was apparentiy made for another family in Wrc
c ~ c e s See
. CIC "Ddy Wrapn (14 Juiy 1998) at 3, cihg a story âom the July 13,1998 edition of
the St.John TeZegraphJountd

"

one unhappy fate for an equally unhappy one of seIf-imposed imprisonment.~

The nature of discretion is such that it leaves the Minister subject to criticism
fiom both sides of the debate. For example, she rnay be cxiticized for being too fiee with
I

her discretion in issuing Minister's Perrnits to facilitate the entry of convicted criminals to
Canada?

Yet, at the same tirne, the same critics may decry failure to exercise discretion

on behalf of someone who has taken church smctuary. The task of answering these
cxiticisms is made even more difflcult because of the Privacy Act, which prevents the
govemment nom publicly disclosing any information relating to a particdar applicant.@'

Thus, while the applicant may seek out notoriety in the media, the department's response
to allegations of application mishandling, or even abuse of discretion, must often be

Limited to a simple 'ho comment", if consent to disclosure of information has not been
given.
Additionally, political action is not simply limited to the device of putting
departmental policy or practice under the intense glare of media and public scrutiny.
Other fonuns exist as well to attempt to exert influence on discretionary authority,

For a recent example, se+ CIC "Daily Wrap" (2 Aprii 1998) at 3, quoting a story from the A p d 2, 1998
edition of the The Toronto Star. It details the refiisal of the Minister to gant a stay of deportation for a
Palestinian family that has taken up sanctuary in a Toronto church. The Miaister's lack of inclination to
budge on such matters, of course, leaves her subject to much personal Criticism. The article, for example,
quotes immigration Iawyer Mendel Green as saying that "This is the most hard-hearted minister 1have
corne across in my 38 years of practising."
6x1See, for example, CIC "Daily Wrap" (9 June 1998) at 1, citing editoriais from the June 9, 1998 editions
of the Ottawa Citizen and Ottava Sun criticking the Minister for being too lax in issuance of Minister's
Permits enabling convicted criminalsto enter Cana&.
For more on the Priwcy Act and the privacy rights of mdividuaIs, see below section 3.4-4
Human
Rights, Privacy and Access to information Because of an applicant's right to privacy, it is also the case
that individuai departmental decisions are udikely to be ever chaiienged by anyone, Save the appiicant.
Even if some member of the public did leam of an individuai decision which they wished to chalienge, it is
unlikely that they would ever gaining standing to pursue an action. See Canadian Council of Churches,
supra note 536 where the court seiterated the criteria applicable to the question of standing and evidenced
an unwiilingness to tolerate lightly interventions by third parties not directly impiicated in a suit.

@'

sometimes on a broader scale, so as to effect systemic change. De Smith,for example,
observes that judicid review has often been employed as a fonn of political action?
Those dissatisfied with the state of the law, including immigration law, have sometimes
chosen to employ judicial review as a means of holding up govemment policy and
procedures to scmtiny and embarrasment. He notes, however, that while such action
may have a salutary effect in the short term, it often achieves littie of lasting
consequence. This is so, since the govemment often may cure any defect by the simple
expedient of amending the la^.^^ Sometimes, however, the change is more substantial

and long-lived. A notable Canadian example is the Singh case, which led to the creation
of the IRB and implementation of more extensive safeguards for consideration of claims
by refbgee claimants. More commonly, however, lasting change is best ef5ected where

the judicial intervention is more narrow and focused, such as in the matter of construction

and interpretation of a provision. Such a result is evident, for example, with respect to
the negative discretion accorded to visa officers under section 11(3) of the ReguIati0n.s
and the manner in which it has been namwed by judicial interpretation?
3.4.2 Members of Parliament

While the Minister is often too busy herself to attend personally to individual
cases, the case is quite the opposite for Membm of Parliament (M.P.)?

In Independent

De Smith, supra note 190 at 23.
S a for example, the h m case, supra note 594, which made interviews for assessing the factor of
"personal suitability"rnandatory. To overcome this re@emenh section 11.1 was added to the
Regulations.
See discussion in section 3.3.4 Negative Discretion, above.
65~' hdeed, one of the fïrst place many applicants seek assistance in immigration matters i
s at an M P . 3
office. See for example, the advice of colimmist Joe Serge in the Toronto Star (October 25, 1997 edition)
advising one reader, seeking advice on how to accelerate processing of his wife's application for

cases, the assistance of an M.P. is usually sought by a relative or Wend of the applicant
who is resident in Canada. The importance of the immigration portfolio varies among
electoral ridings. dependhg upon the immigrant make up of each riding. In the large

urban centers of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, however, immigration cornplaints
and requests for assistance can form up to 80% of an M.P.3 constituency w ~ r k i o a d . ~

Because of this, many ME'S and their staff spend a great deal of thne preparing and
submitting representations on immigration cases. Indeed, such representations may

number into the tens of thousands in any given yearY The nature of those
representations range fiom simple queries regarding status of an application and the stage
of processing it may be at, to pleas for reconsideration of failed applications and requests
for favourable discretionary pro~essing.~
The quality and efficacy of M.P interventions, of course, varies widely. The most

effective seem to be those who undertake a thorough examination and are familiar with

the rnerits and demerits of a case before approaching the responsible visa office. In rny
experience. however, this sort of cornmonsense approach escapes too many M.P.3 and so

permanent residence, to contact his local M.P. Cited fiom digest of article as given in CIC "Daily Wiap"
(27 October 1997).
W6 See **Ire
over Immigration" Macleans (20 Ianuary 1997) 14. According to Toronto MI.Demis Milis,
the time consumed by immigration issues is so vast that his oflice has little attention to give to other issues.
Fmstrated, Mills pins much of the blame for his workload on the cutbacks that have been experïenced by
CIC in recent years. The article quotes a disgusted Miils as saying that this immigration workload "...is a
most unfair demand on MPs." He ad& that it is time for money to be put back into CIC "...to relieve
politicians of their burden." The article concludes by noting the importance of the immigration issue for
many M.P.'s. In Milis' words, "[tJhings don't look too good for any of us FIP.'S]...if we can't deliver on
immigration files."
For example, in 1997 the visa officein New Deihi, India aione received over 4000 representations fiom
M.P.'s. My thanks to Mr.Jean Roberge, immigration Program Manager, New Delhi,for this information.
Ironicaily, to an outside obsmcr, it might appear that, in the Canadian legal system, a trafnc ticket is a
more Unportant matter than a grant of permanent residence and, ultimattely, of citizenship. This is so since
M9.% are forbidden fiom intervening in regular court processes, yet may legitimately attempt to idluence
immigration decision malters.

greatly blunts the force of their interventions. Like any other advocate, M.P.3 need to
appreciate that there is often more depth to a case than may be apparent h m hearing one
side only. Reacting to constituent concems is, of course, part of the hinction of an M.P.
However, an effective, good faith intervention demands more than simply pummehg an
immigration officiai for claimed delay or mishandling. While it may play well back in
the constituency, the confbntational style is rarely efficacious. Substantive discretion is
more often effectively manipulated by reasoned, logical arguments, and less often by
irnpassioned rhetoric. UnfortunateIy, it seems to be a rare M P who will have spent any
time grasping the substantive aspects of a case.
Frankly, the object of the exercise too o h seems to be simply one of giving the
appearance to a constituent that something substantive has been done on their behalf by
the M.P.3 office. It is an appearance that is also reinforced by the apparent abandon with
which M.P.'s will give personai references. Quite commonly, M.P. 's offer personal
assurances and character references, either for the applicant (less cornmon in Independent
cases for the obvious reason that the applicant is not in Canada and so unlikely to be
known by the M.P. directly) or, more commonly, for the Canadian "sponsor"and the
depth of their cornmitment to supporthg the appiicant?

Such approaches, of course,

decrease in efficacy with the number of references and assurances an M.P. is known to

give. Although, a s a matter of departmental policy, CIC has undertaken to respond
within several days to M.P. representations, no other special consideration is given to
There is no accountability on M.P.'s for the refefences they provide in support of immigration
applications. It is a problem that is seen most giaringiy in applications for visitor visas. Typicaily, an M.P.
wiii provide a character reference for the famiiy to be visited in Canada and a bold personal assurance that
any terms placed upon a visa issued to the applicant will be sttictiy observed. When the visa applicant later
699

them. M P . 3 are simply one other interested party to whom an official may be
accountable - nothhg more or less. They have no ability to demand a particula.
substantive o ~ t c o m e For
. ~ these reasons, then, it is not ofien that M.P.'s are able to
idluence substantive outcomes in immigration cases.
Although, as Page confknsml,the ability of M.P.'s to influence particular
outcomes is doubtful, they are clearly effective as a .oversight mechanian to ensure that
cases are not overlooked or forgotten. Their position and profile is such that their
representaîions carry significant weight, at least in so far a s procedural matters are
concemed. They have access to the Minister and the public forum of Parliament, and so
hold a tnunp card to ensure that any dereliction of duty, or even simple mishandling, will
not go unnoticed. AccordingIy, their interventions can be a usefbi and economical means
for asserthg control over discretionary power, at least to the extent of ensuring integrity
in its application. The attentions of an M.P. may spur new action on an application that

has languished for want of attention, with the result that an overdue processing step may
be taken. Altematively, such attentions may serve also to ensure that scmpulous faUness
is adhered to in the exercise of substantive discretion,

overstays in Canada or otherwise fails to observe those terms, there simply are no consequemes to the M.P.
For an article discussing generaUy the role of M.P.'s as a form of redress outside of the courts, see AIan
C. Page, "M.P.s and the Redress of Grievances" (1985) Public Law 1. This article observes that M P . 3
really came to be inundated with requests for ilssistance 2Lfter the Second World War, with the rise of the
welfare state. interestingly, the article, (though speaking of Britain but with similar applicabiiity to
Canada) doubts that Ml'. representations resuit in many diffefent decisions than would otherwise have
been the case. Though it seems that such intewentions make iittle différence to actuai outcomes, the author
does still note a number of advantages, such as making constituents feel better by having someone that will
l i s t a to them.
mi rd.
'O0

3.4.3 The Role for Counsel
As discussed earlier, the continuhg cutbacks in CIC have fuel4 increased roles

for lawyers and consultants." CIC no longer has the capacity to provide individualized
service, information and counseling. The result is a potential bonanza for lawyers and
consultants. However, these two groups have so far shown little aptitude for capitalking

on the new opportunities. In the case of la-,

a large part of the prublem seems to

stem from a lack of attention to details and an hability to get over an adversarial
are trained as litigators and spend most of their careers dealing with
m i n d ~ e t .Lawyers
~~

judicial and quasi-judicial types of triblmals where formality is the nom and there are
often opposing parties to be represented. The visa application process, however, does not
fit into such a mold and lawyers seem to have difficulty adjusting to this.

-

-

The role of immigration c o d t m t s who are not lawyers has recently been called into question by the
decision in Law Society of B. C. v. Mangat (14 August 1997) Vancouver Docket No. Cg32910 (B.C.S.C.)
[unreported]. In that case, the Law Society sought and obtained an injunction to prevent the defendant, a
non-iawyer, fiom representing clients at immigration hearings. in granhg the injunction, the court agreed
that the Immigration Act does not authorize non-lawyers to represent clients, for a fee, in such hearings.
Further, the court found that even if this reasoning was incorrect, federd law, such as the Immigration Act,
couid not be used to trench upon an area of provincial jurisdiction, such as regdation of the Iegai
profession- The case is curreatiy under apped to the B.C.Court of Appeal and its ultimate outcome
remains to be sem. However, its impact, at Ieast for overseas processing, is likely to be minimal. At most,
it would simply drive consultants offshore, beyond the reach of any Iaw society, where many of them
already have offices. Alternatively, it might force some c o d t a n t s to work under the auspices of a
lawyer, where a number of them already have their practices Iocated. For some analysis and comrnentary
on the Mangat decision, see Robert Matas, "Immigration hearings in iimbo" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(20 August 1997) Al.
'O3 TheTe is a unique nature to mimigration practice that brings with it many challenges not seen in other
areas of the law. For a review of some of those cmenges, see Derek Lundy, "Unique ethical problems
face immigration lawyers" (1996) l6:3O The Luwyers WeeWy 11. For an exaxxcple descnbing a case where
an immigration Iawycr claims to have been duped by his clients, see Cecil L. Rotenberg, Q-C. and Robert JMoorhouse ' ~ c t i c Note
e
to the Profession" (1995) 30 Imm. L X (2d) 273, That Note describes the woes
of one Toronto lawyer who assisted a "delegatio of more than 80 so-called Chinese investors" to corne to
Cana& on a fact finding visit only to find that all of them disappeared shortiy after &val. He was left to
disabuse the R.C.M.P. of the notion that he was operating a "sophisticated alien smuggling" operation.
'O2

Sirnilarly, many lawyers seem to be harnpered by a traditional mindset that prefers
suspicions of ill-gotten motives by visa officers. Such a mindset is abundantiy apparent
in the views of one eminent counsel, for example, who observes that:
"Immigration officers (visa officers) recoil in homr at the doctrine of procedural
fairness because they contemplate that such doctrine rnay not in itself be f& to
them. In their seMce which presentiy makes ever-increasing demands upon
onicers to process an ever-increasing volume of cases with historically less
resources, the obligation to provide procedural fainiess is regarded as a millstone
around their neck. However that may be, quaiity of service dernands procedural
faimess, especialiy if the Immigration Service of Canada is ever going to obtain
respect fiom Canadians and the appropriate overseas ethnic communities where
immigration is being recruited.'m
Though written some years ago, my interactions with the immigration bar suggest that the
attitude evident in this passage is still faVly common. Regrettably, these worcis evidence
a lack of any insight or concession to the inte-

of rank and file visa officers and

highlight the lack of common ground that obtains between the bar and the bureaucracy.
Not surprisingly, instead of a cooperative relationship, theirs is sadly one containing
significant elements of muhial mistnist and suspicion.7m
At the risk of perhaps generalizing too much, my observation has been that visa
officers prefer to view immigrant selection as more of an exercise in substantivejustice,
while lawyers tend to fix their gaze ahost exclusively on procedure. The penchant for
procedure, of course, is a habit consistent with training and expenence aimed at gearing
lawyers to h c t i o n in the adversarial forum of courts. Because of it, many lawyers bring

"CL. Rotenberg, "Conundrumsn(1987) 1 Imm LA. (2d) 72 at 75.
For a thogght provoking article on a divergence of aims and objectives between govemmcnt policy and
lawyers' interests, and the possible consequences of same, see Peter Tomplch, "Immigration:
Govemments and Lawyers on a Colhion Course" (1995) 17 Loy. L A . Int'l& Cornp. LJ. 89 1. The
author cites a widaiing gulf betwccn the positions of these two interests that b markcd by ever more
fkactious confrontation. In his view, at 891, such confrontation is "...of iittie benefit to either side
and.. .may weaken the democratic process in those counhies that value it most."

an adversarial mindset to their immigration practice. Such an attitude, however, often
entails modes of operation and methods of practice that are unsuited to effective visa
office advocacy. This is particularly true where the objective may be to induce and
influence an exercise of discretionary power. The object of a visa office intewiew is to
ascertain reality and detemine how the law is applicable to mch reality. The d e of the
visa officer is to a u r d an impartial assessrnent of the facts and the law applicable to
them. They shodd have no vested interest in the matter and no preference as to the

outcome.
Lawyers, on the other hand, are not bound by considerations of impartiality. They
are advocates in the service of a client and so are expected to put forth their best effort for
that client. However, the point is sometimes lost on lawyers that the visa officer is the

decision-maker, rather than the adversary. And in the absence of a true adversarial
process, the legitimacy and efficacy of adversaial methods and tactics becomes
questionable. Threats, bullying and use of pressure tactics, for example, often simply
Likewise, counsel blunt their
produce intransigence rather than the desired decisi~n.'~
own effectiveness by employing the m a l panoply of adversarial tactics, such as over-

glorifying their client's virtues while glossing over, tnvializing or ignoring altogether a
fadt which rnay be a significant stumbling block to a successful application. A one sided
approach to visa office advocacy is rarely so effective as a balanced approach, where
pluses and minuses are acknowledged and deait with openly. Certainly, a visa officer

who senses honesty and forthrightness in the presentation of an application is far more
The tactics can range h m 3attling'' on an offica to her supaiors to threateningjudicial review. For
the most part, thesc tend to bc ineffective and usually resuit in even p a t e r intransigence on the part of the

likely to be co-opted as an ''ally" to aid the applicant to overcome any substantive
problems. Where the case presents no unusual features, there is still importance to
fostering a relationship of respect and cooperation. Procedurd discretion exists to favour
the client with faster, l e s intense pmcessllig and this discretion is more likely to be
swayed where the decision-maker reposes confidence and trust in the advocate. The

importance of this relationship is difficult tu overestimate, particdarly in the cwent era
where the client's advocate may well be the decision-maker's sole source of information.

The practicd result has been a continuing faim of lawyers to M y understand
and capitalize on the changes going on within CIC.

AU of the restnicturing and re-

engineering has literally driven clients into their m s because of the bewildering array of
documents and iaformation now required of applicants. The curent need in immigration
is for increased cooperation, rather than increased litigiousness. Recognizing this, CIC
lawiched an outreach initiative captured in the notion of "immigration partnerships",
which involved a conscious effort to provide more and better information and
communication with the bar and consulting communities. However, the initial flush of
anticipation over partnerships has now faded. CIC has perhaps become more realistic in
its expectations of what the profession is willing and able to deliver in tams of
application quality and integrity and just how willing counsel are to support new
initiatives. For example, the development of the "one-step application" concept of file
decision-der.
mr In faUnas, some lawyers do appear to have some recognition of the opportunities and chaiienges that
BPR changes have presented to theni, See Owen, "List of 'designated occupations' for immigrant
selection is being expanded", supra note 358, where the reaction of CBA membcrs to various BPR changes
is given. For example, 'Teter Rekai of Toronto's Rekai and Johnson thought that there would be more
need for Iawyers under the new regime. "But we will be different people and so wiii the visa officers," he
predicted. The system is becoming more complex and numerid, he said. It wiU be working more on

processing should have been a boon to immigration advisers? Under this concepf the
applicant ran the risk of having her application rejected in its entirety, for example, with

no processing undertaken at all, if it was not totally complete. Unable to easily access a
iive person at CIC to assist with application preparation and submission, many applicants,
*rrvt

dcularly those unfkmiliar with Engiish or French, nanirally tunieci for information and

assistance where they could fhd it, most often for a fee. The concept failed to catch on
however. Though thei-ewere some design and delivery problems highlighted by pilots
A significant reason for its demise
that were undertaken, these were not intra~table.~

was simply the unwillingness of immigration advocates to ernbrace it.
Immigration consultants710
do not d e r so much Eom the adversarial rnindset of
the lawyers. Unfortunately, this does not mean that they are any better at dealing with

visa offices. There is a significant problem of competence that a.Eects this group, largely
because there is no regdation of the business of immigration consulting and so no
standards conceming capability and integrity?" The problem is noted in a submission
made by the C.B.A. to a Parliarnentary Cornmittee on Citize~l~hip
and Immigration:

Anyone can set up business as an immigration consultant, regardless of
qualification. These immigration consultants are not subject to any test of
competency before they provide advice to would-be immigrants and refugee
claimants. Where former employees of Citizenship and Immigration Canada
paper, by mail.'"'
See text accompanying note 370, supra.
The obvious problem was the issue of bblock-in"disnissed supra, in text accompanying note 372.
For the purposes of the present discussion, it suffices to define "immigration consultants" as "nonlawyers", being persons who are not members of and licensed to practice law by any provincial Iaw society
in Canada,
nie problem of competence, of course, is not one Mted just to consuitants, though it does seem more
apparent with this group than with Iawyers. See, for example, Craig Harper, "Refugee lawyers say 'inept'
colleagues hurt practice" (24 May 1996) 16:3 me Lawym WeeHy 3. The article lists cornplaints by
lawyem against other mernbers of îheir profession who are d e g e d to iack even the most basic skiils and
knowledge for deaiing with refigee cases.

"'

establish immigration consulting businesses, they may indeed possess a higher
level of cornpetency than fly-by-night immigration consultants who prey on
would-be immigrants. The concern, however, is with the standard of competency
in general. At present, no fderal or provincial regdation governs the
qualification of immigration ~oasultants."~
These concerns have prompted some consuitants to band together to form the
Organization of Professional Immigration Consultants (O.P.I.C.).One of the primary

objectives of O.P.I.C. is to increase the cornpetence of its mernbers by providuig training.
However, participation in the organization rem& voluntiiry and so many of the worst
consultants rernain beyond the reach even of the minimal supervision offered by 0PIC.713
Although the C.B.A. would like CIC to 5e involveci in regulating consultants, it is not
likely that CIC will soon assume such responsibility."' As a result, the cment
environment within which private immigration advice and assistance are offered
continues to be characterized by extremes in cornpetence and capability, both within the

Canadian Bar Association, "Submission on immigration Consultants" (Submission to Parliamentary
Standing Cornmittee on Citizenship and Immigration) (June, 1995) at 13. Although the C.B.A. submission
concedes something to those consultants who are former employees of CIC,I would offer that an even
betîer case is to be made for them. At the risk of king accused of bias, it has nonetheless been my
experience that former CIC officers tend to be amongst those who are most effective in deaiing with visa
offices, This is, of corne, a generalization and I admit also to having d d t with some notable exceptions
to this d e . Ln generai, however, former departmental employees are most likely to understand the nature
of the workload and pressures in a visa office and to put extra care into application preparation, so as to
rniniinize the hstrations of the processing officer. My perception is that because of their experience
inside the visa office, such practitioners appreciate better the importance of getting details right.
OPIC bas no mandatory authority even over those c o d t a n t s who opt to join the organisrirtion. See
OPIC,"Code of Etùics & Rules of Professional Conduct" (OPIC, mdated), where it is stated that members
"voluntady submit to the smtiny and discipline necessary to maintain high standards of ethical practice."
Although OPIC has a comptamts process, the most serious penalties appear to be an "order" to return the
client's fee andor termination of membership in OPIC-Even the "order" to retuni a fee, however, is not
enforceable by any compulsive means on the part of OPIC.
'14 See, for example, H. Gremberg, "immigration Alert No. 27 - Unofficial Minutes of CBA and CIC
Meeting on November 4,1996" (Toronto: CBA, 6 November 1996). At that meeting, while the CBA
expressed its desire that CIC shodd assume responsi'bility for reguiating codtants, the department
expressed its reluctance to do so. In particular, CIC noted that such responsïbiiity would necessady
involve additional costs to the department and, in an environment of fiscal restraint, CIC was Unwrely to
convince the Finance and Treasury Board of the Govenunent of Canada to malce more fun& available to it
for this purpose.

"'

bar and the consulting community. These range fiom the very good to the very bad and
even into the realm of the dishonest and deceitfÛPs
Notwithstanding this, it is clear that to constnictively participate in the new
paradigm of visa processing, professional advisors of al1 sûipw need to get beyond their
traditional habits and practices. This is particularly true since the need for good quality
professional assistance is greater than ever before. The fhdamentals for any professional
immigration advisor who wishes to capably represent her clients must be integrity and
scnipulous attention to detail. Like any other field of advocacy, advocates in the
immigration world quickly develop a reptation regarding their reiiability and
trustworthyness and visa offices do share information amongst themselves on such
matters. Even the rumou. of a lack of integrity in a particular advocate can be damaging.
Any advocate tamished by the iillnt of a lack of ethics or diligence wiIi h d that

p r o c e d d discretion will rarely be exercised, with the resuit that few of their applications

will enjoy the benefit of a waiver of interview. Such a taht may aiso a e c t the exercise
of substantive discretion, with circumstances cited to justify same subjected to more
rigorous scrutiny and the benefit of doubt Iess easily granted. This is only nahual in an
atmosphere where CIC decision makers may never meet the client and are forced to rely
more and more on the information collectecl, interpreted and presented by the applicant's
See for example, David Hogben, 'Wegligence, h u d alleged in immigration business" Vancower Sun (8
November 1995), as cited m DFAIT "INFOFLASH" (8 November 1995). The article details concerns by
the Law Society of B.C. that immigrant applicants are bemg preyed upon by unscrupdos and mcompetent
immigration consultants. See also CIC ''Dady Wrap" (14 May 1998) 1, citing a story fiom the M a y 14,
1998 edition of the VancouverSun where Reform Party immigration critic John Reynolds cornplains that a
'Vancouver immigration consultant charged with passport forgery, people-smuggliag and other crimes
shouldn't be allowed to remain in busmess." The story relates that the consuitant was charged in March,
1998 "...with 18 counts, uicluding forgery, assadt,h t e n i n g and counselling (sic) his clients to lie to
immigration officers. Since the charges were iaid, Rezaei [the codtant] has continued to operate his

counsel. It should be obvious, then, that much depends upon the reptation of the
advocate.
Attention to integrity must also be combined with the acquirement of new skiIls.
In particda., for too long it seems that advocates have viewed the preparation of the
application for permanent residence - the basic IMM8 application foxm - as a mere
clerical matter, best left to a secretary or junior in their office. Such an attitude misses the
point entirely. It is no longer adequate to simply fill out that f o m in the haphazard
manner of former days. The M M 8 is the essential, central document by which all
immigration processing is carried out. In an atmosphere where there is no loziger much
capacity in the system to remedy mistakes, the proper completion of this document is
crucial. In a very real sense, the IMM8 is the application. It provides a road map to the
appticant's file and is the reference guide to wbich aU else is appended. This is
particularly true for screening officers who may see dozens of files in a day. For them,
the IMM8 is the starhg point and, while an application may contain reams of supporting

materia17'6,no other document is ordinarily studied, reviewed and referred to in the same
intensive manner as the IMM8. The importance of givùig complete and accurate
information in this document is reinforceci by the fact that it contains a declaration, which
the applicant must sign, attesting to same. AccordingIy, advisors must appreciate and
understand the significance of every bit of information sought in the application and must
ensure that it is presented in an immediately useable fashion.

business at 204-1 149 Hornby, directly across the street from the Canada Immigration Centre."
Indeed, too ofien an appiicationcontains supporthg information that is of litfie or w d value. The
glaring nature o f such a problem k highiighted when the nle contains such fldf but then lacks oher very
relevant information.
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For advocates, the importance of the infiormation gathering stage to their client's
ovemll chances for success cannot be stresseci enough. Officers no longer have the same
time available to veri@ missing, unclear or erroneous information. Since faimess at the

paper-screening stage does not require an oral hearing, applicants may be refuseci if it is
not clear on the face of the application that they qualiQ. Likewise, while the paperscreening officer may not be the officer to ultimately approve the application, that £ïrst
oEcer wields the discretionary procedural authority to waive the necessity of interview.
Recognizing that discretion may be influencecl by a host of sociological and
organizational factors, the job of the advocate should be to make the life of the paperscreening officer as easy as possible. Ail necessary Monnation to justify waiver should
be submitted ab initio with the application. On the cher hand, superfluous or gratuitous

information should be omitted, lest it create a negative impression of obsequiousness or a
lack of sincerity."'
Similarly, counsel need to appreciate the role of screening officers, or case
analysts as they are called at some posts, who may review dozens of applications in a day.
These officers face productivity measures which ensure that they have only a finite

'"in my experience, there is no end to the irrelevant information that counsel will submit with an
application, apparently on the theory that more is better, For example, one applicant's counsel thought it
necessary to submit a letter showing that she had been one of eight persons wiMmg the " S d e Campaign"
at her place of employ. Wodd counsel have the selection process conducted on the basis of look? Other
examples 1have encountered include submission of a certificate from an ice skating course that the
applicant took. Although this was presumribly intended to suggest preparation for life in Canada, it is
equally suggestive of a m-ve perception of what skills are really necessary. Perhaps the most amusing and
perplexing example 1have encountered was that of a couple whose child was born to them in Canada,
whiie on a month long tourist visit. At mtenriew, they presented the child's passport to ver* that she was
a Canadian citizen, Perhaps to emphasize the fact that they did mdeed have a Canadian relative, a smali
plastic bag was then pulled out and presented to me. On closer inspection, it was revealed to contain the
child's now desiccated and shriveled up umbilical corci, which had been stapled to a card issued by the
hospital. In the face of this overwhelrning evidmce, there was clearly no basis to dispute the citizenship of
the child.

amount of time to spend on any one application. In case of doubt, their inclination may
be to refer the matter to interview where ambiguities and doubts can be explored more
Mly, in a block of time that specincaliy ailotted to the case for that purpose.
Accordingly, a simple, but effective technique to sway any discretion in favour of an
applicant is to M y utilize the IMM8 application fom. Too often, out of laziness or
habit, counsel choose not to fiII out boxes on the MM8 d e a h g with education and work
experience and simply include a note to "see attached". The h t r a t i o n level of the
screening officer with this device inmeases in proportion to the amount of material that

has been attached to a file and the fkequency with which they are directed to "see
attached". There is never an excuse for not filling out the education and work history
portions of the IMMS, particularly since these are meant only to cover the most recent
employment and education. Filling out the education box, for example, with kindergarten

and grade school information is the hallmark of a marpuiaiiy competent counsel. Instead,
the point of the exercise is prirnarily to determine what is the highest level of education
that an applicant possesses. If an applicant has more relevant education than can be
included in the M M 8 (which is rare), then the details should be listed in reverse order

with the highest level of education listed k t and so on. Similarly, unless the client has a
very spotty and inconsistent work history, there is little reason that the highlights of that
work history camot be provided on the -8.
Understanding the IMM8 and integrity corne together with the assessrnent of
language proficiency. The f o m asks applicants to indicate whether they speak, read and
write English and French "fluently", 'bvell", "with diflicultf' or 'hot at all". It is hard to
accept that a serious effort to gauge language ability has been undertaken, for example,

where fiuency is indicated but the applicant attends intemiew with an interpreter. While
the categorïes for language ability are hardly certain and precise, there is sufficient clarity

in these categorizations that egregious over-estimation invariably refiects poorly on
counsel. Additiondly, the IMM8 form seeks information about any affiliation or
associations the applicant has had with groups such as political parties, student and
vocational organizations and whether any rnilitary service has been undertaken. Too
ofien, such infornation is not rnentioned at aii by the applicant. This information is used
to assess the background of the applicant and gauge whether they pose any sort of
security risk. Counsel who omit to mention any such affiliation do so at their client's
peril. Should the information corne out at intenriew, the inclination of a decision-maker
to recommend a positive exercise of discretion is likely to be negatively impacted by the
appearance of subtemige and deliberate concealment. Similarly, considerable delay can
be occasioned to the applicant's file, since background checks that could have been
commenced on receipt of the application may wait until d e r interview. The same is true
for other questions which ask whether the applicant bas ever had serious health problems,
a criminal record or has ever been denied a visa anywhere, been deported or denied entry
to any country. Providing details up fiont invariably saves fiutration and delay later on.
It is important to recognize that while the big prize fiom the paper-screening stage
for many applicants will be a waiver of intewiew. this is not the only benefit. For some,
simply clearing paper-screening to enter an interview queue may enhance their chances
for success. As in so much of immigration work, it is often easiest to refuse applicants at
the fiont end, before the case has tirne to develop new complexities. The f.urther into the
process the applicant goa. the more involvement required of the decision-maker to

document and justifjt a refbsal. Thus, even if an inteMevu is required, the chances for

refiisal diminish greatly d e r paper-screening. This is particularly true of discretionary
decision-making. It is infinitely more difficult to refuse an applicant, at least fiom a
psychological standpoint, once a personal connection has been made at interview.
Similarly, counsel who have asked for an exercise of discretionary power offen seern to
have adequately counseled their clients as to the importance of demonstrating at interview
those positive qualities which are likely to impel a .officer to look favourably on their
appiication. Even a sense of humour, though a trivial matter, c m be important to
establishing a sufiicient rapport with the decision-maker that will swing any doubt in
their favour. The reality is that the exercise of discretion is made easier when the officer
is lefi with a sense of ease about an applicant and is familiar with them as a person, and
not just as a file.

In the event that the client is affected by a problem or condition which may render
them inadmissible, counsel will obviously be seeking a gant of positive substantive

discretionary authority to overcome sarne. Pointing up such problems at the time of
submission of the application is obviously a better ploy than leaving it to be discovered
by the visa officer at interview. But this is not enough. Again, counsel should approach

the task of seeking such discretion with the view that anything that can be done to make
the decision-maker's task easier should be done. This may involve some research and

attention to preparation of the application submission that counsel may not be used to, but
the benefits will follow. Specifically, counsei should not leave the task at ?hepoint where

the problem has been highlighted. Rather, they should i d e n w the ground of
inadmissibility and locate it in the statutory regime set out in section 19 of the Act. Most

effectively, counsel should provide cogent, articulate reasons why the ground should be
overcome. In this regard, it is aiways impressive to cite h m the policy manuals for

guidance as to why and how a ground of inadmissibility should be o v e r ~ o m e .Further,
~~~
if the ground for inadmissibility involves criminality, counsel would do well to provide

copies of ail indictments and police reports, together with a copy of the foreign criminai
statute under which the applicant was convicted The process of rehaiiilitation h m
criminal inadmissibility requires that the visa officer detennine whether the foreign

offence has an equivalent under Canadian criminal law. By supplying al1 of this
information up fkont, counsel is also weli positioned to offer an opinion as to the likely
Canadian equivalent, if any. Oftentimes, a foreign offence may be equivaient to two or
g
under Canadiau law. B y proactively
more different offences, of d i f f e ~ senousness,
approaching the question of equivalency, counsel is better positioned to infhence the
officer's interpretative discretion as to which of a range of potentiai offences is achiaiiy
the most equivalent to the foreign offence.

In its submission to the Parliarnentary Standing Cornmittee on Citizenship and
Immigration, the Canadian B a . Association cited exorbitant fees charged by consultants
for simple services a s a justification for action to regulate immigration con~ultants.7~~
An

example was even &en of one consultant who '%ad charged $500 6 ' j ~for
t f i k g out a
form'"'[footnote omitted].m In the majoriw of visa office cases, the fiUing out of one

-

form the IMM8 - will be the most significant task undertaken by an advocate for her
'Is The number of advocates 1have corne across who seem to be unaware even of the existence of the
policy man@ is astounding. This reference source should be a basic part of any immigration
professional's iiirary.
'19 CBA.,"Subrnission on Tmmigration Consultants", supra note 712 at 13.

client. An advocate who approaches this task with diligence and attention will j u s w
their "$500", since its completion cm mean the ciifference between the burden of

interview and the benefit of waiver, or even the dinerence between acceptance and
rejection. Moreover, since the majority of cases may be waived the necessity of
interview, the rest of an advocate's involvement in case processing rnay simply be of a

"hmd holding" varietPt, requiring little or no involveci advocacy or speciai expertise.
The most effective counsel tend to be those who take the tirne and effort to
appreciate the pressures that decision-makers face, who seek to understand the nature of

the process by which a discretionary decision will be made and who pay care and
attention to presenting facts and evidence in a marner that is logical and consistent. As
discussed, this often involves simple things, yet they tend not to be done ofien enough in
p r a c t ~ e .In~the current era, however, a failure to attend to details could weU mean a

failure to draw upon available discretion. Caveat emptor then to the client left to choose
--

--

-

-

noId. at 14.

For example, assisting the client to gather other information, secure medical testmg and the me.
A favourite example which causes visa officers much consternation and suspicion as to counsel's
competence is to be found in Business Class applications. The tendency of counsel is to submit a foot deep
pile of paper to ver@ assets, business experience and the me. Consisting of financial statements,
statistical data, banking infoxmation and other smiilarly tedious documen~,they rarely rnake compeUing
reading. Given the innate denseness of these types of materials, the importance of logical sequencing and
adequate explanations is heightened. Yet,rarely are such documents provided in any sort of order or with
any description and summary of theh contents and purported significance. The inevitable impression
given is that what is sought is obfhcation, rather than clarification. Likewise, another simple but effective
technique that eludes many counsel concerns providing an estimate as to how many units of assessment an
Independent applicant should be awarded. Some advisors provide no assessment at ail while otbers will
provide only a global figure. Providing a points taUy, with a specific breakdowu of the estimated pomts for
each of the selection criteria, shouid be routine for any advisor. It ai& the screening officer to ensure that
their own assessrnent is correct and serves to dispel the notion that the advisor has exaggerated
qualifications or simply made an arithrnetical error to overestimate the available points. Similady, it is
foolhatdy for a professional advisor to submit an Independent application without specificaiiy stating what
is the applicant's intended occupation in Canada. What may be pdectly obvious to the advisor, who
probably has met the client and has personal knowledge of her, may not be so obvious to a visa officer
reviewing the applicatioa If left to guess as to what the intended occupation might be, the officer may
well determine that the applicant has no experience relevant to the General Occupaions List,with the

her advisor. Whether her fees are well spent or misspent may depend largely upon care to
details.
3.4.4

Human Rights, Privacy and Access to Information

Another source of potential control over discretionary power that bears mention
concerns use of the human rights complaint process under the Canadian Human Rights
Act?

As was noted in the Menghani casem, Canadian human rights iegislation rnay be

applicable to overseas Independent immigrant pmcessing, though very specific
circwnstances need to be present. In particular, for the Human Rights tribunal to have
jurisdiction, there must be an "afkted" relative in Canada to launch a complaint. Wide
grounds for complaint, such as discrimination on the basis of source country, leave plenty
of scope for such applications. C W y , hproperly exercised discretion may cause a
discriminatory effect or may proceed fkom a discriminatory basis. Either way, the
exercise is potentially subject to Human Rights Act jurisdiction.

Two pieces of legislation, the Access to Informutio Actm and the Privacy ActM
also exert some control over the use of discretionary authority, because of the openness in
govemment operations which they mandate? The Privocy Act has two major functions:
it allows individuals access to personal information that the govemment has collected
about them and it provides protection to individuals by circumscribing how such

-

result that the application is refirsed,
RS.C. 1985, C. El-6.
Supra note 175.
ns Access to Infonnation Act, c. A-1, R.S.C. 1985,
Supra note 249.
See generally Access to Information Act and Privacy Act (ï.nfonnationbooklet), id.

information may be use& whom it may be disclosed to and under what ~ircumstances.~

In the immigration conte- the Privacy Act access procedures allow an applicant, or their
representative, to obtain a copy of their immigration nle h m the relevant visa office.

The complete contents of a nle, h m the case notes to medical reports and other
information are availabie for inspection. The obvious benefit, at least in so far as
controlling discretionary power is concerned, is that it enables an applicant to peruse the
information to verify its accuracy, ensure that it was interpreted in a correct fashion and
discover the rationale for the manner in which decision making was conducted.
While the Privacy Act enables individuais to access their own file, the Access to

Information Act has broader application. This statute permits Canadian citizens or
permanent residents to access noncase specific information held by federal govemment
i~stitutions.~
An access request can be used to obtain copies of almost any document
that is found in a federal govemment office?' An example in the area of immigration
law might be any policy document, either in CIC headquarters or at a visa office abroad,
which provides guidance as to how discretion should be exercised. If the policy guidance

has not otherwise been made public, then an access request provides a practical avenue
for its discovery.
Through the two tools of access to information and the CAPS database, CIC
operates in something of a fishbowl. Indeed, because of them, there is probably no other
governrnent deparûnent or tribunal in Canada that operates under the sarne intense

Id. at 7.
rd. at 4.
See g e n d y id. at 4. Exemptions are aiiowed under the Accers to Infimation Act for materiiii whose
release might cause hann or be contrary to law.
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scrutiny that CIC receives. The combination of these two has enabled private operators
to mine CIC databases for even the finest bit of data. For example, the Lexbase fkm,
which bilis itselfas 'The National Monnation Network for Immigration Fractitioners'',

has so inundateci CIC with access requests as to keep several employees very busy
answering them. And the results of those requests are telling. The information is

packaged in the form of a monthiy newsletter and sold to subscribers who are provided
bighly detailed particulars of CIC's intemal operatiom. In a recent issue of the
newsletter, for example, case processing statistics conceming the pass, fail and interview
waiver rates of individual employees within the Buffalo RPC and Buffao visa office
were given?
While there is a broad justice objective to be served in having the operations of
individual visa offices subject to such scrutiny, a note of caution must be sounded as well.
As the sociological discussion earlier in this study pointed out, institutional and operative

considerations may influence the exercise of discretion just as much as legal constraints.

In the case of the Buffalo statistics, for example, there is perhaps a double whamrny to be
contended with. First, making the statistics available amongst officers within a given
work unit, so that each decision maker is made accountable relative to others within her

unit, creates pressure for conforrnity in decition making. But,having those statistics
available publicly adds a f.urther dimension, as officers are made individually accountable

in a very public way."* No longer do nameless, faceless civil servants toi1 in senrice to

"'

'Wew Lexbase "Waiver" Chart #1: 1997 Waiver Rates by Category, by Exnployee"Lexbare
(August(September 1997 Sending) 2.
Whiie the "New Lexbase Waiver Chart #In, id, =fers to those individuai e~1lp10yeesonly by their
initiais, this is sufficient to m e that the decision makers in question wiii be identitiable and known to the

"

the Minister who bears notional responsibility for each and every decision. Rather, each
is now in the spotlight with relentless gathering and publication of their individual
productivity measures a constant factor in the back of their rnindsm With few
opportunities to justify or defend their actions, both to headqwrters mandarins who
monitor such things and to the public who consume them, the pressure to conform and
not stand out by reason of undue Ieniency or untoward severity becornes significant.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to plumb the exact linkage between
publication of such statistics and outputs, intuitively one senses that a correlation will

exist, if there are no proper controls over their usage. There is also a question to be asked
conceming the uses to which such information is put to by sources outside the

department. The fact that such information is regularly sought and provided to
immigration practitioners in a monthly newsletter certainly suggests that it is valuable to
them. Comparing statistics between offices, and now even between individual officers

within an office, is clearly meant to enable advisors to counsel clients as to where and
when to lodge a particular type of application, so as to best enhance its chances of
success. This issue presents features, such as the impact upon the public interest,
immigration system design and the Idce, which eclipse the more immediate focus of this
paper and so will not be pursued fiuther. SSuffice to Say, discretionary decision making is

likely to be impacted when cornpetition between offices and individual decision makers
clientele, such as Iawyers and consuitants, with whom they dealcloser to home for civil servants because their email is also subject to access
requests. See for exampie, Caro1 Turner-Trusca '%sident's Report"P ! S O Update (iivewsiettw of the
Professional Association of Fomgn S m c e W c e r s ) 15:1 (Jan1998) at 1, where it is noted that
several PAFSO mernbers in CIC have had their emaiI accounts accessed Pursuant to those requests, the
"...members have been asked to supply the entire contents of their e-mail account for extended periods of
time (up to six months)...." Of course, even personal messages found in the email account are subject ta

"'The matter actuaUy hi&

c m be fostered by the provision of statistics. In an atmosphere where the weU being of

an office, or even of an individual decision-maker, may be in jeopardy because of
institutional or other changes, the provision of such statistics cm exacerbate the situation.
Conceivably, they may give nse to pressures pushing dismtionary decision making to
becorne irrationd or divorced n o m the particdars of each individual case, for reasons
that have little to do with the facts presented?

public disclosure pursuant to an access request.
See for example, "AUeged ûiad leader's enky traced to bid to save jobs", supra note 364. That article
suggests that the alleged triad leader was able to obtain a visa at the Los Angeles visa office because of an
overly generous waiver policy. The exercise of discretion to waive mterviews was apparently motivated, at
least m part, by concerns about the continueci viability of the office.
'Y

CHAPTER 4

- CONCLUSIONS

"Comptissima republicae,plurimae 1egaSm

4.1

Discretion Now
Discretion is a broad, multi-purpose administrative tool that has many facets. It

exists in tandem with d e s to aid their interpretation and to fiil in gaps left by d e s . It

may be positive or negative in its effect and it occurs both in matters of procedure and
substance. In the face of impossibility of devising complete, self-executing rules for

immigrant selection, discretion has long been seen as essential for canying out of
Parliament's will in this area of public law. There is, in fact, broad consensus that the
existence of some discretion is essential in immigration law. However, that consensus
evaporates when consideration of discretion moves beyond generaiities to specific issues
conceming its scope, application and usage. How much, under what circumstances and
of what character are hotly debated questions.
Parliament's will in immigration matters, broadly expressed in the objectives
contained in the Immigration Act, is both expansive and selective. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the formulation of discretion in our current immigration regime possesses both
positive and negative facets - a power to include and also to exclude. The issue of a dual
character for discretion has been the central focal point of bureaucratie and judicial
interest. Intervention and reformulation have followed that interest, with the result that a

'The worse the state, the more laws it has-" T.R. Reid, "The World Accordmg To Rome" (August
1997) 192 National Geographic 54 at 64. Reid attributes tbis quotation to the Roman historian Tacitus.
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significant make over of immigration discretion has taken place.
"The very concept of administrative discretion involves a right to choose between

more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people
to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred.'-

This pronouncement by Lord

Diplock in Turne.de Metro. Borough Council describes the essence of discretion

-

choice. In recent years, however, that choice has been narrowed and redcted by a
confluence of movements, originating in the courts and the immigration bureaucracy, to
reduce the availabiiity and scope of substantive discretionary power. Though each side
has acted independently for different reasons and motives, the result has been something
of a loosely coordinated action whereby substantive discretion has been caught in the
jaws of a narrowing vise.

In rethinking discretion, the bureaucracy and the judiciary have approached the
matter fiom different viewpoints and for different reasons. The philosophical footing
fiom which courts have proceeded has largely followed a Diceyan orientation centered on

the concept of the d e of law. Thus, while the amplitude of positive discretion has been
assiduously nurtured, there has simuitaneously been an emphasis on control and
reduction of negative discretion. It is a viewpoint that is untroubled by the inconsistency
of these apparently contrary approaches to the two sides of ~iiscretion?~This is because
the root focus in both instances has proceeded nom a consideration of applicant rights.
Thus, regardless of whether p r o c e d d or substantive discretion is involved, any
--

"Secretav of Stateefor Educ. & Science v. Tameride Metro. Borough Councii, [1977l A.C. 1 0 14 at 1064.
Evans,supra note 2, noting that the holding of contrary opinions about discretion is not uncornmon.
Thus, those who see threats to liierty and the d e of law in negative discretion may hold the opposite view
of positive discretion used to confer benefits.

impingement upon rights or entitlements has been met by the strictest scmtiny and
control.
Most often,judicial intervention agaiust discretionary power has been justified by
the fïnding that its exercise has involved an untoward infigement upon the nght to

faimess. The courts have been particularly bothered by the broad scope of substantive
negative discretion. Thus, judicial interpretation has been employed to read meaning into
the express delegation of such discretion in the Regulutiom to restrict its usage to matters

related to the ability of an Mmigrant to economically establish in Canada. At the same
time, the amplitude of positive substantive discretion has been guarded by the stricture

against unlawfül fettering of discretion.
Procedural discretion, on the other hand, has enjoyed something of a renaissance.

This is because its negative side tends to have far less impact than is the case for
substantive discretion and its positive usage is uncontroversial. Generally, therefore,
judicial interventions with respect to procedurai discretion have been lirnited to occasions
where it has been used negatively to somehow UIlfairIy deprive an applicant of an
entitlement or right that was due to ber? Clearly, the most important reason for the
flowering of procedural discretion has been the fimctional benefits it has provided to the
bureaucracy. It has been a major source of the increased efficiencies that were needed
because of labour reductions mandated by the fiscal austerity imposed upon CIC. Since
applicants have also benefited h m such efficiencies, there has no cause for cornplaint
See for example, the Choi decision, mpra note 270, where the visa office exercised procedural
discretion to give the applicant a PAQ,rather than an ordmary application fonn. This decision adverseIy
affected the applicant's nght to "lock in" his applicationprior to a regdatory change On the other hand, a
procedurai decision not to waive au interview does not adversely affect any accrued substantive rights the

and so littie reason for such discretion to a-t

judicial notice.

A cornmon rallying cry against negative discretion has centered upon its apparent

incompatibility with a central precept of the d e of law - that there should be no
penalization, Save as clearly defined by law. Reference to the concept of the mle of law
has followed a similar pattern to that of judicial intervention on discretion generally. It is

cited in relation to negative discretion but never mentioned with respect to positive
discretion. Thus, though the rule of law mandates that the law should apply to all
equdiy, it is nowhere to be seen when government moves positively to grant visas
outside of the ordinary processes provided for by lawOn9In immigration matters at any
rate, the rule of law seems to be more a matter of convenience than one of necessity and
strict practice. Thus, discretion in the courts' conception is very large when employed as
a positive instrument for qualification, but much namwer when used to disqualify. For

most applicants, therefore, the immigration application process will involve only a
figurative toss of a two headed coin - one side allowing for qualification by the rules with

the other allowing qualification by the exercise of discretionary power.
The other viewpoint, common to the bureaucracy, is more utilitarian and derives
its philosophical inspiration fiom the hctionalist viewpoint. It prefers a broader view of
discretion, both positive and negative, as a tool for supplementing the shortcornings of the

applicant may have. Interview is the ordinary requirement and so failure to waive same has ody deprived
the appiicant of a speciai benefit, not a right.
739 See for example, CIC, "Daiiy Wrap" (21 October 1997), providing the foiiowing digest of a s t q cited
to articles in the October 2 1, 1997 editions of the Ottawa Citizen, Financial Post and Hamilton Spectator:
"Prime Minister Jean Chretien said yesterday he is ready to offa a visa to a retired Russian navy captain
Russian Prime Minister was quoted as
charged with treason for his work on nuclear poiiution.
saying the Mi. Nikitin would be fice to go once justice has nin its course. He is accused of high ireason for
having publicize [sicJ the danger of poiiution posed by aging Rwian nuclear submarine [sic]. Mr.Nikitin
applied in late 1993 to emigrate to Canada."

m]

des. That viewpoht, however, has been tempered in the last five or six years by fiscal
imperatives and practical concems that militate agahst costly, labour intensive
processing methods. The exercise of substantive discretion, of course, involves very
individualized processing. Regardless of whether such discretion is used positively or
negatively, each decision demands a considerable cornmitment of tirne and energy h m a
decision-maker. In an era of restraint and reduction, it is inevitable that use of such

discretion should be eschewed. So too, the lessons drawn against positive substantive
discretion h m fiscal Unperatives have also been drawn against substantive negative
discretion. Substantive discretion, whether positive or negative, is simply very intensive
by nature and hence "expensive". Moreover, working under the supervision of the courts,

the bureaucracy has had to reckon with judicial disdain for any f o m of negative
discretion. These two trends have worked to reduce the scope and availability of dl
substantive discretion, both positive and negative. While some substantive discretion
remains available, primarily because it is explicitly provided for in the legislation, it is
clearly no longer favoured by the bureaucracy as a tool of general application. On the

other hand, the use of procedural discretion has been encouraged and enhanced because

of the savings in labour and resources it offers.
Thus it is that a combination of jurisprudential trends and a tight fiscal
environment have left substantive discretion in a reduced state. Though the judiciary and

the bureaucracy hold apparently divergent views on most aspects of discretion, it is
interesting to observe that they have convergeci in a preference for a more black and

white, niles based system. The judiciary favours such a system because of the assurances
it appears to offer for safeguarding applicant rights, while the bureaucracy sees efficiency

and savings in it. Ironically then, one tugs towards d e s as a way to enhance

individiialized processing while the other sees an opportunity in rules to increase
efficiencies by reducing individualid processing.
There is another shared commonality to the approaches employed by the
bureaucracy and the bench. Both have involved a downplaying of the public interest in
immigration matters. The notion of a public trust has long animated immigration law and
policy, and visa officers have tended to be very conscious of the fact that they are public
servants. As such, they tended to believe that their fmt degiance was to the public trust,
and not necessarily to the client at the counter. According to CIC management, however,
such a mindset is no longer susfainable. This is evident in the statement of Raphael
Girard, former Assistant Deputy Minister (Operations) who, in 1993, "...aclcnowIedged
that most of his officers have a different perspective &om his. They think the client is the
general public. He thinks bowever, that] the client is ''the person standing at the
~ i c k e t . ' "The
~ ~ courts, for their part, have also pursued a course of focusing o d y on the
individual applicant. The reasons for this are rooted in the nature of judicial review and
the singuiar focus it has upon procedure. This focus bas been followed without regard to
the substantive consequences that may flow f?om particuiar decisions and is epitomized
by the notion that even '%ad decisions" wiii be mstained by "good procedures" and vice
versa.
Whatever the reasons for it, it is clear that the pressures exerted by both the
judiciary and the bureaucracy have reduced the usage of substantive discretion and are

adding impetus for the creation of a more d e s oriented selection system. That system

has yet to be M y devised, but much recent interest and activity suggests that refom may
corne sooner rather tha. later."' The ways and meam of immigration processing have

been radically affected by the divergent, but yet converging, trends of judicial formalism
and bureaucratic formalism. Whatever the course of any hiture refom, the present
situation is clear. The relentless progress of judicial intervention and bureaucratic
expediency have combined to whittle d o m the scope and availability of substantive

discretion, but enhance the use of positive procedural discretion. In either case, discretion
is now primarily an instrument of positivisrn - for inclusion substantively or for
procedural convenience.
4.2

-

Refonning Discretion Immigration LegislaUve Review Report

The role of discretionary power within immigration law and processes remains a
topic of current interest as witnessed by the fact that attention has been paid to it in a
recent study of possible future directions for refom. Commissioned by the Minister of
Immigration, that shidy, entitled "Nat Just Numbers - A Canadian Frameworkfor
Future Immigration

has suggested radical structurai, procedural and substantive

changes affecthg all aspects of immigration law. Acting on a one year mandate to advise
the Minister, the Legislative Review Advisory Group which undertook the study singled
out discretion for special attention. In so far as selection of Independent immigrants is

concemed, the group's principal concIusion was that the necessity for a "general

"Gerald Owen, supra note 358 at 10.
"' See generaiiy Chapter 2, above, disaiaing initiatives by the bureaucracy to reduce substantive
discretion. Also, see below, section 4.2
Refonning Discretion - immigration LegisIative Review
Report, for a discussion of proposais for reworking discretion offered by a legisiative review group that
was set up by the Ministex.

discretionary power" resting in the han& of visa officers could be eliminated through
adoption of completely objective selection criteria Regrettably, no details of what such a
selection system might actually look like have been offered by the Group and so some
very important context for assessing their recommendations is lacking. Likewise, such a
move naively overlooks the poiitical nature of immigration p o l i ~ y and
' ~ assumes that the
world can be made black and white, with few exceptions for difficdt cases.
The new vision of discretion offered by the Advisory Group is set out in five

recommendations found at Chapter 10 of the Executive Surnmary, under the title of

'Xethinking Discretion: Residual Powers." The primary recommendation, number 168,
reads as follows:

The Immigration and Citizenship Act should provide for only two types of
extraordinary powers to be exercised, at two different levels and not subject to
delegation:
(i) measures taken in the national interest by the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration;
(ii) measures in a situation of dependency of a person on a Canadian citizen or
landed immigrant, or vice versa, taken by the director general of the region
c~ncerned.~~
The obvious key features of th& recommendation are that they seek to control the
exercise of discretionary power by reducing its application and centraking it in the hands
-
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Legislative Review Advisoiy Group, (Ottawa: Ministrr of Public Works and Governmmt SeMces,

1997).

The highly political nature of immigration law and policy may be evident fiom the intense interest and
a h o s t universai, negative reaction which has greeted the LegisIative Review Report, See, for example,
Ross Howard "Immigrantgroups take on Ottawa" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 February 1998) Al,
detailing strong criticisms to various aspects of the Report by immigrant groups, the Canadian Bar
Association, non-governmental organizations and other "stakeholders". See also Irwin Block,
"Immigration proposai denouncedn The ~alrlfàx]Smdq Dai& News (8 March 1998) which descnies, for
example, a brief on the proposais presented by the National Association of Canadians of Origins in India
(NACOI) to the Minister of Immigration at a Montreai public hearing. NACOI stated it was opposed to the
proposal for a "...CO=-standardssystem, saying it would eliminate those who meet requirements in one
area but are deficient in others." Likewise, the group feels that "[s]uggestions that the new policy recover
immigrant recruitment costs also discrimiua- against applications fiom poorer corntries.. .."

of a select group of high level officials. Unfortunately, if this is meant to appease the
critics of discretion, it has fallen short of the mark. The criticisms, of course, are not just

limited to concerm about the application of discretion. They also arise, perhaps just as
fiequently, with respect to its non-application since there are many who argue that
discretion is simply not used enough. And hard cases are unlikely to disappear just
because more objective selection criteria are adopted. Those cases will rernain and, in al1
Likelihood, discretion will simply be driven M e r underground with line officers
devising creative solutions to bridge the gap between the form of statutory enactment and
the substance of legislative intent.

The proposal to centralize discretion is also a retroga.de move that fails to draw
upon previous experience. Centralization would simply restore much of the situation that
passage of Bills C-8674sand C-44" had earlier sought to deviate, where long backlogs of

inadmissibility cases awaited personal consideration by the Minister or other high level
officials. For example, even routine discretionary decisions, such as rehabilitation for a
very old, minor criminal offence would be re-centralized in the Minister's office. The

delegation to Program Managers in local offices, in Canada and abroad, of discretionary
authority over such cases that was effected by Bill C-86 resulted in a ciramatic
improvernent in client service, with no apparent reduction in protection of the Canadian
p ~ b l i c . 71s~ it
~ possible that the Review Cornmittee has envisioned a way to completely
- - --

Tu

Supra note 742 at 37.

See for example, notc 123 supra, descn'bing delegation of authority over R 2.1 "hurnanitKiaa and
compassionate"discretion to local program managers,
7'6 See supra note 3 13 regarding delegation of rehabilitatian authorïty for minor criminal convictions to
local program managers.
For example, the waiting period for approvai of rehabilitation in minor criminal conviction cases was
reduced fiom an average of 18-24 months to a matter of weeks.

objectiQ statutory inadmissibility provisions so that discretion will not often be needed to
deai with sarne? Ifso, they have not given any indication of it in their report.
Moreover, the proposai to centralize discretion increases the risk for political
interference, since such power will be wielded only by the Minister and a select group of
senior oEncials. This gmup may be more subject to political manipulation because of the
sensitivity and awareness which they m u t maintain for public sentiments on immigration
related issues. Not that this awareness is bad. On the contrary, it is actually necessary for
the larger objective of ensuring that overail policy and practice maintab the necessary

high Ievel of public support that is crucial to a successfbi program. However, it is an
awareness that is uzlllecessary to decisions in the types of routine matters which are
currently handled within individual visa offices. Moreover, it is an awareness which may
be difficult to counterbalanceby a mere paper review of an individual case.
Although some discretion has been provided for by the Advisory Group, likely
because of a realization of the impossibility of legislatively providing for every case, its
complete rernoval nom local offices would simply increase bureaucracy and delays.

Under cwent law and practice, authority for discretion in routine matters has been
localized where it is needed - at the point of contact with the client. Such routine matters

are characterized by the fact that the discretion involved is unlikely to implicate
significant concems regarding the wider issues of public health, saféty, sec*

or

expense. Where such concems are evident, then discretion has been retained at higher
levels, where a balancing of those concems with the interests of the particular applicant
can best be c h e d out. This dichotomy has worked well to ensure a fair state of

equilibrium in immigration law, with due regard for the nghts of individual applicants

and the public interest. This split jurisdiction has enhanced the ability of Canadian
immigration law to provide humane, individuaiized responses that maximize justice both
for applicants and the public.

Centralking all discreton, however, is Likely only to throw that equilibrium out of
balance. In fact, it may actuaily work to enhance arbitrarhess, since it will sewe to
decrease accountability by insulating decision-makers h m clients. It is a situation where
field sensitivity may well be allowed to f d before headquarfers' and political
imperatives. Certainly, splendid isolation seems to be the goal of recommendation 170,
which is an adjunct to 168. It States that the Minister or Director G e n d would have no
obligation to consider whether to exercise their residual discretionary power, wodd not
be required to provide reasons and any decision would be h a l . This is hardly a move to

enhance the transparency which the cornmittee otherwise appears to favour and does
nothing to M e r accountability.
Similady, if the Cornmittee's intention was to reduce litigation by referrïng to
decisions of the Minister or a Director General as "Euial", experience shows that courts
are unlikely to be impressed by this attempt to constnict a privative clause and will still
f h d reason to assumejurisdiction. Admittedly, however, courts do tend to show more

deference to discretionary decisions made by officiais at the highest levels of the
bureaucracy, with the result that this recommendation would likely make discretion
harder to challenge successfidly. Accordingly, the position of the department might
enjoy some overd enhancement, through some reduction of the litigation burden.
However, the gains in this respect are likely to be minimal and may be outweighed by the
costs in temis of client satisfaction and public confidence that would likely be inherent in

any move to what is maniféstly a more secretive type of process for discretionary
decision making. Recommendation 168 suggests a lack of confidence in the judgment of
those who deal directly with the clients on a day to day basis and assumes that
discretionary power is somehow enhanced and legitimized by its concentration at the
highest levels. The reality, however, is that even under this proposai, the higher authority
would still be dependent upon the judgement and recommendations of those field officers
who actually conduct the investigations. The difference is that any semblance of
substantive accountability is dispenseci ~ i t h . ' ~

In its place, the cornmittee has offered a sort of procedural accountability that is
unlikely to satisQ critics. Recommendation 169 stipulates that an annual report should
be made to Parliament summarizing the circumstanca and fiequency of the usage of
di~cretion.'~~
As a global tool, such a report is usefbl to shed light on general trends in the
usage of discretion within the system. Such political accountability is desirable and is to
be encouraged. But it is not a substitute for providing reasons directly in individuai cases
to those personally afTected by such de~isions.'~
Beyond the structural aspect to the proposal contained in recommendation 168,
This is in fact the situation that presentiy obtains with respect to certain types of discretionary powers
that remain centtalized in the Minister's office. For example, approval of permanent rehabilitation in cases
invoIving more serious crimMalconviction cases must stiu corne £hmthe Minister's office. A similai.
situation exists with respect to authority to issue temporary entry Minister's permits in such cases, where
approval must be granted by a Director General in a regional headquarters- Accordingiy, whiIe the
investigating officer may recommend that approval be graated in a given case, the Minister is fi-ee to ignore
that recommendation. See Leung, supra note 235. And, in the absence of any requirement for reasons, this
leaves even the field officer in the awkward position of attempting to explain a decision whose ratiode
may not be obvious.
749 In fact, a partial report to this effect i
s aiready given to Parliament pursuant to the Minister's obligation
under section 37(7) of the A c t to detail annually for Parliament the number of Minister's Pennits that have
been issued by her department,
'50 There may weU be cabin circumstances, puch as cases implicating national security concerns, where
some secrecy may be justifiable. However, as a general matter, there seM e justincation for denying
'
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there is also a substantive elemmt to be considered. The proposal assumes that d types
of residual discretionary decision making powers can be easily isolated into 1of 2 types

and that they are all of a suficient weight or gravity to justib consideration only by the
Minister or a Director General. Yet, a large variety of situations may raise the
requirement for some discretionary decision-making. For example, one type of
inadmissibility may implicate a whole range of seriousness. Thus, criminai
inadmissibility arising f?om a shopiifting conviction cannot be compared to a conviction
for murder. And a positive decision to grant entry, for example, is different in kind f b r n

a negative decision to exclude. Thus, declaring a person to be a danger to the Canadian
public is an infinitely different decision from deciding whether an applicant is in need of
discretionary processing because of the existence of a situation of dependency.
Manifestly, al1 such decisions are not of similar importance or gravity. While some
decisions, like that of declaring a person to be a danger to the public, are of a sufficiently
serious and extraordinary nature to justie consideration at the highest levels, others, like
dependency, are best dealt with at a local office level where experience and expertise in
such matten is aiready present. And again, the notion that discretion could be reduced in
the fashion suggested assumes that it is possible to devise a complete legislative scheme
of d e s that codd achieve an almost perfect balance between the public interest in
immigration and the interests of applicants.
The recommendations on discretionary residual power also suffer h m ambiguity.
Recommendation 168 taiks about the Minister acting in the "National Interest" but no
definition has been offered for this term. Use of the term "national interest" appears to
reasons m more rnundane cases.

assume that every such case wiil implicate a weighty issue. However, one example

serves to illustrate that this may miss the mark,at least insofar as overseas immigrant
selection is concemed. Independent overseas applicants who f d one or two points short
of the mark needed for a clear pass, but who otherwise appear to have good potential for
settling in Canada, are routinely approved on discretion in current practice. Such
decisions are quickly made in local offices by the interviewing officer, albeit with the
concurrence of a senior officer. This is not just efficacious but also sensible, since it is
the interviewing officer who is best placed to understand all of the subtleties and equities
of a given case. Under recommendation 168, however, it seems that such a case could

only be approved by the intervention of the Minister, who would need to be satisfied of
some "national interest" angle. It is simply unacceptable, both fiom the perspective of
administrative efficiency and in terms of fahess to the applicant, that such a
straight50rward matter should require direct approval by the Minister. The measures
respecting "dependencf

also appear designed to promote a drive towards a mles based

system that wodd have none of the flexibiiity which is the hallmark of current law and
practice."' Recommendation 168 allows that only Directors General may approve
dependency cases. Under recommendation 171,dependency could only be claimed on
behalf of those close relatives of a Canadian sponsor who fail to meet some statutory
requirernent, but who otherwise meet the Family Class definitionnm

75' The entire measures respecting dependency are contained in reco~lllllendations
168, 17 1 and 272. The
review group is inconsistent in its terminology even within these few clauses, using the term "dependency"
in 168 and 172, whiie &O r e f e g to "complete dependmcy" in 171.
Pursuant to the dennition of 'Yamiy" h d at section 2(1) of the Act, the Family Class curreptly
inchdes the spouse, the chiidren and the parents of a Canadian citizen or pexmanent resident, The Review
Group has recornmended a considerable expansion of the group of persons who might qualw in the
F d y Class to include any "relative"and even "close personal acquaintances of the sponsor's choice."

And in the end, what is most important to understand overall about the
Committee's recommen&tions on residual powers is that they are predicated upon the
move towards a more d e s based system, with a r d t a n t decline in the availability of
discretion, both positive and negative. This is made clear by their statement favouring
the adoption "...of an objective selection process [which] would mean that a generai
discretionary power would no longer be necessary for a visa o f f i ~ e r . 'The
~ ~ danger
inherent in such a move is that there may well arise a situation of disconnection between
expectations and resuits. Just as the reduction of negative discretion may result in the
approval of more cases seen to be undeseming, so too it may foilow that there is an
increase in the nurnber of deserving cases that are rejected because no tools are available
to approve them.

In the end, ail stakeholders, includùig the public, applicants, their advocates and
functionaries within the system, may find that the rethinking offered by the Cornmittee
has not improved the supposed deficiencies of the current system. The Legislative

Review Advisory Group has clearly been influencecl in its efforts by a positivist view of
the world that sees codification as a complete panacea. There are pros and cons to such a

development and so it is may be more a matter of personal opinion as to whether such a
development is good or bad. However, the potential cost and risks of such an approach
need to be fully appreciated. Discretion is the means by which the human element has

long been incorporated into the immigration system. Circumscribing its use must

See the Executive Summary, Not Jtrst Numbers ", Legisiative Review Advisory Group, (Ottawa:Minister
of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), generaiiy at "Chaptm 5 - The F d y : Essential for
Success" .at 18 - 20.
' ~ 3 ibid. at I l .

inevitably detract h m the capability to provide individuaiized resuits that can bridge the
deficiencies between legislative intent and drafter's language sometimes apparent in the
law. Any reduction of discretion is Iücely therefore to implicate also a reduction of the

humanity and compassion for which the program has been renowned. A less humane
system is not likely to be in anyone's interest and it is this result which must be fully

considered. Unfortunately, the proposals offered by the Advisory Group do not appear to
offer any significant measufes to take up the shortfidi that would likely follow their
prescription. The brevity of the reco~ll~llendations
on "Rethinking Discretion" suggests,
however, that the proposals have not proceeded h m full and in-depth mearch and study

of this issue.'% Accordingly, any move to act on these recomrnendations would be ill
advised unless and until the totality of the necessity for and usage of discretion in
immigration law and practice, and the implications for its reduction and centrafization,

are better defined and understood.
As the name of the report suggests, and as the Cornmittee has stressed in its

introduction, immigration is not just about numbers. Rather, it is about people. And an
incredibly diverse range of people at that. It is about a dynamic, human movement which
ebbs and flows with world events. The immigrant pool is drawn fkom an -te

varieV

of local conditions worldwide that are best dealt with by generalized legislation,

stipulating minimum standards, that is capable of some flexibility in its local application.
Particularly in an overseas selection context, both applicants and the public agenda are

7Y Indeed, the Legislative Review Advisory Group admits as much, ibid, where the foilowing statements
are made: "are caution that our recommen&tions were often made m iight of the lirnited research and &ta
avaiiabIe. We encourage aii parties to strengthen research a d d y s i s activities both b i d e and outside of
government."

better served by delegation of authority to program managers in local offices to deai with
conditions as they are found at the selection source. It is this type of flexibility which
ensures that the best possible fit between legslative intent and actual practice is achieved.

Many of the cornplaints about immigration delivery stem not h m the availability of
discretion, but rather the lack of it. And they stem dso h m cornpendious des, imposed
by legislation and judicial interpretation, which foster bureaucratie responses. The
Advisory Group's proposals for discretion, as conceived, wodd simply hamstRng CIC's
ability to respond in a timely and appropriate fashion to shifting events and priorities.

Fixing the d e s affêcting procedures in the stone of statute is actually Likely to have the
opposite effect from that envisioned by the Cornmittee. Likewise, it will limit the
responses available by bctionaries within the system, leading to M e r
bureaucratization rather than less. Many of those who study the administrative realm
have noted a tendency for bureaucracy to do as linle as is required by the courts and their
political masters when carrying out their mandate. Reducing discretion, and hence
personal responsibility for individual cases may be in nobody's interest, particularly if the
cost is a devaluation of the humanity of applicants and of the public interest in
immigration. It is this feature which has been so central to the successes of the Canadian

immigration program. Discretion recognizes that no legislative scherne is ever perfect
and ailows for individualized responses that suit the particular circumstances. Reducing
discretion in the manner suggested by the Advisory Group is likely only to take away the
"focus on people"'55 which the Group claims to fav0ur.7~If immigration is to be more

'"Supra note 742 at 2.
' ~ 5

Most of the public interest in the Review Committee's Report has been taken up by proposais that d

than just a ninnbers garne, it is this fact which must be recognized and reckoned. If not,
then it may tnùy corne to pass that bureaucracy will reign triumphant.
4.3

Conclusion and Recommendations

In an article about the enduring influence of ancient Rome, T.R.Reid makes the
point that one of the most important components of the Roman legacy may be the
comprehensive collection of statutory and case law surviving fiom that period. But it is
not the particulars of the individuai cases and statutes themselves which are so central to
that legacy. Rather, it is the jurisprudentiai ethos which they represent, a desire to
regularize the law in ail its expressions, functions and processes that is of exceeding
importance. They reflect a hunger for clarity, certainty and precision that f o n d its
expression in a penchant for precedent and a compulsion to organize, typi@ and
categorize. It is a hunger which we stiii know today and its essence is captured in one
haliowed doctrine that remains a touchstone for al1 western legal systems. It is, of course,
the d e of

Zmv. which draws upon "[tlhe ideal of written law as a shield - to protect

immigrants should have either be fluent in English or French, or be responsiile themselves for the costs of
language training. C M y , the public consultations convened by the Minister have been dominated by
this particular issue. See, for example, "The language of immigration" [editorial] The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (5 March, 1998) A22. As that editorid notes, closing off immigration only to those fluent in English
or French is hardy redistic. This is so for a number of reasons, not least of which is the fact that there
simply are not enough potential immigrants with such skiiis to meet Canada's immigration needs. Caught
between the jaws of a declining birth rate and an aging population, immigration- in significant numbers is essential to Canada's continued prosperity, accordmg to most demographic predictions. Thus, as the
Globe editorial asks, "Why waste any more time discussing such a regressive idea?" Other U-conceived
proposais are apparent as well in the Report, such as the recornmendation to expand the family class by
allowing sponsor's to defme themselves who wiii be included Again, the Globe editorialist rightly
dismisses such unworkable inanity by saying "[tlhe panel's recommen&tions to expand faznily-class
immigration - to the ridiculous lengths of welcoming anyone "known and emotionally important" to a
sponsor - should see the same fate as thc ianguage requirement." UnfortunateIy, such hot-button proposais
have diverteci attention from what is tniiy signifïcant- that the Report suggests a fitndamental restructuring
of immigration law and policy that encompasses a shiA away from an individualized proceshg orientation
to one that is more d e s based, with l e s capacity for dealing with the exccptional or the u n d . Whether

individuals against one another and against the awesome power of the state.. ..'?-

Although this doctrine is ultimately attn'butable to the Greeks, Reid posits that it
was the Romans who perfected its practice and that it is their conception of it that
continues to innuence our law today. Judging h m the volumes of statute and case law
evident in any law ùirary, it is clear that we have learned the lesson well. Certainly, our
propensity to favour written law is manifest in the massive regulatory and legislative
intervention that now takes place in a l l facets of our s o ~ i e t y .Immigration
~~
law, in
particular, has not been immune to the trend of micro-management by legislative fiat?'
The d e of law has brought many of the once broad vistas of discretionary common law

unmigration powers under the plow of detailed regulatory enactment.

But as the

quotation at the start of this chapter ilîustrate~~~,
even the Romans themselves may have
been ambivalent about the extent of justice actually inherent in written law. More
poignantly, if it be true, it offers a decidedy sobering comment on the cment state of our
socieîy.
It seems only natural to those schooled in the westem legal tradition to extol the

or not we reaily want this is whcre the debate shodd lie. Sadly, however, as is too often the case, pubtic
debate in immigration seems more concerned about superficiai details than fundamental approach.
7nT K Reid. supra note 735 at 63-64.
Perhaps the most notable exvnple of preference for written law in Canadian society is the advent of the
Charter of Righis and Freedom. Prior to its promulgation in 1982, Canada possessed a mosîiy unwritten
constitution, Iargely developed in case law, foiîowing the British exampie.
749
See for example, Margaret Young, supra note 1i t ,at footnote 1 on page 3, where the author notes
that "Canada's h
t immigration statute m 1869 had 14 pages; by 1952, it had reached 34 pages." Also, id.
at 3, she observes that the cumot Immigration Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2) "...came into effea in 1978.. ..Its
length - 122 pages - illustrates the complexity of modem immigration reguIatio~~[footnate
omitted]" This
compiexity is fùrtherdemonsûated, in her view, id. at 4-5, by the fact that the Act is supplemmted by
equaiiy lengthy reguIations, al1 of which require interpretative and application guidance that is found in a
multi-volume set of policy and procedure manuals published by the Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada (CIC).
7a T h e wone the state, the more ïaws it bas. Supro note 735.

vii.tues of M e n law. But it is not the only viewpoint on the matter. Reid notes that the
Chinese empire, as old and storied as that of the Romans, actually developed a

jurisprudential outlook that eschewed the biases of the rule of law that favour wmitten te''Confucius and his disciples down through the centuries distmsted M e n laws. A dusty
statute book was too inflexible to handle the infinite variety of human experience, the
Chinese sages felt. They chose to tmst people, not laws - to rely on innate human
goodness as the best guarantee of a civil so~iety.'~~'
He notes a tenaciousness to this
philosophy which continues to induce hesitancy and circumspection. "Even today," Reid
writes, '?he concept of written law and written contract is fairly weak in China and other

East Asian nations within its cultural ambit?
For western legal systems that purport to follow the nile of law, it is important to

remember that discretionary power is hardly a new or alien adjunct to our law. Reid
observes, for example, that while one uniforrn system of law was an essential glue
binding the many far-flung and variegated portions of the ancient Roman empire
together, yet it was fiexibility of application and enforcement which gave that glue its
staying power through many centuries?

Such flexibility, or discretion if you will,

permitted regard for local peculiarities and individual circumstances while still adhering
to the overall imperial standard. The case is no different today, even after dl these
centuries. Though the Par Romana has long since passeci away, the Roman notion of
discret!^ in application remains equally as enduring and vital a legacy to our systern of

law and conception ofjustice as the d e of law itself.

'' T X Reid, supra note 735 at 64. (August 1997)
7Q

Id.

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt but that our f
h
tloyalty is to the notion of the
'hile of law"?

And the importance of this fact cannot be overstated. From it springs the

chief incident that devotion to this principle entails and one which is a hallmark of our
modem society - a pronounced propensity to reduce every particle of the law, nom its

nghts and fkeedoms to its duties and obligations, to written fom. In an environment of
this type, the notion of discretionary power nahually causes discornfort and anxiety.
Such power, by its very nature, is incapable of reduction to a precise factual statementAt best, it can be guided by policy statements and contained by judicial interpretations

and pronouncements, but never whoiiy reduced to an unequivocal calcdation or a simple
mechanicd application. And it is this irnprecision that troubles devotees of the nile of
law most.

Though ail signs point toward development of a more rules based immigration
selection system, it must be recognized that the complete elimination of discretionary
power will never be possible nor, for that matter, desirable. There is always a question of
fit - of applying the d
e
s to the particda. facts of each case. Without some flexibility of
interpretation and application, such a fit is difncuit to obtain. And the need for some
flexibility in Unmigration matters is perhaps more cogent than for any other area of Iaw.
Immigration d e s m u t be capable of worldwide application under an infinite variety of
cùcurnstances. We know f?om experience that it is v W y impossible to devise d e s

that wiU deliver the desired r d t s in every case. The myriad possibilities of human

T E Reid, 'The Power and the Glory of the Roman Empire" (July, 1997) 192 National Geographic 2 at 30.
7aFor evidence of the high esteem with which we regard this principle, one need look na firrther than the
preamble to the Gznadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, where it is accorded recognition, second only to the supremacy of God.

experience are simply too great. In any case, this sort of interpretive discretion is not all
that controversid, particulariy as the judicial review process closely monitors it and has
remedies well suited to addressing it. The same may be said for procedural discretion.

The real problem, of course, is what to do about substantive discretion.

On the negative side of the equation, conceming whom to exclude, the answer is
obvious and poses Little moral or intellectual challenge.

Our notions of justice and

fairness irresistibly impel us to formulate ever more concise d e s to keep out the
undesirabie. Certaidy, this is in accordance with that part of the d e of law which states
that no one should be "condemned", Save as expressly provided for by law. The case for
inclusion, however, is less capable of reduction to a set formula While d e s do a good
job of ensuring procedural faimess, they do not always render substantive justice. Even a
fair process occasionaily produces d a i r redts.

Admittedy, substantive justice is

difficult to achieve and that is why most of our efforts have been concentrateci on

producing procedural justice?'

The attainment of substantive justice is also hampered by

our preference for predictability and certainty. Indeed, it is the knowledge of these
limitations that seems to continually prompt us to query whether technical adherence to
the rules and procedures of our statutory scheme is reaUy producing Wllment of the

social philosophy that is embodied in our immigration law. Inevitably, our notions of
fundamental justice involve some consideration of substantive justice and the attainment
of fair, humane results. Positive substantive discretion remains the essentid means by

which an indispensable human element is kneaded into the fibers of the law, and a link

See for aample, Arthurs, nrpm note 30 at Z, who feels that courts are more disposai to judging the
technicalitiesof abused discretion, rather than the substance.

secured between the science of rules and procedures and the art of intuition and common
sense.
The shortcomings of d e s , of course, are heightened because of the way that
Independent selection is conceived and conducted The focal point of the exercise is to

find people who wiil be able to sustain themselves and make a contribution to the
econornic vitality of our country. Though we employ any number of selection cnteria,
such as occupation, language and education, to sort among potential candidates, it is not
these paaicular qualifications which are most important to successful establishment.

Instead, they are ones such as adaptability, motivation, initiative and resourcefulness,
innate and unique to each individual applicant, that are not so neatly reducible to a system

of mechanistic d e s . They are laudable qualities which we do want to select for. Though
we can recognize them when we see them, devising a system of d e s to mesure them
rem-

simply a sociologist's pipe dream. The result is that some discretion has always

been necessary to overcome the deficiencies of the rules in meitsuring and rewarding such
qualities. Accepting then that the overail objectives of the selection system are always

more important than the technical points by which it is administered, some residual
discretion, particdarly at the operational level where the d e s are put into practice, is
essential if a tyranny of d e s is to be avoided and the substantive goals of the selection
systern met.
Despite the difnculties of using the notion of 4csuccessfulsettlement" as a
selection standard, this does not mean that it should be discarded. In reality, the results
Eom its use have been impressive. A high level of Independent migration has been
sustained over a long period of tirne precisely because those selected have been able to

sustair? themselves and make a contribution to the economic and cultural vitality of this
country. It is simply a case, therefore, of doing a better job at containing and structuring
the residual discretion fhat must accompany use of this standard. If properly cabined and
closely focused, the advantages of discretion wiU be promoted and ifs negative aspects
Limited. But any residual discretion must retain both a positive and a negative character.

Just as the d e s may fail in a positive way to select those who should be included, it may
also fail in a negative way.
A point too often lost in the debate over discretion in immigration matters is that

the public interesf and the interests of applicants are not inconsistent. Rather, in many

ways, they are CO-extensive. The public interest is present in the need for a selection
systern that is fair, open and honest with applicants. Quite simply, it demands that justice

be done in every case. Thus, in some cases, it will require that a person who does not

meet the strict qualifications be granted entry nonetheless. In other cases, it will mean
that a person who has qualined on the criteria must be denied entry, if the basis for her
selection appears enonmus and is iikeIy to l a v e her unable to be self-sustaining in the
economy. It m u t be this way since the public is intimately a f k t e d by immigrant
selection decisions and it is the public that is lefi, socially, financially and even mordly,
to pick up any pieces h m a dyshctional selection process. With respect, therefore, it is
naïve to view iminigation as simply a question of focusing on the cüent at the counter.
A sustainable program must factor in the needs of another client, the public, whose

interests are also affectai by each selection decision.

In this post-Charter era in Canada, the trend in all areas of law has been to place
greater emphasis on rights and to favour niles as the means for safeguarding those rights.

The bureaucratic and judicial initiatives outlined in this study are simply a manifestation
of those preferences in the p h c u l a r field of immigration law. hdeed, it may be that the
checkered history of broad substantive discretion in immigration matters added extra
cogency to the arguments in favour of d e s and nghts in this area of la^.'^ Whatever the
case, it is important to recognize the current state of evolution of immigration law and the
path that is likely to be followed in the near future. Certainly, substantive discretion is
now in decline and it is unrealistic to expect that a greater availability of it, even if it were
desirable, would be attainable. It is patent that a broad, residual discretion is no longer
palatable and there is simply no significant will or interest in any quafter to swim against
this tide. Accordingly, the way forward is clear.

Efforts should be undertaken to develop a more comprehensive systern of d e s
governing immigrant selection. The current Act and Regulations, devised some twenty
years ago, were built around the notion that a general discretionary power could be used
to supplement any shortcomings in the d e s . This premise is no longer valid. The vision
for substantive discretion

EOW

points to it being, at best, a secondas. or incidental

element of any selection system, rather than at the heart. Greater specificity and clarity in
statute and regulation are central to current notions of justice

and fair play. If properly

conceived, a more comprehensive set of d e s for immigration offers the potential
advantage of satisfjmg judiciai, bureaucratic and client needs. The key, however, is not
just more d e s . Rather, selection criteria

need to be simpler and better dehed than is

presently the case. The danger of too many niles is that they may become convoluted and
impenetrable, if too much specificity is attempted. Thus, what is needed is a more
- -
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See Tuca-Turner and Saqat-Mehta, supm note 12.

generic selection system, rather than one focusing on the minutiae of education, work
experience and skills, and the like. While selection might benefit from less specincity, it

is clear that exclusion must be approached from the opposite direction.

More

particularity rather than less is necessary, if exclusionary decisions are to be sustained in
the courts. Thus, it is essentiai that groimds for exclusion should be codified in detail in

the selection regime. Such specificity is more in keeping with current notions of justice
and fair play, and enables those to be excluded to discem early and clearly the potential

barrier to entry.

In Re Singh, Wilson J. accepted an argument by counsel for a Refugee applicant
that Charter protections must apply equally to al1 applicants dealing with the Canadian
govemment, both within Canada and outside its borders at visa offices abroad. To do
otherwise, she opined, would be to create a duplicitous situation encouraging applicants
to disregard o u immigration laws, in order to have their claim heard in Canada. She
accepted that a geographic boundary for the Charter would create an environment that

". ..would

...reward those who

sought to evade the operation of our immigration laws

over those who presented their cases openly at the first available ~ppominity.'''~~Though

speaking about the particular circumstances of Refugee claimants, Wilson J.3 wisdom is

sound and has application to the immigration system whole. If efforts are not made to
avoid the scenario of effectively "punishing the h o c e n t and rewarding the guiltf', then

the notion of the d e of law is seriously undeRnined. Ultunately, such a development
leads to the sort of cynicism that saps the popular base of support on which immigration
policy rests. Should a general collapse of public confidence follow, it would have

&ous

consequences for dl aspects of the program. Unforhuntely, our system as

currently devised and operated is so overwhehed by devotion at the altar of process that
it is b h d to the delicate balance between facilitation and c o n t d that Parfiament saw fit
to establish within the immigration legislative scheme. It is ironic that in the name of
faimess, we restrict the application of discretion to the point where even good d e s are
allowed to spawn bad decisions.
The need for balance is obvious. The public interest demands it and the causes of
justice and faimess deserve it. RecogniPng the current penchant for d e s , consideration
should be given to formdating a specific d e Linking applicant integrity with the
pnvilege of a visa Any deliberate attempt at hud, deception or other maXeasance that is
significant and material, either to a present or a fiiture visa application, should be a
ground for refusal. There is no reason in good conscience or in law, why applicants
should not be expected to display integrity as a key for qualification. Certainly, it is a
quality that is valued and prized in Canada and there is an important message to be sent to

prospective members of our commimity as to the methods and functioning of the society
that they are interested to join. Likewise, there is a certain skepticism amongst the
Canadian public as to whether effective control is maintained over the immigration
program. A clear comection between behaviour in applying for a visa and issuance of
the visa itself would serve to camy forward these objectives.

A penalty involving

disqualification fkom a visa, perhaps for a minimum period of three or five years, would
be appropriate.

Re~ogniangthat some discretion will remain both indispensable and desirable in

'"Supra note 64, 17 D.LR (4&) 422 at 463,

our immigration system, then some accommodation of it will be necessary. It is an
accommodation that will require cooperation h m both CIC and the courts. For its part,
CIC needs to de-emphasize statistics and numbers. The fiscal concems of recent years
have forced CIC into a mold of wringing ever-greater productivity gains from existing
personnel and resources. Such efforts are driven by the yearly numbers c m c h and the
need for CIC to deliver on the target amounced by the Minister. Meeting those targets
may become a priority, even at the expense of the quality of service a c W y delivered.
While the number of immigrant landings is closely monitored and tabulated, there are few
measures of quality of service in the system. 1 do not suggest that statistics can ever be
totally eliminated. They do serve a useful planning fiuiction. However, the adverse
impact of a singular focus on numbers must be recognized and conceded. And with such
recognition must corne a more realistic appraisal of the numbers that are deliverable,
while yet maintaining a sufFicient Ievel of quality and satisfaction. Further, the system
has few measures for determinhg which officers dehered quality product and few

rewards for individual efforts to this end. More c m certainly be dont in this regard. And
de-emphasizing numbers would go far to empowering officers to use more judgment and
common sense and to more readily and effectively engage the discretion they possess to
ensure humanity and compassion remain an integral part of our selection system.

The courts, as overseers of the Unmigration process, need to be a full partner in
the search for a just system that is fair, both to applicants and to the public interest. This

wiil require less of a nghts focus and more consideration of what justice in a particular
case really requires. To achieve this, the courts might adopt a two-part procedure for
assessing whether any particular decision is fair, both procedurally and substantively.

The first branch of the test would be to ask whether the procedure was flaweâ, as is

presently the case. h o t , then that is the end of the inquiry. If a flaw is found, however,

then the second branch of the inquiry would be to ask whether substantive justice was
nonetheless done, considering ali of the circumstances. Was the r e d t fair, considering
the goals and objectives of the immigration legislation and the level of entitlement the
applicant had to the particdar type of visa? If so, then substantive justice has been
rendered. Given that this test is similar to that under which courts guide issuance of their
own prerogative remedies, a radical rethinking of the administrative process wodd not be
required. It is simply a case of recognizing that immigrant selection must be a pragrnatic
process, weighing d l of the equities in each particular case and baiancing the public
interest and the rights of individuai applicants.

Some concrete steps towards improving the mechanism of judicial review are also
needed. Visa officers must do a better job of documenting thei.decisions so that it is
readily apparent on appeal what has gone on and why. CIC Public Relations staff might
consider ways to better publicize the means, methods and processes of visa offices and to
highlight the many problems that aise in applying domestic immigration law in diverse
foreign settings. CIC litigation staff and counsel need to be more proactive in educating
the courts as to the realities of overseas processing and to ensure that all relevant facts

and materials are before the courts. hdeed, CIC ne& to work more closely with Justice
stafYwho represent CIC to ensure their training is adequate and that they have a M l

understanding of overseas immigration processes. Likewise, the courts need to recognize
the limits oftheir knowledge and understanding and to seek out better education and
training and dernand more information fiom counsel when they see it is lacking. Given

the volume of visa office iitigation before the federal courts, even their training would
likely benefit fiom more information about, or even £ k thaud exposure to, the operations
of a visa office?

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the evolution I have attempted to detail in
this work has been the fact that it has taken place largely unnoticed. Certainly, most of
the change has occurred as result of quiet developments in the courts and the bureaucracy,

with little public recognition or significant opportwiity for discussion and debate. The
importance of meanin@ discussion is obvious, given the profound, fiuiAamental changes
that are underway and which are completely transforming the way immigrants are selected.

Our immigration law and its selection processes reflect our society, our legal system and
our values. That they should be in p e d of becomuig hidebound by d e s and devoid of

significant human contact is a worrying proposition. This is particularly tme if the

transformation is contrary to the popular conception of how the immigration program is
constituted and operated Regrettably, there is Little significant media coverage of the
actud realities of immigration processing.

Instead, sensationalisrn and worst case

scenarios seem to be the o d y items that regularly gamer media attention. The resdt is
that the public is il1 informecl and has a false impression of how immigration r e d y
works.
The two trends ofjudicial formalism and bureaucratie expedience should be part
of a larger debate about how and why immigration processing is undertaken, for what

This need not involve lengthy and expensive taxpayer fùnded m e t s to exotic lands. Even a short trip
from Toronto to the Bunalo visa office, or from Vancouver to the Seattle visa office, would suffice to give
the sort of exposure that would educak and idem as to how a visa office operates and under what
conditions.

purpose. and in what way it should be shaped. In this way, it might betterreflect who and
what we are as a nation. The ment Legistative Review report and the attention it gave to

discretionary authority offered some hope of focusing attention and starting the process of
debate and dialogue. Unfortunately, the debate that has been generated by that report has
been hijacked by emotional, but largely inconsequential issues, such as a proposal that all

immigrants shodd possess a certain levei of language skills. Caught between an aging
population and a dwindling birth rate7? a high level of immigration is demographically

necessary if we are to sustain the economic growth of Canada. With a stated objective of
delivering more than two hundred thousand landings per year, the real problem for

Canadian immigration has been one of h d i n g suffïcient numbers of skilled, talented

immigrants who will be able to succasfidiy establish quickly and easily. Limiting the
pool of potential applicants to those already fluent in English or French is a proposal hard
to take senously. There simply are not enough English and French speakers available to
meet the Ianding targets. In the meantime, however, attention has been diverted nom real
issues of substance. The proposa1 for reworbg of discretion, for example, that is
contained in the report will clearly have a profound impact upon the ways of means of
immigration, if implernented. Presumably, action will be taken in the near hture to
implement at least some parts of the Advisory Group's recommendations. The need for
broad debate and consensus thus r e m a b urgent and important. Before legislation is
drafted and a brave new world of immigration processing cast into the Stone of statute,

'* Statistics Canada predicts that naturai population p w t h in Canada will approach zero by the year 2020.
Also, in 1996, Statistics Canada estimated that newborns accounted for only 47% of Canada's popdation
increase, while mimigration contriiuted the remahhg 53%. See CIC '?3aily Wrap" (26 June 1998) at 1,
c i h g stories in the June 25,1998 editions of the HaliJm Chronicle Herald, Toronto Sun, Winnipeg Free

fundamental issues, such as a continueci role for discretion, should be placed on the public
agenda If not, it may be that few will be happy with the end d
t
,
particularly if it
means that immigrant processing is reduced to a mere d e s based number crunch.

Press,Edmonton Sun and Saskatoon Star Phoena.

APPENDIX A- Independent Immigrant Selection Grid

1 1. Education

Points awarded for each level of
educatio~liilattaiament, beginning with 5
points for simple completion of high
school up to 16 points for a masters or
doctoral level mïversity degree.
Related to Factor 4. Points awarded
according to normal training and education
required for the ~articularoccupation.
Points awarded according to years of
experience in an occupation. Less than
one year of full t h e experience will result
in a failed amlication.
Occupations open to prospective
immigrants in Canada are set out in the
"General Occupations List".'"' Every
independent immigrant must list an
intended occupation in Canada. If the
occupation is not on the List,then the
application fails.
Bonus points for applicants who have a
confumed job offer in C d a , or who are
going to work in certain prescribed Wgh
demand" occupations.

n
3. Experience

4. Occupational demand

designated occupation

Formerly known as "Specific Vocationai Preparation". This name was derived fkom the Canadian
Classification and Dictionary of Occupations ("CCDO") (HaQue.: Min. of Supply & Services, 1978),
which was replaced May 1, 1997 by the National Occupatiod Classification guide ('WC'')(Ottawa:
Min, of Supply & Services, 1993). Both of these manuais are essenMy catalogues listing occupations
and descn'bing the duties inherent in the occupations and the type of training and education that wouid
normdy be required to carry out the parti& occupation.
Current version dated May 1,1997. if an applicant does not show their mtnided occupation as one of
the occupations contained on the list, îhe application will ordinariiy fail for iack of "occupational demand".

1 6. Demographic factor
7. Age

1
8. Language ability

1

1
9. Personal suitabiiity

1 The bblevelscontrol" which is adjusted

1 10 (presentiy
set at 8)
fhm thne to time by CIC.
10 points awarded to those 21-44 years of 10
1 age. 2 points deducted for each year above 1
or below that range.
Points awarded for fluency in either or
15
1 both of French and English. Maximum 9 1
1 points for "Wlanguage and 6 for
1
"second" language.
Points awarded at an interview for skills
10
that aid successful settlernent, such as
adaptability, motivation, resourcefihess,
and initiative.

*Table adapted fiom CIC,Applying for Permanent Residence in Cànada: A SeIf-AssessrnentGuide and
Application Kit for Independent Applicantr.

Based on the foregoing grid, Independent unmigrants must obtain 70 points
overall to qualify for admission to Canada Assisteci Relative applicants effectively
receive five '%onus points" for having a relative in Canada, thus reducing the threshold
they require for a "pass" mark to only 65 points. Likewise, Business immigrants receive
fkom 30-45 bonus points (30 for self-employed, 45 for entrepreneurs and investors),
which has a sixnilar reducing effect on the number of units needed to quai@. In addition,
Business immigrants are not subject to d l of the factors on the grid?

7-12For more detaiïs, see subsections 8(1)@) & (c) of the Reguiations which provide exemptions from
certain selection grid factors for self-employed, entrepreneur and investor applicants.

1
1
1

1

-

APPENDIX B lndependent Immigrant Selection Process Chart
Application Receipt and
Acknowiedgernent

Inmmplete-Rejected

File Review ("Paper-screeningn)

1

1

Interview Waiver

1

Paper Process

'

'

-1

1

(-i

Non-waiver of Interview

I

I1
Interview

Statutory Bars - S. 19

tCI-[*

11
Visa lssuance

Permit lssuance

-

APPENDlX C ISSUING AND UCTENDING MINISTER'S PERMITS
Level of Concurrence Repuiredm

Authority for issuance of Minister's Pennits to overcome inadmissibility grounds
contained in section 19 of the Immigration Act is divided between three different
locations. Generally, the Muiister has retained direct authonty for dealing with those
grounds of inadmissibility which are considered most serious. In such cases, visa offices
must obtain approvai hthe Minister, at National Headquarfers, prior to issuance of a
Minister's Permit. In the case of medical inadmissibility, visa offices wili need to obtain
the approvd of the Regional Headquarters serving the applicant's province of destination,
before Pennit issuance. Authority in all other cases rests with program managers at visa
offices abroad.
National Headquarters

A

Criminality [Al g(l)(c)(c. l),(c.2)]where the person is a prospective immigrant
(including those persons who have visitor status and whose application is being
processed in Canada or outside of Canada).
Al1 recommendations in criminal cases should be addressed to the Director, Case Review

(BCM), Case Management Branch, NHQ.
War crimes and crimes against humanity [Al g(l)(i)]

Any recommendation about someune falling into this class of inadmissibility must be
scrutinized by Case Management Branch (BCD).Address your recommendation to
Security Review @CZ) in BCD and copy the geographic desk in the International Region
(RnSecurity and Public Safety - section 1g(l)(d), (e), (f), (g), &), (l)

AU recommendations in security or public safety cases should be addressed to the
Security Review. (BCZ), Case Management Branch @CD), NHQ. Concurrence may be
sought h m NHQ without reference to RHQ where the recommendation originates in
Canada. When the recommendation onginates outside of Canada, visa posts will seek
concurrence fiom NHQ and copy the information to Regional authorities/CIC1sin
provinces where the inadmissible person is deshed.

Adapted fiom CIC M OP-19, Appendix A "Issuing and Extendhg Minister's Permits" (ver. 01-97) at
21.

B.

Reaional Headauarters

Medical Inadmissibility- section 1g(I)(a)
C.

Local Level (CIC or Visa office)

Criminal Inadmissibility - Visiton
Criminai Inadmissibility - Immigrants - section l9(2)(a), (a1) or (b)
Al1 other cases

-

APPENDIX D SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A more highly rules based system of selection for Independent immigrants should be
devised Central to any such system is a need for more generic selection criteria that
do not inherently require the making of overly fine distinctions.

Since the purpose of any selection system that might be devised is to select those with
potentiai to establish and settle successfûlly in Canada, the concept of bbsuccessful
settlement", and the measures against which it is to be assessed, should be d e h e d
with specificity and clarity.
Broad residual substantive discretion should not be a feature of any such system.
R e c 0 g n . g the need for a mechanism to aileviate against rule failure, however, some
residual substantive discretion, but only of a highty restricted variety, should be
provided for in the selection system design. Such discretion should be limited in its
scope by tying its use to the concept of successfid settlemcnt Any exercise of such
discretion unrelated to the definition of successfùl settlement would be invalid- Other
than for this limited purpose, discretion should not avaiIable as a g e n d exclusionary
mecfianism.
To the extent possible and practical, discretionary power should be localized in the
field offices where it is to be exercised.

CIC should evaluate the emphasis that is placed on statistics within the organization
and the effect that this may have upon the use of discretionary power and the quality
of decision-making generally.
In conductingjudicial review in Independent selection matters, courts should adopt a
2 part test allowing consideration of substantivejustice, as well as procedural faimess.
A specific rule allowing for exclusion in instances involving deiiberate
misrepresentation or other willfitl non-cornpliance with immigration law should be
devised. The rule should include a mechanism for obtaining relief fiom its operation.

More debate and discussion on the operations of the immigration system as a whole,
and on the particular role of dimetion ùi that system, is desirable.
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